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12 Chronology 
The  (Highland)  Division  was  created  by  the  establishment  of  a  Territorial  Force  in  1908 
and  remained  in  Scotland  until  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War.  It  was  mobilised  in 
August  1914  and  sent  to  Bedford  for  training  for  a  period  of  eight  months.  Between  30 
April  and  3  May  1915  the  division  was  transported  to  France  where  it  was  either  used  as 
a  line-holding  or  reserve  formation  until  15  June  1915,  when  it  took  part  in  its  first 
offensive  action  during  the  battle  of  Givenchy. 
After  Givenchy,  the  division  was  employed  in  line-holding  duties  for  over  a  year  until  it 
was  involved  in  an  unsuccessful  attack  on  High  Wood  in  July  1916  during  the  early 
stages  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme.  Over  the  following  months  the  51St  was  moved 
consistently  to  different  sectors,  carrying  out  a  line-holding  role,  until  November  1916, 
when  it  attacked  and  overwhelmed  the  German  strongpoint  at  Beaumont  Hamel. 
During  the  subsequent  winter  period,  the  division  remained  on  the  Somme  at  Courcelette 
and  in  April  1917  the  51St  took  part  in  two  successful  attacks  during  the  battle  of  Arras. 
The  division  also  played  an  attacking  role  in  the  opening  assault  of  the  third  battle  of 
Ypres  in  July  1917  and  again  in  the  battle  of  Menin  Road  on  20  September  1917.  By 
early  November,  the  division  had  moved  to  the  Cambrai  sector  and  was  employed  in  an 
offensive  with  massed  tanks. 
The  division  remained  in  the  Cambrai  area  over  the  following  few  months,  where  it  faced 
the  German  onslaughts  of  March  1918.  Significantly  weakened,  the  (Highland)  Division 
was  transferred  to  the  Bethune  area  near  the  River  Lys  on  1  April  1918,  but  a  second 
German  offensive  hammered  the  division  again.  Withdrawn  from  the  line  to  regroup  and 
reinforce,  the  51st  remained  at  Oppy  near  Arras  until  11  July.  The  division  was  then 
rushed  to  support  the  French  Army  south-west  of  Rheims,  as  it  was  attacked  in  the  last  of 
the  1918  German  offensives. 
13 By  August  1918  the  German  Army  was  exhausted  and  the  allied  forces  began  to  drive  it 
backwards.  On  26  August,  the  51St  attacked  near  Arras  and  engaged  in  five  days  of 
fighting  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  enemy  strongpoints  at  Rouex  and  Greenland 
Hill.  Subsequently,  the  division  played  a  role  in  pursuing  the  enemy  in  September  and 
October  1918,  before  being  withdrawn  from  the  front  line  on  29  October  1918. 
14 Introduction 
There  has  been  a  considerable  revision  in  approaches  towards  the  study  of  the  First  World 
War  during  the  past  twenty-five  years.  Andrew  Simpson  has  divided  the  post-war  literature 
into  two  categories,  old  and  new.  '  He  describes  almost  everything  published  before  Bidwell 
and  Graham's  Firepower2  as: 
based  on  the  Official  History's  narrative,  with  a  leavening  of  formation  histories  to  provide  detail 
of  operations,  and  a  reworking  of  the  early  biographies,  memoirs  and  published  diaries  of 
participants;  the  proportions  of  these  ingredients  varied  according  to  whether  the  author  was 
writing  an  operational  account  or  a  biography. 
Green,  in  Writing  the  Great  War,  Sir  James  Edmonds  and  the  Official  History,  has  pointed 
out  that  the  official  histories  were  of,  `substantial  historical,  military  and  literary  value.  '3 
However,  no  matter  how  thorough  and  well  written  they  were,  there  were  still  limits  to  their 
objectivity,  and,  as  Bidwell  and  Graham  remarked  of  one  of  the  authors: 
Edmonds  spoke  for  a  generation  of  regular  officers  who  believed  that  the  politicians  had  let  them 
down 
.... 
He  was  torn,  himself,  between  exposing  military  incompetence  for  the  good  of  the  British 
Army  and  in  the  interests  of  truth  and  protecting  the  reputation  of  the  men  who  had  done  their  best, 
although  that  was  often  not  good  enough.  4 
Many  books  published  immediately  after  the  war  and  for  a  considerable  period  thereafter 
were  of  debatable  quality.  Official  (Government)  requirements  and  a  variable  access  to 
sources  imposed  sanctions  on  objectivity.  However,  this  is  not  to  suggest  that  all  the  works 
were  poor,  merely  that  many  did  not  effectively  challenge  the  British  conduct  of  the  war. 
Bailey  in  The  First  World  War  and  the  Birth  of  the  Modern  Style  of  Warfare  states: 
It  is  remarkable  that  the  First  World  War,  the  most  profound  of  military  phenomena,  has  been  so 
neglected  by  historians,  and  more  culpably  by  military  analysts.  This  neglect  has  not  been  of  the 
First  World  War  per  se  but  of  its  critical  links  to  and  lessons  for  military  operations  since.  The 
'  A.  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One'  (London  University  College  Ph.  D, 
2001),  p.  11. 
2  Bidwell  and  Graham  produced  a  groundbreaking  work  that  firmly  placed  the  evolution  of  the  BEF  through 
artillery  development  and  an  associated  rapid  and  near  continuous  evolution  of  tactics  and  weaponry.  S. 
Bidwell,  and  D.  Graham,  Firepower,  British  Army  Weapons  and  Theories  of  War  1904-1945  (London,  1982). 
3  A.  Green,  Writing  the  Great  War,  Sir  James  Edmonds  and  the  Official  History,  1915-1948  (London,  2003),  p. 
207. 
4  Bidwell  and  Graham,  Firepower,  p.  39. 
15 First  World  War  remains  a  topic  of  immense  literary  output,  but  this  is  predominantly  sentimental, 
of  `military  antiquarian'  interest,  social  study,  or  battlefield  tourism.  5 
To  understand  the  reasons  for  this  mixed  quality  and  lack  of  objectivity,  at  least  in  part,  it 
should  be  noted  that  the  Public  Record  Office/National  Archive  files  were  not  opened  to  the 
wider  research  community  until  1964  (for  1914,  under  the  50  year  rule).  6  Until  that  point,  the 
official  histories  and  published  memoirs  were  virtually  the  only  near  primary  sources 
available.  However,  with  direct  access  to  official  primary  records,  the  study  of  military 
history  became  not  only  more  objective,  but  more  diverse.  As  a  collorary  of  this,  the  field  of 
military  history  became  more  established  and  respected  in  academic  circles.  7 
More  specifically,  until  the  early  1980s,  scholars  had  tended  to  attribute  the  operational 
performance  of  the  British  Army  in  France  and  Belgium  to  either  internal  or  external  factors. 
Tim  Travers  in  The  Killing  Ground  demonstrated  this  academic  divide  by  discussing 
differing  views  amongst  historians.  The  former  group  (internal)  examined  the  high  command 
and  a  top-down  command  and  control  mechanism,  which,  it  invariably  posited,  failed  to 
perform  effectively;  the  latter  (external)  focused  more  on  material  or  strategic  factors,  such  as 
equipment  shortages  or  enemy  superiority,  blaming  them  for  the  problems  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  suffered  until  the  battles  of  mid-1918.8 
Travers  maintained  that  the  British  Army  leadership  did  not  want  to  abandon  pre-war  ideas 
and  values,  and  because  of  this,  he  argued  that  the  BEF  suffered  from  a  rigid  hierarchical 
command  structure  that  smothered  initiative,  and  was  significantly  devoid  of  any  progressive 
tactical  doctrine.  In  How  The  War  Was  Won,  9  Travers  went  on  to  examine  command  and 
technology  in  the  BEF  over  the  final  two  years  of  the  war,  and  attempted  to  demonstrate  how 
new  systems  were  created  and  sustained  in  an  adaptable  BEF  structure,  concluding  that  it  was 
more  by  luck  than  design  that  the  British  Army  became  instrumental  in  winning  the  war. 
S  J.  Bailey,  `The  First  World  War  and  the  Birth  of  the  Modern  Style  of  Warfare',  in  Strategic  and  Combat 
Studies  Institute  Occasional  Paper,  No.  22,  p.  35. 
6  B.  Bond,  The  Unquiet  Western  Front  (Cambridge,  2002),  p.  55. 
1  P.  Simkins,  `Everyman  at  War',  in  B.  Bond  (ed),  The  First  World  War  and  British  Military  History  (Oxford, 
1991),  p.  289. 
8  T.  Travers,  The  Killing  Ground,  The  British  Army,  the  Western  Front  and  the  Experience  of  Mobile  Warfare 
1900-1918  (London,  1987),  p.  1. 
9  T.  Travers,  How  the  War  was  Won  (London,  1992). 
16 Other  scholars  have  agreed  with  Travers,  including  Martin  Samuels  who  studied  the  German 
Army  and  its  tactical  evolution  and  compared  them  favourably  with  the  British  Army.  '° 
However,  others  have  disagreed.  Bill  Rawling  has  demonstrated  how  units  and  formations 
(within  the  Canadian  Corps)  adapted  throughout  the  conflict,  concluding  that  from  the  battle 
of  the  Somme  until  the  end  of  the  war  there  was  a  gradual  `learning  curve'.  11  Prior  and 
Wilson  have  agreed  with  this  view,  asserting  that  from  July  to  November  1918  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  achieved  the  right  balance.  12  Paddy  Griffith,  in  Battle  Tactics  of  the 
Western  Front,  emphasised  that  over  the  course  of  the  war,  the  British  Army  made  substantial 
progress  through  decentralisation  of  command  and  the  development  of  tactics.  He  also 
championed  the  `learning  curve'  theory  and  highlighted  the  significant  role  of  GHQ  in 
ensuring  that  the  BEF  had  systems  in  place  to  enable  rapid  dissemination  and  distribution  of 
knowledge.  13  Griffith,  in  his  next  book,  British  Fighting  Methods  in  the  Great  War,  14  further 
developed  the  argument  that  GHQ  was  a  `driver'  in  the  development  of  tactical  and 
technological  theory  and  application,  and  demonstrated  that  decentralisation  and  flexibility 
were  increasingly  prevalent  throughout  the  war.  More  recently,  Gary  Sheffield's  Forgotten 
Victory  has  also  put  forward  the  revisionist  case  that  the  British  Army  learned  enough  from 
its  mistakes  to  achieve  a  remarkable  victory  in  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1918.15 
In  truth,  not  enough  study  has  been  undertaken  upon  which  to  base  an  objective  judgement  on 
the  performance  of  the  whole  Expeditionary  Force.  To  develop  fully  an  understanding, 
scholars  need  to  examine  further  the  integral  parts  of  the  BEF  war  machine.  As  Peter  Simkins 
has  asserted  in  The  First  World  War  and  British  Military  History: 
Although  the  pattern  is  undoubtedly  changing,  research  on  the  high  command,  strategy, 
organisation,  doctrine,  and  civil-military  relations  still  tends  to  hold  sway  over  battle  studies.  As  a 
result,  the  great  personal  experience  archives  assembled  in  the  past  two  decades  are  virgin  territory 
for  many  postgraduates  working  on  the  First  World  War,  and  all  too  few  military  historians  in  this 
country  possess  intimate  knowledge  of  the  tactical  and  sociological  factors  affecting  the  conduct  of 
units  in  battle.  The  study  of  strategy,  grand  tactics,  and  command  decisions  will  not  illuminate  all 
the  issues  raised  by  First  World  War  battles.  Research  on  the  experience  of  front-line  soldiers  is 
also  crucial  to  any  analysis  of  the  reasons  for  variations  in  battle  performance.  What  motivates  a 
10  Samuels  has  added  particular  value  through  the  focus  on  foreign  sources,  which  have  been  under-exploited  in 
the  English  language  literature.  M.  Samuels,  Doctrine  and  Dogma,  German  and  British  Infantry  Tactics  in  the 
First  World  War  (Westport,  1982). 
11  B.  Rawling,  Surviving  Trench  Warfare  (Toronto,  1992). 
12  R.  Prior,  and  T.  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front  (Oxford,  1992). 
13  P.  Griffith,  Battle  Tactics  of  the  Western  Front  (London,  1994). 
14  P.  Griffith  (ed),  British  Fighting  Methods  in  the  Great  War  (London,  1996). 
15  G.  Sheffield,  Forgotten  Victory,  The  First  World  War,  Myths  and  Realities  (London,  2001). 
17 unit  to  do  well,  or  causes  it  to  do  badly,  in  a  particular  battle?  What  are  the  effects  of  change  or 
continuity  at  divisional,  battalion,  or  company  level?  How  far  were  other  ranks  briefed  about  their 
objectives  or  allowed  to  rehearse  operations?  What  was  the  quality  of  a  unit's  officers  and  NCOs? 
Did  the  unit  have  good  or  sufficient  equipment?  What  part  did  regimental  tradition  play  in 
battlefield  morale?  Did  the  unit  have  social  cohesion?  If  so,  was  this  based  on  a  shared 
occupational  or  geographical  background  amongst  its  citizen  soldiers?  How  was  the  unit  affected 
by  casualties?  How  often  did  a  particular  battalion  successfully  carry  out  its  orders?  ............ 
The 
clues  may  not  always  be  found  in  individual  letters,  diaries,  unpublished  memoirs,  or  oral  history 
recordings  but  rather  by  what  Dr  Paddy  Griffith  has  called  `tactical  snippeting',  the  painstaking 
analysis  of  sometimes  minute  detail  in  a  whole  range  of  such  sources.  Unless  scholars  in  Britain 
and  elsewhere  brace  themselves  to  undertake  the  necessary  comparative  research  and  produce 
more  operational  histories  and  studies  of  battlefield  performance,  many  of  the  current  myths  and 
half-truths  about  the  First  World  War  are  likely  to  prevail.  16 
Simkins  was  correct.  Although  a  study  of  all  levels  of  military  command  is  the  ideal,  a 
particularly  utilitarian  formation  on  which  to  focus  is  the  division.  John  Bourne  has  stated 
that,  `a  true  understanding  of  the  evolution  of  the  British  army's  operational  method  during 
the  Great  War  must  be  sought  not  only  below  the  level  of  high  command  but  also  below  that 
of  army  and  corps,  principally  at  the  level  of  the  division'.  17  The  division,  as  the  largest 
tactical  formation  in  the  British  Army,  bridges  the  gap  between  operations  and  strategy. 
Many  scholars  have  tended  to  agree  that  a  key  focus  of  research  should  be  at  the  operational 
command  level.  However,  the  division  did  not  exist  within  a  vacuum  and  the  inter- 
relationships  with  other  levels  of  command  are  vital,  particularly  as  the  academic  argument 
swings  towards  greater  integration  and  cohesion  within  the  Expeditionary  Force  as  the  war 
progressed.  There  has  been  a  growing  awareness  that  significant  insights  into  the  nature  and 
functions  of  the  Army  should  be  viewed  from  different  levels.  Indeed,  it  is  the  only  objective 
approach  as  the  study  of  history  is  about  interpretations,  and  the  greater  the  awareness  of  the 
different  levels,  the  greater  the  objectivity.  To  this  end,  a  number  of  works,  such  as  Ian 
Brown's  British  Logistics  on  the  Western  Front,  18  or  Prior  and  Wilson's  Command  on  the 
Western  Front,  have  focused  on  the  role  of  arms,  or  on  the  corps  and  army  level  of  command, 
and  the  overall  rewards  have  been  substantial. 
Whilst  this  is  positive,  there  have  been  few  major  modem  publications  focusing  on  the  role  of 
the  division,  or  a  division,  although  there  have  been  a  number  of  useful  articles  and 
contributions  to  wider  publications,  such  as  Peter  Simkins'  chapter  on  the  performance  of 
16  Simkins,  `Everyman  at  War',  in  Bond  (ed),  The  First  World  War  and  British  Military  History,  pp.  312-313. 
17  J.  M.  Bourne,  `British  Divisional  Commanders  During  the  Great  War,  First  Thoughts,  in  Gunfire,  No.  29.  p. 
22. 
18 BEF  and  Dominion  formations  during  the  `100  Days'.  19  There  has  been  a  greater 
concentration  on  the  study  of  divisions  at  postgraduate  and  workgroup  level  and  some 
excellent  work  has  been  completed  or  is  underway.  The  SHLM  project,  established  at  the 
Imperial  War  Museum  to  create  a  comparative  database  of  BEF  divisions,  rating  them 
individually  and  against  one  another  using  a  series  of  performance  indicators,  could  provide  a 
useful  criterion  for  evaluation.  As  a  separate,  but  complimentary  development,  the  University 
of  Birmingham  has  produced  a  number  of  valuable  formation  studies,  such  as  Simon  Peaple's 
`The  46th  (North  Midland)  Division  T.  F.  on  the  Western  Front,  1915-1918'  20  Other  essential 
research  involves  sub-formations  such  as  brigades,  battalions,  and  companies,  and  some 
excellent  studies  have  been  recently  completed,  such  as  Helen  McCartney's  thesis  on  the  1/6`h 
and  1/10`h  battalions  of  the  Kings  (Liverpool)  Regiment.  21 
It  is  also  vital  to  address  key  questions  in  traditionally  ignored  areas.  As  Dominick  Graham 
has  stated: 
The  learning  process  of  the  armies  has  only  comparatively  recently  been  explored  in  historical 
work  about  the  fighting.  Records  of  `tail'  activities  are  comparatively  scarce.  Yet,  it  was  military 
`boffins',  workshops  mechanics,  munition  designers,  logistics  staffs,  radio  and  telephone 
technologists,  road  builders,  quartermasters,  hospital  doctors  and  nurses,  who  were  conscious  of 
progressive  methods  because  all  of  them  were  engaged  in  functional  activities.  The  platoon, 
company,  squadron  or  battery  soldiers  because  they  were,  all  too  often,  short-lived,  were  unaware 
of  change.  It  is  they  who,  featuring  mainly  in  the  literature,  have  left  the  impression  that  the  form 
of  fighting  was  homogeneous.  22 
Many  of  Graham's  `tail  activities'  have  been  considered  implicitly  in  some  of  the  works 
already  mentioned.  However,  explicit  study  has  been  the  exception  rather  than  the  rule. 
Training,  in  Britain  in  particular,  has  been  largely  neglected,  which  is  surprising  as  it  went 
`hand  in  hand'  with  tactical  evolution.  Morale  and  esprit  de  corps  have  also  been  `touched 
upon',  but  much  of  the  literature  is  recycled  and  adds  little  value  to  the  debate.  There  are 
18  I.  M.  Brown,  British  Logistics  on  the  Western  Front,  1914-1919  (Westport,  1998). 
19  P.  Simkins,  `Co-Stars  or  Supporting  Cast?  British  Divisions  in  the  `Hundred  Days',  1918',  in  Griffith  (ed), 
British  Fighting  Methods  in  the  Great  War,  p.  50. 
20  S.  Peaple,  `The  46th  (North  Midland)  Division  T.  F.  on  the  Western  Front,  1915-1918'  (University  of 
Birminham  Ph.  D,  2003). 
21  H.  McCartney,  `The  1/6t1i  and  1/100i  Kings  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First  World  War' 
(Cambridge  University  Ph.  D,  2000). 
22  D.  Graham,  Against  Odds,  Reflections  on  the  Experiences  of  the  British  Army,  1914-45  (Basingstoke,  1999), 
pp.  50-51. 
19 notable  exceptions,  such  as  J.  Baynes'  Morale23  and  N.  Perry's  `Maintaining  Regimental 
Identity  in  the  Great  War,  The  Case  of  the  Irish  Regiments'.  24  It  is  crucial  that:  training; 
esprit;  tactics;  recruitment  and  reinforcement;  battle  performance;  Regular/Territorial/New 
Army  identity  and  interaction;  artillery  and  combined  arms;  leadership;  and  organisation  and 
administration,  be  dealt  with  systematically  and  comprehensively.  Again,  the  signs  are 
positive,  recruitment  and  reinforcement  have  received  considerable  attention,  with  excellent 
recent  works  by  Derek  Young25  and  Helen  McCartney26  complimenting  previous  studies  such 
as  that  undertaken  by  Beckett  and  Simpson,  27  although  much  of  the  work  in  this  area  has 
focused  on  the  voluntary  period.  John  Bourne's  ongoing  analysis  of  divisional  commanders  is 
important  to  the  understanding  of  wider  questions  of  recruitment,  promotion,  social  factors, 
and  command  and  control  mechanisms.  Whilst  much  work  has  been  done  on  senior 
commanders,  little  has  been  completed  at  the  divisional  level,  and  there  are  few  biographical 
accounts  of  divisional  commanders. 
Aims 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  evaluate  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  over  the  course  of  the  First 
World  War.  Underpinning  the  study  is  an  analysis  of  both  change  and  continuity,  at  home 
and  overseas,  and  the  performance  of  the  division  as  a  fighting  unit.  The  key  themes 
identified  for  study  have  been  training,  esprit  de  corps,  recruitment  and  reinforcement,  and 
battle  performance.  Through  the  investigation  of  the  key  themes,  other  important 
characteristics  have  been  analysed,  such  as  command  and  control,  organisation,  and  the  level 
of  centralisation  in  both  the  formation  and  in  the  wider  Army. 
Key  questions  in  the  research  apply  to  both  divisional  study  and  to  wider  academic 
understanding  of  the  First  World  War.  The  thesis  considers  a  number  of  themes  that  have 
been  neglected  by  historians  old  and  new,  and  brings  into  sharp  focus  some  areas  of  research 
that  may  have  produced  inaccurate  assumptions.  In  addition,  a  substantial  range  and  quantity 
of  primary  sources  have  been  utilised,  many  unexplored  until  now. 
23  J.  Baynes,  Morale,  A  Study  of  Men  and  Courage,  The  Second  Scottish  Rifles  at  the  Battle  of  Neuve  Chapelle 
1915  (London,  1967). 
24  N.  Perry,  `Maintaining  Regimental  Identity  in  the  Great  War,  The  Case  of  the  Irish  Regiments',  in  Stand  To, 
No.  52. 
25  D.  Young,  `Voluntary  Recruitment  in  Scotland,  1914-1916'  (Glasgow  University  Ph.  D,  2001). 
26  McCartney,  `The  1/6th  and  1/10th  Kings  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First  World  War'. 
27  I.  Beckett,  and  K.  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  in  Arms,  A  Social  Study  of  the  British  Army  in  the  First  World  War 
(Manchester,  1985). 
20 The  selection  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  for  study  was  based  on  a  number  of  criteria. 
(Highland)  Division  experiences  were  both  unique  and  not  unique.  In  some  areas  it  was  a 
very  individual  formation,  but  in  other  areas  or  at  particular  times  of  the  war  it  was  not. 
The  following  quotations  give  some  indication  of  the  depth  and  variety  of  sources,  and  the 
distinctive  nature  of  the  5  1st. 
From  J.  F.  C.  Fuller,  Memoirs  of  an  Unconventional  Soldier: 
Presently  a  section  of  the  night  seemed  to  be  advancing  slowly  towards  us,  an  undistinguishable 
mass  in  the  darkness;  they  came  on  at  a  pace  which  was  just  on  the  active  side  of  standing  still.  As 
they  passed,  we  learned  that  they  were  a  Highland  battalion,  part  of  the  51s`  Division  that  fought  so 
well  and  suffered  so  heavily  on  the  following  day.  None  of  them  spoke,  and  their  silence,  the 
weight  and  slowness  of  their  tread,  and  the  solemnity  of  their  passing  by,  bore  such  an  implication 
of  fate,  and  were  shrouded  with  so  much  mystery  by  the  night,  that  one  felt  as  if  one  were  hailing 
men  no  longer  of  this  world.  28 
Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley: 
These  two  opposing  characters  of  two  different  types  of  Scots,  the  fire  of  the  Highlander  and  the 
dourness  of  the  man  from  the  Plains,  were  so  blended  in  the  old  Highland  Division  that  come  what 
might  against  us  the  Division  was  resolute.  29 
From  M.  M.  Haldane,  A  History  of  the  Fourth  Battalion  The  Seaforth  Highlanders: 
Long  after  the  war  was  over  a  distinguished  Irish  General  expressed  the  hope  that  if  ever  he  had 
troops  under  him  again  they  might  be  Scots.  A  Scotsman  present  expressed  surprise  at  his 
preference  for  foreigners,  to  which  the  General  replied  that  he  held  that  hope  because  of  the  high 
standard  of  Scottish  education,  which  ensured  that  the  youngest  lance-corporal  would  intelligently 
carry  on  his  Commander's  intentions  even  after  all  his  officers  were  killed.  30 
28  J.  F.  C.  Fuller,  Memoirs  ofAn  Unconventional  Soldier  (London,  1936),  pp.  203-204. 
29  National  Library  of  Scotland,  ACC  7380,  box  9,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
30  M.  M.  Haldane,  A  History  of  the  Fourth  Battalion  The  Seaforth  Highlanders  (London,  1927),  p.  58. 
21 From  J.  G.  Fuller,  Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies 
1914-1918: 
The  51St  perhaps  owed  its  pre-eminence  among  Scottish  Divisions  in  part  to  the  fact  that  it  was, 
until  April  1918,  the  only  Scottish  Territorial  Division  on  the  Western  Front:  the  52"d  (Lowland 
was  lost  in  the  comparative  backwater  of  the  Palestine  theatre.  That  left  only  the  9t'  and  15 
Divisions  which,  as  Kitchener  formations,  could  not  of  course  match  the  51  St.  31 
Undoubtedly,  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  left  strong  impressions.  How  accurate  were  these 
impressions?  Were  they  a  result  of  something  more  than  just  consistent  fighting  quality? 
Indeed,  was  there  a  consistent  fighting  quality?  This  thesis  will  attempt  to  provide  answers. 
Sources 
The  research  approach  did  not  automatically  rule  out  any  particular  type  of  source.  Instead  a 
judgement  was  applied  based  on  the  relevance  of  a  source  to  a  particular  question  or  theme. 
When  occasion  dictated,  and  that  was  frequent,  other  sources  were  used  to  support,  verify,  or 
balance  a  point.  The  range  of  sources  utilised  was  wide  and  diverse,  and  included  memoirs, 
diaries,  letters,  newspapers,  casualty  lists,  video  and  film  evidence,  official  histories, 
formation  and  unit  histories,  academic  papers,  and  official  army  documentation. 
There  was  a  reliance  on  official  army  documents  to  provide  much  of  the  factual  information. 
Other  primary  sources,  such  as  the  diaries  and  memoirs  in  the  Imperial  War  Museum  and 
National  Library  of  Scotland,  have  also  been  employed  on  a  regular  basis,  although  these, 
along  with  many  of  the  secondary  sources,  have  to  be  viewed  with  a  critical  eye.  The 
questions  asked  of  these  sources  should  always,  in  the  first  instance,  be  about  the  source 
itself.  Who  wrote  the  source?  Why  was  it  written?  And  when?  The  answers  can  set  the  source 
in  a  specific  context  rather  than  see  it  as  universally  valid.  Andrew  Simpson  stresses  of  his 
thesis: 
In  general,  this  thesis  relies  upon  non-anecdotal  primary  sources,  principally  the  reports, 
memoranda,  conference  minutes,  orders  and  documents  in  Corps,  Army  and  GHQ  War  Diaries 
(though  not  the  diaries  themselves,  which  have  greater  potential  for  retrospective 
falsification)...........  Criticism  of  Travers  is  made  not  infrequently,  because  he  is  too  often 
inclined  to  believe  anecdotal  evidence  which  suits  his  argument,  but  fails  to  verify  it  elsewhere.  32 
31  J.  G.  Fuller,  Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies  1914-1918  (Oxford, 
1991),  p.  166. 
22 Bidwell  and  Graham  also  advocated  the  use  of  factual  sources: 
It  is  never  easy  to  distinguish  the  possible  from  the  desirable  in  war  and  hindsight  is but  a  mirage; 
for  it  distracts  attention  from  the  technical,  tactical  and  administrative  work  that  is  the  daily 
concern  of  soldiers  and  is  the  stuff  of  victory.  By  grasping  the  working  methods  of  the  soldier,  the 
historian  may  lay  his  hands  on  the  continuous  thread  of  reason  that  was  real  to  his  subjects  at  the 
time  and  led  them  through  the  noise  and  confusion.  33 
However,  to  balance  these  views,  war  was  not  all  dispassionate  thought,  but  was  emotive  and 
emotional.  Bidwell  and  Graham  themselves  stated  that  `noise  and  confusion'  were  the  norm. 
When  dealing  with  questions  of  emotions  and  ideas  in  some  areas  of  this  thesis  (in  particular 
with  regard  to  esprit  de  corps),  rational  fact  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to  provide  answers.  War 
diaries  contain  much  official  army  documentation,  such  as  operational  orders,  routine  orders, 
lessons  learnt,  memoranda,  and  reports  and  instructions,  along  with  the  day-to-day 
chronicling  of  events.  These  are  the  best  sources  for  factual  information  and  can  be  extremely 
accurate.  However,  the  information  they  provide  is  still  limiting  and  is  often  based  on 
someone's  interpretation  of  something.  They  are  frequently  of  variable  quality;  are  written  by 
and  usually  focus  on  officers;  have  the  potential  to  omit  significant  data;  were  often  compiled 
after  an  event;  and  thus  could  be  biased  or  incorrect.  Peter  Simkins  states  of  Martin 
Middlebrook's  research  for  The  Kaiser's  Battle,  that: 
he  concentrates  on  the  experiences  of  individuals  and  small  units  but  here-  to  an  even  greater 
extent  than  in  his  study  of  the  Somme-  the  evidence  he  has  garnered  plainly  exposes  the  limitations 
of  the  British  unit  war  diaries  and  published  histories  as  source  material.  As  one  of  several  cases  in 
point,  he  reminds  us  that  the  regimental  history  of  the  Royal  Inniskilling  Fusiliers  describes  the  2nd 
Battalion's  action  at  Boadicea  Redoubt  on  21  March  in  terms  of  an  epic  last  stand,  in  which  there 
were  `very  few  of  the  defenders  left  alive  and  unwounded'.  In  reality,  Middlebrook  maintains,  the 
garrison  filed  out  of  the  redoubt  after  a  negotiated  surrender,  at  least  16  officers  and  500  men  of 
the  battalion  being  captured.  He  concludes  that  the  `hybrid'  British  Army  of  March  1918  was 
indeed  `tired  and  war  weary',  and  that  it  did  collapse  prematurely  in  many  places,  its  `threshold  of 
resistance'  having  been  eroded.  34 
Other  official  material,  such  as  the  Stationery  Series  of  papers,  were  intended  to  serve  as 
guidelines  to  what  should  be  employed,  not  as  markers  to  that  which  was  actually  carried  out. 
32  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  16. 
33  Bidwell  and  Graham,  Firepower,  p.  63. 
34  Simkins,  `Everyman  at  War,  Recent  Interpretations  of  the  Front  Line  Experience',  in  Bond  (ed),  The  First 
World  War  and  British  Military  History,  p.  303. 
23 Sources  such  as  diaries  and  letters  are  relevant,  and  if  used  in  conjunction  with  the  more 
factual  of  the  official  records  provide  a  wealth  of  information  and  insights  into  aspects  of  the 
war  that  the  official  documents  alone  could  not  hope  to  furnish.  Ashworth  was  correct  when 
he  asserted: 
The  reader  might  now  comprehend,  not  only  that  the  search  for  a  single  `true'  account  of  the  war 
experience  is  misconceived,  but  also  that  the  inconsistency  between  some  interpretations  of  trench 
warfare  is  illusory;  for  each  could  be  a  valid  and  `true'  rendering  of  one  distinct  dimension  of  a 
multi-dimensional  phenomenon.  Thus  the  contradiction  between  the  image  of  trench  war  as  an 
obscenity  of  death  and  degradation,  found  in  the  poems  of  Wilfred  Owen,  and  the  image  implied 
by  the  comment  of  an  infantry  officer:  `Could  you  ever  have  guessed  how  much  I  should  enjoy  the 
war',  is  to  some  extent  resolved  with  the  knowledge  that  the  opposition  marks  two  different  but 
possible  trench  war  situations  and  careers.  35 
All  accounts  are  subjective  and,  in  addition,  our  interpretations  are  naturally  coloured  by  our 
21St  Century  perceptions.  People  thought  differently,  wrote  differently,  and  had  different 
values  in  that  period.  It  is  also  accurate  to  state  that,  just  as  there  was  a  different  balance  of 
international  relationships,  the  interaction  and  integration  between  various  parts  of  Britain 
was  not  as  it  is  today.  The  researcher  must  bear  these  differences  in  mind. 
Many  of  the  official  army  records  are  available  at  the  National  Archives  in  Kew.  However, 
large-scale  destruction  has  occurred.  War  Office  and  GHQ  papers,  along  with  army,  corps 
and  division  files,  are  incomplete.  Many  personnel  records  of  officers  and  men,  unit  muster 
rolls,  general  orders  of  unit  commanders,  and  unit  orders  regarding  the  granting  of  leave, 
postings,  casualties,  and  movements  of  individuals  are  gone.  These  gaps  in  the  record  are 
particularly  evident  in  the  remaining  documentation  on  training  and  recruitment. 
Fortunately,  the  war  diaries  of  the  51St  Division  are  extensive.  The  main  staff  records,  the  `G' 
and  `A  and  Q'  papers  are  comprehensive,  and  although  battalions  diaries  are  more  variable  in 
quality  and  volume,  they  still  provide  a  satisfactory  chronicle.  The  war  diaries  of  key 
supporting  units,  such  as  the  Royal  Engineers  and  Royal  Artillery,  are  also  worthy  of  study, 
as  are  the  records  of  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps,  Divisional  Ammunition  Column,  and 
trench  mortar  units,  etc.  A  major  weakness  is  the  lack  of  information  concerning  incidences 
of  indiscipline,  which  only  appear  occasionally  in  the  calendar  diary.  The  other  evidence  for 
35  T.  Ashworth,  Trench  Warfare  1914-1918,  The  Live  and  Let  Live  System  (London,  1980),  p.  22. 
24 misbehaviour  or  illegality  within  the  division  tends  to  be  located  in  the  routine  orders,  that 
also  feature  sporadically  in  the  record. 
There  are  a  number  of  published  divisional,  regimental,  and  battalion  histories.  These 
accounts  often  focus  on  battles  and  particular  individuals  and  are  of  variable  quality  due  to 
the  constraints  placed  on  the  authors  (usually  officers)  who  were  writing  for  a  particular 
audience.  However,  the  only  comprehensive  Great  War  divisional  history,  written  in  1921  by 
Major  F.  W.  Bewsher  (who  served  on  the  divisional  staff),  is  excellent.  36  The  author  had 
access  to  the  divisional  war  diaries  after  the  war  and  as  a  result  much  of  the  presented 
evidence  is  factual.  Another  excellent  divisional  source,  entitled,  Behind  the  Lines,  An 
Account  of  Administrative  Staffwork  in  the  British  Army  1914-18,  was  written  by  Colonel 
W.  N.  Nicholson  just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Second  World  War.  37  Nicholson  also  served 
on  the  staff  of  the  515,  but  his  accounts  are  based  less  on  combat  and  more  on  the  daily 
activities  that  were  crucial  to  the  maintenance  of  an  effective  formation. 
The  Victorian  and  Edwardian  Education  Acts  resulted  in  many  more  men  being  able  to  read 
and  write  and  the  Imperial  War  Museum  is  full  of  excellent  primary  source  material  written 
by  officers  and  men  who  served  in  the  51st.  Although,  it  was  illegal  to  maintain  a  personal 
diary  in  the  trenches,  many  did,  and  a  considerable  amount  of  data  is  contemporary,  such  as 
the  diaries  of  Lieutenant  H.  A.  Munro  of  the  1/8th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  who 
was  killed  in  action  and  whose  belongings  were  returned  to  his  family.  However,  many  of  the 
diaries  were  written  up  after  an  event,  or  even  after  the  war,  and  care  must  be  taken  when 
using  their  evidence.  One  such  source,  the  diary  of  Private  A.  E.  Wrench,  is,  however, 
particularly  enlightening  on  a  whole  range  of  issues.  Wrench  served  as  a  brigade  runner  for 
much  of  the  war  and  his  diaries  provide  a  useful  viewpoint  from  an  other  rank's  perspective. 
The  study  of  letters  can  be  very  rewarding,  although  their  reliability  as  factual  sources  varies 
with  the  state  of  mind  of  the  writer  and  the  nature  and  status  of  the  intended  recipient. 
Correspondence  to  parents  would  take  a  different  form  from  that  written  to  other  soldiers. 
Two  brothers,  both  captains,  and  both  in  the  same  battalion,  after  having  followed  the  same 
military  path,  had  different  views  on  the  war.  Their  letters  clearly  show  that  one  was  very 
36  F.  W.  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"'  Highland  Division,  1914-1918  (Edinburgh,  1921). 
37  W.  N.  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  An  Account  of  Administrative  Staffwork  in  the  British  Army  1914-18 
(Stevenage,  1939). 
25 upbeat  whilst  the  other  was  in  considerable  distress.  One  brother  rarely  mentioned  hardships 
and  tended  to  provide  a  colourful  portrayal  of  life  around  him,  focusing  on  his  experiences 
out  of  the  line.  The  other  consistently  referred  to  the  miseries  of  trench  warfare,  citing  bad 
weather,  plagues  of  vermin,  and  seas  of  mud.  38  Which  can  be  used  as  a  reliable  source?  The 
answer  should  be  `both',  but  the  right  questions  have  to  be  asked  for  the  interpretation  to  be 
appropriately  contextualised.  Of  particular  relevance  to  this  study  are  the  letters  of  a  pivotal 
figure  in  the  (Highland)  Division,  Brigadier-General  L.  Oldfield,  and  the  reflections  on  those 
letters  by  his  close  friend,  Miss  Whittaker.  39 
Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley's  unpublished  autobiography,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  is  a 
tremendous  source.  He  served  in  the  51St  Division  during  both  world  wars  and  commanded 
the  formation  at  El  Alamein  in  1942.  However,  if  the  researcher  was  to  apply  the  maxim  that 
autobiographies  are  not  particularly  reliable  due  to  the  passage  of  time  between  event  and 
writing,  then  the  potential  within  a  great  source  such  as  this  would  be  diminished,  as 
Wimberley's  account  was  closer  to  the  events  than  would  automatically  be  assumed.  He 
stated: 
The  story  of  the  next  three  years  I  wrote  for  my  mother  in  1918,  when  I  was  at  home  recovering 
from  a  wound.  My  mother  had  it  typed,  and  so  I  now  reproduce  it  almost  exactly  as  I  wrote  it, 
while  the  war  was  still  going  on.  I  added  later  some  explanatory  footnotes,  but  in  all  else  it  is  the 
account  of  a  young  officer  of  the  times,  aged,  at  the  date  of  writing,  but  twenty-one,  and  holding 
the  War  Rank  of  Major.  4° 
Another  memoir  that  falls  into  this  category  is  that  written  by  a  51St  Division  gunner,  S. 
Bradbury,  in  1923,  but  copied  from  his  original  diary. 
The  Wimberley  papers  in  the  National  Library  of  Scotland  are  also  excellent  and  contain 
much  official  documentation.  However,  many  of  them  were  written  during  the  inter-war  or 
post-Second  World  War  years,  such  as  when  Wimberley  was  a  staff  officer  in  the  War  Office 
with  a  responsibility  for  infantry  schools,  41  or  when  he  gave  a  lecture  at  the  Senior  Officers' 
School  on  discipline  and  morale  based  on  his  experience  with  the  Highland  battalions  in  the 
First  World  War,  42  or  when  he  gave  a  talk  to  the  Black  Watch  Association  in  1948  focusing 
38  Imperial  War  Museum,  Con  Shelf,  `Account  of  the  War  Experiences  of  Captains  G.  Stewart  and  W.  Stewart'. 
39  IWM,  PP/MCR/134,  Papers  of  Miss  Whittaker. 
40  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  D.  N.  Wimberley,  'A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  25. 
41  NLS,  ACC  8681/51,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
42  NLS,  ACC  8681/54,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
26 on  the  (Highland)  Division.  43  All  these  sources  are  helpful  when  handled  appropriately.  The 
use  of  papers  written  after  the  war  is  all  the  more  valid  when  contrasts  are  made  between  the 
51St  Division  of  the  First  and  Second  World  wars,  44  and  it  is  clear  that  many  aspects  of 
divisional  attitudes  and  modes  of  conduct  were  near  identical. 
Similar  arguments  can  be  put  forward  in  support  of  oral  histories,  poetry,  songs,  and  artwork. 
Each  has  a  credible  role  to  play  if  employed  appropriately  and  is  substantiated  adequately. 
Structure 
Chapter  1  considers  the  significance  of  training  in  Britain  and  overseas  during  the  period  of 
the  war.  It  demonstrates  that  the  quality  and  quantity  of  training  varied  dependent  on 
circumstance,  was  influenced  by  a  number  of  internal  and  external  factors,  broadly  worked 
within  the  framework  of  the  British  Army  `learning  curve',  and  did  adhere  to  official  training 
policy.  It  also  demonstrates  that  the  ideal  training  process  had  its  limits,  beyond  which  it  was 
difficult  to  progress. 
Chapter  2  considers  recruitment  and  reinforcement  within  the  division.  Where  the  men  were 
recruited  from,  and  how  that  recruitment  altered  as  casualties  increased  over  the  years  is 
analysed  and  set  in  a  context.  The  chapter  demonstrates  that,  for  the  division,  there  were 
changes  to  the  recruitment  and  reinforcement  pattern  as  the  war  progressed,  and  that  the 
changes  were  broadly  similar  to  other  BEF  formations.  It  is  also  shown  that  Highland  units 
were  the  core  components  of  the  51St  throughout  the  war,  and,  although,  as  time  passed, 
increasing  strains  were  placed  on  the  system  for  reinforcing  those  units  from  local  areas,  the 
military  drafting  system  did  attempt  to  maintain  a  localised  and  later  Scottish  emphasis  in  the 
units  of  the  division. 
Chapter  3  focuses  on  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  51St  and  analyses  its  form,  how  it  functioned 
and  how  it  was  maintained.  It  argues  that  the  esprit  de  corps  changed,  but  was  always 
prominent,  and  that  it  added  value  to  the  division's  performance.  To  determine  the  reasons 
for  this,  it  is  necessary  to  investigate  the  internal  dynamics,  daily  routines,  and  internal  and 
external  relationships  of  the  51st. 
43  NLS,  ACC  8681/137,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
27 Chapter  4  considers  the  performance  of  the  division  over  four  key  battles.  The  selection  of 
the  battles  was  based  on  the  significance  of  the  engagement  and  its  outcome  for  the  51" 
Division,  and  for  the  wider  British  Expeditionary  Force.  A  consideration  is  made  of  battle- 
specific  factors,  such  as  the  strength  of  the  enemy  position,  objectives  to  be  taken,  and 
casualties  incurred,  and  the  battle  set  in  a  developmental  context  that  considers  improvements 
in  training  and  tactics,  command  and  control,  and  organisation  and  administration.  The 
chapter  demonstrates  that  there  were  significant  changes  to  the  division's  performances 
throughout  the  war,  and  also  that  those  performances  were  not  necessarily  consistent 
improvements  on  that  which  had  went  before. 
as  C.  French,  `The  5  1st  Highland  Division  from  St  Valery  to  El  Alamein'  (Glasgow  University  M.  Phil,  1995). 
28 Chapter  1  The  Training  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division 
This  Chapter  will  analyse  the  impact  and  influence  of  training  methodologies  and 
initiatives  employed  by  the  division  and  its  units  throughout  the  war.  It  will  seek  to 
demonstrate  that  training  in  the  division  varied  with  circumstance;  was  influenced  by 
factors  such  as  modes  of  command,  environment,  resources,  and  the  overall  military 
situation;  by  and  large  worked  in  synchronicity  with  the  training  advances  in  the  British 
Army;  and  adhered  to  the  application  of  centralised  methodologies.  It  will  also  posit  that 
training  in  the  division  was  progressive,  but  did  have  its  limitations. 
In  order  to  examine  the  impact  and  form  of  the  training  of  the  515`  Division  throughout 
the  war,  it  is  essential  that  we  look  at:  how  thoroughly  the  division  was  trained  upon 
arrival  on  the  Western  Front  during  May  1915;  the  mechanisms  and  methods  by  which 
the  51St  Division  trained  on  the  Western  Front  from  May  1915;  the  relative  influences  on 
the  division  of  commanders  within  the  BEF  hierarchy;  and  other  essential  external  and 
internal  factors  that  contributed  to  training  effectiveness.  These  factors  include:  whether 
the  51St  adhered  to  centralised  training  programmes  and  methodologies;  how  much 
instruction  was  relayed  from  higher  commanders  outside  the  divisional  structure;  whether 
the  (Highland)  Division  employed  similar  training  methodologies  to  other  formations; 
and  if  the  training  regimes  of  the  5  1St  had  an  impact  on  other  formations  and  at  the  centre. 
Training  in  Britain 
Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war, collective  training  could  hardly  be  described  as  thorough 
as  it  was  prohibited  by  the  scattering  of  drill  halls  across  Scotland.,  Individually,  units 
were  officially  required  to  complete  a  prescribed  number  of  drills  over  the  course  of  the 
year,  but  these  were  often  at  the  ultimate  discretion  of  the  battalion  or  company 
commanding  officers.  The  main  focus  of  the  training  was  the  annual  training  camp, 
which  was  staged  over  eight  to  fifteen  days  during  the  summer  months.  However,  there 
was  also  a  less  than  professional  attitude  to  the  annual  camp: 
1  D.  Young,  `Voluntary  Recruitment  in  Scotland,  1914-1916'  (Glasgow  University  Ph.  D,  2001),  p.  90. 
29 Yet  another  attraction  for  the  members  of  U  Company  was  two  weeks'  paid  holiday  at  the 
annual  summer  camp,  which,  on  18  July  1914,  was,  again  held  in  glorious  weather  at  Tain  in 
Ross-shire  on  the  shores  of  the  Dornoch  Firth.  There  the  students  threw  off  the  cares  and 
anxieties  of  recent  degree  examinations  with  some  rigorous  military  training  accompanied  by 
a  good  deal  of  student  devilment........  Parades  commonly  finished  at  half  past  three  in  the 
afternoon  and  in  the  long  northern  summer  evenings  there  was  plenty  of  time  for  swimming  in 
the  sea  or  playing  golf  on  the  excellent  Tain  links  course.  In  the  second  week  there  was  a 
Battalion  football  tournament,  usually  won  by  U  Company,  a  golf  match  against  the  members 
of  Tain  Golf  Club,  a  Battalion  sports  meeting  and  a  field-firing  shooting  competition. 
On  the  whole,  British  society  was  critical  of  Territorial  standards  in  training  and  the  use 
of  weaponry,  the  level  of  attendance  at  camp,  and  delays  in  providing  drill  halls  and 
ranges  for  units  in  the  Force.  In  many  cases,  the  pre-war  learning  had  been  counter- 
productive  and  the  expectations  and  attitudes  of  the  soldiers  had  to  be  changed. 
During  mobilisation,  the  common  fate  suffered  by  many  of  the  Territorial  formations  was 
to  have  a  debilitating  long-term  effect  on  the  (Highland)  Division  as  the  Regular  staff, 
attached  in  peacetime  for  training  purposes,  were  removed  and  sent  back  to  their  Regular 
units.  As  Lieutenant-Colonel  T.  M.  Booth  stated: 
The  last  months  of  1914  and  1915  were  more  than  filled  with  hectic  preparations  all  over 
England  for  raising  a  huge  Territorial  Army,  beginning  with  the  nucleus  of  the  original  14 
Territorial  Divisions.  Lack  of  trained  officers  and  N.  C.  O.  s  impeded  progress,  and  the  51"' 
Highland  Division  training  at  Bedford  was  no  exception  to  the  rule.  Only  three  regular  officers 
and  a  mere  handful  of  regular  N.  C.  O.  s  were  all  our  three  Brigadiers  had  to  train  the  brigades 
3  of  4,000  men  each. 
The  divisional  commander,  Major-General  R.  Bannatine-Allason,  was  critical  of  the 
impact  on  the  division  in  a  report  to  First  Army  headquarters  on  7  October  1914,  when  he 
stated  that,  `The  removal  of  the  greater  part  of  the  Permanent  Staff  shortly  after 
mobilisation  seriously  hindered  the  training  of  units'.  To  compound  the  long-term 
impact  of  the  removal  of  these  professional  soldiers  from  the  Territorial  Force,  the  great 
majority  of  Regular  officers  and  men  that  subsequently  became  available  for  training  new 
recruits  were  attached  to  New  Army  units. 
2  J.  McConachie,  The  Student  Soldiers  (Elgin,  1995),  pp.  10-11. 
3  Black  Watch  Museum,  N/A,  Autobiography  of  Lt.  Colonel  T.  M.  Booth,  p.  24. 
4  National  Archives,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  7  October  1914. 
30 Experienced  leadership  was  vital  to  the  (Highland)  Division  at  the  outset  of  post- 
mobilisation  training,  but  with  the  removal  of  the  professionals,  the  remaining  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  division  had  to  accept  the  full  responsibility  of 
command.  Many  of  those  officers  and  NCOs  were  unable  to  cope  with  the  demands  of 
full-time  training  and  the  divisional  war  diaries  testify  to  the  removal  of  unworthy 
officers:  `The  disposal  of  officers  incapable  of  exercising  command  has  been  a  matter  of 
urgency.  These  officers  have  been  a  great  handicap  to  efficient  training.  '5  This  was 
further  emphasised  at  battalion  level:  `The  Permanent  Staff  appointed  has  been  found  on 
mobilisation  to  be  totally  inadequate  to  the  training  and  administrative  requirements'. 
Bannatine-Allason  emphasised  to  First  Army  headquarters  that: 
One  of  the  great  difficulties  in  carrying  out  the  training  of  territorials  satisfactorily  is  the  lack 
of  training  and  teaching  power  of  most  of  the  officers  and  ncos  of  the  Force.  The  men  on  the 
whole  are  intelligent  and  keen  and  would  make  rapid  progress  if  efficient  instructors  were 
available.  7 
The  gulf  between  the  professional  and  the  amateur  soldier  was  marked  and  the  officers 
and  men  of  the  (Highland)  Division  had  to  learn  the  business  of  soldiering  without  an 
experienced  leadership.  Indeed,  it  `becomes  a  matter  of  plain  common  sense,  only  when 
you  know  how;  and  when  by  constant  training  it  has  become  second  nature'.  8  However, 
problems  arose  because  the  men  did  not  `know  how',  and  Colonel  W.  N.  Nicholson 
concluded: 
through  it  the  men  worked  wonderfully.  They  didn't  talk,  they  doubled  as  hard  as  they  could, 
dripping  with  sweat.  They  extended  when  they  were  told,  closed  a  minute  later,  extended 
thirty  seconds  afterwards;  all  without  rhyme  or  reason;  but  all  at  the  double  and  in  the  best  of 
faith.  No  Regulars  would  have  done  what  they  did  so  quickly  and  so  silently.  The  manner  of 
doing  it  wasn't  particularly  good;  but  the  intention  to  do  their  very  best  was  obvious  enough, 
and  with  good  teaching  anything  could  have  been  made  of  them.  The  officers,  too,  tried  hard; 
but  their  indecision  was  painful  to  see.  They  wanted  to  be  in  leading  strings,  and  from  the 
most  senior  to  the  most  junior  they  looked  around  for  someone  to  help  them.  9 
s  NA,  WO  95  2848,  Adjutant  and  Quartermaster  (A  and  Q)  War  Diary,  8  September  1914. 
6  NA,  WO  95  2865,1/8's  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  War  Diary,  August  1914. 
7  NA,  W095  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  7  October  1914. 
!  W.  N.  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  An  Account  ofAdministrative  Staffivork  in  the  British  Army  1914-1918 
(Stevenage,  1939),  p.  46. 
9  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  47. 
31 If  the  lack  of  experienced  officers  was  detrimental  to  training,  so  was  the  constant 
movement  of  men  out  of  units.  Transfers  to  other  arms  and  units,  or  to  industry,  caused 
disruptions  and  interruptions  to  the  steady  development  of  individual  and  collective 
training.  Because  of  this  upheaval,  Bannatine-Allason  stated,  `The  recruits  of  the  three 
brigades  are  at  various  stages  of  the  official  syllabus'.  10  A  significant  problem  was  that 
many  of  the  men  who  were  permitted  to  remain  during  peacetime  were  removed  after 
mobilisation  as  they  were  deemed  unfit  for  duty  and  that  also  `considerably  interfered 
with  the  progress  in  training'.  " 
In  1914  and  early  1915,  a  factor  which  had  a  detrimental  impact  on  the  smooth  running 
of  the  recruitment  and  reinforcement  process  in  the  (Highland)  Division  was  the  option  to 
sign  the  Imperial  Service  Pledge.  12  On  10  August  1914,  it  was  announced  that  the  War 
Office  was  willing  to  accept  complete  units  for  Imperial  Service  to  relieve  garrisons  and 
free  troops  for  Europe.  However,  by  21  August,  these  guidelines  had  changed  to  include 
units  with  only  80  per  cent  of  volunteers  and  by  31  August  this  was  amended  to  allow 
second-line  Territorial  units  to  be  raised  where  at  least  60  per  cent  of  a  unit  had 
volunteered. 
As  Spiers  points  out,  not  all  `Scottish  Territorials  were  eager  to  serve  overseas;  while 
`practically  the  whole'  of  the  5th  Battalion,  The  Black  Watch  and  over  90%  of  the  8th 
Battalion,  Scottish  Rifles  (Cameronians)  volunteered,  the  51st  (Highland)  Division 
10  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  January  1915. 
11  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  7  October  1914. 
12  'When  in  1908  the  voluntary  tradition  had  been  codified  in  the  establishment  of  the  Territorial  Force,  the 
formal  terms  and  conditions  constituted  a  compromise  between  the  architects  of  the  Force  and  its  members. 
They  conferred  privileges  on  the  pre-war  Territorials,  many  of  which  were  successfully  defended  until 
1916,  although  they  were  not  extended  to  volunteers  in  other  formations.  Crucially,  the  Territorial  soldier 
was  guaranteed  the  right  to  serve  with  the  unit  he  joined  and  was  not  liable  to  serve  outside  the  UK.  This 
meant  that  Territorial  battalions  could  not  be  used  as  feeder  units  for  the  Regular  Army,  nor  were  they 
required  to  fight  abroad  without  a  percentage  of  the  battalion  assenting.  These  privileges  were  jealously 
defended  by  County  Associations.  Men  could  enlist  for  home  service  until  March  1915,  and  existing 
members  were  given  until  2  March  1916  to  submit  to  overseas  service  or  be  discharged,  becoming  subject 
to  conscription.  ',  H.  McCartney,  `The  1/6th  and  1/10`s  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the 
Period  of  the  First  World  War'  (Cambridge  University  Ph.  D,  2000),  p.  178. 
32 showed  nothing  like  the  same  enthusiasm'.  13  Webster  stated  that  the  option  to  sign  the 
Pledge  in  his  artillery  regiment  caused  unrest: 
No  doubt  their  Commanding  Officer  had  some  advance  warning,  but  to  the  rank  and  file  it  was 
a  rude  shock.  The  long  delay  in  being  dispatched  had  allowed  a  good  deal  of  the  initial  martial 
fervour  to  evaporate,  and  now  that  they  knew  what  lay  ahead  of  them  caused  several  to  think 
furiously.  The  first  evidence  of  this  was  reflected  when  notice  was  given  that  unless  those 
under  age  volunteered  for  Active  Service,  they  had  to  be  given  the  option  to  remain  for  Home 
Defence  in  Britain.  At  a  full  parade  the  next  morning,  and  to  Webby's  horror  quite  a 
proportion  of  the  battery  stepped  out.  14 
All  (Highland)  Division  units  did  take  the  Pledge  by  October  1914,  but  the  problems  in 
reorganising  troops  for  Home  and  Imperial  Service  created  significant  difficulties  which 
`more  or  less  disorganised  the  units.  '  The  divisional  commander  goes  on  to  state,  `In  the 
case  of  this  Division,  in  which  all  units  have  volunteered  for  foreign  service,  the 
formation  of  a  Home  Service  Division  is  an  urgent  necessity,  if  Bde  and  Div  training  is  to 
be  carried  out  properly  by  the  Imp.  Service  unit'.  15 
Progress  was  made  in  this  reorganisation,  but  it  took  time  to  make  satisfactory 
arrangements.  Many  Imperial  Service  recruits  were  at  their  peace  stations  and  problems 
were  experienced  in  sending  them  to  Bedford.  Bannatine-Allason  stated  that  recruiting 
for  the  reserve  units  was  not  `v.  brisk.  It  seems  doubtful  if  certain  units  will  be  able  to 
raise  sufficient  recruits  to  come  anywhere  near  their  establishment'.  16 
The  following  table  indicates  the  extent  of  the  problem  in  Bedford  in  November  1914: 
Fig.  1  Imperial  Service  Home  Service 
Off  O/R  Off  O/R 
Seaforth  and  Cameron  Bde  117  4043  3  823 
Gordons  Bde  123  3182  -  649 
"  E.  Spiers,  `The  Scottish  Soldier  at  War',  in  H.  Cecil,  and  P.  H.  Liddle  (eds),  Facing  Armageddon:  The 
First  World  War  Experienced  (London,  1996),  p.  316. 
14  Imperial  War  Museum,  N/A,  The  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W. Webster,  p.  47. 
15  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  7  October  1914. 
16  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  7  November  1914. 
33 A  and  SH  Bde  116  3589  1  600 
1st  Scottish  Horse  26  439  -- 
Div  Artillery  90  2375  7  310 
Div  Engineers  15  352  2  140 
Div  Train  28  517  4  122 
Div  Supply  Column  5  227  -- 
Field  Ambulances  29  582  -  88 
Total  549  15306  17  2732 
Fig.  2  No  of  men  and  officers  at  peace  stations: 
Seaforth  and  Cameron  Bde 
Gordons  Bde 
A  and  SH  Bde 
Imperial  Service  Home  Service 
Off  O/R  Off  O/R 
1  279  8  493 
-  720  37  821 
756  68  796 
1st  Scottish  Horse  ---- 
Div  Artillery  -  659  -  531 
Div  Engineers  -  286  -  68 
Div  Train  --  14  262 
Field  Ambulances  9  209  5  225 
Total  10  2909  132  3196 
Fig.  3  The  total  of  Reserve  units  (Imperial  and  Home  Service)  at  Bedford  and  peace 
stations: 
Officers  Other  Ranks 
Seaforth  and  Cameron  Bde  12  1595 
Gordons  Bde  37  2643 
34 A  and  SH  Bde  69  2289 
Ist  Scottish  Horse  -- 
Div  Artillery  7  1500 
Div  Engineers  2  494 
Div  Train  18  384 
Field  Ambulances  14  522 
Total  159  9427 
The  situation  had  become  acute  by  March  1915,  and  Bannatine-Allason  outlined  the 
problems  for  the  units  designated  for  overseas  duty  and  the  second-line  units  that  were  to 
reinforce  them.  He  felt  that  the  (Highland)  Division  had  been  enormously  handicapped 
by  the  prohibition  of  moves  between  Bedford  and  Scotland.  The  Home  Service  men  who 
had  come  with  the  division  to  Bedford  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  were  still  in  Bedford 
and  the  Imperial  Service  recruits  who  had  enlisted  since  mobilisation  were  still  in 
Scotland.  He  expressed  the  view  that  this  was  to  the  `very  great  disadvantage  of  everyone 
concerned'.  He  felt  that  the  necessity  of  bringing  Imperial  Service  men  from  Scotland  to 
Bedford  had  reached  an  acute  stage,  owing  to  the  requirements  of  drafts  for  the  overseas 
units,  and  unless  those  men  were  transferred,  drafts  could  not  be  found.  He  added  that  not 
only  should  Imperial  Service  recruits  be  sent  to  Bedford  as  a  matter  of  urgency,  but  also 
any  officers  and  men  who  had  returned  from  overseas  and  were  `fit'  again.  `Their 
services  will  be  of  the  greatest  value  not  only  for  completing  drafts  but  also  for 
instructing  the  second  line  units,  which  they  will  join.  '  17 
The  Territorial  Association  in  Elgin  observed  on  1  March  1915  that: 
there  was  too  large  a  proportion  of  Officers  in  the  Reserve  Battalion  for  Home  Service  only, 
and  it  was  resolved  to  ask  Colonel  Black  to  put  the  matter  before  his  officers  and  endeavour  to 
get  a  larger  proportion  of  them  to  undertake  the  Imperial  Service  obligation.  It  was  also 
considered  that  it  was  highly  desirable  that  a  larger  percentage  of  the  Rank  and  File  should 
take  the  Imperial  Service  obligation,  and  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  meeting  that  if  the  Officers 
17  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  6  March  1915. 
35 first  took  the  obligation  it  would  have  a  good  effect  in  inducing  the  men  to  come  forward  to  do 
likewise.  " 
The  above  problems  on  home  and  imperial  service  were  still  evident  in  a  report  to  First 
Army  during  April  1915. 
Combined  with  this  blockage  of  reinforcements  to  first-line  units,  the  urgent  need  for 
units  to  be  sent  to  France  and  Belgium  resulted  in  further  disruptions  as  brigades  were 
shorn  of  many  of  their  best  battalions  and  supporting  troops.  In  early  1915,  the  division 
lost  six  infantry  battalions  to  the  Western  Front,  although  they  were  replaced  by  other 
units. 
Added  to  this  were  the  many  restrictions  that  were  also  placed  upon  training  areas 
available  to  the  division.  Commanders  were  informed  that  when  taking  possession  of 
land  (under  the  provisions  of  the  Defence  of  the  Realm  Act  No.  2  of  28  August  1914)  they 
were  to  interfere  as  little  as  possible  with  `the  amenities  of  the  civilian  population'.  19  The 
divisional  historian,  F.  W.  Bewsher,  outlined  the  difficulties  involved  in  using  the  land 
around  Bedford  for  training  and  manoeuvres: 
The  country  round  Bedford  can  only  be  called  a  moderate  training  ground  for  the  larger  units. 
The  absence  of  ranges,  particularly  obnoxious  clay  soil,  and  generally  small  enclosures  were 
obstacles  to  overcome.  Ranges,  were  at  once  commenced;  but  two  sites,  which  were 
underwater  in  winter,  required  a  lot  of  pumping  to  make  them  serviceable.  2° 
A  report  from  the  (Highland)  Division  to  First  Army  headquarters  further  emphasised  the 
poor  conditions  available,  and  the  lack  of  flexibility  in  developing  them,  `In  addition  to 
the  wet  and  muddy  condition  of  the  fields,  the  area  used  by  troops  is  getting  v.  restricted 
as  the  young  crops  are  now  springing  up'.  21 
1°  National  Archives  of  Scotland,  MD8/3,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of 
Elgin. 
19  P.  Simkins,  Kitchener'sArmy  (Manchester,  1988),  p.  237. 
20  F.  W.  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51°`  Highland  Division,  1914-1918  (Edinburgh,  1921),  pp.  1-2. 
21  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  March  1915. 
36 Another  hindrance  to  effective  training  was  the  billeting  of  the  troops  in  various  locations 
in  and  around  Bedford.  It  was  a  time-consuming  and  convoluted  process  to  assemble  the 
men  each  morning  in  order  for  them  to  be  marched  off  for  training.  The  sessions  would 
then  have  to  be  interrupted  so  that  the  men  could  return  to  their  billets  for  the  evening 
meal  u 
Equipment  shortages  caused  serious  delays  and  this  was  exacerbated  by  a  lack  of  quality 
in  the  equipment  that  the  division  actually  had.  The  War  Office  order  that  no  `Peace 
Training  Equipment'  should  be  taken  to  war  stations  delayed  the  `Musketry  Instruction' 
of  the  division  considerably.  3  In  particular,  the  artillery  moved  slowly  in  the  direction  of 
preparedness  for  war.  They  had  ancient  `pieces',  poor  and  ill-fitting  harness  and: 
No  practice  blank  ammunition  has  yet  been  made  available  for  the  Divisional  Artillery.  It  is 
urgently  required  to  train  the  horses  to  artillery  fire.  Telephone  equipment  is  not  yet  supplied 
to  the  Artillery.  Having  regard  to  the  experience  of  the  Artillery  at  the  Front  the  want  of  this 
equipment  is  a  great  handicap  to  satisfactory  training.  In  this  neighbourhood  it  is  difficult  to 
find  Artillery  positions,  where  telephones  are  not  required  24 
However,  the  negative  aspects  of  the  division's  training  period  in  Bedford  were  at  least  in 
part  offset  by  the  positive  attitudes  and  earnest  efforts  of  officers  and  men,  even  if  they 
did  not  fully  understand  what  they  were  doing  or  why  they  were  doing  it.  To  combat  this 
lack  of  knowledge,  but  to  capitalise  on  the  eagerness  to  learn,  officers  were  made  aware 
of  the  official  pamphlets  and  instruction  materials  produced  by  the  War  Office  and  from 
other  sources:  `The  organisation  of  the  2nd  Line  Transport  divisional  trains  under  W.  O. 
instructions  and  pamphlets  was  commenced'  25  To  compliment  this,  presentations  and 
discussions  on  various  subjects  were  arranged  to  disseminate  knowledge,  in  some  cases 
taking  the  form  of  daily  lectures  by  commanding  officers  and  other  officers  to  all  ranks. 
zz  Simkins,  Kitchener'sArmy,  p.  249. 
23  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  7  October  1914. 
24  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  December  1914. 
25  NA,  WO  95  2848,  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  21  August  1914. 
37 Where  possible,  officers  and  men  would  be  sent  on  courses  to  develop  their  skills,  and 
the  expectation  was  that  those  officers  and  men  would  return  and  disseminate  their 
knowledge: 
Further  parties  of  Officers  and  NCOs  have  been  sent  to  the  School  of  Instruction  at  Chelsea 
Barracks,  Bisley  etc.  Some  more  officers  of  the  Divisional  Artillery  have  attended  the  course 
of  instruction  in  cooperation  between  aircraft  and  artillery.  On  their  return  they  have  given 
lectures  to  the  various  batteries.  Weekly  lectures  have  been  given  by  the  Administrative  Staff 
on  the  following  subjects:  a)  Interior  Economy  b)  Billeting  c)  Supply  in  Peace  and  War  d) 
Horse  Management-Shoeing.  26 
Occasionally,  the  division  would  also  receive  visits  from  experts  who  would  instruct  the 
units  in  specialised  areas,  and  toward  the  end  of  the  March  1915  the  division  secured  the 
services  of  six  instructors  from  Aldershot  to  take  classes  in  bayonet  fighting  and  `final 
assault  practices'.  7 
Direction  in  the  organisation  of  training  programmes  was  channelled  through  an  Army 
Council  order  issued  on  mobilisation,  which  laid  down  a  syllabus  of  training  for  the 
infantry,  the  support  units,  and  the  other  arms.  The  intention  was  that  the  training  process 
would  take  six  months,  the  first  three  months  being  devoted  to  individual  skills,  and  the 
second  three  months  to  unit  tactics.  The  infantry  `basic  training  element'  of  the  syllabus 
covered  a  period  of  ten  weeks.  During  the  first  two  weeks  the  division  received 
`preliminary  instruction  in  musketry  and  elementary  squad  drill'  which  would  consist  of 
basic  military  procedures  such  as  saluting,  standing  to  attention,  parading,  and  marching. 
Extended  order  drill  and  night  work  were  introduced  in  the  third  week,  route  marching  in 
the  fourth  week,  outpost  duties  in  the  fifth  week,  and  entrenching  and  bayonet  fighting  in 
the  seventh  and  ninth  weeks  respectively.  Platoon  drill  began  in  the  tenth  week.  After 
three  months,  during  which  the  men  were  expected  to  complete  the  musketry  course, 
company  training  commenced  and  lasted  another  five  weeks.  At  that  point,  some  men 
were  selected  for  specialist  training  as  machine  gunners,  grenade  throwers,  and  scouts,  or 
in  signalling  and  transport  duties: 
26  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  March  1915. 
27  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  March  1915. 
38 By  the  fifth  month  the  troops  had  graduated  to  training  at  battalion  and  brigade  strength,  with 
field  days,  entrenching  schemes  and  extended  route  marches  comprising  a  major  part  of  the 
syllabus.  The  final  stages  of  the  programme  included  the  completion  of  the  trained  soldiers' 
musketry  course,  field  firing  with  artillery  support,  and  divisional  exercises  and  route  marches 
lasting  two  or  three  days  at  a  time.  28 
For  the  artillery,  the  period  of  `basic  recruit  training'  was  much  shorter,  lasting  only  six 
weeks.  Like  the  infantry,  gunners  and  drivers  spent  time  performing  dismounted  drill  and 
PT,  but  the  gunners  also  learned  gun  drill  and  the  technique  of  loading,  laying,  fuse- 
setting,  and  firing,  while  the  drivers  were  taught  how  to  ride  and  to  look  after  the  horses 
and  stables.  From  the  seventh  week  onwards  the  gunners  were  given  special  instructions 
in  signalling  and  range-finding,  with  the  drivers  beginning  mounted  drill  when  they  were 
adequate  riders. 
Mounted  parades  and  manoeuvres  at  battery  strength,  as  well  as  practice  shoots  on  a  miniature 
range,  were  to  start  after  thirteen  weeks,  brigade  drills  and  exercises  in  the  nineteenth  week 
and  divisional  artillery  training  in  the  sixth  and  final  month.  For  recruits  in  the  field  companies 
of  the  Royal  Engineers  there  was  a  three-month  programme  of  basic  training  which,  in 
addition  to  squad  drill,  signalling  and  musketry,  embraced  instruction  in  field  fortifications 
and  demolition  work.  In  the  fourth  month  the  sappers  progressed  to  bridging  and  combined 
training  with  the  infantry  and  artillery.  29 
The  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps  (RAMC)  followed  much  the  same  training  as  the 
infantrymen  with  the  exception  of  rifle  practice.  At  a  later  point,  stretcher  drill,  and 
medical  lectures  (following  a  course  laid  down  in  the  RAMC  manual)  took  place.  This 
occupied  the  first  three  months  of  the  recruits  time,  after  which  they  were  drafted  to  a 
hospital  to  learn  in  practical  situations.  The  Army  Service  Corps  had  many  duties,  but 
new  recruits  were  not  given  much  specialist  training  at  all,  except  riding  and  driving. 
Then  they  were  actually  sent  out  to  do  the  supply.  30 
War  diaries  at  formation  and  unit  level  testify  that  the  (Highland)  Division  followed  the 
syllabus  closely  and  reports  from  the  divisional  commander  to  First  Army  headquarters  in 
November  1914  stated  that  training  progressed  satisfactorily.  `The  infantry  have  been 
28  Simkins,  Kitchener'sArmy,  p.  296. 
29  Simkins,  Kitchener's  Army,  pp.  296-7. 
30  E.  Wallace,  Kitchener's  Army  and  the  Territorial  Forces  (London,  1916),  p.  137. 
39 doing  company  training,  inc  company  marches.  A  few  brigade  exercises  were  carried  out. 
Recruits  commenced  their  musketry  course  on  the  7`h  Oct  and  trained  soldiers  on  215  Oct. 
The  men  are  getting  fitter  and  march  well.  01  Similar  progress  was  noted  for  December 
with  the  completion  of  company  training  and  the  commencement  of  battalion  training. 
Several  divisional  exercises  were  also  carried  out.  Musketry  training  was  almost 
completed  for  the  more  experienced  soldiers,  whilst  good  progress  was  also  made  in 
musketry  with  new  recruits.  32 
However,  poor  conditions  and  `The  Defence  of  the  Realm  Act'  increasingly  obstructed 
the  development  of  training  throughout  the  early  months  of  1915.  Reports  to  First  Army 
headquarters  stressed  that  weather  adversely  affected  the  ability  to  utilise  training 
facilities;  `During  the  whole  month  the  training  of  all  arms  has  been  considerably 
hampered  by  bad  weather  and  the  wet  state  of  the  country.  In  the  first  fortnight  Divisional 
Training  was  carried  out.  In  the  various  exercises  the  troops  had  to  be  kept  almost 
entirely  to  the  roads';  33  `The  work  has  been  much  interfered  with  by  the  constant  bad 
weather';  34  and  crucially,  the  larger  formation  exercises  were  stymied  in  their  progress 
and  practice  due  to  the  difficulties  for  troops  to  leave  the  roads  and  carry  out  manoeuvres 
on  the  surrounding  land.  35  This  was  a  significant  setback,  as  this  period  was  crucial  to  the 
evolution  of  the  mobility,  communication,  co-ordination  and  co-operation  of  the  whole 
division.  Its  men  had  learned  the  basics  of  individual  training,  and  were  physically  fit,  but 
the  most  difficult  element  of  fighting  as  a  formation,  operating  cohesively,  was  in  no  way 
clear  and  practised.  During  the  practice  manoeuvres  that  were  carried  out,  the  failings  of 
the  division  were  all  too  apparent.  Nicholson  observed  the  division's  efforts  from  his 
position  on  the  divisional  staff  and  stated  that,  `This  shout  of  wolf  gave  overpowering 
proof  to  all  concerned  with  its  administration  that  our  division  was  but  a  rusty,  rickety, 
jamming  machine  that  would  quickly  fall  to  pieces  if  put  on  the  road'.  6  He  further 
explained  that: 
31  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  November  1914. 
32  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  December  1914. 
33  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  January  1915. 
34  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"'  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  March  1915. 
35  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  April  1915. 
36  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  17. 
40 There  was  one  divisional  field  day  that  I  attended,  mainly  confined  to  the  roads  on  account  of 
cultivation.  Neither  side  attacked;  the  brigade  on  one  side  was  scattered  over  miles  of  country 
and  advanced  some  two  miles  in  four  hours;  while  the  other  brigade  sat  in  a  hole  and 
successfully  escaped  notice.  The  unprotected  mountain  artillery  of  one  force  were  opposed  by 
cyclists,  who  ran  away;  while  the  infantry  of  the  other  kept  well  in  rear  of  their  own  field 
gun  37 
To  add  further  confusion  for  (Highland)  Division  troops  who  had  been  involved  in 
company  training  over  the  previous  months,  orders  were  issued  to  reorganise  battalions 
on  a  four-company  basis,  and  then  to  carry  out  further  courses  of  revised  company 
training.  38  The  eight-company  system  had  been  discarded  by  the  Regular  Army  before 
1914  (improved  weaponry  permitted  smaller  units  more  mobility  with  no  loss  in 
firepower),  but  was  retained  by  the  Territorial  Force  as  a  means  of  administering  units 
that  were  often  recruited  from  isolated  areas  with  low  population  densities. 
There  was  a  great  deal  of  effort,  both  within  and  without  the  division  to  bring  it  to  the 
appropriate  standard  to  take  the  field.  For  the  War  Office  this  state  of  readiness  was 
achieved  as  it  sanctioned  the  transfer  to  the  front,  however  what  that  decision  was  based 
upon  is  open  to  debate: 
They  said  we  were  one  of  the  best  divisions.  We  are  all  ready  to  believe  pleasant  things  that 
are  said  about  ourselves.  But  I  do  not  know  who  it  was  that  came  and  saw  and  flattered.  No 
one  during  the  months  that  we  were  in  Bedford  visited  my  branch  to  learn  first  hand  the 
administrative  value  of  a  newly  mobilised  division.  39 
In  reality,  it  proved  to  be  too  steep  a  learning  curve  and  failings  in  overall  supervision 
and  co-ordination  of  training,  confusion  over  revising  existing  tactical  doctrine,  and  the 
general  lack  of  awareness  of  tactical  developments  on  the  battlefield,  and  the  resultant 
over-dependence  of  commanding  officers  on  outdated  manuals  and  a  prescribed  syllabus 
gave  training  an  unprofessional  and  unrealistic  feel. 
37  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  pp.  46-47. 
38  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  Report  to  First  Army,  January  1915. 
39  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  18. 
41 During  May,  the  division  arrived  in  France  with  its  training  only  partially  completed.  The 
official  history  stated  that  the  (Highland)  Division  was  `practically  untrained'  and  `very 
green  in  all  field  duties'  [Haig's  marginal  remark]  as  it  moved  up  to  Givenchy  in  June 
1915  40 
Centralising  training  programmes 
The  theory  that  the  German  Army  was  more  advanced  in  its  training  and  tactical  thinking 
than  its  British  counterpart,  and  that  the  British  often  came  upon  new  concepts  more  by 
accident  than  design,  leaving  it  until  1918  before  any  coherent  attempt  was  made  to 
centralise  training,  has  been  increasingly  challenged.  As  Simpson  has  asserted,  the 
paradigm  is  extremely  contentious  as  the  BEF  actually  began  the  war  with  a  single  set  of 
centralised  tactics  in  the  Field  Service  Regulations  (FSR),  41  and  throughout  the  war  it 
attempted  to  codify,  issue,  and  revise,  centralised  tactical  and  training  advice. 
By  the  end  of  1915  the  level  of  training  in,  and  of,  formations  arriving  on  the  Western 
Front  was  recognisably  poor.  In  order  to  remedy  this,  it  was  considered  that  more  definite 
instructions  were  required  than  had  been  in  circulation  up  to  that  point.  The  FSR  and  its 
supporting  training  manuals  were  still  considered  pivotal,  but  the  officers  applying  the 
principles  in  practice  were  simply  too  inexperienced  to  do  so  properly.  It  was  deemed 
essential  to  devise  a  way  by  which  potential  instructors  could  be  trained  to  disseminate 
new  methods  and  to  ensure  that  they  were  applied  uniformly.  Since  the  basic  tactical  unit 
of  the  Army  was  the  division,  it  was  at  this  level  that  new  training  schools  were  formed, 
and  commanding  officers  were  to  continue  to  be  `personally  responsible  for  the  training 
of  their  divisions,  "assisted,  controlled  and  supervised  by  the  Corps  and  Army"...  In 
addition  to  these  reforms,  and  to  supplement  the  FSR,  GHQ  began  to  issue  instructional 
40  J.  E.  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  France  and  Belgium,  1915.  Battles  ofAubers  Ridge,  Festubert,  and 
Loos  (London,  1928),  p.  73. 
41  Continuity  of  thought  in  British  Army  from  pre-war  to  end  of  war,  expressed  through  the  application  of 
Field  Service  Regulations  (1909),  Part  1  Operations,  'FSR  was  a  set  of  principles  for  application  by  trained 
and  experienced  officers,  which  specifically  avoided  going  into  too  much  detail,  since  those  applying  them 
should,  through  experience  and  training,  know  what  detailed  actions  to  perform  within  their  framework.  ', 
in  A.  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One'  (London  University  College  Ph.  D, 
2001),  p.  8. 
42 pamphlets  for  the  new  warfare'.  2  The  GHQ-led  reforms  can  clearly  be  seen  in  the 
(Highland)  Division  when  it  opened  the  first  of  its  divisional  schools  (Grenades)  on  10 
January  1916,  followed  by  another  (Infantry)  on  24  January  1916,43  and  the  syllabuses 
that  issued  followed  guidelines  in  GHQ  memoranda. 
As  the  war  progressed,  GHQ  produced  and  circulated  pamphlets  and  manuals  on  a  range 
of  subjects,  whilst  army,  corps,  and  division  often  simultaneously  produced  their  own 
materials,  including  instructions  and  memoranda.  This  process  had  begun  as  early  as 
August  1914,  when  GHQ  had  established  an  Army  Printing  and  Stationery  Depot  to 
facilitate  publication  of  BEF  documents  and  pamphlets.  Initially,  all  manuals  were 
printed  in  London  for  the  War  Office  Central  Distribution  Section  (the  CDS  Series),  and 
then  sent  to  France  for  distribution.  However,  within  six  months  of  the  start  of  the  war, 
GHQ  was  sporadically  issuing  its  own  material  and  the  designation  was  eventually 
changed  from  CDS  to  SS  (Stationery  Service)  at  the  beginning  of  1916.44 
As  the  BEF  increasingly  codified  its  own  ideas,  the  instructions  that  were  issued  were 
frequently  updated  as  lessons  were  learned:  SS  109  `Training  of  divisions  for  offensive 
action'  of  May  1916  was  followed  by  SS  119  of  July  1916,  which  in  turn  was  followed  by 
SS  135  which  appeared  in  December  1916.  Further  revised  editions  were  issued  in  both 
January  and  November  1918.  These  documents  were  clearly  `to  apply  specifically  to 
training  for  methodical  attacks  on  prepared  positions'.  They  suggested  appropriate 
training  drills,  and  also  how  the  division  was  to  organise  for  and  plan  an  operation.  They 
also  outlined  what  the  respective  responsibilities  of  corps  and  division  were.  5  All  these 
recommendations  were  very  much  based  on  the  experience  gained  during  the  fighting  of 
1916,  concentrating  on  counter-battery  work,  the  employment  of  the  machine  gun 
barrage,  and  the  timetabled  artillery  barrage  throughout  an  operation. 
42  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  41. 
43  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
44  P.  Griffith,  Battle  Tactics  of  the  Western  Front  (London,  1994),  p.  181. 
45  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  87. 
43 The  winter  of  1916/17  was  one  of  the  most  important  periods  in  the  development  of 
British  infantry  tactics.  The  most  influential  GHQ  manual  of  the  period  was  `Instructions 
for  the  training  of  platoons  for  offensive  action'  (SS  143),  that  issued  in  February  1917 
(another  development  on  the  earlier  SS135  of  December  1916).  This  paper  built  on  the 
concept  introduced  in  SS135,  that  the  platoon  was  the  basic  tactical  unit  of  infantry. 
SS143  went  one  step  further  than  SS135  by  describing  a  platoon  composed  of  four 
different  specialist,  mutually  supporting  sections,  whose  principal  armament  would  be  the 
Lewis  gun,  rifle,  rifle  grenade,  and  bomb. 
Also  during  1917,  the  system  for  co-ordinating  training  across  the  armies  in  France  was 
improved  and  a  training  branch  was  established  in  GHQ  under  Brigadier-General  A. 
Solly-Flood.  This  Branch  published  SS  152  `Instructions  for  the  training  of  the  British 
Armies  in  France'  in  June  1917,  the  object  of  which  was  to  co-ordinate  policy  and 
system.  This  was  only  an  interim  version  however,  and  an  authoritative  draft  did  not 
appear  until  January  1918.  SS152  re-emphasised  the  rule  that  commanders  should  train 
the  troops  they  led  into  action,  and  the  publication  included  detailed  syllabuses  for 
courses  of  instruction  at  corps  and  army  schools  across  the  full  range  of  requirements. 
Other  arms  were  not  ignored  in  this  increasingly  centralised  dissemination  of 
information,  with  SS139  (Artillery  Notes),  and  SS145  (Notes  on  R.  E.  preparations  for, 
and  the  employment  of,  the  R.  E.  in  offensive  operations),  featuring  amongst  many 
others  46 
In  1918,  GHQ  appointed  Lieutenant-General  Ivor  Maxse  as  Inspector-General  of 
Training,  and  although  the  role  was  an  advisory  one  only,  his  office  was  empowered  to 
check  upon  commands  in  France  and  in  Britain,  to  suggest  improvements  to  training,  and 
to  disseminate  tactical  doctrine.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  Maxse's  duties  included 
ensuring  that,  `training  is  carried  out  in  accordance  with  Field  Service  Regulations,  the 
official  manuals  and  General  Staff  publications'.  7 
46  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  106. 
47  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  181. 
44 It  is  outwith  the  scope  of  this  chapter  to  outline  comprehensively  the  tactical  deployments 
of  the  51s'  Division  during  its  battles,  but  operational  orders  and  reports  on  engagements 
confirm  that  the  (Highland)  Division  was,  broadly,  if  not  exclusively,  adhering 
consistently  to  the  suggested  attack  methodologies  in  the  SS  papers. 
As  discussed  earlier,  the  1914  post-mobilisation  War  Office  Training  Syllabus  formed  the 
basis  of  training  during  the  division's  stay  in  Bedford,  and  that  was  supplemented  by 
manuals  and  pamphlets  (both  official  and  unofficial).  However,  in  contrast,  upon  arrival 
in  France  there  was  little  in  the  way  of  centralised  information  concerning  training.  As 
Ashworth  states,  `In  1915,  directives  lacked  force,  being  issued  into  something  of  a  void 
where  weapons  and  skills  were  neither  standard  nor  developed  and  morale  had  to 
compensate  for  established  skills  and  techniques'  48  The  (Highland)  Division  received  no 
new  general  training  syllabus,  although  it  did  receive  notes  and  memoranda  from  General 
Headquarters,  army,  and  corps,  drawing  the  attention  of  the  divisional  commander  to 
general  principles  and  specialist  training  in  such  activities  as  bombing.  9  However,  as  the 
war  progressed,  there  were  more  frequent  references  to  the  SS  papers  and  other 
centralised  memoranda  and  papers  of  instruction.  To  focus  on  1918,  SS  papers  are 
present  in  the  war  diaries  on  a  regular  basis;  GS  memo  of  12  January  1918  stated  that 
SS  152  on  `Instructions  for  the  Training  of  British  Armies  in  France....  will  shortly  be 
issued';  50  and  in  March  1918,  `Notes  on  Recent  Fighting  No.  16,  Use  of  Gas  by  the 
Enemy  prior  to  his  attack  on  the  British  on  the  Aisne  the  27th  May  1918';  No.  15 
`German  Attack  on  the  British  Front  on  the  Aisne  on  the  270i  May';  No.  14  `German 
Method  of  Overcoming  Machine  Guns  in  Depth';  No.  13  `German  Tactics  in  the  Attack'; 
and  No.  9  `Tactical  handling  of  Machine  Guns  in  Defensive  Operations'  were  all  issued 
to  divisions  for  further  distribution  to  battalions  51  Often  the  documents  issued  would  be 
voluminous  and  were  intended  primarily  for  guidance  rather  than  for  strict  application. 
However,  on  occasion,  senior  commanders  in  the  51'`  would  dictate  that  key  elements  in 
the  SS  papers  must  be  employed:  `The  importance  of  adhering  strictly  to  the  injunctions 
48  T.  Ashworth,  Trench  Warfare  1914-1918,  The  Live  and  Let  Live  System  (London,  1980),  p.  85. 
49  NA,  WO  95  2869,51"'  Division  Circular  Memorandum,  7  July  1915. 
50  NA,  WO  95  2863,152nd  Brigade  War  Diary,  12  January  1918. 
51  NA,  WO  95  2885,154th  Brigade  War  Diary,  March  1918. 
45 laid  down  in  Circular  Memorandum  No.  SS.  419.  B  dated  17th  July  1916.  cannot  be 
exaggerated.  ',  52  and  Routine  Order  1033  of  7  June  1918  concerning  Bombing  stated: 
Attention  is drawn  to  S.  S.  182  `Instructions  on  Bombing'  Nov  1917,  part  2,  Chapter  IX.  The 
precautions  therein  laid  down  have  been  adopted  as  a  result  of  experience,  and  it  is  not 
permissible  for  any  individual  officer  to  introduce  a  practice  differing  therefrom,  on  grounds 
of  personal  opinion.  Officers  and  other  ranks  who  are  instructing  in  bombing  will  be  held 
responsible  for  any  accidents  which  may  occur  through  neglect  of  these  precautions.  53 
The  awareness  and  use  of  the  centrally  issued  ideas  can  be  determined  through  a 
comparison  of  the  training  methods  employed  by  Major-General  G.  M.  Harper  (515` 
Division  GOC)  and  Lieutenant-General  Maxse.  They  were  remarkably  similar,  and 
Maxse  was  held  in  some  esteem  in  this  area.  Maxse  thought  enough  of  Harper  to 
recommend  that  he  be  given  a  corps  command.  Major-General  Harper's  `Notes  on 
Infantry  Training  and  Tactics'  that  issued  in  August  1918,  were  also  indicative  of  the 
main  principles  in  the  1918  SS  papers.  When  he  stressed  that  training  was  `the  key  factor; 
that  the  men  must  be  aware  of  tactical  principles;  that  leadership  and  initiative  are  vital; 
and  that  frontal  assaults  without  guile  are  wasteful',  he,  not  the  actual  compiler,  the 
Deputy  Chief  of  Staff  at  GHQ,  could  have  been  writing  a  memo  to  the  Director  of 
Military  Operations  at  the  War  Office  in  July  1918,  which  stated  essentially  the  same.  54 
Another  indicator  of  adherence  to  the  centre  can  be  seen  through  changes  in  operational 
emphasis.  In  1915,  a  key  focus  for  the  Expeditionary  Force  was  the  use  of  the  bomb, 
whilst  by  1917  this  had  shifted  to  the  rifle.  In  both  these  cases,  the  51s'  Division  adhered 
to  and  employed  training  methods  that  followed  the  trend.  During  1917,  the  General 
Officer  Commanding  issued  an  order  to  improve  skill  with  the  rifle,  and  `During  this 
period  of  rest  all  training  was  centred  on  Musketry.  It  was  found  that  few  men  knew  how 
to  use  the  rifle  at  all.  Some  improvement  was  made''55  and,  `During  period  in  TILQUES 
area  [9-22  June  1917]  great  improvement  was  made  in  musketry  of  the  Division.  The 
area  was  found  provided  with  excellent  long-distance  and  short  ranges,  and  much 
52  NA,  WO  95  2861,152  nd  Brigade  War  Diary,  26  July  1916. 
53  NA,  WO  95  2849,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  7  June  1918. 
54  A.  Whitmarsh,  `The  Development  of  Infantry  Tactics  in  the  12th  (Eastern)  Division,  1915-1918,  in  Stand 
To,  No.  71,  p.  32. 
55  NA,  WO  95  2845,51"  Division  G  War  Diary,  1-9  May  1917. 
46 assistance  was  received  from  the  staff  of  the  Second  Army  of  the  Second  Army  School  of 
Musketry.  56 
Along  with  a  dissemination  of  information,  the  various  schools  that  were  established  also 
taught  and  examined  officers  and  men  on  the  SS  principles.  Major  A.  Anderson,  whilst  at 
No.  2  Royal  Garrison  Artillery  Officer  Cadet  School  during  November  1917,  had  to  sit 
exams  that  focused  on  information  contained  in  the  SS  papers.  57 
However,  the  ethos  which  permitted  a  level  of  flexibility  in  command  and  control  in 
formations  and  units  could  actually  work  against  standardisation  and  often  such  guidance 
was  not  applied  because  the  front  line  recipients  of  the  advice  were  likely  to  resent  any 
suggestions  from  those  they  perceived  to  be  detached  rear-echelon  intellectuals.  Some 
ordinary  officers,  who  were  expected  to  benefit  from  the  ideas  and  advice  `reacted  with 
hostility  against  general  directives  from  above  which  seemed  to  limit  their  freedom  of 
action  or  even  their  use  of  language  when  talking  about  it'.  58  To  add  to  this,  it  was  also 
often  the  case  that  papers  such  as  the  Stationery  Series  would  be  extremely  difficult  for 
many  officers  and  men  to  understand  fully  and  appropriately  employ.  59 
The  51St  Division  was  no  different  from  any  other  formation  in  the  BEF  in  that  it 
selectively  applied  elements  of  the  centralised  advice.  However,  it  is  clear  that  the 
division  did  employ  the  majority  of  central  recommendations  in  the  development  of 
training.  This  was  an  ongoing  process  and  the  message  often  took  time  to  filter  through  to 
become  standard  practice  in  sub-units,  but  such  materials  were  seen  as  a  way  of 
spreading  new  ideas,  rather  than  dictates  that  had  to  be  obeyed.  However,  they  did  permit 
for  a  degree,  a  significant  degree  in  the  case  of  the  (Highland)  Division,  of 
standardisation. 
56  NA,  WO  95  2845,51"  Division  G  War  Diary,  19  June  1917. 
57  IWM,  85/23/1,  The  Papers  of  Major  A.  Anderson,  14  November  1917. 
58  Griffith,  Battle  Tactics  on  the  Western  Front,  p.  26. 
59  S.  Bidwell,  and  D.  Graham,  Firepower,  British  Army  Weapons  and  Theories  of  War  1904-1945  (London, 
1982),  p.  127. 
47 Higher  commanders 
It  has  been  determined  that  centralised  training  methodologies  did  have  an  impact  on 
many  aspects  of  51St  Division  training,  and  it  has  also  been  shown  that  this  was  not 
prescriptive  and  that  there  was  an  element  of  flexibility  through  the  divisional  command 
and  control  model. 
The  same  rule  can  be  applied  to  the  influence  of  army  and  corps  command  in  the 
direction  and  development  of  the  training  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division.  There  was  a 
constant  flow  of  information  which  may  have  involved  aspects  of  training  (such  as 
routine  orders  (army,  corps,  division)),  and  memoranda  focusing  on  specifics  (such  as  the 
use  of  gas  respirators).  However,  the  actual  direction  of  training  was  another  matter. 
Simpson  has  argued  convincingly  that  during  1916  training  was  split  between  GHQ, 
army,  corps,  and  division,  60  but  that  by  1917  responsibility  was  increasingly  devolved, 
`staffs  were  now  more  experienced,  corps  were  less  prescriptive  in  their  dealings  with 
divisions,  and  their  respective  responsibilities  were  now  clearer.  Corps  dealt  with  the 
general  (or  operational)  and  divisions  with  the  local  (or  tactical).  '61  However,  it  is 
debatable  whether  there  was  ever  a  period  when  corps  presumed  to  dictate  training 
methodologies  to  divisions.  That  is  not  to  assert  that  they  did  not  have  an  influence,  as 
Prior  and  Wilson  recorded  of  1915:  `Unquestionably,  the  HD  were  not  fit  for  battle  at 
Festubert.  Rawlinson  felt  particularly  concerned  about  the  poor  staff  work  of  the  HD'.  He 
had  to  send  his  chief  of  staff  to  help  them  prepare  orders.  2  However,  there  was  no 
suggestion  that  Corps  should  direct  training  within  the  division. 
The  (Highland)  Division  passed  through  many  corps  during  the  course  of  the  war,  often 
only  staying  for  short  periods  of  time,  and  during  the  second  half  of  1916  were  almost 
constantly  on  the  move,  `Between  July  and  December  our  division  changed  its  area 
eighteen  times'.  3  This  did  not  permit  corps  command  to  impose  any  consistent  and 
comprehensive  training  system  or  practices  on  the  51".  During  July  1915,  General  Sir 
60  Simpson,  'The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  49. 
61  Simpson,  'The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  97. 
62  R.  Prior,  and  T.  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front  (Oxford,  1992),  p.  97. 
63  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  85. 
48 James  Willcocks,  commander  of  the  Indian  Corps,  stated  to  the  brigadier-general  of  153rd 
Brigade  his  `great  disappointment  that  he  has  never  had  an  opportunity  of  inspecting  it 
[153rd  Infantry  Brigade]  before  leaving' 
. 
64  Maxse  also  stated  at  the  inquiry  after  the  battle 
of  Cambrai  that: 
the  main  thing  hampering  the  proper  training  of  troops  and  dissemination  of  doctrine  in  the 
BEF  was  the  high  turnover  of  divisions  through  corps,  so  that  the  "expert  supervision"  of  their 
training  that  could  be  permitted  by  corps  commanders  was  largely  lacking.  65 
However,  there  were  occasions,  albeit  rare,  when  the  corps  commander  could  and  did 
impose  rigid  routines  on  the  division.  When  the  51St  joined  Maxse's  XVIII  Corps  in  June 
1917,  it  underwent  a  significant  and  comprehensive  training  programme,  utilising 
methods  dictated  largely  by  the  corps  commander.  Maxse  himself  realised  that  the 
influence  of  higher  commanders  should  be  limited.  During  the  court  of  inquiry  on 
Cambrai,  he  stated  that  `Every  Corps  Commander  should  be  held  responsible  for 
supervising  without  interfering  with  the  deliberate  training  of  his  divisions.  Each  division 
has  to  be  studied  separately  and  treated  according  to  its  own  commander's  training 
capabilities  and  personal  characteristics.  '  In  making  that  statement,  Maxse  realised  that 
corps  command  could  not  impose  itself  under  the  current  command  and  control  system: 
how  can  a  corps  commander  who  has  as  many  as  20  divisions  passing  through  his  hands  in 
one  year  be  held  responsible  for  their  training  for  the  battle.  It  is  not  reasonable  that  he  should 
be,  and  the  conclusion  seems  to  be  that  half  the  divisions  in  France  will  not  be  efficiently 
trained  until  they  are  permanently  posted  to  definite  corps.  Books,  circulars,  schools,  lectures 
all  abound  in  profusion.  But  unless  they  are  applied  with  knowledge  of  men  and  in  a  practical 
manner,  they  do  not  produce  trained  formations  or  handy  fire  units.  66 
The  GOC 
In  theory,  the  training  of  each  division  was  carried  out  under  the  personal  `guidance'  of 
the  general  officer  commanding,  who  was  assisted,  and  ultimately  supervised  by  corps 
and  army.  Under  this  rule,  the  application  of  any  centralised  training  principle  was,  by 
and  large,  at  the  discretion  of  the  formation  commander.  However,  the  system  that 
64  NA,  WO  95  2869,153d  Brigade  War  Diary. 
6$  Simpson,  `The  Operational  Role  of  Corps  During  World  War  One',  p.  157. 
66  IWM,  file  40,  The  Papers  of  Lieutenant-General  Ivor  Maxse,  Undated  note  to  a  member  of  the  Court  of 
Inquiry. 
49 evolved  within  the  BEF  was  designed  to  stimulate  local  originality  through  a  centralised 
leadership.  Its  success  rate  was  variable,  but  it  was  never  a  complete  free-for-al1.67  GHQ 
wanted  command  handled  systematically  and  regulation  was  increasingly  apparent  as  the 
war  progressed. 
The  general  officers  commanding  the  51St  Highland  Division  were  ultimately  responsible 
for  the  `efficiency'  of  the  units  under  their  command  and  under  that  authority  and 
guidance  battalion  commanding  officers  were  responsible  for  the  applications  of 
`training'  for  all  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  men  in  their  units.  This  was  a 
crucial  responsibility  as  the  way  formations  trained  usually  dictated  the  way  they  fought, 
in  that  training  and  tactical  evolution  were  inextricably  linked. 
The  51St  Division  had  three  divisional  commanders  during  the  period  it  spent  on  the 
Western  Front  and  each  served  with  the  division  at  significant  periods  in  its  development; 
Major-General  R.  Bannatine-Allason  during  the  `blooding'  of  the  division  upon  arrival  in 
France;  Major-General  G.  M.  Harper,  the  longest  serving  GOC,  who  led  the  51St  through 
key  events  in  1916  and  1917;  and  Major-General  G.  T.  C.  Carter-Campbell,  who  had  the 
difficult  task  of  holding  the  division  together  after  March  1918,  and  reforming  and 
retraining  it  in  order  to  permit  its  return  to  combat  during  the  closing  stages  of  the  war. 
Each  of  these  commanders,  in  different  ways,  had  significant  influence  on  the  training 
methodologies  of  the  5  1st 
Major-General  Bannatine-Allason  took  command  of  the  51St  Division  on  mobilisation, 
prepared  it  for  the  Western  Front,  and  took  it  to  France  in  May  1915  where  he 
commanded  it  on  active  service  until  September  1915.  He  then  transferred  to  England 
and  subsequently  commanded  the  61St  (South  Midland)  Division  and  the  64th  (Highland) 
Division.  Commissioned  to  the  Royal  Artillery  (trained  at  Woolwich),  he  served  in 
Afghanistan,  the  Sudan,  South  Africa,  Manchuria  (with  the  Japanese),  and  the  Indian 
frontier  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War.  68 
67  Griffith,  Battle  Tactics  on  the  Western  Front,  p.  185. 
68  With  thanks  to  Dr  J.  Bourne,  University  of  Birmingham. 
50 All  secondary  accounts  state  that  he  was  a  thorough  and  reliable  officer.  However,  his 
background  was  old  army.  Nicholson  viewed  him  as: 
A  square  shouldered,  square  faced  man  with  a  gift  of  putting  the  hardest  and  squarest  of 
fingers  on  the  spot;  not  by  any  reasoning  power,  that  I  was  aware  of,  but  by  instinct.  If  he  had 
left  it  there,  and  said  nothing  his  vision  would  have  seemed  impressive.  But  he  had  a  fatal 
habit  of  explaining.  69 
His  command  technique  was  very  much  a  product  of  another  age.  He  was  content  to  set 
himself  apart  from  his  subordinates  and  trusted  in  the  delegation  of  much  of  the  training 
to  the  official  syllabus  and  his  officers.  The  51st  (Highland)  Division  Circular 
Memorandum  No.  6  of  7  July  1915  focused  on  the  use  of  hand  grenades,  and  emphasised 
that  the  responsibility  for  training  with  these  weapons  lay  with  brigade,  battalion,  and 
company  commanders: 
in  exactly  the  same  manner  as  does  the  responsibility  for  other  branches  of  training  within 
their  unit.  The  General  Officer  Commanding  is  unwilling  to  lay  down  any  hard  and  fast 
system  of  training  for  the  attainment  of  this  object.  He  considers  such  matters  are  best  left  to 
the  discretion  of  Brigadiers.  He  desires,  however,  to  point  out  that  the  first  essential  is  the 
training  of  the  officers  in  order  that  they  themselves  may  become  efficient  instructors......  The 
G.  O.  C.  directs  that  Brigadiers  shall  give  this  matter  their  utmost  attention,  and  that  the  training 
shall  be  pushed  on  with  the  utmost  energy.  He  trusts  that  within  a  month  from  this  date  there 
will  be  no  man  in  the  ranks  of  the  Infantry  who  is  incapable  of  handling  the  hand  grenade  with 
safety  and  of  using  it  with  effect  when  the  emergency  arises.  70 
As  examined  earlier  in  this  chapter,  Bannatine-Allason  had  a  difficult  task  as  he 
endeavoured  to  train  the  formation  under  the  extremely  testing  conditions  in  and  around 
Bedford.  Moreover,  the  first  few  months  that  he  commanded  the  division  on  the  Western 
Front  gave  little  opportunity  to  develop  systems  and  routines  that  would  progress 
training.  War  diaries  testify  that  for  much  of  the  period  the  51St  was  occupied  in  constant 
trench-holding  duties.  Much  of  the  training  that  was  carried  out  consisted  of  unit  and  sub- 
unit  activity  and  `learning  on  the  job'  in  the  trenches. 
69  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  26. 
70  NA,  WO 95  2869,153rd  Brigade  War  Diary. 
51 Bannatine-Allason  was  an  important  figure  in  the  evolution  of  the  51St  Division,  but,  as 
Ivor  Maxse  pointed  out,  he  ultimately  failed71  to  produce  a  well-trained  body  of  men 
during  his  year  in  command:  `I  knew  the  51St  Division  before  General  Harper 
commanded  it  and  then  considered  it  ill-organised  and  unsold  ier-like'.  72 
On  24  September  1915,  Bannatine-Allason  gave  up  command  of  the  division.  Bewsher 
stated,  rather  discreetly,  that  he  had  been  in  indifferent  health  for  some  time  and  that: 
The  strain  of  the  past  four  months,  in  which  he  had  commanded  the  division  in  its  first 
experiences  of  war,  had  been  severe  and  the  General  therefore  felt  that  he  could  not  continue 
either  with  justice  to  himself  or  the  Division  in  so  responsible  a  position  until  his  health  was 
sufficiently  recovered.  73 
His  successor,  Major-General  Harper  was  to  prove  fundamental  to  the  development  of 
training  routines  and  regimens  within  the  division.  As  an  officer  with  previous  experience 
of  commanding  a  formation  on  the  Western  Front,  74  he  brought  confidence  in  his  ability 
to  deal  with  the  situation  at  hand.  Originally  commissioned  in  the  Royal  Engineers, 
Harper  went  on  to  develop  a  thorough  knowledge  of  different  sectors  in  the  Army.  He 
saw  action  in  South  Africa,  instructed  at  the  Staff  College  at  Camberley,  served  as 
Deputy  Director  of  Military  Operations  at  the  War  Office,  and  as  Chief  Operations 
Officer  at  GHQ  in  France,  before  assuming  his  field  command: 
`B.  A.  '  and  `Uncle'  Harper  were  both  forceful  characters  but  with  very  distinct  personalities. 
There  had  been  drive  in  'B.  A.  's'  rugged  methods;  but  he  came  to  the  war  late  in  life  to  find 
conditions  quite  outside  his  experience  and  training.....  Both  knew  all  the  `Big  wigs' 
intimately;  Smith  Dorrien,  Haig,  Wallie  Robertson  and  Henry  Wilson  were  constant  visitors  at 
our  Divisional  Headquarters  in  the  early  days;  but  whereas  `Uncle'  treated  them  all  with  the 
familiarity  of  a  man,  sure  of  himself,  'B.  A.  '  was  on  the  defensive.  " 
Harper  immediately  had  an  impact  on  the  training  pattern  of  the  515tDivision.  War  diaries 
detail  an  increase  in  the  personal  inspections  of  units  by  the  GOC  and  many  more 
instructions  issued  from  divisional  headquarters.  Throughout  Harper's  command  of  the 
71  If  we  use  the  premise  that  a  GOC  is  responsible  for  the  efficiency  of  the  units  under  his  command. 
72  IWM,  69/53/12,  box  No.  54,  The  Papers  of  Lieutenant-General  Ivor  Maxse,  27  September  1917. 
73  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  46. 
74  He  commanded  17th  Brigade  of  6th  Division  from  February  1915  to  September  1915. 
75  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  140. 
52 division,  training  was  constant,  and  his  direction  of  subordinates  in  the  application  of 
training  methodologies  was  more  obvious  and  progressive  than  that  of  his  predecessor. 
Whilst  maintaining  an  overall  direction,  he  advocated  devolving  training  responsibility 
down  to  section  commanders,  emphasised  the  need  for  basic  tactical  understanding 
through  training  to  all,  and  endorsed  the  practice  of  combined  arms  training  whenever 
and  wherever  possible: 
He  achieved  this  object  to  a  certain  extent  by  lectures  to  officers  and  men,  but  more 
particularly  by  informal  discussions.  He  regularly  visited  units  in  the  line  and  out,  and  seldom 
left  without  having  discussed  some  tactical  principle,  explained  his  views  on  it,  and  impressed 
all  with  their  soundness.  What  the  General  thought  today  the  Division  thought  and  practised 
76  the  following  week. 
In  conjunction  with  the  evidence  from  the  war  diaries  and  other  sources,  Harper's 
theories  on  training  can  be  further  determined  through  his  Notes  on  Tactics  and  Training 
which  originally  issued  in  August  1918,  and  which  emphasised  that  `Many  of  the 
methods  proposed  in  this  pamphlet  had  been  already  found  successful  by  the  51  s` 
(Highland)  Division.  '  He  went  on  to  outline  his  assessment  of  what  had  been  lacking  in 
the  general  training  of  the  BEF,  and  as  an  extension  of  that,  what  he  had  found  and 
attempted  to  correct  in  the  (Highland)  Division: 
In  the  past  the  main  efforts  in  training  had  largely  been  directed  too  much  towards  the  training 
of  the  body  and  too  little  towards  the  training  of  the  mind.  It  had  not  always  been  appreciated 
that  in  war  it  is  the  fittest  mind  which  survives  as  much  as,  if  not  more  than,  the  fittest  body. 
Training  has  not  been  progressive,  but  has  been  chiefly  composed  of  short  periods  out  of  the 
line  recurring  at  varying  intervals,  during  which,  in  many  units,  all  ranks  began  again  at  the 
beginning,  and  in  consequence  never  reached  the  end.  When  failure  occurred,  the  cause  was 
almost  invariably  that  the  men,  not  having  been  taught,  when  their  leaders  became  casualties 
did  not  know  how  to  act  and  had  no  confidence  in  their  weapons.  " 
Harper's  recommendations,  based  on  the  principles  he  applied  to  training  the  51S`,  rested 
on  the  continual  adaptation  of  training  patterns  to  suit  new  weaponries  and  on  increasing 
and  improving  the  tactical  awareness  of  the  infantry.  78  He  stressed  that  initiative  and 
76  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"Highland  Division,  p.  142. 
77  G.  M.  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training  (London,  1919),  pp.  9-10. 
78  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  pp.  17-18. 
53 leadership  on  the  part  of  officers  and  men  were  a  key  component  of  successful  training,  79 
`When  men  failed,  it  was  often  due  to  lack  of  awareness  of  what  to  do'.  80  Harper's  views 
on  the  importance  of  the  inculcation  of  initiative  through  training  is  evident  from  early 
1917,  when,  during  a  liaison  visit  before  the  attack  at  Arras,  Major  E.  L.  Spears  had  been 
impressed  by  Harper's  use  of  models  and  a  dummy  battlefield  to  train  his  men.  The 
General  had  told  him,  `The  time  had  come  ....  when  soldiers  should  use  their  brains 
again'.  Spears  commented,  `This  principle  he  certainly  applied'.  81  A  further  example  is 
provided  by  Major  F.  W.  Bewsher  when  discussing  Harper's  approach  to  raiding: 
In  these  raids  it  became  clear  that  a  blind  leap  into  a  trench  was  not  a  sound 
policy......  Considerable  pains  were  therefore  taken  to  train  the  men  not  to  rush  blindly  at  their 
objective......  The  men  were  therefore  constantly  practised  in  assaulting  reserve  trenches....  It 
was  after  these  raids,  to  which  reference  is  made  later,  that  General  Harper  in  an  increasing 
degree  emphasised  in  training  his  troops  the  necessity  for  fighting  with  their  wits,  and  not  by  a 
mere  display  of  seeing  red  and  brute  courage.  82 
Lieutenant-General  Maxse  also  held  Harper  in  some  esteem  as  a  trainer  of  formations.  ß3 
On  27  September  1917  in  a  report  to  Fifth  Army  HQ,  he  stated: 
I  have  the  honour  to  furnish  the  following  report  upon  Major-General  G.  M.  Harper,  C.  B., 
D.  S.  O.,  commanding  51  s`  Division  in  this  Corps- 
During  the  past  three  months  of  strenuous  work  in  FLANDERS  I  have  formed  a  high  opinion 
of  this  officer.  He  has  an  intimate  up-to-date  knowledge  of  infantry  tactics  and  is  thorough  in 
his  training  methods. 
His  division  is  organised  from  top  to  bottom  in  all  departments,  and  he  handles  it  in  a  masterly 
manner  in  active  operations.  It  is  now  one  of  the  two  or  three  best  divisions  in  France  and  its 
fighting  record  is  well  known.  I  attribute  its  success  mainly  to  its  present  commander  and 
recommend  him  for  promotion  to  a  Corps.  84 
However,  it  is  impossible  to  discuss  Major-General  Harper  without  mention  of  the 
incident  that  has  had  such  a  negative  impact  on  his  reputation  as  a  progressive  trainer  and 
tactician.  Whilst  in  command  of  the  (Highland)  Division  at  the  battle  of  Cambrai  in 
79  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  p.  19. 
80  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  p.  20. 
81  W.  A.  Moore,  A  Wood  Called  Bourlon,  The  Cover-Up  After  Cambrai,  1917  (London,  1988),  p.  51. 
82  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  143. 
83  The  51"  under  Harper  served  in  Maxse's  XVIII  Corps  in  1917. 
84  IWM,  Con  Shelf  Volume  41,  The  Papers  of  Lieutenant-General  Ivor  Maxse,  XVIII  Corps  G.  S.  82.,  27 
Sept  1917. 
54 November  1917,  Harper  ordered  that  sections  detailed  to  follow  tanks  in  the  initial 
advance  should  do  so  in  `wave  formation'  and  at  a  distance  of  not  less  than  100  yards. 
Most  of  the  tanks  were  shelled  as  they  approached  a  ridge  on  the  Hindenburg  support  line 
and  were  destroyed.  Unsurprisingly,  officers  of  the  ill-fated  Tank  Corps  were  prominent 
amongst  those  who  condemned  Harper  for  poor  tactical  judgment.  A  Tank  Corps 
reminiscence  described  him  as  `a  man  of  extremely  strong  views',  who  declared  the 
Cambrai  plan  to  be  a  `fantastic  and  unmilitary  scheme'.  It  asserted  that  Harper  would  not 
have  his  men  alter  their  regular  mode  of  attack  and  that  he  refused  to  rehearse  the  new 
tank  battle  drill  with  the  result  that  the  troops  did  not  move  close  enough  to  the  tanks  and 
both  arms  were  not  mutually  supporting.  It  continued: 
The  training  of  (tank)  battalions  in  co-operation  with  the  51°`  Division  had  not  been  thorough. 
This  division  had  very  definite  ideas  on  what  they  could  do  and  practically  said  'We  will  do 
our  stuff.  Hope  you  can  do  yours.  '  They  did  not  like  the  idea  of  moving  `worm-formation' 
close  up  behind  tanks  and  preferred  to  follow  in  lines  about  200  yards  in  rear.  85 
Tim  Travers  outlined  a  particularly  vicious  account  by  Brigadier-General  Hardress- 
Lloyd86  who,  in  May  1918,  stated  that  Harper  had: 
repudiated  the  new  `worm'  infantry  approach  formation  which  called  for  single  file  rather  than 
the  line  formation,  with  a  rather  simple  argument:  "`Now"  explained  this  old  ass  [Harper]  "if 
you  were  walking  down  the  road  with  a  girl  how  would  you  go?  "  "Arm  in  arm"  answered  HL, 
"There  you  are",  exclaimed  old  Harper.....  "Well  General",  replied  HL,  "If  you  and  the  late 
Oscar  Wilde  were  walking  down  the  street  together  where  do  you  think  he  would  go?  "  Harper 
was  very  nearly  taken  out  of  the  room  in  an  ambulance.  87 
However,  the  Tank  Corps  had  not  impressed  during  operations  at  Third  Ypres  and 
confidence  in  its  effectiveness  as  something  more  than  a  mere  arm  of  the  infantry  was 
fading.  Field  Marshal  Haig  wrote  on  23  December  1917  that: 
On  our  side,  on  the  other  hand,  we  now  have  the  advantage  of  a  new  feeling  of  confidence  in 
our  tanks,  which  runs  all  through  the  Army.  Before  November  20`h  very  few  commanders 
believed  in  tanks,  and  the  troops  took  little  account  of  them.  Their  value  is  now  so  universally 
85  R.  Woollcombe,  The  First  Tank  Battle,  Cambrai  1917  (London,  1967),  p.  107. 
86  Commander  of  the  3`d  Tank  Brigade. 
87  T.  Travers,  How  the  War  was  Won  (London,  1992),  p.  6. 
55 recognised  that  any  future  operations  with  tanks  will  now  be  undertaken  with  a  feeling  of  great 
confidence  in  all  ranks.  88 
It  is  clear  that  the  Tank  Corps  had  needed  a  substantial  success  to  offset  its  earlier 
disappointments  and  it  may  have  been  necessary  to  find  a  scapegoat  on  whom  to  pin  any 
potential  failings. 
Other  sources,  both  primary  and  secondary,  also  contradict  many  of  the  above  assertions. 
Tank  Corps  officers  were  present  during  co-ordination  lectures  and  training  and  yet  did 
not  appear  to  question  Harper's  deployment  of  infantry  behind  tanks.  Former  officers  of 
the  1/60'  Seaforths  stated: 
in  the  early  days  of  November  the  only  thing  worthy  of  note  was  a  lecture  by  Brigadier- 
General  Pelham  Burn  to  all  officers  of  152"d  Brigade,  which  was  attended  by  many  officers  of 
the  Tank  Corps....  tanks  were  to  figure  largely  in  the  scheme  that  was  unfolded.  Highland 
officers  fraternised  with  officers  of  the  Tank  Corps  as  the  plot  was  revealed.  89 
Woollcombe  added: 
First  the  men  were  taught  to  advance  behind  the  tanks  just  as  they  had  behind  barrages,  but 
more  slowly  and  at  a  greater  distance.  Then  the  tactics  of  the  Tank  Sections  were  explained  to 
them.  Repeated  rehearsals  followed,  in  some  places  with  tanks,  in  others  with  tank  officers  in 
place  of  their  ships....  supplemented  by  frequent  meetings  by  tank  and  infantry  officers  and 
N.  C.  O.  s,  9o 
and  Brigadier-General  Beckwith  reported: 
the  Tank  Officers  and  N.  C.  O.  s  concerned  were  brought  together  with  the  Officers  and  N.  C.  O.  s 
with  whose  Companies  and  Platoons  they  were  to  work,  the  former  actually  representing  their 
tanks  in  the  Battalion  practices  beforehand,  as  well  as  in  the  Brigade  ones.  Great  camaraderie 
was  established  and  all  had  confidence  in  each  other  and  understood  each  others'  roles  and 
objectives.  91 
88  NA,  WO  158/54,  Report  by  Haig  Summarising  the  Operations  between  20  November  and  7  December. 
89  R.  T.  Peel,  and  A.  H.  MacDonald,  6h  Seaforth  Highlanders,  Campaign  Reminiscences  (Elgin,  1923),  p. 
52. 
eo  Woollcombe,  The  First  Tank  Battle,  p.  107. 
91  NA,  WO  95  2846,153`d  Brigade  Lessons  Learnt,  Notes  on  Operations  between  Metz  and  the  Cantaing 
Line  19-24  November  1917,20  November  1917. 
56 51st  Division  instruction  No.  1,  dated  7  November  1917  clearly  stated  that  `In  the 
forthcoming  operations  the  Tanks  are  the  primary  weapon  of  attack',  emphasising  that 
Harper  did  not  consider  the  tanks  to  be  merely  support  weapons,  and  that  `No  infantry 
should  follow  closer  than  100  yards  behind  the  Tanks.  The  actual  distance  will  be 
governed  by  the  necessity  for  each  Platoon  to  keep  touch  with,  and  not  lose  sight  of,  its 
respective  section  of  tanks.  '  This  was  in  accordance  with  Tank  Corps  instructions.  The 
instruction  also  stated  that  the  first  wave  of  the  infantry  should  follow  in  extended  order 
to  avoid  potential  concentrations  of  enemy  fire  on  the  tanks.  The  instruction  finished 
with,  `In  order  to  afford  every  chance  of  success  to  the  operation,  Tank  personnel  and 
Infantry  must  work  constantly  together  and  must  understand  thoroughly  each  other's 
methods.  '92  Again,  hardly  a  convincing  case  for  strong  disagreement  over  tactical 
deployment. 
The  conclusion  is  that  Major-General  Harper  followed  the  prescribed  Tank  Corps 
instructions  regarding  the  distance  to  be  followed  behind  the  tanks.  The  decision  to 
follow  in  extended  order  was  his  own,  but  was  understandable  in  an  attempt  to  safeguard 
his  infantry.  Whether  the  infantry  followed  in  `wave'  or  `worm'  formation  is  largely 
irrelevant  as  it  is  highly  doubtful  that  the  troops  would  have  engaged  with  the  enemy  in 
time  to  save  the  tanks  being  knocked  out. 
Such  a  misleading  and  biased  appraisal  of  Harper's  character  should  not  be  permitted  to 
reflect  badly  on  the  generally  positive  impact  that  he  had  on  progressing  the  training  of 
the  51S`  (Highland)  Division.  It  certainly  did  not  appear  to  be  a  prevalent  issue  in  March 
1918  when  he  was  promoted  to  the  command  of  the  IV  Corps  in  Third  Army. 
He  was  replaced  as  GOC  by  Major-General  Carter-Campbell.  Commissioned  in  the 
Scottish  Rifles  and  having  served  in  South  Africa,  Carter-Campbell  was  the  second-in- 
command  of  1/2nd  Scottish  Rifles  in  8d'  Division  at  the  start  of  the  war,  and  subsequently 
commanded  it  until  September  1915  when  he  was  appointed  to  the  command  of  94`h 
92  NA,  WO  95  2846,51"  Division  Instruction  No.  1,  S.  G.  729/7,7  Nov  1917. 
57 Brigade.  He  took  over  the  51St  Division  on  the  16th  day  of  the  cataclysmic  month  of 
March  1918. 
Carter-Campbell  had  considerable  field  experience  within,  and  in  command  of,  infantry 
units  and  formations.  Much  of  that  experience  was  accumulated  during  the  campaign  in 
France  and  Belgium.  All  accounts  indicate  that  he  was  a  strong  and  solid  officer: 
George  Carter-Campbell  was  an  outstanding  officer,  small  and  neat  in  appearance  with  a 
rather  dry,  incisive  manner.  Good,  though  not  exceptional  brains  were  allied  to  shrewd 
practical  ability  and  a  capacity  for  putting  his  finger  on  essentials.  A  strong,  resolute  character 
whose  judgment  of  people  and  their  abilities  was  remarkably  good........  Both  morally  and 
physically  he  was  fearless.  He  was  a  martinet  but  by  no  means  unapproachable,  and  although 
he  may  not  have  enjoyed  much  affection  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  inspired  respect  and 
confidence.  On  active  service  he  was  imferturbable  under  any  conditions  however  bad,  as 
witness  his  leadership  at  Neuve  Chapelle.  9 
That  imperturbable  nature  would  be  useful  as  the  German  Army  continued  the  advance 
that  had  begun  on  21  March  and  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  gradually  buckled  and 
broke  under  tremendous  pressure.  Casualties  were  enormous  and  the  operating  systems 
within  the  division  were  effectively  shattered.  As  soon  as  Carter-Campbell  could  reform 
the  withdrawn  division,  it  was  hit  again  by  another  huge  German  force.  Withdrawn  once 
again,  the  (Highland)  Division  that  Carter-Campbell  had  taken  over  from  Harper  had 
almost  ceased  to  exist. 
Carter-Campbell's  influence  during  this  period  was  considerable.  With  the  loss  of  so 
many  officers  and  men,  and  the  addition  of  so  many  inadequately  trained  reinforcements, 
his  direction  was  vital.  A  conscientious  and  methodical  soldier,  he  retrained  the  division 
to  a  standard  considered  necessary  for  it  to  take  part  in  active  operations  once  more. 
However,  the  division  was  never  fully  trained  for  the  semi-open  warfare  that  was  a 
characteristic  of  the  second  half  of  1918  and,  when  it  did  become  involved  in  battle 
again,  suffered  heavy  casualties. 
93  J.  Baynes,  Morale,  A  Study  of  Men  and  Courage,  The  Second  Scottish  Ries  at  the  Battle  of  Neuve 
Chapelle  1915  (London,  1967),  p.  22. 
58 Officers  and  men 
The  system  of  command  and  control  within  the  51St  Division  did  not  radically  alter  during 
the  course  of  the  war,  although  there  were  shifts  in  the  focus  of  responsibility  and 
authority.  Some  officers  had  more  or  less  impact  on  training  dependent  on  the  stage  of 
the  war  and  the  condition  of  the  units.  However,  it  is  accurate  to  state  that  all  down  to  and 
including  battalion  commanders  had  an  influence  on  the  development  of  training 
programmes.  It  is  also  accurate  to  state  that  the  more  junior  levels  of  command 
experienced  a  greater  responsibility  for  the  direct  training  of  men  as  the  war  progressed 
and  many  more  officers  and  men  became  teachers  as  specialisms  became  less  specialist 
and  more  widely  applied. 
It  has  already  been  stated  that  general  officers  commanding  throughout  the  British 
Expeditionary  Force  were  ultimately  responsible  for  the  `efficiency'  of  the  units  under 
their  command.  In  this  they  were  supported  by  the  senior  officers  of  the  division,  such  as 
brigadier-generals.  However,  battalion  commanding  officers  were  directly  responsible  for 
the  training  of  all  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and  men  in  their  units,  as  were  the 
commanding  officers  of  supporting  units  and  other  arms.  `The  Divisional  Commander  is 
a  trainer  of  men,  and  knowing  that  constant  efficiency  can  only  be  maintained  if  a 
training  system  is  deeply  embedded  in  the  hearts  of  the  Brigadiers  and  Commanding 
Officers.  '94  The  51s'  (Highland)  Division  adhered  to  these  principles,  although  there  was 
some  flexibility  to  the  rule,  which  was  also  reflected  in  changes  to  the  command  and 
control  in  the  Expeditionary  Force  as  a  whole  as  the  war  progressed.  Divisional 
commanders  of  the  51St  Division  applied  different  command  styles  dependent  on  their 
own  particular  command  preference  (they  were  permitted  this  degree  of  flexibility)  and 
on  the  particular  stage  in  the  war.  In  contrast  to  Bannatine-Allason,  Harper  and  Carter- 
Campbell  were  more  `invasive'  and  `directive',  consistently  issuing  detailed  operational 
and  training  instructions  and  conducting  routine  inspections  on  a  regular  basis. 
94  IWM,  21/2/17,  The  Papers  of  Lieutenant-General  Ivor  Maxse,  Letter  from  Brigadier-General  Kentish,  21 
February  1917. 
59 Brigadier-generals  were  also  important  figures  in  the  training  of  the  (Highland)  Division 
throughout  the  war.  Within  the  flexible  command  and  control  system  where  senior 
officers  could  apply  different  levels  of  `hands  on'  control,  brigadier-generals,  such  as 
Pelham  Burn,  were  extremely  influential.  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley  stated: 
I  may  say  they  set  only  a  standard  I  had  expected  of  them,  because  though  a  Cameron,  I  had 
been  well  trained  in  my  youth  in  1917  in  the  Highland  Division  when  I  served  under  a  certain 
Regular  officer  of  your  Regiment,  who  knew  what  standards  meant-Brigadier  H.  Pelham 
Bum.  95 
Brigadier-generals  served  in  both  a  supervisory  capacity,  ensuring  that  the  GOC's 
instructions  were  carried  out,  and  as  co-ordinators  of  battalion  training  within  their 
formations. 
To  develop  satisfactory  training  programmes  in  their  brigades,  brigadier-generals  would 
discuss  and  agree  training  schemes  and  syllabuses  at  both  the  divisional  and  the  battalion 
level  of  command.  The  brigadier-generals  would  also  consider  and  co-ordinate  responses 
to  higher  command  initiatives  to  improve  training  and  tactics.  Often  this  would  take  the 
form  of  preparing  and  producing  a  report  on  a  particular  exercise  or  engagement. 
Brigadier-General  Campbell  requested  from  divisional  headquarters  that  he  be  permitted 
to  plan  and  execute,  `Regimental  Exercises  for  Officers  and  N.  C.  Os.  during  rest  period', 
due  to  `the  majority  of  all  ranks'  needing  `training  for  open  warfare'.  96  The  centralising 
SS  papers  could  also  be  criticised  by  brigadier-generals,  and  in  a  memo  to  divisional 
headquarters  Pelham  Burn  stated,  `With  reference  to  S.  S.  523  (Regulations  regarding 
leave),  I  hope  that  I  may  be  allowed  to  put  forward  the  case  of  the  officers  and  men  of 
this  Brigade'.  97 
Other  commanders  would  also  direct  the  training  actions  of  supporting  units  and  other 
arms  under  their  control  and  supervision.  The  war  diaries  from  units  in  the  Royal  Army 
95  National  Library  of  Scotland,  ACC8681,  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley:  Talk  to  the  Gordon 
Highlanders  Association  1947,  Glasgow  Branch. 
96  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Report  from  Brigadier-General  D.  Campbell  to  Divisional  Headquarters,  S.  G.  34/2,13 
August  1916. 
97  NA,  WO  95  2862,152'd  Brigade  War  Diary,  memo  undated. 
60 Medical  Corps  or  from  the  Deputy  Assistant  Director  Ordnance  Supply  contained  many 
instances  of  specialist  memos  written,  and  lectures  given,  by  senior  officers  outlining 
methods  and  modes  of  training  in  their  sectors.  Major  Bewsher  stated  of  the  divisional 
artillery  that  `General  Oldfield's  officers  not  only  handled  their  guns  with  great  skill,  but 
also,  as  a  result  of  his  teaching,  were  able  in  emergencies  to  take  command  of 
disorganised  detachments  of  men  and  fight  equally  skilfully  as  infantry  officers'.  98 
Infantry  battalion  commanders  had  the  direct  responsibility  for  training  their  units,  which 
involved  the  preparation  of  training  programmes  which  were  submitted  to  brigade  and 
divisional  command  for  approval.  Battalion  commanding  officers  would  subsequently 
carry  out  and  supervise  the  application  of  those  programmes.  The  training  would 
predominantly  occur  when  the  battalion  was  `at  rest'  and  out  of  the  line.  However,  during 
periods  in  the  line,  commanding  officers  had  to  ensure  that  sub-units  in  the  battalion 
continued  to  organise  and  carry  out  individual  training. 
The  individual  units  that  composed  the  (Highland)  Division  could  differ  in  their  training 
methods,  particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war  when  there  was  less  direction  from 
divisional  headquarters.  Battalion  commanders  were  frequently  left  to  their  own  devices. 
`A  thing  that  appeals  to  us  all  from  the  CO  downwards  is  the  way  we  are  left  alone. 
Orders  come,  are  obeyed  and  then  you  carry  on  again.  Over  here  one  is  not  worried  with 
silly  questions  and  orders  like  you  are  when  training  at  home.  '99  The  variable  standards  in 
training  can  be  seen  by  a  comparison  of  five  battalions  in  the  51St  during  September  and 
October  1915.  On  21  September  1915,  Lord  Kitchener  complimented  the  commanding 
officer  of  the  1/5th  Seaforths  on  his  battalion,  stating,  `Colonel,  you  have  the  finest  body 
of  men  I  have  ever  seen'.  100  By  way  of  contrast  to  this  glowing  reference,  Brigadier- 
General  Edwards  of  154th  Brigade,  upon  inspection  of  the  battalions  under  his  command 
said  of  the  1/8th  King's  Liverpool  Regiment  on  8  October  1915,  that  `trench  discipline 
was  faulty.  Many  rifles  with  uncharged  magazines.  Officers  had  not  instructed  men.  '  On 
9  October,  he  stated  of  the  1/4th  North  Lancashires,  that  its  trench  discipline  was  good 
98  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  71. 
99  IWM,  78/22/1,  Diary  of  Captain  J.  S.  Mahon,  undated. 
100  D.  Sutherland,  War  Diary  of  the  51h  Seaforth  Highlanders  (London,  1920),  p.  40. 
61 and  `ncos  and  men  were  well  instructed  in  their  duties'.  He  went  on  to  compare  the  1/6th 
Scottish  Rifles  as  being  `fairly  well  instructed  in  their  duties  not  so  clean  as  the  N. 
Lancs',  whilst  he  also  recorded  on  10  October,  the  1/4v'  King's  Own  Lancaster 
Regiment's  `Trench  discipline  and  ability  to  meet  emergencies  fairly  good'.  Finally,  on 
12  October  1915,  he  stated  that  the  billets  of  the  2/5th  Lancashire  Fusiliers  `were  very 
dirty  and  no  care  seemed  to  have  been  taken  for  the  cleanliness  of  the  billets  or  welfare  of 
the  men.  Sanitary  arrangements  were  bad.  i101  Clearly  there  were  differences  between 
both  units  in  separate  brigades  and  between  units  in  the  same  brigades. 
Under  Major-Generals  Harper  and  Carter-Campbell,  there  was  more  direct  command, 
control  and  direction,  which  also  reflected  the  growing  awareness  of  the  importance  of 
progressive  training  methodologies  and  the  ongoing  standardisation  of  training  principles. 
However,  even  with  this  increased  direction,  there  were  still  differences  in  the  style  and 
standard  of  training  in  each  unit.  There  were  a  number  of  reasons  for  this,  such  as  the 
effectiveness  of  the  commanding  officer,  102  or  the  number  of  casualties  sustained  by  the 
battalion  and  the  resultant  standard  of  reinforcements.  There  were  also  external  factors, 
such  as  what  type  of  area  was  occupied  in  the  line  or  out  of  the  line.  However,  as  a 
general  rule  as  the  war  progressed,  the  units  of  the  (Highland)  Division  increasingly 
displayed  similar  methods  of  training. 
Battalion  commanders,  as  those  directly  responsible  for  the  training  of  the  units  under 
their  command,  were  in  a  prime  position  to  upwardly  influence  the  decisions  of  the 
higher  levels  of  command  in  the  division.  As  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gemmill  of  the  1/8th 
Royal  Scots  (Pioneers)  stated  on  18  August  1916: 
I  think  that  all  officers  require  practice  in  tending  [to]  working  parties  and  putting  them  to 
their  tasks..  ..  with  regard  to  methods  employed  I  am  of  the  opinion  that  better  results-  I  refer  to 
work  only-  might  in  some  cases  have  been  obtained  if  an  officer  of  the  General  Staff  or  senior 
101  IWM,  78/42/1,  Diary  of  Brigadier-General  G.  T.  C.  Edwards,  15401  Brigade. 
102  There  were  many  changes  of  battalion  commanding  officers  throughout  the  war.  Some  were  killed  or 
wounded  after  a  short  time  in  charge,  or  were  transferred  or  sent  home  on  health  grounds.  In  some 
instances,  commanding  officers  were  sacked.  All  these  cases  would  create  a  disruption  to  training. 
62 R.  E.  Officer  selected  by  the  Staff,  had  been  attached  to  the  Brigade  and  made  responsible  for 
all  work  required  by  the  Division  or  Brigade  concerned.  103 
For  the  officers  below  the  rank  of  battalion  commander,  the  consistent  emphasis  was 
placed  more  on  understanding  the  principles  that  issued  from  the  higher-level  command 
and  to  ensure  that  the  troops  were  practised  in  those  principles.  However,  as  the  war 
progressed  a  greater  onus  on  sub-unit  training  and  tactics  was  to  ensure  that: 
The  importance  of  platoon  commanders  cannot  be  over  exaggerated;  not  for  their  elementary 
military  knowledge,  but  because  they  are  the  actual  commanders  of  men.  Higher  commanders 
can  teach,  direct  and  inspire  them;  but  remain  dependent  on  their  platoon  commanders  in 
action.  '°4 
For  the  ordinary  rank  and  file  in  the  sub-units  of  the  division,  there  was  a  degree  of 
responsibility  for  individual  training,  but  there  was  very  little  influence  on  the  wider 
training  methodologies  that  were  employed.  F.  W.  Webster's  view  of  command  and 
control  in  the  (Highland)  Division  was  to  change  dramatically  as  the  war  progressed. 
However,  in  1914  he  stated,  `it  was  unlikely  they'd  be  informed  as  in  these  days  there 
was  a  tremendous  gulf  of  communication  between  officers  and  other  ranks  and  even  if 
any  of  them  knew  what  was  going  on,  the  news  would  never  have  been  leaked  to  the 
troops'.  '°5 
Under  Harper's  command  the  opposite  approach  was  advocated  towards  informing  the 
troops: 
The  infantry  commander,  having  learnt  the  principle  of  tactics,  must  also  know  how  to  train 
his  command  in  a  tactical  exercise.  The  platoon  commander  must  be  responsible  that  the 
section  commanders  know  their  duties  and  can  lead  their  sections  intelligently.  The  section 
commander  must  have  a  knowledge  of  the  use  of  ground,  fire  and  movement,  and  fire  and 
orders,  and  understand  the  role  of  the  section  and  of  his  particular  section  in  attack  and 
defence.  The  training  of  the  section  commanders  must  be  such  that,  having  had  the  role  of 
their  platoons  fully  explained  to  them,  they  carry  it  out  without  further  orders  from  their 
officers.  The  men  must  be  taught  to  answer  to  the  command  of  the  section  leaders,  and  also, 
103  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Note  from  Lieutenant-Colonel  Gemmill  to  511`  Division,  18  August  1916. 
104  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  138. 
los  IWM,  N/A,  The  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W.  Webster,  p.  28. 
63 when  necessary,  to  act  as  individuals  with  an  individual  intelligence.  They  must  learn  to 
become  self-confident  and  to  rely  on  themselves.  '06 
Various  special  instructors  were  also  trained  at  schools  in  order  to  assist  the  commanding 
officers  in  the  training  of  their  units,  and,  to  complement  this,  courses  were  organised  at 
schools  of  instruction  for  company  commanders,  platoon  commanders,  company  sergeant 
majors,  and  platoon  sergeants.  Lectures,  on  a  variety  of  subjects,  were  then  given  by  the 
officers  and  men  who  had  recently  returned  from  the  schools. 
Formation  and  sub-formation  schools  were  important  in  the  development  of  the  training 
of  the  (Highland)  Division.  These  schools  were  established  by  GHQ,  armies,  and  corps, 
on  a  permanent  basis  with  an  approved  establishment  for  the  primary  purpose  of  training 
instructors.  Classes  of  instruction  were  also  formed  temporarily  by  divisions,  brigades 
and  battalions  for  the  purpose  of  training  personnel.  Battalion,  brigade  and  divisional 
classes  were  regularly  in  progress  for  training  in  the  following  as  might  be  required: 
musketry,  Lewis  guns,  signals,  scouting,  dug  out  construction,  bombing  and  rifle 
bombing,  and  light  trench  mortars.  Griffith  states  that  practice  differed  widely  from  year 
to  year  and  from  one  formation  to  another,  although  there  was  an  attempt  to  standardise 
this  in  1918.  He  asserts  that  there  was  already  a  form  of  school  structure  applicable  to 
most  of  the  BEF  within  less  than  a  year  of  the  war's  start.  '  07 
The  first  of  many  divisional  schools  was  formed  in  the  (Highland)  Division  in  January 
1916.  It  was  established  as  a  grenade  school,  at  which  13  officers  and  260  other  ranks 
were  put  through  a  course  every  week.  108  During  the  course,  instruction  was  given  in  the 
Mills  bomb  which  had  by  then  replaced  the  former  types  of  improvised  bomb.  The 
syllabus  included  lectures,  tactical  bombing  exercises,  the  working  out  of  schemes, 
grenadier  tactics,  German  bombing  methods,  and  group  organisation.  This  was 
immediately  followed  by  the  establishment  of  a  divisional  school  of  infantry  under 
Lieutenant-Colonel  D.  Baird,  commanding  the  1/8th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders. 
106  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  p.  23. 
107  Griffith,  Battle  Tactics  on  the  Western  Front,  p.  189. 
108  NA,  WO  95  2844,5  1°`  Division  G  War  Diary,  10  January  1916. 
64 At  this  school  20  officers  and  40  NCOs  attended  a  series  of  fourteen-day  courses.  109  The 
object  of  the  school  was  to  increase  the  powers  of  command  of  the  senior  officers  and 
NCOs  and  to  improve  their  knowledge  of  tactics.  The  syllabus  included  communication, 
discipline  and  esprit  de  corps,  sanitation,  route  marching,  billeting,  musketry, 
reconnaissance,  trench  attacks,  transport,  map  reading,  and  field  engineering. 
Nicholson  described  the  usefulness  of  these  divisional  schools: 
we  formed  instructional  centres  to  meet  all  requirements.  There  were  divisional  schools  in 
which  officers  learnt  the  rudiments,  and  a  little  bit  more,  of  their  duties.  An  admirable 
institution  for  the  inexperienced  young  officers  who  arrived  from  home  and  for  those  already 
out  who  needed  a  little  more  polish.  The  best  of  our  senior  combatant  officers  acted  in  turn  as 
commandants.  We  had  brigade,  divisional  and  army  grenade  schools,  and  trench  mortar 
schools.  We  had  special  courses  of  instruction  for  artillery  and  infantry.  Cadet  schools  for 
N.  C.  O.  s  who  were  recommended  as  officers;  gas  schools  for  everyone-and  so  on.  Very  good 
institutions  in  every  way.  They  kept  the  whole  army  au  fait  with  the  latest  improvements,  and 
improved  the  entente  between  the  different  branches  of  the  service  and  units.  All  these  courses 
of  instruction  went  on,  no  matter  what  battle  was  being  fought.  Men  were  taken  out  in  the 
middle  of  an  action,  and  sent  off  in  a  Piccadilly  bus  to  this  or  that  house  of  knowledge.  '  10 
Webster  related  his  experience  of  the  divisional  gas  school  and  his  appointment  as  his 
unit's  gas  instructor: 
He  found  the  course  most  interesting  and  having  procured  himself  a  good  notebook,  he 
divided  it  into  sections  covering  the  various  subjects  and  cut  a  thumb  index  at  the  edges  of  the 
pages  so  that  he  could  refer  quickly  to  any  special  subject.  His  foresight  paid  handsome 
dividends  for  his  notes  were  retained  by  the  School.  On  his  return  to  his  Battery,  he  had  to 
secure  another  notebook  from  the  Bty.  Office  and  with  the  aid  of  some  rough  notes  he  had 
made  in  class  he  managed  to  make  a  fair  copy  of  those  retained  by  the  Divisional  Gas  School. 
He  discussed  his  plans  for  training  the  Bty.  with  his  Sgt.  Major  and  was  given  several  good 
N.  C.  O.  s  for  a  start  to  train,  and  once  he  had  them  up  to  standard  he  was  able  to  decentralise 
the  work  and  go  up  and  train  all  the  gunners  at  the  Gun  Position.  " 
The  growth  of  the  divisional  training  schools  was  also  stimulated  by  a  multiplicity  of 
technical  specialities: 
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65 At  one  higher  remove  there  were  subjects  such  as  machine  guns,  trench-mortars  and  artillery 
cooperation;  and  beyond  them  again  came  such  items  as  air-to-ground  liaison,  counter-battery 
location,  combined  tank-infantry  tactics  or-the  ultimate  mystery  of  all-'staff  writing'.  Each 
one  of  them  could  boast  its  own  school,  its  temporary  course,  its  weekend  seminar,  or  at  least 
its  half-day  firepower  demonstration.  Soldiers  of  any  rank  might  be  assigned  to  almost  any  of 
the  subjects  at  almost  any  time,  often  on  an  apparently  random  basis;  although  naturally 
officers  tended  to  be  disproportionately  heavily  represented.  Indeed,  the  more  senior  he 
became,  the  more  likely  an  officer  was  to  spend  time  in  training  rather  than  in  the  trenches.  '  12 
In  the  latter  stages  of  the  war,  these  schools  could  disseminate  new  ideas  which  were 
usually  issued  through  official  manuals.  However,.  there  was  still  the  flexibility  in 
command  and  control  and  SS152  re-emphasised  the  rule  that  commanders  should  train 
the  troops  they  led  into  action.  The  publication  included  detailed  syllabuses  for  courses  of 
instruction  at  corps  and  army  schools  across  the  full  range  of  requirements,  but  it  was  at 
the  discretion  of  the  commander  to  apply  the  guidelines.  As  Travers  states,  GHQ,  `did  not 
impose  tactics  and  ideas  on  the  BEF,  rather  army,  corps  and  divisions  organised  their 
own  methods  of  fighting,  which  they  were  to  use  for  the  rest  of  the  war'.  113 
Sport 
Sport  was  a  key  element  in  the  training  of  the  men.  The  improvements  in  physical  fitness 
that  were  derived  from  it  were  complimented  by  other  mental  and  health  benefits.  This 
was  recognised  at  all  levels  of  command  in  the  BEF  and  there  were  structured 
programmes  to  develop  it.  `The  value  of  games  as  breeders  of  the  fighting  spirit  in  the 
soldier  was  a  recognised  principle  before  the  war,  and  experience  during  the  war 
confirmed  this.  A  scheme  of  recreational  training  was  therefore  prepared  and  was 
launched  in  December,  1916'.  114 
However,  before  official  recognition  took  shape  in  the  form  of  structured  training 
programmes,  sport  was  widely  played.  Recreational  training  had  also  been  introduced  by 
the  staff  into  convalescent  depots  long  before  it  was  officially  sanctioned,  but  eventually 
it,  received  the  enthusiastic  support  of  the  Adjutant  General  and  was  carried  out  until  the 
Armistace.  Sports  such  as  boxing  were  always  popular  and,  when  Denis  Winter  stated 
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66 that  football  was  made  compulsory  in  the  winter  of  1917  with  every  platoon  being  issued 
with  a  regulation  ball,  he  could  also  have  added  that  troops  in  the  (Highland)  Division 
indulged  in  that  pastime  at  every  given  opportunity.  '  15  Wauchope  stated  that: 
The  afternoons  were  chiefly  given  up  to  recreation  of  various  kinds,  especially  in  cross- 
country  running,  in  which  the  commanding  officer  took  the  leading  part.  The  usual  inter- 
company  and  battalion  football  matches  were  played  and  the  Division  held  a  boxing 
competition  at  Abbeville.  '  16 
The  French  were  mystified  why  the  British  played  so  much  football  and  did  not  just  train 
instead.  117  However,  sport  was  an  integral  part  of  the  social  and  cultural  fabric  of  Britain 
and  it  was  manifest  in  a  variety  of  forms.  118  Gary  Sheffield  even  cites  examples  of  sports 
analogies  in  the  official  training  manuals  and  instructions  119  and  (Highland)  Division 
commanders  were  amongst  those  who  indulged  in  using  sport  as  military  examples: 
They  must  know  the  principles  of  war  as  laid  down  in  F.  S.  Regulations,  Part  1,  and  be  able  to 
apply  them. 
They  must  realise  that  there  is  only  one  form  of  warfare,  which  is  permanently  governed  by 
the  same  principles,  whether  it  is fought  in  a  trench  or  above  ground,  and  that  these  principles 
are  simple  axioms  which  they  can  learn  by  the  study  of  their  profession  as  easily  as  the  rules 
of  cricket  or  football.  120 
Wider  impact 
Scholars  such  as  Martin  Samuels  have  been  critical  of  the  rigidity  of  the  top-down 
command  and  control  model  in  the  BEF,  but  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  training 
methodologies  and  tactical  ideas  of  the  (Highland)  Division  did  have  an  impact  on  other 
formations  in  the  Expeditionary  Force  and  also  upon  GHQ  and  the  War  Office. 
115  D.  Winter,  Death's  Men,  Soldiers  of  the  Great  War  (London,  1979),  p.  156. 
116  A.  G.  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Vol  II.  (London,  1926),  p. 
278. 
117  A.  Roshwald,  and  R.  Stites  (eds),  European  Culture  in  the  Great  War  (Cambridge,  1999),  p.  340. 
118  J.  G.  Fuller,  Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies  1914-1918  (Oxford, 
1991),  p.  133. 
119  G.  D.  Sheffield,  Leadership  in  the  Trenches,  Ofcer-Man  Relations,  Morale  and  Discipline  in  the  British 
Army  in  the  Era  of  the  First  World  War  (Basingstoke,  2000),  p.  47. 
120  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  pp.  23-24. 
67 A  significant  contributor  to  the  improvement  of  tactical  thinking  and  training 
methodologies  took  the  form  of  comprehensive  debriefs  that  were  often  completed  by 
formations  and  units  immediately  after  combat.  This  had  become  standard  practice  for  all 
divisions  in  the  BEF  towards  the  end  of  the  war.  However,  the  regularity  and  diversity  of 
the  combat  experience  of  the  (Highland)  Division  throughout  the  1917  and  1918  period 
(also  a  period  when  much  of  the  centralising  material  was  being  codified  and  revised), 
coupled  with  its  reputation  and  prestige,  would  have  insured  that  views  emanating  from  it 
were  considered  thoroughly  by  higher  commanders. 
Harper's  Notes  on  Tactics  and  Training,  which  reflected  the  training  methods  used  by  the 
51S`  (Highland)  Division  was  common  reading  at  all  levels  of  command  throughout  the 
BEF.  121  Another  significant  divisional  contribution  to  BEF  training  methodologies  was 
issued  by  Harper  in  January  1918,  in  the  shape  of  a  memorandum  containing  a  number  of 
principles  for  defence  and  trench  construction,  which  at  their  own  request  was  circulated 
to  a  number  of  Divisions,  and  adopted  by  them.  122  It  is  not  surprising  that  this  occurred, 
as  the  centralised  advice  on  defensive  techniques  tended  to  be  inadequate  and  was  often 
poorly  interpreted. 
On  a  more  direct  level,  the  (Highland)  Division  was  also  frequently  called  upon  to  carry 
out  the  instruction  of  other  formations,  units,  support  units,  and  individual  personnel: 
By  August  1915  the  Division  had  so  successfully  overcome  its  earlier  difficulties  that  it  was 
selected  to  instruct  the  18th  Division,  newly  arrived  from  England,  in  trench  warfare. 
Subsequently,  the  22nd  Division,  32"d  Division,  and  afterwards  the  36a'  Division,  were  also 
attached  to  the  (Highland)  Division  for  tours  of  inspection  in  the  line.  123 
This  remit  to  instruct  also  included  formations  from  other  nations,  and  the  78th  American 
Division  carried  out  a  period  of  attachment  during  August  1917.124  The  type  of 
instruction  varied  in  form  from  trench  familiarisation  through  to  general  training 
programmes,  dependent  on  the  period  of  the  war.  However,  an  example  of  a  set  of 
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68 instructions  that  were  issued  for  the  training  of  60th  Division  in  June  1916  focused  on 
individual,  platoon,  company,  and  battalion  instruction.  There  was  also  a  focus  on 
staffwork,  machine  guns,  artillery,  supply,  signals,  and  the  work  of  the  Royal  Engineers, 
the  Pioneers,  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps,  and  the  Army  Service  Corps.  125 
In  the  line 
Trench  warfare  for  the  (Highland)  Division  followed  a  pattern  that  remained  essentially 
similar  until  1918.  Each  infantry  battalion,  whilst  holding  a  section  of  the  line,  spent  a 
number  of  days  in  the  front  line,  then  an  equal  number  in  support  and,  finally,  at  rest.  126 
The  theory  was  that  training  would  take  place  at  the  different  rotational  stages  reflecting 
the  different  conditions  as  units  moved  away  from  the  line.  Obviously  the  form  of 
training  undertaken  would  reflect  the  type  of  unit  or other  arm,  and  crucially  some  sectors 
were  much  busier  than  others,  impeding  the  opportunity  to  train.  The  `busier'  the  sector, 
then  the  greater  the  need  for  flexibility  in  command  and  control,  thus  making  training  `in 
the  line'  one  of  the  most  difficult  to  standardise.  However,  wherever  possible,  the  51St 
maintained  that  the  `on  the  job'  training  activities,  such  as  patrolling,  be  supplemented  by 
training  in  ordinary  duties  such  as  sanitation,  carrying,  digging,  and  anti-gas  precautions. 
The  51St  Division  learned  many  aspects  of  trench  warfare  through  practical  experience  in 
the  line.  As  Paddy  Griffith  points  out,  `a  very  great  deal  of  informal  training  actually  did 
take  place  in  the  trenches,  on  the  basis  that  survival  itself  depended  upon  speedy 
adjustment  to  local  conditions'.  127 
Poorly  trained  in  up  to-date  techniques  upon  its  arrival  in  France,  the  division  was 
fortunate  to  have  been  used  sparingly  in  attack  until  the  battle  at  Beaumont  Hamel  in 
1916  and  the  division  gradually  built  up  experience  in  holding  and  consolidating 
positions  without  incurring  heavy  casualties.  This  ensured  a  valuable  consistency  in 
troops  and  commanders.  For  much  of  1915: 
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69 The  Division  had  profited  considerably  by  their  prolonged  tour  in  the  same  sector,  and  had 
completed  its  education  in  trench  warfare  in  a  most  thorough  manner.  The  men  had  learnt 
trench-craft,  that  art  which  enables  them  to  keep  the  enemy  constantly  on  the  alert  and  at  the 
same  time  to  protect  themselves  by  their  wits  from  avoidable  casualties  and  discomforts. 
They  had  also  had  time  to  acquire  that  sixth  sense  which  a  short  spell  of  the  war  gave  to  all  the 
fighting  troops,  of  working,  walking,  and  fighting  in  the  dark.  They  had  become  good  snipers, 
and  experienced  trench  workers.  They  had  learnt  valuable  lessons  regarding  such  questions  as 
the  influence  of  the  nature  of  the  soil  on  trench  construction,  the  organisation  of  working 
parties,  the  disposal  of  mine  soil,  etc.  128 
Although  the  division  consistently  moved  around  in  1916,  concentrating  mainly  on 
defence  and  line-holding,  the  new  GOC,  Harper,  continually  developed  training  in  both 
defence  practice  and  offence  principle.  After  Beaumont  Hamel,  the  regular  use  of  the  51St 
in  attack  permitted  the  same  experience  to  be  built  up  in  offence  practice,  although  the 
greater  loss  of  casualties  began  to  interfere  with  the  consistency  of  progression.  In  its 
previous  battles  at  Givenchy  in  1915  and  High  Wood  in  1916,  the  (Highland)  Division 
knew  mostly  failure,  but  through  these  failures  it  had  learned  from  its  mistakes  and 
developed  a  more  sophisticated  system  of  tactics  and  training. 
It  is  evident  from  the  war  diaries,  and  in  accordance  with  Tony  Ashworth's  views  on 
British  Expeditionary  Force  aggression,  129  that  the  (Highland)  Division  became  more 
offensively  minded  during  the  second  half  of  1916  as  raiding  became  a  more  prevalent 
activity.  This  was  both  an  opportunity  and  an  inspiration  for  the  development  of  training 
and  tactics.  Raiding  was  useful  in  training  officers  and  men  in  small-scale  attacks  over  no 
man's  land  and  in  the  enemy  line,  and  it  also  permitted  improvements  in  co-ordination 
and  intelligence.  During  raids  carried  out  prior  to  the  battle  of  Arras,  `it  became  clear  that 
a  blind  leap  into  a  trench  was  not  a  sound  policy',  and  `Considerable  pains  were  therefore 
taken  to  train  the  men  not  to  rush  blindly  at  their  objective'.  The  result  of  this 
development  was  that  `The  men  were  therefore  constantly  practised  in  assaulting  reserve 
trenches'.  It  was  after  these  raids,  to  which  further  reference  is  made  later,  that  General 
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70 Harper  to  an  increasing  degree  emphasised  the  training  of  his  troops  in  fighting  `with 
their  wits,  and  not  by  a  mere  display  of  seeing  red  and  brute  courage'.  130 
Other  arms  and  support  units  also  `learned  on  the  job',  as  Bewsher  stated  of  the  Royal 
Artillery  which  made  the  most  of  the  static  warfare  at  the  beginning  of  the  division's 
period  on  the  Western  Front: 
During  the  period  in  which  the  Division  was  in  this  sector,  great  progress  towards  efficiency 
was  made  by  the  Divisional  artillery.  By  the  time  they  had  arrived  in  France  mobile  warfare 
was  for  the  time  being  in  abeyance.  This  was  a  distinct  advantage  to  Territorial  gunners,  as  the 
conditions  of  service  in  peace  time  afforded  then  few  opportunities  for  training  for  warfare  of 
movement.  They  had,  however,  devoted  a  considerable  amount  of  study  to  technical  gunnery. 
Consequently,  they  had  less  ground  to  make  up  than  would  have  been  the  case  if  they  had 
been  engaged  in  a  war  of  movement.  131 
Out  of  the  line 
It  was  acknowledged  by  the  high  command  that  collective  training  could  only  be  carried 
out  during  the  periods  when  units  were  out  of  the  trenches  and  that  these  periods  could  be 
sub-divided  into  both  short  periods  of  rest  and  long  periods  of  training.  During  short 
periods  of  rest,  the  training  carried  out  would  also  have  a  strong  element  of  recuperation 
and  points  for  attention  would  include  the  cleaning  of  the  men,  equipment  and  transport; 
ceremonial  drill;  laying  and  fuse  setting;  skill  at  arms;  gas  defence;  physical  training; 
route  marching;  recreational  training;  and  amusements.  However,  for  long  periods  of 
training  when  out  of  the  line,  a  programme  had  to  be  `laid  down'  by  the  battalion 
commanding  officer,  which  would  have  been  divided  into  both  individual  training  and 
collective  training.  To  assist  the  unit  and  formation  commanders  in  progressing  this 
training,  it  was  War  Office  policy  that  in  forward  areas  all  billets  reserved  for  the  use  of 
troops  resting  from  duty  in  the  trenches  should  have  connected  with  them  a  bayonet 
fighting  course,  ranges  of  at  least  30  yards,  bombing  trenches,  drill  grounds,  recreation 
grounds,  machine  gun  ranges  and  light  trench  mortar  practice  grounds.  It  is  interesting  to 
see  the  above  `general  policy'  from  a  company  officer  perspective  (in  the  (Highland) 
Division)  immediately  prior  to  Third  Ypres: 
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71 when  out  of  the  line  the  daily  routine  must  be  adapted  to  the  circumstances  pervading,  but  we 
aim  at  keeping  up  training,  and  arranging  a  programme  of  work  covering  almost  everything 
that  needs  be  known  by  the  average  soldier.  However,  it  is  impossible  to  carry  out  training  in 
France  "to  the  letter"  as  at  home.  It  is  impossible  to  carry  continuously  all  the  requisitions 
necessary  for  complete  training,  as  it  must  be  remembered  that  we  are  seldom  more  than  two 
weeks  in  the  one  place;  but  we  manage  to  make  substitutes  of  our  own,  and  devise  schemes 
which,  if  not  up  to  date,  are  always  effective......  we  have  recourse  to  carrying  out  elementary 
training,  such  as  saluting  drill,  squad  drill,  and  so  on.  But  all  this  is  done  to  keep  up  a  standard 
of  efficiency  and  strict  discipline,  which  tends  to  make  men  act  on  their  own  initiative  and 
have  more  reliance  in  their  own  powers  of  endurance  when  up  against  the  enemy.  It  must  not 
be  forgotten  that  only  discipline  will  hold  an  army  together-without  discipline,  we  go  under. 
Particular  attention  is  therefore  payed  [sic]  to  the  following  advanced  training:  Platoon  and 
Company  Drill,  Musketry,  Bayonet  fighting,  Physical  Drill,  skirmishing,  and  so  on. 
At  other  times,  however,  we  find  that  all  manner  of  fatigues  interfere  with  our  training.  This 
depends  greatly  on  the  area  in  which  we  happen  to  be  placed,  and  the  sector  in  front  of  us.  132 
Other  arms  and  support  units  followed  their  own  training  programmes.  In  January  1917, 
the  DADOS  war  diary  stated: 
During  the  latter  half  of  this  month,  while  the  Division  has  been  at  rest,  the  whole  of  the  guns 
except  2  have  been  overhauled....  The  entire  gun  stores  ....  of  each  artillery  unit  have  been 
inspected  in  detail....  The  transport  of  2  out  of  3  brigades  has  been  inspected  and  a  large 
number  of  repairs  and  changes  made.  Returns  have  been  received  showing  how  each  battalion, 
mg  company  and  TM  [Trench  Mortar]  Battery  and  Field  Company  stood  with  regard  to 
important  stores  and  indents  for  all  discrepancies  passed........  The  outstanding  feature  of  this 
month  has  been  the  improvement  in  the  supply  of  artillery  stores.  133 
In  general,  the  51St  Division  moved  too  often  and  fought  too  much  to  be  able  to  develop 
any  sustained  progress  in  combined  formation  training  away  from  the  line.  From  March 
1916  through  to  January  1917,  the  51St,  as  a  formation,  was  not  out  of  the  line  `for  more 
than  ten  days',  134  and  from  that  period,  `The  Division  had  been  continually  in  the  line 
since  February,  had  fought  for  three  days  in  the  battle  of  9th-12th  April,  and  had  only 
forty-eight  hours'  rest  before  again  taking  over  a  battle  front.  '  135  It  did  have  the  debatable 
advantage  of  fighting  often  and  that  could  be  considered  to  be  as  valuable  practical 
experience,  but  the  casualties  incurred  prohibited  tactical  and  training  development 
beyond  a  certain  level. 
132  IWM,  89/7/1,  Memoir  of  Lieutenant  W.  Paterson,  p.  51. 
133  NA,  WO 95  2853,51"  Division  DADOS  War  Diary. 
134  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  55. 
135  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  170. 
72 Training  under  brigade  or  battalion  whilst  `at  rest'  was  also  often  problematic  due  to  the 
nature  of  the  sectors  that  the  51"  inhabited.  Lieutenant-Colonel  M.  Haldane  of  the  1/4th 
Seaforths  emphasised  what  was  to  be  a  recurring  factor,  `Training  was  to  some  extent 
interrupted  by  the  chronic  call  for  large  working  parties'.  136  An  example  of  the 
fundamental  problems  and  potentially  disastrous  consequences  of  this  policy  is  evident 
by  the  amount  of  time the  51st  Division  spent  on  reworking  its  sector  prior  to  the  German 
March  offensive  in  1918  instead  of  training  officers  and  men  in  defence  in  depth  tactics. 
This  was  a  recurrent  difficulty  throughout  the  war,  as  Maxse  pointed  out  of  his  command 
in  1916: 
the  total  casualties  in  my  Division  in  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  amounted  to  6754.  This  is  not  a 
figure  to  boast  about,  because  I  am  convinced  that  perhaps  30%  of  these  casualties  would  have 
been  avoided  if  officers  and  men  had  been  trained  more  in  open  country  ... 
No  Corps 
commander  or  corps  staff  could  possibly  have  done  more  for  my  division  to  give  it  TIME  to 
train,  during  the  four  months  preceding  1$`  July.  Plan  after  plan  was  made,  every  device 
thought  out;  all  were  alert  to  getting  training  accomplished.  But  our  training  programmes 
came  to  nothing;  every  plan  was  necessarily  vetoed  on  account  of  our  manual  labour  being 
required  day  and  night  whenever  battalions  were  out  of  the  trenches..  . 
No  rest  and  no  training 
were  possible  for  Infantry,  except  during  the  one  week.  137 
Another  problem,  certainly  in  1915  and  in  early  1916,  was  the  lack  of  ammunition 
available  for  training  purposes.  Of  the  many  examples  in  the  (Highland)  Division  war 
diaries,  the  entry  of  27-29  September  1915  sums  up  the  scale  of  the  problem,  in  that  the 
`Allowance  of  ammunition  reduced  to  what  is  absolutely  necessary  for  retaliation'.  138 
As  had  been  the  case  in  Britain,  the  facilities  for  training  the  division  were  often  found 
wanting.  By  the  end  of  1915,  many  formations  in  the  BEF  were  beginning  to  adopt 
training  in  full  scale  replicas,  often  taking  the  form  of  facsimiles  using  tape  to  mark  the 
various  trench  lines  and  strong  points  on  similar  ground  to  the  objective.  The  (Highland) 
Division  employed  this  technique  at  that  time  and  continued  to  employ  it  until  the  end  of 
16  M.  M.  Haldane,  A  History  of  the  Fourth  Battalion  The  Seaforth  Highlanders  (London,  1927),  p.  153. 
137  R.  Bryson,  `The  Once  and  Future  Army',  in  B.  Bond  (ed),  Look  to  Your  Front,  Studies  in  the  First 
World  War  (Staplehurst,  1999),  p.  48. 
138  NA,  WO  95  2844,5  1°`  Division  G  War  Diary,  27-29  September  1915. 
73 the  war.  However,  to  utilise  this  training  mechanism,  units  at  rest  needed  access  to 
training  areas  where  they  could  lay  out  such  a  practice  ground: 
Large  training  areas  were  hired,  and  so  that  officers  and  men  might  form  some  impression  of 
the  German  position,  which  they  could  not  see,  a  large  model  was  made,  about  the  size  of  four 
tennis  courts,  in  which  hills,  valleys,  streams,  houses,  roads,  woods,  trenches,  etc.,  were  all 
accurately  represented  by  models.  Platforms  were  then  erected  at  intervals  round  it,  from 
which  officers  could  point  out  to  their  men  the  appearance  of  the  area  which  they  could 
traverse  during  the  operations. 
In  some  battalions  each  platoon  made  similar  models  in  the  orchards  round  their  billets, 
showing  all  the  features  in  the  area  allotted  to  their  companies  for  the  attack. 
An  exact  replica  of  the  German  trenches  was  also  marked  out  with  tracing-tapes  on  the 
training  ground  full  size,  in  which  every  known  trench  and  farm  was  represented.  The  troops 
were  then  practised  on  this  course  until  they  could  find  their  way  to  their  objectives  according 
to  plan,  without  any  officers  taking  part  in  the  exercise.  The  men  were  also  carefully  trained  in 
the  manner  in  which  each  post  was  to  dig  itself  in  during  consolidation,  and  how  to  pile  the 
earth  as  it  was  excavated,  so  that  it  at  no  time  obscured  their  field  of  fire  to  the  front. 
The  attack  was  not  delivered  until  31$`  July,  so  that  the  Division  was  given  six  weeks  in  which 
to  make  its  preparations.  During  this  period  the  plans  for  the  operation,  as  well  as  the  training 
of  the  troops,  were  perfected  down  to  the  minutest  detail.  139 
In  theory,  command  areas,  both  in  army  and  corps,  should  have  had  organised  training 
areas  to  permit  tactical  exercises:  in  army  areas,  for  a  division;  and  in  corps  areas,  for  at 
least  a  brigade.  F.  W.  Bewsher  describes  one  such  army  area  at  Eperleques  in  June  1917, 
`This  district  was  a  properly  constituted  training  area,  administered  by  the  headquarters 
of  the  Second  Army,  in  which  troops  were  allowed  full  liberty  of  manoeuvre,  and  in 
which  there  were  no  restrictions  as  regards  the  digging  of  practice  trenches,  etc. 
Moreover,  it  contained  first-class  classification  ranges  up  to  600  yards  in  length,  with  all 
the  necessary  appliances.  '  However,  he  went  on  to  state  that,  `This  was  the  first  occasion 
on  which  the  Division  had  occupied  an  area  in  which  adequate  arrangements  for  training 
existed'.  140  Brigadier-General  Pelham  Burn  also  testified  to  the  need  for  better 
organisation  at  army  level: 
The  necessity  for  the  provision  of  rifle  ranges  behind  the  lines  cannot  be  over-estimated. 
Through  lack  of  practice  on  the  range  it  is  still  undoubtedly  the  fact  that  our  men  have  not  yet 
got  entire  confidence  in  their  rifles.  The  necessity  for  ranges  for  Lewis  Guns  is  even  greater. 
139  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  5J3'  Highland  Division,  pp.  196-197. 
140  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  S1"  Highland  Division,  p.  192. 
74 The  large  majority  of  Lewis  Gunners  go  into  action  having  never  fired  their  weapons  on 
ranges  longer  than  30  yards.  141 
The  lack  of  organisation  is  also  evidenced  at  corps  level:  `Ranges  in  area  indifferent,  and 
it  is  most  important  that  these  should  be  made  and  their  upkeep  provided  for  by  the  Corps 
by  means  of  Area  Commandants  with  a  small  permanent  staff  of  P.  B.  men'.  142 
Casualties 
The  impact  on  the  (Highland)  Division  of  sustaining  heavy  casualties  was  substantial. 
The  result  was  that  training  was  often  stymied  due  to  the  need  to  educate  new  recruits  in 
the  basic  skills  and  tactics  that  were  needed  in  order  to  survive  on  the  Western  Front. 
The  infantry  battalions  and  their  front  line  support  units  were  damaged  most  consistently. 
For  comparative  purposes,  it  is  interesting  to  view  an  account  from  divisional 
headquarters  where  casualties  were  far  lighter  and  a  continuity  certainly  sustained. 
Nicholson  stated  that,  `Our  organisation  in  the  51St  Division  had  been  harmoniously 
evolved;  as  the  war  progressed  so  we  improved'.  143  Such  harmony  was  not  possible  for 
all  units. 
The  51st  was  fortunate  that  casualties  were  not  consistently  heavy  in  any  of  its  units  until 
after  the  battle  of  Beaumont  Hamel  in  November  1916.  This  permitted  the  division  to 
evolve  and  learn  many  of  the  lessons  that  had  been  developed  by  the  BEF  until  that  point. 
However,  after  then,  the  regular  use  of  the  division  in  attack  resulted  in  reinforcements 
being  needed  more  frequently  and  in  greater  quantity. 
Even  a  battalion  that  was  `wiped  out'  in  the  field  would  retain  a  number  of  experienced 
personnel,  as  a  cadre  of  men  from  each  unit  was  left  out  during  attacks  to  ensure  a  core 
continuity:  `A  single  action  may  reduce  a  unit  by  half;  a  series  of  actions  may  leave  only 
a  handful  of  veterans  to  rebuild  a  regiment,  to  train  fresh  troops,  and  to  inspire  them  with 
the  glories  and  traditions  of  past  achievements'.  MacKenzie  went  on  to  state: 
141  NA,  WO  95  2846,152  nd  Brigade  Report,  7  April  1918. 
142  NA,  WO  95  2845,51"  Division  G  War  Diary,  1-9  May  1917. 
143  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  pp.  210-211. 
75 In  the  months  of  April  and  May,  the  battle  casualties  of  the  6`h  Battalion,  excluding  all  cases  of 
sickness  were  632.  During  April,  May  and  June  836  reinforcements  were  received.  The  losses 
in  officers  and  NCOs  had  been  particularly  severe,  and  June  and  July  were  devoted  to  training 
and  recuperating.  The  gallant  behaviour  of  the  Battalion  in  engagements  later  in  the  year  is  in 
itself  the  highest  proof  of  the  ability  and  energy  shown  by  the  training  personnel-old  and  new- 
in  restoring  and  maintaining  the  high  spirit  and  resolute  action  which  had  distinguished  the 
conduct  of  the  battalion  during  the  preceding  two-and-a-half  years.  '44 
However,  new  recruits  meant  an  increased  strain  on  the  survivors,  who  already  had  busy 
schedules,  and  Sutherland  stated  that,  in  December  1916,  five  days  were  spent  in  training 
the  new  men  in  the  battalion  attack  methods.  145  Bradbury  concurred,  `We  now  received 
many  drafts  of  new  men,  most  of  them  raw  recruits  from  England,  and  these  additions 
caused  us  a  great  amount  of  extra  work  with  the  result  that  on  the  following  day  we  had 
to  work  all  night'.  146 
In  a  formation  like  the  (Highland)  Division  that  was  used  consistently  in  attack  for  almost 
two  years,  the  result  was  often  that  units  were  thrown  into  the  fray  without  being  able  to 
learn  and  practise  the  lessons  of  the  previous  battle,  as  reported  by  Major-General  Carter- 
Campbell  after  the  March  combat  of  1918: 
The  Division  having  sustained  219  casualties  to  officers  and  4646  O.  Rs.  in  the  operations 
concluding  March  26`h  was,  therefore,  largely  composed  of  fresh  drafts,  both  of  officers  and 
other  ranks,  when  it  went  into  action  on  April  9`h.  It  became  evident  during  these  operations 
that  the  officers  and  men  were  lacking  in  training  in  the  elementary  duties  of  an  infantry 
soldier,  and  were  unable  to  apply  the  lessons  learnt.  There  was  a  conspicuous  lack  of 
confidence  in  the  rifle  and  of  the  ability  to  use  it  effectively.  The  knowledge  of  the  use  of 
ground  and  cover,  and  of  fire  control,  both  on  the  part  of  officers  and  men,  or  small  bodies  of 
men  without  a  leader,  were  devoid  of  initiative.  147 
An  excellent  example  of  this  lack  of  experience  can  be  determined  by  an  account  from  an 
officer  of  the  King  Edwards  Horse,  who  with  his  unit  was  trapped  by  advancing  German 
forces  in  April  1918: 
144  D.  MacKenzie,  The  6`"  Gordons  in  France  and  Flanders  (Aberdeen,  1921),  p.  121. 
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76 I  shall  never  forget  the  sight  of  them.  The  roads  and  the  fields  to  the  right  were  being  heavily 
swept  by  bullets,  and  the  grey  coats  were  just  beginning  to  show  through  the  fence  in  our  right 
rear;  but  the  Scots  came  up  the  road  at  the  double,  as  if  nothing  was  happening,  with  their  kilts 
swinging.  It  was  a  piece  of  the  old  decent  warfare  came  back  again.  The  leading  platoon  came 
right  up  to  our  parados  and  I  shouted  to  them  to  swing  over  to  help  Ewbank.  The  rest  dropped 
out  in  the  fields  forming  a  line  at  right  angles  to  ours.  Their  officer,  Captain  Sutherland  went 
back  to  look  after  them.  I  thought  he  was  killed,  but  met  him  again  in  the  evening.  The  Boche 
now  began  bombing  us  up  the  trench  and  were  within  a  100  yards  of  Headquarters.  The  Scots, 
raw  drafts  of  youngsters  just  out  from  home,  were  like  lost  sheep  without  their  officer  and  lay 
down  in  a  lump  behind  the  parados,  and  did  nothing.  Poor  boys  did  not  lack  courage,  but 
simply  did  not  know  what  to  do.  148 
In  conclusion,  there  is  a  common  accord  amongst  scholars  that  there  was  a  lack  of 
appropriate  and  effective  training  in  Britain  during  1914-1915.  Although  relatively  few 
studies  exist  that  substantiate  this  view,  the  experience  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division 
does  indicate  that  it  is  correct.  Upon  its  arrival  in  France  in  May  1915,  the  division  was 
only  partially  trained  in  outdated  techniques. 
The  failure  to  provide  effective  training  in  Britain  was  a  result  of  inexperienced  officers; 
inadequate  training  facilities  and  training  conditions;  poor  quality  (or  lack  of)  equipment 
and  ammunition;  significant  disruptions  to  formation  and  unit  training  caused  by  constant 
transfers  of  men,  the  Imperial  Service  commitment,  and  a  redeployment  of  (Highland) 
Division  units  to  other  formations.  In  addition  to  this,  the  official  War  Office  training 
syllabus  was  predominantly  based  on  outdated  pre-war  training  theories  and  programmes 
that  Territorial  officers  and  men  of  the  (Highland)  Division  were  incapable  of  fully 
understanding  and  employing  irrespective  of  its  value. 
When  the  division  arrived  on  the  Western  Front,  there  was  little  in  the  way  of  centrally- 
(GHQ,  army,  corps)  directed  training  programmes  and  initiatives.  Lessons  that  had  been 
learned  since  the  outbreak  of  the  war  had  not  yet  been  codified  and  circulated  for 
adoption.  However,  that  was  as  much  a  result  of  confusion  over  what  lessons  had  been 
learned  as  it  was  an  incapacity  to  organise  and  disseminate  the  information.  The  pre-war 
Field  Service  Regulations  continued  to  provide  a  focus  for  training  in  the  BEF,  but  it 
essentially  took  the  form  of  a  series  of  principles,  rather  than  directives  for  practice. 
148  L.  James  (ed),  The  History  of  King  Edward's  Horse  (London,  1921),  pp.  287-8. 
77 However,  as  the  war  progressed  and  the  bureaucratisation  of  the  BEF  became  more 
pronounced,  there  was  an  ever-increasing  quantity  of  centrally  distributed  information  on 
training  and  tactics  (SS  papers,  memoranda,  etc)  which  assisted  in  applying  a  degree  of 
training  standarisation.  GHQ  recognised  that,  by  itself,  the  training  literature  was 
insufficient  to  guarantee  unit  and  formation  progress.  To  supplement  the  written  material, 
GHQ  and  other  tiers  of  the  BEF  command  sponsored,  organised,  and  participated  in 
schools  and  courses  of  instruction  for  officers  and  men. 
At  different  periods  of  the  war  (dependent  on  who  commanded),  corps  and  army  had  a 
greater  or  lesser  influence  over  the  training  of  divisions.  However,  the  GOCs  of  divisions 
had  the  ultimate  responsibility  for  the  training  of  the  formations  under  their  command  at 
all  periods  of  the  war.  As  a  result  formation  training  could  often  vary,  even  if  there  was 
an  expectation  that  central  guidelines  (where  applicable)  would  be  applied. 
The  (Highland)  Division  GOCs  certainly  orchestrated  the  training  of  the  51"  in  different 
ways,  but  there  were  also  similarities  in  some  aspects  of  their  approach.  All  were  aware 
of  the  centralised  guidelines  (when  they  existed),  all  applied  them,  and  all  ensured  that 
there  was  a  dissemination  of  relevant  information  to  at  least  senior  commanders  within 
the  division.  However,  Harper  was  clearly  more  of  a  former  and  driver  of  training 
programmes  than  Bannatine-Allason. 
Other  officers  within  the  division,  such  as  the  brigadier-generals  and  battalion 
commanders,  could,  and  did,  have  significant  influence  over  both  the  interpretation  and 
application  of  centralised  advice  within  the  division,  and  the  organisation  of  specific 
training  programmes  and  training  patterns. 
The  (Highland)  Division  did  develop  some  advanced  and  progressive  training 
methodologies  during  the  war.  The  ability  to  achieve  this  was  a  result  of  the  combination 
of:  progressively-minded  and  effective  senior  officers;  the  ability  of  the  division  to  focus 
on  training  for  periods  of  time;  the  adherence  to  key  principles  of  centrally  issued  advice; 
78 a  sustainable  and  manageable  rate  of  casualties;  and  lessons  learned  from  battles.  The 
methodologies,  such  as  those  codified  in  Harper's  `Notes'  were  very  probably  copied  and 
employed  by  other  formations  in  the  BEF. 
Within  the  division,  there  were  consistent  attempts  by  headquarters  to  ensure  that  all  units 
were  trained  to  similar  standards.  This  involved  providing  an  equal  measure  of  time  for 
training  both  in  and  out  of  the  line;  organising  and  supporting  divisional,  brigade,  and 
unit  schools  of  instruction;  and  endorsing  team-building  pursuits  such  as  sports 
competitions  and  tournaments. 
However,  casualties  could,  and  did,  have  a  negative  impact  on  formation  training.  Even 
the  most  efficient  training  programme  in  a  formation  or  unit  was  useless  if  the  men  were 
dead.  The  (Highland)  Division  would  have  been  superbly  trained  in  the  arts  of  war  from 
1916-on  had  it  sustained  fewer  casualties  in  1917  and  early  1918.  The  loss  of  so  many 
well-trained,  experienced  soldiers  had  a  negative  impact  on  progressive  training.  As 
Nicholson  wrote,  `The  trouble  was  that  for  the  next  four  years  we  did  no  more  than 
perfect  this  limited  knowledge;  on  the  rare  occasions  when  open  warfare  intervened  we 
were  but  untrained  self-opinionated  soldiers'.  149 
149  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  65. 
79 Chapter  2  Recruitment  and  Reinforcement 
This  chapter  will  analyse  the  system  of  recruitment  and  reinforcement  for  the  51St  (Highland) 
Division  throughout  the  First  World  War  and  determine  to  what  extent  it  was  a  significant 
influence  on  divisional  performance.  It  will  seek  to  demonstrate  that  the  division  was,  to  a 
large  extent,  originally  composed  of  volunteers  from  the  traditional  recruiting  grounds  of 
regiments  predominantly  associated  with  the  Highland  region;  that  over  the  course  of  the  war 
those  traditional  areas,  as  viable  recruiting  centres,  became  more  and  more  unsustainable;  that 
some  units  were  affected  more  than  others;  that  a  high  proportion  of  Scots  was  desirable,  but 
not  essential  to  maintain  a  particular  (Highland)  Division  ethos;  and  that  the  system  for 
reinforcing  the  (Highland)  Division  worked  effectively  until  1918. 
In  order  to  investigate  the  recruitment  and  reinforcement  process  for  the  51St  (Highland) 
Division,  it  is  necessary  to  analyse:  the  provenance  of  units  that  served  in  the  (Highland) 
Division;  the  proportion  of  men  and  officers  who  served  in  the  formation  throughout  the  war 
from  areas  traditionally  associated  with  the  Highlands;  the  drafting  system  and  its  role  in  the 
maintenance  for  recruitment  and  reinforcement;  and  the  impact  and  effectiveness  of  the 
reinforcement  process  on  the  5  1St  whilst  it  served  on  the  Western  Front. 
Territorial  recruiting:  provenance 
Post-war  popular  sentiment,  often  found  in  secondary  source  materials  such  as  regimental 
histories,  clearly  associated  the  units  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  with  the  Highlands  of 
Scotland.  This  popularised  image  tended  to  be  rural  and  traditional,  as  evidenced  by  the  lead 
article  in  The  Scotsman  from  29  September  1924,  `At  the  bidding  of  duty  they  forsook  the 
quiet  hills  of  home  for  the  desolate  fields  of  France  and  Flanders.  The  crofter,  the  fisherman, 
the  miner,  the  gillie  and  the  farm  hand  turned  aside  from  the  arts  of  peace  to  learn  those  of 
war'.  '  However,  if  the  literal  definition  of  the  Highland  region  is  taken  to  be  the  area  to  `the 
north-west  of  Scotland,  bordered  geologically  by  the  great  fault  running  from  Dumbarton  to 
Stonehaven',  or  on  an  even  more  proscriptive  basis,  that  which  is  `ethnologically,  the 
considerably  narrower  area  in  which  Gaelic  is  or  was  recently  spoken',  2  it  is  apparent  that 
I  The  Scotsman,  29  September  1924. 
2  Chambers  English  Dictionary  (Edinburgh,  1990),  p.  670. 
80 many  of  the  units  that  served  in  the  (Highland)  Division  were  formed  from  areas  outside  the 
Highlands. 
In  practice,  however,  the  most  potent  factor  in  the  formulation  of  the  identity  of  the  Highland 
units  lay  within.  3  The  regimental  culture,  esprit  de  corps  and  traditions,  rooted  in  18`h  century 
British  military  expansion,  permitted  the  definition  of  `Highland'  in  the  case  of  the  51St 
Division  to  have  a  greater  degree  of  flexibility.  By  the  Great  War  period,  it  is  clear  that  units 
in  the  division,  such  as  the  battalions  of  the  Black  Watch4  definitely  associated  themselves 
with  the  Highlands,  even  though  some  were  actually  recruited  from  Lowland  areas.  Major- 
General  D.  N.  Wimberley,  in  a  speech  to  the  Black  Watch  Association  in  1948,  stated  of  the 
1/7`h  Black  Watch  from  Fife: 
it  is  an  added  advantage  to  your  Regiment  that  for  so  long  you  have  included  in  your  recruiting 
area  certain  territories  which  are  predominantly  Highland  and  Celtic  and  certain  other  territories 
which  are  and  always  have  been  Lowland,  and  a  great  strip  of  country  between  the  two.  ' 
Others  such  as  1/6t"  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  that  recruited  in  Renfrewshire  felt 
the  same  way.  Crucially,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  all  of  those  battalions  that  recruited  in  the 
Lowland  areas  actually  bordered  on  the  Highland  Line,  thus  maintaining  a  clear  geographical 
and  psychological  link. 
Care  must  also  be  taken  when  attempting  to  define  the  traditional  recruiting  grounds  of  units 
in  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  due  to  a  changing  composition  as  the  war  progressed.  The 
composition  remained  the  same  from  the  Territorial  Force  Act  in  1908  until  shortly  after  the 
post-mobilisation  period  in  1914  and  during  that  time  consisted  of  three  brigades,  all  closely- 
linked  Territorial  units  with  strong  Highland  associations: 
1/4th,  1/5th,  1/6th,  1/7th  Gordon  Highlanders; 
1/6th,  1/7th,  1/8th,  and  1/9th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders; 
1/4th,  1/5th,  1/6th  Seaforths  and  1/4th  Cameron  Highlanders. 
I  E.  A.  Cameron,  and  J.  M.  Robertson,  `Fighting  and  Bleeding  for  the  Land:  The  Scottish  Highlands  and  the 
Great  War',  in  C.  MacDonald,  and  E.  McFarland  (eds),  Scotland  and  the  Great  War  (East  Linton,  1999),  p.  81. 
4  Joined  the  division  early  in  1915. 
S  National  Library  of  Scotland,  ACC  8681/137,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley,  Speech  to  the 
Black  Watch  Association,  1948. 
81 However,  the  composition  altered  a  number  of  times  during  the  course  of  the  war6  due  to  the 
vagaries  of  units  being  posted  to  other  formations  or  being  amalgamated.  Concomitantly,  this 
resulted  in  a  different  combination  of  recruiting  areas.  The  list  of  units  below  shows  the 
regiments  from  the  areas  traditionally  associated  with  the  Highlands  consistently 
predominated,  whilst  a  high  proportion  were  constants: 
Fig.  4 
1/4`h  Black  Watch  (Jan  1916-Feb  1916),  1/5`h  Black  Watch  (Jan  1916-Feb  1916),  1/6`h  Black 
Watch  (April  1915-Nov  1918),  1/7h  Black  Watch  (April  1915-Nov  1918) 
1/4th  Gordon  Highlanders  (Aug  1914-Feb  1915)  (Feb  1916-Nov  1918),  1/5th  Gordon 
Highlanders  (Aug  1914-Feb  1918),  1/6`h  Gordon  Highlanders  (Aug-Nov  1914)  (June  1916- 
amalgamation  with  1/7`h  Gordons  Oct  1918),  1/7`h  Gordon  Highlanders  (Aug  1914- 
amalgamation  with  1/6`h  Gordon  Highlanders  Oct  1918) 
1/6th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  (Aug  1914-June  1916)  (October  1918-Nov  1918), 
1/7th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  (Aug-Dec  1914)  (March  1916-Nov  1918),  1/8th 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  (Aug  1914-Feb  1918),  1/9th  Argyll  and  Sutherland 
Highlanders  (Aug  1914-  Feb  1915) 
1/4`h  Seaforth  Highlanders  (Aug-Nov  1914)  (Jan  1916-Nov  1918),  115`h  Seaforth  Highlanders 
((H)  Division  throughout),  1/6th  Seaforth  Highlanders  ((H)  Division  throughout) 
1/4th  Cameron  Highlanders  (Aug  1914-Feb  1915)  (Jan  1916-Feb  1916)  disbanded  and 
absorbed  into  1St  Battalion  in  March  1916. 
1/4th  Loyal  North  Lancaster  Regiment,  April  1915-Jan  1916 
1/4th  King's  Own  Lancaster  Regiment,  April  1915-Jan  1916 
1/8th  King's  Liverpool  Regiment,  April  1915-Jan  1916 
6  For  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  constitution  of  the  division  throughout  the  war,  see  Annexe  1. 
82 2/5'h  Lancashire  Fusiliers,  April  1915-July  1915 
1/6'h  Cameronians  (Scottish  Rifles),  June  1915-Feb  1916 
1/8th  Royal  Scots,  August  1915-Nov  1918 
1/9th  Royal  Scots,  March  1916-Feb  1918 
From  this  composite  list,  a  series  of  conclusions  can  be  drawn.  A  number  of  units,  such  as  the 
1/9th  Royal  Scots  or  the  1/4`h  Gordons,  were  clearly  not  from  the  Highland  region,  but  did 
have  distinct  associations  with  the  Highland  region.  7  It  is  also  evident  that  of  the  English 
units  or  the  units  not  associated  with  the  Highlands,  the  reasons  for  their  inclusion  were 
essentially  pragmatic,  with  both  the  English  and  the  Cameronian  (Scottish  Rifles)  battalions 
replacing  outgoing  battalions  due  to  the  urgent  need  for  the  latter  to  fight  in  France  and 
Belgium.  It  is  also  apparent  from  the  list  that  as  soon  as  possible  the  Territorial  units  with 
Highland  associations  returned.  From  this,  we  can  determine  that  there  was  an  official  policy 
position  for  the  51S`  and  that  there  were  conscious  efforts  by  the  military  authorities  to  retain  a 
clear  Territorial  homogeneity  for  the  division  that  was  centred  on  the  Highland  region  or  on 
battalions  closely  associated  with  the  Highland  region. 
Popular  and  traditional  assumptions 
Again,  as  with  the  composition  of  the  formation,  there  was  a  popular  assumption  that  certain 
Territorial  battalions  from  regiments  such  as  the  Black  Watch  were  composed  and  reinforced 
by  men  from  a  specific  region.  The  Linklaters'  view  was  a  commonly  held  one: 
Dundee  was  the  home  of  the  4`h;  it  was  commanded  by  a  Dundonian  businessman,  and  the  Dundee 
Courier  reported  the  war  through  the  eyes  and  letters  of  Black  Watch  men  who  before  1914  had 
worked  in  jute  mills  and  jam  factories  in  the  city.  In  1915,  it  was  amalgamated  with  the  5th 
Battalion,  which  was  drawn  in  general  from  Angus  (Forfar)  and  in  particular  from  the  fishin 
villages  on  the  coast  and  Arbroath,  Montrose  and  Broughty  Ferry.....  Perthshire  and  the  6 
Battalion  were  inseparately  linked;  unlike  the  others,  the  Jocks  of  the  6`h  Battalion  were 
predominantly  countrymen,  officered  in  the  traditional  manner  by  landowners.......  In  Fife,  as  in 
Angus  and  Perthshire,  the  peacetime  social  and  economic  structure  had  put  on  khaki  and  the  Black 
Watch  tartan,  but  the  7th  Battalion,  which  came  from  Fife,  bore  especially  the  imprint  of  just  one 
7  The  1/9t'  Royal  Scots  was  known  as  `The  Dandy  Ninth'  due  to  it  being  the  only  kilted  battalion  in  that 
regiment. 
83 industry-coal;  colliers,  miners  and  pit  managers  gave  it  a  character  as  distinct  as  each  of  the  others, 
and,  like  them,  a  character  that  was  notably  close  knit.  8 
Sources,  whilst  testifying  to  the  camaraderie  of  the  Territorial  units,  also  emphasised  the 
territorial  homogeneity,  suggesting  that  a  large  number  of  troops  were  familiar  with  one 
another  and  their  local  recruiting  area: 
From  the  first  Volunteer  Corps  of  the  Highlands  were  distinguished  by  their  emphasis  on  the  ties 
of  family  and  clan.  Far  more  even  than  in  England-where,  in  the  Yoemanry  regiments,  leadership 
tended  to  be  in  the  hands  of  the  squirearchy-the  volunteers  paralleled  in  their  military  organisation 
the  class  pattern  to  which  their  lives  as  civilians  conformed.  Even  after  the  Haldane  Reforms,  when 
so  much  had  been  done  to  prune  the  more  excessive  forms  of  parochialism,  in  recruitment  the 
Highland  Division  savoured  largely  of  the  club.  Even  at  company  level  units  were  comprised  of 
men  with  similar  interests,  or  drawn  from  one  locality.  9 
There  were  many  reasons  for  volunteering.  However,  a  commonality  in  the  enlistment 
process  during  the  first  year  of  the  war  was  the  feeling  of  loyalty  felt  by  men,  to  town, 
county,  or  community.  In  Scotland,  one  obvious  focus  of  this  allegiance  was  the  connection 
between  regiments  and  geographical  regions.  Specific  regiments  were  very  recognisably 
defined  as  `east  coast  or  west  coast  and  within  this  context  there  was  always  a  tendency  for 
individual  counties,  towns,  or  districts  to  align  themselves  with  a  particular  Territorial 
battalion  within  a  regimental  recruiting  district'.  On  the  outbreak  of  war  when  and  those 
Territorial  forces  were  mobilised,  family,  friends,  and  colleagues,  `would,  by  preference, 
enlist  in  the  local  Territorial  unit,  reinforcing  such  allegiances  as  were  already  there, 
especially  in  the  Highland  regiments  with  their  old  clan  loyalties'.  '0 
Pre-war  Territorial  homogeneity 
If  it  is  accurate  to  state  that  this  localism  was  a  common  trait  in  the  units  of  the  pre-war 
(Highland)  Division,  then  it  is  vital  to  determine  to  what  extent  this  was  manifested  in 
recruiting  figures.  By  way  of  a  contradiction  to  this  assertion  of  a  localised  predominance, 
Derek  Young  gives  statistics  for  the  Regular  units  of  Scottish  regiments  for  1891,  which 
included  the  Black  Watch,  the  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  the  Royal  Scots,  the 
Highland  Light  Infantry,  the  Camerons,  the  Gordons,  and  the  Seaforths,  and  the  figures  show 
8  E.  Linklater,  and  A.  Linklater,  The  Black  Watch,  History  of  the  Royal  Highland  Regiment  (London,  1927),  p. 
143. 
9  A.  V.  Sellwood,  The  Saturday  Night  Soldiers  (London,  1966),  p.  161. 
10  D.  Young,  `Voluntary  Recruitment  in  Scotland,  1914-1916'  (Glasgow  University  Ph.  D,  2001),  p.  325. 
84 that  only  61.5%  of  the  recruits  were  Scots  with  32.9  %  English  and  4.3%  Irish.  "  This  does 
not  outwardly  support  a  localised  recruitment  focus  for  the  regiments,  but  it  is  important  to 
bear  in  mind  that  recruitment  for  the  Regular  Army  was  different  from  that  of  the  Territorial 
Force. 
However,  even  with  this  caveat  in  mind,  the  evidence  for  diversity  in  regimental  recruiting  is 
given  further  credence  by  Major-General  Wimberley  in  a  paper  written  after  the  Second 
World  War  on  `Recruiting  Population  in  Scotland  for  the  Scottish  Infantry': 
In  the  old  days  and  for  generations  the  Lowland  Regiments  went  to  England  for  the  balance  of 
their  recruits,  and  the  Highland  Regiments  who  were  short  of  men,  went  to  the  Lowlands.  As  is 
well  known,  there  were  long  periods  in  their  history  when  the  Lowland  regiments  were  dressed 
much  as  English  infantry  of  the  line,  and  almost  ceased  to  bother  whether  the  bulk  of  their  ranks 
were  filled  with  English,  Irish  or  Scottish  soldiers.  Their  percentage  of  Scotsmen  was  generally 
comparatively  very  low.  Now,  thanks  to  two  great  Wars,  the  Lowland  regiments  are  once  more 
closely  knit  to  their  (since  1888)  [sic]  recruiting  areas,  and  as  the  Highland  Regiments  have  always 
done,  are  now  claiming  to  recruit  Scottish  soldiers  equally  with  the  Highland  Brigade.  '2 
For  Regular  battalions,  the  need  to  recruit  in  areas  with  a  greater  population  base  (such  as 
Glasgow  and  Edinburgh)  was  perfectly  pragmatic.  Regiments  with  a  smaller  proportion  of 
the  population  in  their  recruiting  grounds,  such  as  the  Camerons,  needed  to  be  assisted  by 
those  in  the  better  populated  areas,  such  as  the  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  or  the 
Royal  Scots.  The  problem  was  not  a  new  one  and  had  been  an  issue  for  many  years,  but  it  had 
gradually  become  more  accentuated  as  the  population  in  the  country  areas  steadily  decreased, 
and  the  population  in  and  near  the  towns  correspondingly  increased. 
The  population  density  and  level  of  industrialisation  were  reflected  in  the  nation's  geography. 
The  economy  of  the  east  coast  was  mainly  reliant  on  fishing,  coal,  textiles  and  brewing,  and, 
although  it  could  be  classed  as  an  industrial  area,  east  coast  industrialisation  was  primarily 
light  industry.  The  west  coast  was  heavily  industrialised.  Its  industry  was  centred  on 
shipbuilding  and  heavy  engineering,  supported  by  an  infrastructure  of  coalfields,  iron  and 
steel  industries,  and  chemical  works.  As  west  coast  industry  grew  and  migrants  travelled  to 
the  area  in  search  of  employment,  peripheral  and  unrelated  industries  were  attracted  by  the 
II  Young,  `Voluntary  Recruitment  in  Scotland,  1914-1916',  p.  68. 
12  NLS,  ACC  8681/167,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley.  No  specific  date,  but  does  refer  to  the 
1951  census. 
85 plentiful  supply  of  available  manpower.  As  a  result,  the  western  central  belt  of  Scotland  was 
the  most  densely  populated  section  of  the  country. 
Young  asserts  that  the  population  density  of  an  area  directly  impacted  on  the  number  of 
Territorial  Force  battalions  that  were  created  by  regiments;  of  the  thirty  seven  Territorial 
Force  battalions  extant  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  those  regiments  whose  recruiting  area  fell 
within  an  urban  or  industrial  area  provided,  individually,  a  greater  number  of  battalions. 
However,  he  goes  on  to  state  that  Territorial  recruitment  in  Scotland  was  not  simply  a  matter 
of  available  numbers  as  almost  45  per  cent  of  the  Territorial  infantry  battalions  came  from 
rural  or  agricultural  areas,  with  some  seventeen  battalions  out  of  a  total  of  thirty-seven.  `It 
would  appear  that  Territorial  Army  recruitment,  in  Scotland  at  least,  was  not  solely 
dependent  on  population  density  and  distribution  but  also  relied  on  cultural  and  social  ties 
still  firmly  rooted  in  the  old  volunteer  ethos.  '  13  To  take  this  further  and  possibly  contest 
Young's  view,  it  will  be  essential  to  determine  how  many  of  the  battalions  that  recruited  from 
sparsely  populated  areas  actually  did  so  with  the  assistance  of  networks  and  recruiting  offices 
outside  the  local  area. 
The  population  difference  by  region  was  reflected  in  the  establishment  figures  for  the 
Territorial  Force  in  Scotland  in  1911.  However,  in  all  areas  the  force  was  understrength,  and 
the  establishment  figure  of  54,619  had  a  shortfall  of  9,554  (17.5  per  cent)  with  a  strength  of 
only  45,065.  By  1913  this  shortfall  had  increased. 
Fig.  5  Territorial  strength  in  relation  to  regional  male  population  in  1911: 
City/town  Male  Pop  TF  Strength  %  of  male  pop 
Perth  58364  1379  2.36 
Inverness  42440  1641  3.86 
Aberdeen  147357  4152  2.81 
Stirling  82335  669  0.81 
Dundee  126638  2588  2.04 
Ayr  130196  2339  1.79 
Berwick  14192  285  2.0 
13  Young,  'Voluntary  Recruitment  in  Scotland,  1914-1916',  p.  79. 
86 Glasgow  721369  12047  1.67 
Edinburgh  235427  5314  2.2514 
Although  these  are  rough  indicators,  the  evidence  points  to  some  regiments  in  the  51" 
Division  having  a  greater  number  of  potential  recruits  to  choose  from,  whilst  those  in 
sparsely  populated  areas,  following  the  pre-war  trend,  could  still  potentially  supply  a  high 
proportion  of  recruits,  but  not  necessarily  a  consistently  high  number  over  a  period  of  time. 
Reinforcement:  was  localism  sustainable? 
After  mobilisation,  increased  stresses  were  placed  on  all  regimental  recruiting  areas,  but  in 
particular  on  the  areas  that  were  less  populated.  For  Territorial  reinforcement,  scholars  have 
already  questioned  the  assumption  of  the  Territorial  nature  of  recruitment  for  the  whole 
British  Army  during  the  war.  That  the  local  character  of  units  changed  as  a  result  of  increased 
casualties,  and  that  after  the  battle  of  the  Somme  in  1916  the  localised  identity  of  battalions 
had  been  all  but  destroyed,  is  now  almost  continually  asserted  by  historians.  'S  Both  Ian 
Beckett  and  Peter  Simkins,  in  separate  studies,  have  shown  this  to  be  the  case  for  the 
Territorial  units  of  the  Buckinghamshire  Regiment,  16  and  the  1/6`h  Cheshires  respectively.  '7 
For  the  (Highland)  Division,  it  is  essential  to  test  the  theory  that  recruitment  predominantly 
originated,  or  otherwise,  from  the  territorial  areas  of  the  constituent  battalions  and  that  the 
recruiting  mechanisms  continued,  or  otherwise,  to  maintain  the  flow  of  personnel  during  the 
war.  To  obtain  a  balanced  result,  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  representative  sample  from  the 
battalions  that  served  with  the  division. 
Along  with  three  Seaforth  battalions,  the  1/40'  Cameron  Highlanders  was  a  part  of  a  brigade 
in  the  division  that  mobilised  in  August  1914.  The  four  brigaded  battalions  originated  in 
traditional  Highland  recruiting  areas,  with  the  Camerons  recruiting  in  Inverness.  The 
selection  of  this  battalion  for  sampling  permits  an  investigation  into  a  component  part  of  the 
14  Young,  `Voluntary  Recruitment  in  Scotland,  1914-1916',  pp.  76-78. 
15  H.  McCartney,  `The  1/6th  and  1/10`h  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War'  (Cambridge  University  Ph.  D,  2000),  p.  81. 
16  I.  Beckett,  `The  Territorial  Force',  in  I.  Beckett,  and  K.  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  in  Arms,  A  Social  Study  of 
the  British  Army  in  the  First  World  War  (Manchester,  1985),  p.  147. 
17  p.  Simkins,  'Co-Stars  or  Supporting  Cast?  British  Divisions  in  the  `Hundred  Days',  1918',  in  P.  Griffith  (ed), 
British  Fighting  Methods  in  the  Great  War  (London,  1996),  p.  59. 
87 51St  during  1914  and  early  1915.  Although  the  battalion  left  the  division  in  February  1915,18 
before  briefly  returning  in  early  January  1916,19  1915  casualties  would  be  predominantly 
indicative  of  the  recruitment  process  whilst  with  the  51St.  The  inclusion  of  this  battalion  is 
also  useful  in  that  it  will  serve  as  a  comparator  with  other  units  that  served  solely  with  the 
division  and  also  that  recruited  from  areas  adjacent  to  Inverness-shire. 
The  1/6`h  and  1/7th  Black  Watch  will  provide  comparative  data  for  the  development  of 
battalions  recruited  from  the  adjacent  areas  of  Fife  and  Perthshire.  These  were  predominantly 
Lowland  areas  that  contained  an  agrarian/industrial  mix  and  both  operated  within  the  51S` 
Division  throughout  its  entire  service  on  the  Western  Front  20 
The  1/4th  and  1/5t'  Seaforths  were  both  formed  in  a  traditional  Highland  recruiting  area  with 
economies  that  were  largely  agrarian  and  rural.  The  two  battalions  were  recruited  from  the 
adjacent  areas  of  Ross-shire,  and  Caithness  and  Sutherland.  The  1/4`h  Seaforths  served  with 
the  division  from  August  to  November  1914,  then  again  from  January  1916  through  the  rest 
of  the  war,  21  whilst  the  1/5t'  Seaforths  served  with  the  division  all  the  way  through.  Their 
inclusion  will  provide  useful  indicators  into  battalions  that  recruited  in  areas  side  by  side,  and 
that  were  closely  linked  to  the  51st  Division,  but  followed  a  slightly  different  military  course 
throughout  the  war. 
The  1/6th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  was  selected  to  provide  indicators  to  recruitment 
in  the  Lowland  industrial  region  of  Renfrewshire.  The  unit  served  in  the  51St  from 
mobilisation  until  June  1916,  and  again  from  October  1918  until  the  war  ended. 
Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War,  22  which  names  the  soldiers  who  died  during  and  immediately 
after  the  conflict,  can  enable  us  to  determine  the  proportion  of  men  who  were  born  and 
enlisted  in  a  particular  region. 
18  Joined  80'  Division  in  Feb  1915,  then  7th  Division  in  April  1915. 
19  It  left  again  at  the  end  of  February  1916  and  was  absorbed  into  the  1"  battalion. 
20  They  served  in  the  Black  Watch  brigade  in  Scotland  prior  to  joining  the  51". 
21  In  November  1914,  the  battalion  joined  the  7th  Division,  then  in  November  1915  moved  to  the  460i  Division, 
and  in  the  same  month  moved  again  to  the  15th  Division. 
22  CD-Rom,  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1919,  (Naval  and  Military  Press  Ltd). 
88 The  fact  that  during  the  First  World  War  557,618  Scotsmen  enlisted  in  the  British  Army, 
accounting  for  41.4%  of  men  aged  between  15  and  49,  and  that  some  147,000  of  those  men 
sacrificed  their  lives,  means  that  the  sample  is  representative.  23 
For  the  majority  of  the  source,  place  of  birth  and  enlistment  are  noted.  This  permits  an 
analysis  of  the  regional  origin  of  the  men  recorded  in  the  dataset.  However,  a  caveat  to  the 
use  of  this  material  is  that  the  calculated  statistics  reflect  only  those  who  were  killed  in  action 
or  died  of  their  wounds,  and  do  not  provide  evidence  for  every  man  who  served  in  the 
formation  24 
The  birthplace  is  representative  of  the  regional  affiliations  of  the  men,  because  it  accurately 
shows  a  longstanding  territorial  affiliation.  The  corroborative  category  of  place  of  enlistment 
is  also  indicative  of  territorial  familiarity  as  men  would  have  had  a  desire  to  join  a  battalion 
with  their  friends,  brothers  and  workmates.  In  most  cases  the  men  would  have  enlisted  in  the 
area  in  which  they  lived  or  in  the  city  or  region  in  which  they  were  born  and  raised  25 
Webster  is  not  an  unusual  subject  when  he  indicated  that  he  was  driven  to  join  the  local 
Territorial  Force  by  his  peer  group: 
He  had  been  with  the  firm  about  eight  months  and  some  of  his  workmates  were  already  discussing 
arrangements  for  their  summer  holidays.  He  learnt  that  several  were  members  of  the  Territorial 
Army  and  would  be  going  to  camps  in  July  and  August  for  a  week  or  a  fortnight  and  that  leave  to 
attend  camp  was  in  addition  to  their  normal  holiday  period.  This  sounded  attractive  to  young 
Webby  and  there  and  then  he  decided  to  make  immediate  enquiries  at  various  drill  halls  to  find  if 
he  could  join.  6 
Before  the  military  service  acts  of  1916,  each  volunteer  could  exercise  a  degree  of  choice 
over  the  unit  that  they  wanted  to  join,  and  most  volunteers  would  probably  have  chosen  to 
serve  in  a  unit  connected  with  their  home  district.  Because  of  this,  birth  and  the  place  of 
enlistment  provides  a  reasonable  indication  of  the  number  of  men  in  each  unit  with  close 
23  E.  Spiers,  `The  Scottish  Soldier  at  War',  in  H.  Cecil,  and  P.  Liddle  (eds),  Facing  Armageddon  (London, 
1996),  p.  314. 
24  McCartney,  `The  1/6`s  and  1/10`x'  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War',  p.  82. 
25  McCartney,  `The  1/6"'  and  1/100'  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War',  p.  83. 
26  IWM,  N/A,  The  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W.  Webster,  p.  13. 
89 links  to  the  local  area  and  the  interpretation  of  the  dataset  in  this  way  constitutes  a 
consistently  reliable  source  of  information  provided  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War.  27 
The  evidence  will  be  presented  in  the  form  of  monthly  tables  for  each  year  indicating  whether 
the  recruit  was  born  or  enlisted  in  the  local  recruiting  area  (Reg),  the  wider  Scottish 
community  (Scot),  or  from  outside  Scotland  (0th).  A  subsequent  interpretation  will 
determine  what  proportion  of  the  soldiers  who  died  were  born  or  enlisted  in  the  local 
recruiting  area. 
To  understand  and  interpret  the  data  fully,  it  is  necessary  to  recognise  beforehand  that  there 
were  general  trends  that  affected  all  Territorial  battalions  in  the  British  Army.  Some  of  those, 
such  as  the  military  service  acts,  occurred  at  one  time  and  affected  the  whole  army 
simultaneously,  whilst  others,  such  as  battles,  were  specific  and  localised  to  units  and 
formations. 
The  Territorial  Force  did  get  a  recruiting  boost  in  Scotland  after  mobilisation,  a  boost  that 
continued  on  a  decreasing  curve  until  late  1915.  Voluntary  recruitment  could  not  be  sustained 
indefinitely  and  the  government  introduced  the  Derby  Scheme  in  order  to  avoid 
implementing  conscription.  Recruits  who  participated  in  the  Derby  Scheme,  which  ran  from 
October  to  December  1915,  indicated  that  they  would  fight  if  called  upon  to  do  so.  The  adult 
male  population  was  divided  up  according  to  its  age,  marital  status  and  occupation,  and  those 
that  joined  the  scheme  gave  their  consent  to  serve  (single  men  first).  28  By  January  1916,  the 
scheme  was  deemed  a  failure  as  an  insufficient  number  of  single  men  had  come  forward.  As 
a  result,  Parliament  passed  the  first  Military  Service  Act  in  January  1916,  which  authorised 
the  conscription  of  single  men.  By  May  of  the  same  year,  all  men  between  the  ages  of  18  and 
41  became  liable  for  military  service  as  conscription  was  extended.  If  Ian  Beckett  and  Peter 
Simkins  are  correct,  and  as  conscripts  were  used  as  reinforcements  to  already  formed  units, 
there  should  be  indications  of  a  shift  in  the  number  of  soldiers  recorded  in  the  dataset  for  the 
5  1st  Division  reflecting  a  wider  recruiting  base  from  mid-1916. 
27  McCartney,  `The  1/6t'  and  1/10"i  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War',  p.  83. 
28  J.  M.  Bourne,  Britain  and  the  Great  War  1914-1918  (London,  1989),  p.  121. 
90 Enlistment,  whether  voluntary  or  conscripted,  exceeded  wastage  until  the  end  of  1917  when 
the  need  for  increased  numbers  of  reinforcements  proved  unsustainable. 
For  trends  specific  and  local  to  recruitment  and  reinforcement  for  battalions  of  the  (Highland) 
Division,  we  must  primarily  consider  the  engagements  that  the  formation  was  involved  in  as 
they  had  an  impact  on  the  numbers  of  recorded  fatalities.  The  key  dates  for  these  battles 
were: 
Fig.  6 
June  1915  Givenchy 
July  1916  High  Wood 
Nov  1916  Beaumont  Hamel 
April  1917  Arras,  and  The  Scarpe 
May  1917  Roeux 
July  1917  Third  Ypres 
Sept  1917  Third  Ypres 
Nov  1917  Cambrai 
March  1918  German  Offensive 
April  1918  The  Lys 
July  1918  The  Marne 
Aug  1918  The  Scarpe 
Sept  1918  The  Scarpe 
Oct  1918  Final  advance  from  Cambrai. 
Naturally,  the  datasets  for  all  the  battalions  under  analysis  show  increased  fatalities  during 
those  months. 
1/4'h  Cameron  Highlanders 
There  were  262  recorded  deaths  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War  for  the  1/4`t'  Camerons. 
The  figure  is  relatively  low  due  to  the  absorption  of  the  unit  into  1/1St  Camerons  during  1916, 
in  itself  an  indicator  that  recruitment  and  reinforcement  was  unsustainable  for  this  battalion. 
Place  of  enlistment  is  the  most  consistent  record  for  the  1/4th  with  248  recorded  enlistments, 
whilst  there  are  only  142  records  for  the  place  of  birth.  Both  of  these  figures  reflect  the  pre- 
absorption  period  (August  1914  to  February  1916)  and  14  additional  soldiers  were  killed  after 
91 absorption.  The  overall  figure  for  place  of  enlistment  is  182  Regional,  18  Scottish,  and  48 
Other,  whilst  the  overall  figure  for  recorded  place  of  birth  is  100  Regional,  41  Scottish,  and  1 
Other. 
Both  records  indicate  that  the  death  rate  for  the  1/4th  Camerons  grew  substantially  in  1915. 
Births: 
Both  1914  and  1915  show  almost  3/4  of  the  soldiers  recorded  were  recruited  from  Inverness- 
shire  (77.52%  and  70.92%),  with  the  remainder  being  from  wider  Scotland  (22.22%  and 
28.99%).  Only  in  1916  is  one  soldier  from  an  Other  area. 
Enlistments: 
In  1914  100%  of  enlistments  were  recorded  as  regional.  By  1915,  this  percentage  had 
decreased  to  almost  3/4  from  the  regions  (72.99%),  with  a  representation  of  7.24%  from 
wider  Scotland.  Interestingly,  for  the  same  year  almost  a  1/4  of  men  were  recruited  from 
Other  areas  (19.57%)  and  in  1916,  almost  2/3  were  recruited  from  Other  areas  (66.67%). 
All  recruits  from  the  Other  areas  actually  enlisted  in  Middlesex.  However,  the  statistics  for 
births  for  1915  and  1916  would  indicate  that  Middlesex  was  a  recruiting  area  for  the 
Camerons  that  specifically  targeted  Scotsmen. 
Fig.  7 
1914 
Born 
Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Total  Prop 
Reg  1  6  7  77.52% 
Scot  2  2  22.22% 
0th  - 
9 
92 1915 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  12  2  18  1  43  2  11  4  93  70.92% 
Scot  4  14  7  1  10  1  1  38  28.99% 
0th  - 
131 
1916 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  - 
Scot  1  1  50% 
Oth  1  1  50% 
2 
1914 
Enlisted 
Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Total  Prop 
Reg  1  1  8  10  100% 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
10 
1915 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  13  3  23  1  88  10  1  1  25  5  2  172  72.99% 
Scot  2  1  4  3  1  6  17  7.24% 
Oth  10  1  19  4  1  8  3  46  19.57% 
235 
93 1916 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  - 
Scot  1  1  33.33% 
0th  1  1  2  66.67% 
3 
1/6th  Black  Watch 
There  were  954  recorded  deaths  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War  for  the  1/6th  Black  Watch. 
Place  of  birth  and  place  of  enlistment  are  almost  equal  in  number  with  953  born  and  950 
enlisted.  The  overall  figure  for  place  of  enlistment  was  495  Regional,  375  Scottish,  and  80 
Other,  whilst  the  overall  figure  for  recorded  place  of  birth  was  359  Regional,  471  Scottish, 
and  123  Other. 
Both  records  indicate  that  the  death  rate  for  the  1/6`h  Black  Watch  grew  year  on  year. 
Births: 
Both  1915  and  1916  show  that  the  largest  percentage  of  the  soldiers  recorded  were  recruited 
from  Perthshire  (61.35%  and  66.67%),  with  large  percentages  also  originating  from  wider 
Scotland  (19.31%  and  20.88%),  and  Other  areas  (19.31%  and  12.5%).  However,  in  1917  and 
1918,  the  largest  percentages  were  from  wider  Scotland  (58.48%  and  66.67%)  whilst  the 
battalion  still  retained  a  significant  number  from  Perthshire  (29.24%  and  21.05%). 
Throughout  the  war,  there  was  a  consistent  number  from  Other  areas  (19.31%,  12.05%, 
12.3%,  and  12.2%). 
Enlistments: 
In  1915  and  1916,  the  largest  percentage  of  recorded  enlistments  took  place  in  the  Region 
(90.91%  and  87.82%),  but  by  1917  and  1918,  the  bulk  of  the  recorded  recruitment  took  place 
in  wider  Scotland  (49.26%  and  60.24%).  There  was  a  consistency  of  recruitment  from  Other 
areas  throughout  the  war  (8.77%,  6.07%,  8.46%  and  9.89%). 
94 Fig.  8 
1915 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  13  1  10  3  1  2  4  35  61.35% 
Scot  5  1  2  1  1  1  11  19.31% 
Oth  1  3  4  1  1  1  11  19.31% 
57 
1916 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  4  4  2  11  78  10  14  2  37  2  166  66.67% 
Scot  1  2  13  3  1  30  2  52  20.88% 
Oth  1  1  19  1  3  2  4  31  12.05% 
249 
1917 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  2  29  4  1  24  2  2  2  5  2  76  29.24% 
Scot  2  7  49  12  3  46  8  13  5  6  1  152  58.48% 
Oth  2  17  2  6  1  2  2  32  12.3% 
260 
1918 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  25  7  15  1  17  5  3  6  1  81  21.05% 
Scot  62  44  10  3  70  17  8  37  5  256  66.67% 
Oth  9  7  2  1  14  1  13  1  48  12.2% 
385 
95 1915 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  20  5  13  3  2  2  5  52  90.91% 
Scot  - 
Oth  1  1  1  2  5  8.77% 
57 
1916 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  1  4  5  2  13  99  13  17  3  56  2  217  87.72% 
Scot  2  11  2  15  6.07% 
Oth  1  8  1  1  1  3  15  6.07% 
247 
1917 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  3  43  9  2  29  4  5  4  6  2  110  42.37% 
Scot  2  7  40  9  2  41  6  11  4  5  1  128  49.26% 
Oth  1  12  6  1  1  1  22  8.46% 
260 
1918 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  39  14  15  1  24  6  3  10  1  114  29.67% 
Scot  49  38  10  3  68  16  8  35  5  232  60.24% 
Oth  8  6  2  1  9  1  10  1  38  9.89% 
384 
96 1/7'h  Black  Watch 
There  were  755  recorded  deaths  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War  for  the  117th  Black  Watch. 
The  recorded  number  for  place  of  enlistment  and  place  of  birth  is  almost  equal  with  752 
enlistments  and  746  Births.  The  overall  figure  for  place  of  enlistment  is  354  Regional,  356 
Scottish,  and  42  Other,  whilst  the  overall  figure  for  place  of  birth  is  258  Regional,  431 
Scottish,  and  57  Other. 
Both  records  indicate  that  there  was  a  year  on  year  increase  in  fatalities. 
Births: 
There  was  only  1  fatality  in  1914,  but  in  1915  66.23%  were  born  in  the  Region,  whilst  a  large 
proportion  (30.4%)  was  from  wider  Scotland.  1916  also  had  a  large  proportion  from  the 
Region  (54.64%),  but  an  increasing  number  of  fatalities  were  recorded  from  wider  Scotland 
(41.67%).  By  1917  and  1918,  there  was  proportionally  more  recruitment  from  wider  Scotland 
(65.36%  and  65.79%).  However  there  was  still  quite  a  large  proportion  from  the  Region 
(25.19%  and  24.63%). 
Enlistments: 
1914  and  1915  fatalities  were  all  from  the  Region.  In  1916,  the  highest  proportion  of 
enlistments  were  from  the  Region  at  74.07%,  but  by  1917  and  1918  there  were  greater 
proportions  from  wider  Scotland  (56.18%  and  62.5  %).  Fatalities  recorded  from  Other  were 
low  throughout. 
Fig.  9 
1914 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  100% 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
1 
97 1915 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  1  6  15  6  1  3  2  1  37  66.23% 
Scot  7  3  4  2  1  17  30.4% 
0th  1  1  2  3.57% 
56 
1916 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  1  3  3  8  9  29  2  4  7  15  6  89  54.64% 
Scot  1  1  1  3  4  20  5  3  9  17  4  68  41.67% 
Oth  4  1  1  6  3.68% 
163 
1917 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  3  39  1  2  3  1  7  1  60  25.19% 
Scot  4  6  100  9  4  12  6  7  2  13  2  156  65.36% 
Oth  1  15  1  1  2  1  1  22  9.24% 
238 
1918 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  33  9  4  2  10  3  2  6  2  71  24.63% 
Scot  1  69  36  10  2  31  13  7  19  2  190  65.79% 
Oth  1  1  14  3  2  1  1  2  2  27  9.37% 
288 
98 1914 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  100% 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
1 
1915 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  1  6  23  10  5  5  3  1  56  100% 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
56 
1916 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  2  3  4  9  13  44  4  4  9  18  7  120  74.07% 
Scot  2  6  3  3  7  14  3  38  23.47% 
0th  2  1  1  4  2.47% 
162 
1917 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  4  60  2  3  5  3  8  3  91  36.9% 
Scot  4  5  86  8  3  10  4  6  2  8  3  139  56.18% 
Oth  1  8  1  1  2  1  2  1  17  6.88% 
247 
99 1918 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  40  11  4  1  13  4  2  8  3  86  30.03% 
Scot  1  2  62  34  10  3  29  13  7  15  3  179  62.5% 
Oth  12  3  1  1  4  21  7.34% 
286 
1/4th  Seaforths 
There  were  994  recorded  deaths  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War  for  the  1/4th  Seaforth 
Highlanders. 
The  recorded  number  for  place  of  enlistment  is  greater  with  989  as  opposed  to  762  places  of 
birth.  The  overall  figure  for  place  of  enlistment  was  253  Regional,  386  Scottish,  and  350 
Other,  whilst  the  overall  figure  for  recorded  place  of  birth  was  167  Regional,  348  Scottish, 
and  247  Other. 
Both  records  indicate  that  the  death  rate  varied  year  on  year. 
Births: 
In  1914  there  was  only  1  recorded  death,  but  in  1915  fatalities  were  predominantly  from  the 
Region  with  62.89%.  By  1916  this  had  significantly  altered  to  59.17%  Others.  1917  and  1918 
had  the  greatest  proportion  of  wider  Scotland  (48.08%  and  66.23%),  but  with  a  substantial 
amount  of  Others  (34.72%  and  28.49%). 
Enlistments: 
1915  had  a  large  proportion  of  Others  (38.61%),  but  recruits  were  predominantly  from  the 
Region  (58.82%).  By  1916  this  had  changed  to  54.95%  (Others)  in  contrast  to  31.55%  from 
the  Region.  1917  and  1918  had  the  greatest  proportion  from  wider  Scotland  (46.95%  and 
64.52%),  with  a  significant  proportion  from  Other  (33.78%  and  26.04%)  and  Region  (19.16% 
and  9.24%). 
100 2  died  in  1919,  both  born  in  the  Region  but  enlisting  elsewhere  in  Scotland.  Another  died  in 
May  1920,  having  enlisted  in  St  Albans. 
Fig.  10 
1914 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  - 
Scot  1  1  100% 
Oth  - 
1 
1915 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  3  35  2  28  2  1  2  1  3  1  80  62.89% 
Scot  8  13  1  2  1  1  26  20.49% 
Oth  7  2  10  1  1  21  16.53% 
127 
1916 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  3  7  2  1  6  2  22  24.15% 
Scot  1  2  3  1  4  4  15  16.47% 
Oth  1  2  6  15  4  2  1  14  9  54  59.17% 
91 
101 1917 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  25  5  5  6  1  6  49  17.18% 
Scot  2  36  2  1  3  13  30  2  42  6  137  48.08% 
0th  1  34  5  6  6  22  3  18  4  99  34.72% 
285 
1918 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  6  1  1  1  4  1  14  5.47% 
Scot  37  42  4  6  44  4  3  24  4  1  169  66.23% 
Oth  16  10  1  2  13  1  1  24  5  73  28.49% 
256 
1914 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  100% 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
1 
1915 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  3  45  2  43  2  2  2  4  2  4  2  114  58.82% 
Scot  1  1  1  1  1  5  2.63% 
Oth  1  13  3  49  1  1  1  2  2  2  75  38.61% 
194 
102 1916 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  2  6  14  5  1  2  8  3  42  31.55% 
Scot  2  2  5  1  4  4  18  13.53% 
0th  2  2  2  11  19  5  2  1  19  10  73  54.95% 
133 
1917 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  32  6  11  9  1  7  68  19.16% 
Scot  1  45  2  1  4  12  42  2  51  7  167  46.95% 
Oth  1  44  6  1  6  6  26  6  20  5  120  33.78% 
355 
1918 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  7  3  1  1  5  6  5  28  9.24% 
Scot  43  47  6  6  53  4  3  31  2  1  196  64.52% 
Oth  20  9  1  5  13  2  1  27  1  79  26.04% 
303 
103 1/5`h  Seaforths 
There  were  872  recorded  deaths  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War  for  the  1/5`h  Seaforths. 
The  recorded  number  for  place  of  enlistment  was  greater  than  place  of  birth  by  860  to  607. 
The  overall  recorded  figure  for  place  of  enlistment  was  216  Regional,  416  Scottish,  and  225 
Other,  whilst  the  overall  recorded  figure  for  place  of  birth  was  149  Regional,  353  Scottish, 
and  105  Other. 
Both  recorded  figures  indicate  a  year  on  year  increase  in  fatalities. 
Births: 
There  was  only  1  fatality  in  1914,  but  in  1915  62.89%  were  from  the  Region,  with  36.9% 
from  wider  Scotland.  1916  shows  a  similar  pattern,  but  with  an  increase  from  Other  (up  to 
14.45%  from  0).  1917  and  1918  showed  fewer  fatalities  from  the  Region  (19.27%  and 
10.16%),  with  the  biggest  majority  from  wider  Scotland  (63.69%  and  68.03%),  closely 
followed  by  Other  (17.04%  and  21.93%). 
Enlistments: 
1915  had  enlistment  spread  fairly  evenly,  but  with  the  majority  in  Region  (46.3%)  and  a  large 
proportion  from  Other  (30.49%).  A  similar  pattern  was  evident  in  1916,  with  Other 
increasing  to  35.21%.  1917  and  1918  had  the  majority  from  wider  Scotland  (58.14%  and 
63.69%). 
3  died  in  1919.1  enlisted  in  Stirling;  another  in  Middlesex,  and  the  last  was  born  and  enlisted 
in  Lanark. 
104 Fig.  11 
1914 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  100% 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
1 
1915 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  5  1  19  2  2  29  62.89% 
Scot  8  1  2  2  2  2  17  36.9% 
0th  - 
46 
1916 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  2  2  3  1  2  4  30  5  51  56.82% 
Scot  1  1  1  16  7  26  28.9% 
Oth  1  1  2  1  8  13  14.45% 
90 
1917 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  22  5  2  2  7  2  2  1  43  19.27% 
Scot  1  37  31  20  2  40  1  9  1  142  63.69% 
Oth  11  3  9  1  9  3  2  38  17.04% 
223 
105 1918 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  16  3  1  3  2  25  10.16% 
Scot  1  2  35  18  2  1  45  18  1  42  1  1  167  68.03% 
Oth  4  5  1  8  3  2  29  2  54  21.93% 
246 
1914 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  100% 
Scot  _ 
Oth 
1 
1915 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  5  24  2  1  2  2  2  38  46.3% 
Scot  8  2  2  3  2  1  1  19  23.15% 
Oth  1  2  14  3  1  2  2  25  30.49% 
82 
1916 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  4  3  4  7  2  4  6  48  '  4  83  42.37% 
Scot  1  1  1  2  2  1  1  26  9  44  22.47% 
Oth  2  2  1  4  7  11  6  6  4  25  1  69  35.21% 
196 
106 1917 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  23  9  4  2  12  1  2  4  58  21.19% 
Scot  1  41  32  24  3  46  3  9  159  58.14% 
Oth  1  20  9  10  2  10  3  2  57  20.79% 
274  1  -1 
1918 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sept  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  23  3  5  3  1  1  36  11.85 
Scot  1  2  38  24  3  3  55  17  2  48  1  194  63.69 
Oth  1  10  9  1  1  10  6  2  32  -2  -  1  74  24.33 
304 
1/6`h  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders. 
There  were  320  recorded  deaths  in  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War  for  the  1/6`h  Argyll  and 
Sutherland  Highlanders. 
The  recorded  number  for  place  of  enlistment  was  greater  than  place  of  birth  with  320  as 
opposed  to  246.  The  overall  figure  for  place  of  enlistment  was  245  Regional,  69  Scottish,  and 
5  Other,  whilst  the  overall  figures  for  place  of  birth  were  140  Regional,  88  Scottish,  and  18 
Other. 
Both  records  indicate  fairly  steady  death  rates  over  the  war. 
Births: 
The  figures  throughout  the  war  showed  limited  change.  From  1915  to  1917,  there  was 
67.11%,  63.69%,  and  61.73%  from  the  Region,  and  25.45%,  30.4%,  and  31.65%  from  wider 
107 Scotland.  It  was  only  in  1918  that  significant  changes  occurred,  with  wider  Scotland 
providing  55.87%. 
Enlistments: 
Both  1915  and  1916  showed  98.4%  and  86.21%  of  Regional  enlistment.  However,  through 
1917  and  1918,  the  proportion  decreased  to  71.94%  and  52.63%,  whilst  the  proportion  from 
wider  Scotland  rose  in  1917  (25.64%)  and  1918  (43.67%). 
One  man  died  in  1919  who  was  born  and  enlisted  in  Renfrewshire. 
Fig.  12 
1914 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  - 
Scot  - 
Oth  - 
1915 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  2  3  17  6  4  4  1  37  67.11% 
Scot  3  6  1  3  1  14  25.45% 
Oth  1  2  1  4  7.27% 
55 
108 1916 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  17  4  3  10  1  5  1  2  44  63.69% 
Scot  4  1  4  3  6  2  1  21  30.4% 
Oth  1  1  2  4  5.8% 
69 
1917 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  3  5  13  1  1  3  10  37  61.73% 
Scot  5  1  7  1  2  3  19  31.65% 
Oth  1  1  1  1  4  6.67% 
60 
1918 
Born 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  5  1  1  1  12  21  34.48% 
Scot  1  4  1  2  2  2  2  19  1  34  55.87% 
Oth  1  1  4  6  9.83% 
61 
1914 
Enlisted 
Jan 
Reg 
Scot 
Oth 
Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
109 1915 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  3  7  31  7  10  1  5  1  1  66  98.04% 
Scot  1  1  1.49% 
Oth  - 
67 
1916 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  33  11  3  15  3  9  2  3  79  86.21% 
Scot  2  1  8  1  1  13  14.12% 
Oth  - 
92 
1917 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  2  9  6  17  1  2  2  3  16  59  71.94% 
Scot  2  1  6  2  1  1  4  3  1  21  25.64% 
Oth  2  2  2.44% 
82 
1918 
Enlisted 
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct  Nov  Dec  Tot  Prop 
Reg  1  1  8  1  2  3  2  2  19  2  41  52.63% 
Scot  2  3  1  1  2  2  2  20  1  34  43.67% 
Oth  1  2  3  3.85% 
78 
110 Although,  there  is  some  slight  variation,  the  analysis  of  the  data  for  place  of  birth  for  the 
selected  battalions  indicates  that  in  1914,1915,  and  1916,  the  units  were  composed  of  men 
predominantly,  but  not  entirely,  from  the  local  recruiting  area.  However,  it  is  also  clear  that 
on  a  yearly  basis,  the  proportion  of  men  from  the  local  areas  decreased. 
The  Territorial  Association  in  Elgin  minuted  in  March  1915  that: 
with  the  possible  exception  of  towns  in  the  County,  they  did  not  think  it  would  be  possible  to 
obtain  more  recruits  in  the  district,  the  County  being  practically  drained  of  men  of  serviceable  age, 
including  mechanics,  tradesmen,  farm  servants,  labourers,  etc.  In  these  circumstances  it  was 
decided  that  it  would  be  advisable  to  recruit  outside  the  district.  The  Secretary  explained  that  he 
had  had  certain  communications  with  the  Authorities  a  short  time  ago,  with  a  view  of  obtaining 
permission  to  recruit  in  the  London  area,  but  without  success.  The  meeting,  however,  thought  that 
a  further  attempt  should  be  made  to  obtain  the  necessary  consents,  and  the  Secretary  was  instructed 
to  ascertain  if  permission  would  be  granted  to  recruit  in  the  London  area,  which  was  considered  the 
most  desirable  for  the  purpose.  9 
By  23  August  1915,  a  letter: 
was  submitted  from  the  Secretary  of  the  County  of  the  City  of  Aberdeen  Territorial  Force 
Association,  dated  21M  inst.,  intimating  that  his  Association  and  the  Northern  Counties  Association 
have  agreed  to  recruit  in  each  other's  areas,  and  asking  if  the  same  facilities  would  be  given  to 
their  Association  in  Elgin  if  they  open  the  City  of  Aberdeen  to  the  Elginshire  Association.  The 
meeting  agreed  to  comply  to  the  request.  30 
This  indicates  that  the  widening  of  recruiting  for  many  units  in  the  (Highland)  Division  had 
started  long  before  Beckett's  assertion  that  the  conscription  phase  was  the  root  cause  of  the 
widespread  changes  in  recruiting  patterns. 
Fuller  was  correct  to  maintain  that: 
Moreover,  even  the  truly  Highland  element  steadily  diminished.  Back  home,  men  were  scarce, 
agriculture  could  spare  only  a  limited  proportion  of  its  labour  force,  and  the  Highlands,  with  few 
focuses  of  social  life,  had  already  before  the  war  enlisted  a  higher  proportion  of  the  population  in 
the  Territorials  than  any  other  region.  When  these  first  battalions  wasted,  there  were  few  Gaels  to 
replenish  them.  The  1/40'  (Ross  and  Cromarty)  Seaforth  Highlanders  had  started  the  war  with  at 
least  25  per  cent  of  the  battalion  having  Gaelic  as  their  mother  tongue.  Already,  by  the  end  of 
29  National  Archive  of  Scotland,  MD8/3,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Elgin. 
30  NAS,  MD8/3,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Elgin. 
111 1915,  `it  was  less  characteristically  a  Highland  battalion  and  was  becoming  more  like  a  Regular 
unit,  filled  with  men  from  all  parts  of  the  country.  31 
All  of  the  battalions  also  show  a  marked  decrease  in  the  number  of  men  recruited  from  the 
local  areas  during  1916,  indicating  that  the  system  for  reinforcement  to  the  units  of  the 
(Highland)  Division  was  undergoing  a  change.  This  could  suggest  that  the  local  areas  were 
simply  running  out  of  men  to  recruit,  but  is  also  an  indicator  that  the  conscription  process  was 
having  a  marked  impact  on  the  traditional  recruiting  patterns.  The  Seaforth  and  Cameron 
battalions  in  particular,  due  to  the  scarcity  of  men  in  the  local  areas,  experienced  the  most 
striking  transformation  by  taking  in  many  men  from  outside,  and  this  resulted  in  the  Cameron 
battalion  being  absorbed  by  1/1St  Camerons  due  to  a  lack  of  men. 
By  1917,  the  representative  units  all  experienced  a  shift  from  a  majority  of  serving  soldiers 
recruited  in  the  local  area  to  a  majority  from  wider  Scotland,  with  the  exception  of  the  1/6th 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders.  The  disparity  between  the  Argylls  and  the  rest  was  due  to 
the  Argylls  becoming  a  pioneer  unit  in  1916  and  thus  incurring  fewer  casualties, 
concomitantly  needing  less  reinforcements.  There  were  some  variations  in  the  number  of 
recruits  from  outside  Scotland,  but  considerable  numbers  were  evident  throughout. 
By  1918,  the  shortage  of  manpower  from  specific  areas,  and  the  increasing  strains  on  the 
reinforcement  system  led  to  even  fewer  local  men  serving  in  the  local  battalions  of  the 
division  and  it  is  no  surprise  to  find  that  the  Seaforths  (that  recruited  from  an  area  with  a  low 
population  density)  had  the  fewest  men  from  the  traditional  recruiting  areas. 
The  data  for  place  of  enlistment  corroborates  the  evidence  provided  by  place  of  birth  and  the 
subsequent  analysis.  It  shows  that  the  units  from  the  sparsely  populated  areas  increasingly 
focused  on  recruiting  from  outside  the  local  area  to  maintain  the  battalion  establishment.  It 
also  shows  that  the  increased  focus  was  disproportionate  to  that  of  other  areas  where 
population  density  was  greater. 
By  1917,  the  data  indicates  that  the  ability  to  enlist  for  a  particular  battalion  was  not 
physically  confined  to  small  numbers  of  recruiting  stations,  but  through  the  general  service 
31  J.  G.  Fuller,  Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies  1914-1918  (Oxford, 
1991),  pp.  163-164. 
112 process  was  opened  to  other  potential  recruits  in  many  areas.  This  is  even  more  apparent  by 
1918,  as  all  the  selected  units  had  a  greater  proportion  of  enlistments  from  outwith  the  local 
area. 
The  evidence  contradicts  both  Ian  Beckett  and  Peter  Simpkins  and  agrees  with  Helen 
McCartney,  in  that  local  areas  were  still  a  focus  for  recruitment  after  conscription,  although 
there  were  variations  in  the  most  sparsely  populated  areas.  Although  the  proportion  of 
recruits  from  local  areas  diminished  during  and  after  1916,  the  real  impact  of  a  dilution  in 
local  recruitment  was  not  critical  until  1918,  but  that  impacted  most  severely  on  units  from 
areas  with  a  low  density  of  population. 
Impact  of  conscription 
For  this  consistency  in  reinforcement  to  continue  throughout  the  war,  the  military  authorities 
had  to  have  recognised  the  value  of  local,  regional,  and  national  allegiances  in  Scotland.  An 
analysis  of  the  drafting  system  is  essential  to  verify  that  the  relative  consistency  in  the  51" 
Division  was  not  a  product  of  chance,  but  was,  in  line  with  McCartney,  32  a  result  of  a  more 
systematic  drafting  policy.  It  is  significant  that  a  large  percentage  of  the  total  manpower  in  all 
the  battalions  investigated  came  from  specific  regions  of  Scotland  and  we  have  seen  through 
battalion  analysis  that  there  was  a  conscious  attempt  to  keep  the  majority  of  the  51St  Division 
Scottish. 
It  has  been  shown  that  during  the  pre-war period,  recruitment  in  a  number  of  regimental  areas 
was  problematic  given  population  limitations.  During  the  war,  this  was  exacerbated  by  heavy 
casualties  and  a  demand  for  urgent  reinforcements  from  all  areas.  This  placed  stresses  on 
both  the  voluntary  and  conscript  systems  which  only  increased  as  the  war  progressed  and 
casualties  mounted.  As  early  as  22  June  1915,  the  Territorial  Association  in  Aberdeen  was 
moved  to  write  of  its  concerns  to  the  military  authorities: 
it  was  decided  to  intimate  to  the  Army  Council,  also  to  the  Glasgow  Associations,  that  this 
Association  is  in  sympathy  with  the  views  expressed  in  the  communication  from  the  Lord 
32  McCartney,  'The  1/6`h  and  1/10`h  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War'.  p.  89. 
113 Lieutenant  of  the  County  of  the  City  of  Glasgow  to  the  Secretary  of  State  urging  that  Highland 
battalions  should  retain  their  identity.  33 
In  his  article  on  the  Irish  formations,  Perry  stated  that  almost  all  battalions  in  the  British 
Army  found  it  difficult  to  maintain  a  localised  identity  as  the  war  progressed,  emphasising 
that  the  situation  was  particularly  acute  in  Ireland.  34 
By  mid-1916,  the  51St  Division  had  only  been  involved  in  a  limited  number  of  engagements 
and  had  sustained  manageable  casualty  rates.  This  permitted  the  system  for  recruitment  and 
reinforcement  under  the  voluntary  system  to  function  adequately  as  the  stresses  were 
containable.  In  early  1916,  after  a  stay  in  a  convalescent  camp,  Major  Anderson  returned  to 
the  front  line  from  Etaples  with  a  new  batch  of  recruits.  He  automatically  returned  to  his 
original  battalion  and  stated  that  other  drafts  were  still  going  to  battalions  that  they  would 
have  expected  to  be  sent  to.  35  However,  as  the  division  became  more  active  and  casualties 
grew,  the  system  became  harder  to  sustain. 
The  evidence  also  indicates  temporary  abnormalities  to  the  system  of  reinforcement  for  the 
51st  Division  after  a  conflict.  Wauchope  stated  of  a  draft,  that  `for  the  first  time  in  the 
battalion's  history'  other  regiments  were  included.  However,  he  went  on  to  add  that  the 
system  returned  to  normality  with  reinforcements  issuing  from  the  parent  regiment.  36 
It  is  clear  that  the  War  Office  and  GHQ  valued  Scottish  homogeneity  in  a  particular  way  and 
attempted  to  maintain  it.  Bradbury  testified  to  the  dedication  of  the  system  in  ensuring  that 
drafts  from  Scottish  third-line  battalions  reached  Scottish  front  line  units.  He  enlisted  through 
the  Derby  Scheme  on  12  November  1915  and  joined  the  3/4th  Cameron  Highlanders  and  was 
included  in  a  draft  to  France  in  mid-1916.  Upon  arrival  at  Boulogne,  the  draft  was  informed 
that  the  front  line  Cameron  battalion  was  to  be  broken  up  and  that: 
we  would  be  transferred  to  a  line  Regiment.  We  were  given  two  or  three  regiments  to  choose  from 
(all  Scottish)  and  I  chose  the  50'Gordons  and  received  a  new  number  and  a  Gordon  cap  badge  with 
33  NAS,  MD4/2,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Aberdeen,  22  June  1915. 
34  N.  Perry,  `Maintaining  Regimental  Identity  in  the  Great  War:  The  Case  of  the  Irish  Regiments',  in  Stand  To, 
No.  52,  p.  5. 
35  IWM,  85/23/1,  The  Journal  of  Major  A.  Anderson. 
36  A.  G.  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Vol  11  (London,  1926),  p.  301. 
114 colours  but  in  the  afternoon  several  of  us  were  told  that  there  were  too  many  in  that  Regiment  and 
so  were  posted  to  the  5`h  Seaforths.  37 
The  policy  of  channelling  Scottish  recruits  to  Scottish  units  did  not  only  operate  at  a  high 
command  level,  as  the  then  Captain  Wimberley  stated  when  he  had  `scoured  high  and  low  for 
Jocks  and  over  50%  were'38  in  his  232  Machine  Gun  Company  in  1917.  However,  the  strains 
on  the  system  became  acute  in  1918  as  the  machinery  for  reinforcement  began  to  break  down. 
Wimberley  stated  that  by  March  1918,  although  the  officers  in  his  Machine  Gun  unit  were 
mainly  Scots,  the  other  ranks  were  75%  English.  39  The  following  month,  the  system  that  had 
been  created  by  GHQ  with  regards  Scottish  reinforcements  to  Scottish  units  did  actually 
break  down.  40  At  the  depot  near  Calais: 
On  200'  April  armed  men  wearing  arm-bands  with  S.  W.  C.  on  them  (Soldiers'  and  Workers' 
Council)  attacked  the  camp  and  herded  all  officers  into  the  canteen  where  we  were  held 
prisoners.......  all  night  and  next  day,  while  our  guards  told  us  it  was  the  Communist  Revolution, 
that  the  bulk  of  the  troops  had  joined  them  and  that  we  would  be  shot  if  the  revolt  was  spread  and 
successful......  On  22"d  April  a  Cavalry  division  surrounded  the  Depot  and  troops  of  the  19`h  Corps 
surged  in  and  quelled  the  mutiny  disarming  the  mutineers,  whose  leaders  were  tried  at  once  by 
summary  court-martial  and  those  convicted  taken  out  and  shot.  So  ended  the  attempted  revolution. 
The  organisers  had  chosen  "M"  Scottish  Depot  as  their  primary  target  as  they  knew  that  the 
Scottish  soldiers  were  very  angry  at  an  order  that  they  must  in  future  serve  with  any  regiment,  not 
41  necessarily  Scottish. 
Following  on  from  this,  Christison  recorded  that: 
On  27th  July  I  heard  there  had  been  trouble  at  "M"  (Scottish)  depot  at  Calais.  Men  were  refusing  to 
obey  the  National  Service  Act  which  made  it  possible  to  post  men  to  any  Regiment  that  needed 
reinforcements.  Next  day  we  were  ordered  to  move  back  and  take  over  823  mutineers  and  19 
officers  of  various  Highland  Regiments.  This  we  did  and  entrained  them  disembarking  that  night  at 
Arneke.  I  was  told  these  men  had  refused  to  entrain  for  the  front  unless  they  were  given  assurances 
that  they  would  serve  with  their  own  regiments.  There  were  many  others  in  the  protest.....  Once  a 
week  a  Senior  Staff  Officer  from  GHQ  came  and  tried  to  persuade  the  men  to  obey  orders,  but  they 
would  have  none  of  it.  He  said  all  those  who  obeyed  would  be  granted  a  free  pardon.  I  then  had  to 
call  on  those  who  agreed  to  step  forward.  None  did,  and  he  went  sadly  away.  All  the  men  were 
thoroughly  respectful  and  the  discipline  excellent.  They  were  loyal  in  every  other  way,  and  most 
grateful  for  any  little  thing  we  could  do  for  them.  After  about  6  weeks  the  High  Command  gave  in. 
Their  last  effort  was  to  send  the  Army  Commander  to  address  them.  He  got  no  change.  "Damn  it", 
he  said  to  me  "You  and  I  are  with  them  in  this  nonsense".  I  think  he  saw  Sir  Douglas  Haig 
37  IWM,  81/35/1,  The  Memoir  of  S.  Bradbury,  p.  14. 
38  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  59.. 
39  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  104. 
40  In  1917,  GHQ  ordered  that  English  reinforcements  could  be  transferred  to  Scots  regiments  if  necessary. 
However,  and  crucially,  Scots  reinforcements  could  not  be  transferred  to  English  units. 
41  IWM,  82/15/1,  The  Memoir  of  General  Sir P.  Christison,  p.  70. 
115 personally.  I  took  the  Battalion  back  to  Calais  and  they  all  got  their  postings  to  their  own 
regiments.  How  foolish  can  the  administrative  "A"  branch  be.  42 
This  is  highly  significant  and  a  number  of  points  are  evident.  Until  early  1918,  Scottish 
troops  did  not  expect  the  military  authorities  to  post  them  to  non-Scottish  units,  and  the 
strength  of  feeling  amongst  Scottish  soldiers  at  the  change  of  posting  policy  was  potent 
enough  to  create  a  focus  for  revolt  and  insurrection.  In  July  1918,  the  military  authorities  did 
actually  back  down  in  the  face  of  mass  dissent,  and  the  system  of  reinforcement  returned  to 
the  pre-1918  norm  of  Scottish  troops  to  Scottish  units. 
It  is  worth  contrasting  the  April  1918  revolt  at  Calais  with  its  more  infamous  September  1917 
forerunner  at  Etaples,  where  the  scenes  of  disruption  and  unrest  lasted  almost  a  week  before 
they  were  quelled  by  the  military  authorities.  Gloden  Dallas  and  Douglas  Gill  have  described 
the  incident  at  Etaples,  which  was  centred  around  ANZAC  and  Scottish  troops,  as  one  which 
was  a  result  of  general  discontent  with  the  war,  the  camp  and  its  conditions,  the  harsh  regime 
in  the  camp,  and  the  transitory  nature  of  the  place.  43  David  Englander  in  his  chapter  on 
`Mutinies  and  Military  Morale'  in  the  Oxford  Illustrated  History  of  the  First  World  War 
considers  that,  in  general,  the  1917  period  was  one  of  increasing  restlessness  for  British  (and 
other)  troops  on  the  Western  Front  (also  reflected  in  civilian  discord  in  Britain),  and  sets  that 
as  a  context  for  the  riots  at  Etaples.  44  That  neither  of  these  sources  refer  to  the  reinforcement 
process  would  suggest  that  it  was  indeed,  as  Christison  stated,  a  1918  issue. 
Interestingly,  Dallas  and  Gill  continue  their  discourse  referring  to  the  troubles  at  `M'  Scottish 
Depot  at  Calais  in  July  and  September  1918  (whereas  Christison's  account  refers  to  April  and 
July  1918).  Again,  there  is  no  mention  of  any  issue  with  reinforcement,  when  clearly  there 
was,  and  the  authors  seem  content  to  conclude  that  the  unrest  was  caused  by  general  anxiety 
and  the  need  for  the  war  to  end  45 
42  IWM,  82/15/1,  The  Memoir  of  General  Sir P.  Christison,  p.  72. 
43  G.  Dallas,  and  D.  Gill,  The  Unknown  Army  (London,  1985),  pp.  63-76. 
44  D.  Englander,  `Mutinies  and  Military  Morale',  in  H.  Strachan  (ed),  The  Oxford  Illustrated  History  of  the  First 
World  War  (Oxford,  1998),  p.  196. 
116 Officer  recruitment  and  reinforcement 
In  order  to  understand  fully  the  recruitment  and  reinforcement  process  within  the  51st 
(Highland)  Division,  it  is  also  necessary  to  examine  the  officer  class  and  the  proportion  of  it 
that  was  associated  with  Highland  and  wider  Scottish  regiments. 
The  pre-war  Territorial  divisions  were  commanded  by  professional  officers  from  the  Regular 
Army.  Senior  staff  positions  were  also  held  by  Regular  Army  officers,  and  infantry  and 
artillery  units  usually  had  a  Regular  adjutant  and  Regular  NCO  instructors.  All  other  officers 
up  to  the  rank  of  battalion  commanding  officer  held  Territorial  commissions  and  were  usually 
figures  of  some  local  significance  and  standing  in  the  community. 
For  a  Regular  Army  commission,  there  were  five  pre-war  routes  of  entry  and  these  were 
through  the:  Indian  Army;  the  cavalry;  the  infantry;  through  Sandhurst;  and  through  the 
Royal  Engineers  and  Royal  Artillery.  Many  of  the  officer  candidates  went  directly  from 
universities  and  from  Officer  Training  Corps.  Only  a  small  percentage  of  the  officers  from 
any  of  the  above  came  from  the  ranks,  and  in  1914  officers  were  overwhelmingly  from  public 
schools.  6  There  were  also  commissions  available  for  Regular  officers  in  the  Special  Reserve 
and  Territorial  Force.  However,  the  Territorial  Force  was  generally  considered  a  second-rate 
option. 
Infantry  and  cavalry  officers  were  commissioned  into  a  regiment,  which  did  not  necessarily 
have  to  be  their  local  one  as  military  families  often  had  longstanding  links  with  regiments 
away  from  their  homes.  Major-General  Wimberley  exhibited  a  classic  career  path  as  he  went 
through  a  traditional  Regular  Army  route  that  took  him  through  Sandhurst  from  Wellington 
College  and  Cambridge  University.  His  desire  to  join  a  Highland  regiment  after  Sandhurst 
was  grounded  in  family  connections.  `I  was,  soon  after  arrival,  interviewed  by  Gordon 
Ramsay,  a  Cameron  Highlander,  as  a  starter  for  the  Camerons;  and  how  I  longed  to  get  into 
the  Highland  Brigade,  and  into  my  grandfathers  regiment.  47 
Along  with  familial  links,  it  was  also  often  a  matter  of  prestige  for  an  officer  cadet  to  join  a 
particular  regiment,  as  each  had  a  position  in  the  military  hierarchy  based  on  history, 
45  Dallas,  and  Gill,  The  Unknown  Army,  pp.  88-89. 
46  K.  Simpson,  `The  Officers',  in  Beckett,  and  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  in  Arms,  pp.  64-65. 
47  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  17. 
117 tradition,  royal  association,  ancient  lineage,  social  exclusivity,  regional  affiliation,  and 
military  reputation.  The  Highland  regiments  held  a  high  position  in  this  hierarchy  which 
ranked  as  follows:  Foot  Guards,  Household  Cavalry,  four  or  five  regiments  of  cavalry  of  the 
line,  the  Rifle  Brigade,  other  cavalry,  and  then  the  Highland  regiments  below  these. 
On  mobilisation,  the  51"  Division,  along  with  the  other  Territorial  divisions  suffered  the  loss 
of  many  of  its  Regular  officers  who  subsequently  joined  the  British  Expeditionary  Force. 
Their  departure  ensured  additional  responsibility  for  the  remaining  Territorial  officers  who 
lacked  the  training  and  experience  of  professional  soldiers.  This  not  unnaturally,  caused 
significant  difficulties.  This  problem  was  not  unforeseen,  and  as  early  as  April  1914,  a  Sub- 
Committee  of  the  Committee  for  Imperial  Defence  was  highly  critical  of  Territorial  officers 
describing  them  as  `the  weakest  point'  of  the  Force.  48 
The  problem  of  getting  professional  Regular  or  experienced  officers  to  join  the  (Highland) 
Division  was  exacerbated  as  casualties  started  to  mount  and  experienced  officers  became 
even  more  of  a  premium  commodity.  The  New  Armies  tended  to  have  priority  over  those  that 
were  returned  to  the  formations  at  home.  To  combat  the  ever-increasing  paucity  of 
professional  officers,  the  War  Office  instituted  changes  in  age  and  course  length  for  Regular 
commissions  at  Sandhurst  and  Woolwich.  However,  there  were  still  entrance  exams  and 
healthy  competition  for  the  elite  regiments.  49 
Pre-war  officer  recruitment  for  the  Territorials,  predominantly  controlled  by  the  Territorial 
associations,  was  not  rooted  in  progressive  military  values,  and  relied  more  on  a  system  of 
patronage.  Many  of  the  officers  were  simply  unfit  for  command  and  after  mobilisation  were 
sent  home.  The  (Highland)  Division  itself  continued  to  suffer  from  poor  leadership,  at  both 
senior  and  junior  officer  level,  as  it  took  its  place  on  the  Western  Front: 
There  is  no  doubt,  of  course,  that,  according  to  any  standards  (leaving  those  of  today  out  of 
account)  a  great  many  officers  of  the  1/80'  Argylls  were  too  old  for  the  severe  conditions  of 
campaigning  which  prevailed  in  1915.....  One  of  the  casualties  of  age  was  their  Colonel,  John 
Campbell  of  Kilberry,  who  had  trained  and  brought  them  to  the  battlefield.  5° 
48  p.  Simkins,  Kitchener's  Army  (Manchester,  1988),  p.  18. 
49  Simpson,  `The  Officers',  in  Beckett,  and  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  in  Arms,  p.  69. 
50  G.  I.  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960  (Glasgow,  1960),  p.  27. 
118 Even  the  procedures,  or  more  accurately  the  lack  of  them,  for  internal  promotion  were  viewed 
with  dismay  and  reflected  poorly  on  the  officer  class  in  the  51S`  who  were  seen  to  use  them  to 
endorse  a  form  of  patronage.  Men  of  `U'  Company  of  the  1/4th  Gordons  compiled  a  list  of 
grievances  which,  as  citizen  soldiers  in  1914  they  felt  they  could  air  with  their  officers: 
the  ridiculous  promotions  were  also  discussed.  I  may  tell  you  the  latest  promotions.  The  first  was 
the  Captain's  servant,  promoted  to  lance-corporal.  He  is  a  recruit  and  on  very  rare  occasions 
parades  with  the  Company,  the  consequence  being  that  he  is  absolutely  without  training.  The 
second  was  even  worse.  A  recruit,  three  weeks  joined,  who  had  no  right  to  be  in  the  Company,  for 
he  is  not  a  student,  has  been  promoted.  The  reason  for  his  promotion  is  self-evident  as  he  is  a 
nephew  of  the  last  Company  Commanders' 
Many  in  `U'  Company  were  graduates  of  Aberdeen  University  and  were  clearly  `officer 
material';  however  most  served  in  the  ranks.  To  combat  this,  as  early  as  January  1915,  the 
military  authorities  began  to  trawl  units  for  the  many  potential  officers  within  the  ranks.  The 
chosen  men  were  nominated  by  the  commanding  officer  and  proceeded  to  a  short  training 
course  leading  to  a  commission.  However,  with  conscription,  and  in  line  with  the  increasing 
bureaucratisation  of  the  Army  as  the  war  progressed,  the  War  Office  decided  on  a  new 
selection  process  for  recruiting  young  officers  in  February  1916.52  Officer  Cadet  Battalions 
were  established,  but  access  was  only  available  to  those  who  had  passed  through  the  ranks,  or 
had  some  previous  experience  of  soldiering,  or  had  some  technical  expertise.  War  diaries 
stated  that  a,  `Great  shortage  of  capable  Commanding  Officers  and  2"d  in  Commands  has 
shown  itself....  Replacement  of  officer  casualties  slow,  though  there  is  apparently  a  plentiful 
supply.  Officers'  now  recommended  for  commissions  from  the  ranks  after  1  months  training 
being  ordered  to  join  the  cadet  school  in  November  next',  53  and: 
Commissions  in  the  MG  Corps.  All  Candidates  sent  home  for  admission  to  a  cadet  unit  with  a 
view  to  appointment  to  temporary  commissions  in  the  MG  Corps  will  in  future  be  required  to 
undergo  a  preliminary  course  at  Grantham.  Such  candidates,  therefore  will  only  be  accepted 
provisionally  subject  to  their  being  found  suitable  for  admission  to  a  cadet  unit,  after  being  tested 
during  the  course  at  Grantham.  54 
The  Territorial  Force  associations  saw  these  reforms  as  a  dilution  of  their  authority  and 
responsibilities,  and  as  early  as  August  1915  they  were  fighting  a  rearguard  action  against  the 
War  Office: 
51  J.  McConachie,  The  Student  Soldiers  (Elgin,  1995),  p.  33. 
52  Simpson,  `The  Officers',  in  Beckett,  and  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  in  Arms,  p.  79. 
53  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  24-31  July  1916. 
54  NA,  WO  95  2849,5  1"  Division  Routine  Order  735,21  March  1917. 
119 The  Secretary  read  a  letter  addressed  to  the  Chairman  from  the  War  Office  dated  13'h  August  1915 
with  regard  to  the  first  appointment  of  officers  to  the  Territorial  Force  and  suggesting  that  in  view 
of  the  present  great  shortage  of  officers  in  the  Territorial  Force,  the  Association  should  agree  that 
officers  should  be  gazetted  to  Territorial  Force  units  direct  provided  the  Association  cannot 
provide  suitable  candidates.  The  Secretary  was  instructed  to  inform  the  War  Office  that  this 
Association  had  not  yet  had  difficulty  in  getting  a  suitable  supply  of  officers,  and  ask  the  War 
Office  to  inform  the  Association  as  to  what  they  would  consider  a  reasonable  number  of  officers  to 
be  gazetted  to  a  battalion.  " 
The  debate  came  to  a  head  in  a  meeting  between  the  chairmen  of  the  Territorial  associations 
and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  and  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  (CIGS)  in 
January  1917: 
r 
Sir  William  Robertson  [CIGS]  had  pointed  out  that  under  present  conditions  the  Territorial  Officer 
is,  so  to  speak,  a  thing  apart,  a  dweller  in  a  water-tight  compartment,  and  the  change  suggested 
would  actually  be  for  his  benefit.  The  change  applied  to  the  promotion  of  Territorial  Officers 
which,  to  their  advantage,  is  now  to  go  through  one  channel  of  the  War  Office,  whereby  uniformity 
and  equal  opportunity  would  be  secured.  56 
From  mid-1916  onwards  this  `meritocracy'  led  to  further  changes  in  the  officer  class  and  the 
traditional  differences  between  the  Regular  and  Territorial  officers  were  minimised  even 
more. 
However,  the  new  system  had  its  problems  and  merit  did  not  always  prevail.  Wimberley 
related,  that  at  Grantham,  vested  interests  could  take  precedence  over  fair  selection: 
It  was  February  1917  before  I  actually  got  my  company,  I  had  quite  a  fright  about  it  too.  MGHQ 
[Machine  Gun  Headquarters]  at  GHQ  France  and  the  MGTC  [Machine  Gun  Training  Corps] 
Grantham  did  not  get  on  over  well,  and  the  T.  C.  liked  to  give  their  nominees  the  command  of  the 
new  companies,  rather  than  the  fellows  sent  home  from  France  for  that  purpose.  57 
The  continual  strain  on  the  officer  classes  even  after  conscription  and  throughout  the  rest  of 
the  war  is  evident  in  Routine  Order  836  of  23  August  1917  which  stated  that,  `It  has  been 
decided  that  all  second  lieutenants,  if  duly  recommended,  shall  be  eligible  for  promotion  to 
the  rank  of  lieutenant  on  completion  of  18  months  commissioned  service.  ',  and  `COs  should 
at  once  submit  the  names  of  all  second  lieutenants  who  have  already  completed  the  qualifying 
period  laid  down  above'.  Further  routine  orders  emphasised  this  need  to  fill  vacant  officer 
55  NAS,  MD6/20,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Stirling,  23  August  1915. 
56  NAS,  MD7/5,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Dundee. 
120 posts;  R0861  of  24  September  stated  that  dentists  serving  as  other  ranks  could  apply  for 
commissions  as  Dental  Surgeons,  and  R0864  of  3  October  stated  that  `Applications  For 
Commissions  In  The  Supply  Branch,  ASC'  were  temporarily  halted  due  to  response.  58 
Proportion  of  Scottish  regimental  officers. 
It  has  been  shown  that  the  proportion  of  other  ranks  that  served  with  the  5i  st  (Highland) 
Division  during  the  First  World  War  was  predominantly  Scottish.  It  has  also  been 
demonstrated  that  this  was  official  policy.  However,  the  series  Officers  Died  in  the  Great 
War,  in  contrast  to  Soldiers  Died  in  the  Great  War,  does  not  give  information  about 
birthplace  and  enlistment,  so  comparators  cannot  be  found  in  that  source.  As  an  alternative 
research  method  and  in  order  to  substantiate  the  findings,  three  different  levels  of  officer 
command  will  be  analysed  to  determine  regimental  affiliations.  Dr  John  Bourne  has  compiled 
a  database  of  senior  officers  that  served  in  the  British  Expeditionary  Force,  which  covers  not 
only  birthplace  and  enlistment,  but  the  regiment  in  which  the  officer  was  commissioned.  The 
papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley  provide  a  comprehensive  breakdown  of  the 
regimental  status  of  the  officers  on  the  divisional  staff,  and,  finally,  key  battalion  histories 
also  provide  details  of  battalion  officers.  Throughout  the  analysis,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  officers  did  not  necessarily  choose  a  local  regiment,  as  factors  such  as  familial  tradition 
and  elite  status  would  have  been  a  strong  influence. 
Of  the  three  divisional  commanders,  only  Major-General  Carter-Campbell  was  commissioned 
to  a  Scottish  regiment  and  had  Scottish  familial  links.  However,  Major-General  Bannatine- 
Allason  did  have  strong  Scottish  connections.  Ironically,  Harper,  who  is  most  closely 
associated  with  the  division,  had  no  such  Scottish  roots  and  had  not  been  commissioned  into 
a  Scottish  regiment. 
Fig.  13 
GOC  Regiment 
Bannatine-Allason  Royal  Artillery 
Harper  Royal  Engineers 
Carter-Campbell  The  Cameronians59 
57  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  55. 
SB  NA,  WO  95  2849,51"  Division  Routine  Orders;  836,861,864. 
59  With  thanks  to  Dr  J.  Bourne,  University  of  Birmingham. 
121 Two  out  of  the  sixteen  brigade  commanders  were  from  Scottish  regiments,  all  of  which  were 
either  Highland  or  Highland  associated.  There  was  no  particular  pattern  in  the  timing  of  the 
assumption  of  command  amongst  the  sixteen,  but  the  duration  of  command  clearly  indicates  a 
bias  towards  the  Scottish  commanders  with  a  total  of  2,966  days  in  command  for  Scottish 
regimental  officers  as  opposed  to  1,121  for  non-Scottish  regimental  officers. 
Fig.  14 
Brigadier-General 
Buchanon 
Pelham  Burn 
Edwards 
Hamilton 
Hibbert 
Laing 
Segrave 
Spooner 
Stewart 
Thorpe 
Beckwith 
Campbell 
Dick-Cunyngham 
Gordon 
Green 
Ross 
Regiment 
Seaforths 
Gordons 
20th  Hussars 
Black  Watch 
King's  Own  (Royal  Lancaster) 
Seaforths 
HLI 
Lancashire  Fusiliers 
Black  Watch 
Bedfordshire  Regiment 
Hampshire  Regiment 
Seaforths 
Gordons 
Gordons 
Black  Watch 
Durham  Light  Infantry 
Days  in  Command 
411  days 
630  days 
86  days 
374  days 
165  days 
102  days 
95  days 
7  days 
252  days 
11  days 
252  days 
802  days 
6  days 
84  days 
210  days 
c.  600  days60 
The  data  on  the  divisional  staff  officers  produced  a  more  diverse  result,  with  only  12  out  of 
34  officers  from  Highland  and  Lowland  Scottish  regiments. 
60  With  thanks  to  Dr  J.  Bourne,  University  of  Birmingham. 
122 Fig.  15 
Staff  Regiment 
ADCs  to  Bannatine-Allason  2  Scottish  (Gordons  and  Argylls)  and  2  Other  (Guards  and 
Indian  Army) 
ADCs  to  Harper  2  Other  (North  Staffs  and  West  Yorks) 
ADCs  to  Carter-Campbell  1  Scottish  (Lothian  and  Border)  and  2  Other  (MG  Corps  and 
East  Kent  Yeomanry) 
GSO1  3  Scottish  (Royal  Scots,  Scottish  Rifles,  and  Gordons)  and  3 
Other  (Royal  Engineers,  13th  Hussars,  Royal  Dublin  Fusiliers) 
GSO2 
GSO3 
3  Scottish  (Seaforths,  Royal  Scottish  Fusiliers,  Gordons)  and  7 
Others  (Reserve,  2x  Royal  Artilley,  Indian  Army,  Royal 
Fusiliers,  London  Regt,  10`h  Royal  Hussars) 
2  Scottish  (Camerons,  Highland  Light  Infantry)  and  6  Other  (2x 
Royal  Artillery,  Royal  Garrison  Artillery,  6th  Inniskillen 
Dragoons,  7th  Dragoon  Guards,  10`h  Royal  Hussars) 
AA  and  QMG  1  Scottish  (Royal  Scots)  and  6  Others  (3x  retired  pay,  ASC, 
Shropshire  Light  Infantry,  Royal  Irish  Regiment) 
DAAG  3  Others  (Suffolks,  N/A,  13`h  Hussars) 
DAQMG  3  Others  (N/A,  Army  Service  Corps,  and  General  Service  List) 
The  senior  officers  in  the  infantry  brigades  were  almost  all  from  Highland  regiments  or 
regiments  associated  with  the  Highlands,  with  twenty  officers  out  of  the  total  of  twenty-eight. 
123 Fig.  16 
Senior  Brigade  Officers  Regiment 
152nd  Bde  Comm  4  Scottish  plus  one  probable  (MacFarlane,  D)  (2x  Gordons, 
Seaforths,  Highland  Light  Infantry)  and  2  Others  (Durham 
Light  Infantry,  and  Bedfords) 
Bde  Maj  2  Scottish  (2x  Gordons)  and  3  Others  (London  Regt,  Norfolks, 
Liverpools) 
Staff  Capt  4  Scottish  (3x  Argylls  and  1  Gordons) 
153rd  Bde  Comm  3  Scottish  (HLI,  Seaforths,  Gordons)  and  2  Others  (Hampshire, 
10th  Royal  Hussars) 
Bde  Mai  4  Scottish  (3x  Gordons  and  1  HLI)  and  1  Other  (10`h  Royal 
Hussars) 
Staff  Capt  4  Scottish  (2x  Gordons,  Royal  Scots,  Seaforths)  and  1  Other 
(10`h  Royal  Hussars) 
154  Bde  Comm 
Bde  Maj 
Staff  Capt 
1  Scottish  (Seaforth)  and  5  Others  (N/A,  2x  10`h  Royal  Hussars, 
Kings  Own  Lancashire,  20th  Hussars) 
2  Scottish  (Seaforth,  Argylls)  and  4  Others  (Suffolks,  Indian 
Army,  2x  General  List) 
3  Scottish  (2x  Argylls,  Gordons)  and  2  Others  (Liverpools  and 
unknown) 
124 Most  of  the  officers  in  the  Royal  Artillery  and  the  Royal  Engineers  were  from  their  respective 
corps,  61  and  other  positions  such  as  Assistant  Director  of  Medical  Services,  Deputy  Assistant 
Director  of  Medical  Services,  Deputy  Assistant  Director  of  Veterinary  Services,  and  Deputy 
Assistant  Director  of  Ordnance  Services  were  filled  by  officers  from  specialist  regiments  and 
corps  such  as  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps  and  Army  Ordnance  Corps.  62 
Of  the  Battalion  Commanders,  evidence  from  primary  and  secondary  sources  indicates  that 
battalion  commanders  were  almost  all  from  Highland/Scottish  regiments,  and  many  were 
from  the  regiment  of  the  battalion  that  they  commanded.  There  is  a  wealth  of  information  in 
the  regimental  and  battalion  histories  to  support  a  consistent  Highland/Scottish  regimental 
connection.  With  the  1/6`h  Seaforths: 
Colonel  T.  G.  MacLaren  trained  the  Battalion  at  Bedford,  and  afterwards  took  it  to  France.  He  had 
formerly  been  of  the  K.  O.  S.  B..  He  commanded  the  6`h  Seaforths  in  France  till,  unfortunately,  his 
health  broke  down.  He  was  most  popular  with  all  ranks,  who  much  regretted  losing  him.  The 
Command  was  then  taken  up  by  Colonel  Grant  Smith,  who  continued  in  Command  for  over  a  year, 
earning  the  D.  S.  O.  for  his  distinguished  services  during  that  time.  Other  fine  officers  at  different 
times  held  the  Command,  including  Colonel  Sam  Macdonald,  of  the  5`"  Gordon  Highlanders,  and 
Colonel  Laurie,  D.  S.  O.,  of  the  2nd  Seaforth  Highlanders.  63 
A  close  Highland/Scottish  connection  in  a  battalion  would  also  be  perpetuated  with  the 
second-in-command  taking  over  as  commanding  officer.  `We  were  all  glad  to  hear  that  Major 
W.  Macdonald  was  to  succeed  Colonel  Grant  Smith  in  the  command,  instead  of  a  stranger 
from  another  battalion'.  64  When  Major  MacDonald  contracted  trench  fever,  he  was  replaced 
by  his  second-in-command  as  Colonel.  65  This  type  of  automatic  promotion  was  not  unusual 
in  the  51  S`. 
Casualty/reinforcement  statistics 
The  (Highland)  Division  that  reached  the  end  of  the  war  was  not  the  same  as  that  which  had 
mobilised  in  August  1914.  The  scale  of  the  changes  can,  in  part,  be  witnessed  through 
casualty  statistics  for  both  officers  and  men.  We  know  through  a  representative  sampling  of 
battalions  that  as  the  war  progressed  and  the  system  for  reinforcement  altered,  the  51St  were 
sent  a  greater  proportion  of  drafts  from  wider  Scotland,  but  it  is  vital  to  complement  this 
61  NLS,  ACC  7380  No.  1,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
62  NLS,  ACC  7380  No.  1,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
63  D.  MacEchern,  The  Sword  of  the  North  (Inverness,  1923),  p.  402. 
64  R.  T.  Peel,  and  A.  H.  MacDonald,  6'h  Seaforth  Highlanders,  Campaign  Reminiscences  (Elgin,  1923),  p.  23. 
125 knowledge  with  an  analysis  of  the  statistics  for  the  division  as  a  whole  to  determine  how 
much  the  515  was  under  pressure  for  reinforcements  and  during  which  periods.  In  this 
section,  the  overall  casualty  figures,  the  actual  establishment,  and  where  possible  the 
reinforcement  rate  will  be  considered. 
"The  51"  Division,  "  said  President  Poincare  of  France,  speaking  at  Glasgow  University  in  1919, 
"which  had  won  everywhere  the  admiration  of  the  Allies  signalised  itself  in  1915  at  Festubert, 
where  it  lost  1500  men;  in  1916  on  the  Somme,  where  it  lost  8500  men;  and  on  the  Ancre,  where  it 
lost  2500  men;  round  Cambrai,  where  it  took  Havrincourt,  Flesquieres,  and  Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 
and  lost  2500  men;  in  1918,  in  the  Section  of  Monchies-Bapaume,  where  it  lost  5000  men  and  was 
honourably  mentioned  in  the  Despatches  of  the  Commander-in-Chief;  and  lastly,  in  the  months  of 
July  1918,  amidst  the  French  Armies  of  Champagne,  where  it  bravely  attacked  the  Huns  before 
Rheims,  and  lost  again  2000  men.  "66 
During  1917  and  1918,  casualties  suffered  by  the  51s`  were  high.  After  Beaumont  Hamel,  the 
division  was  used  again  and  again  in  attack,  a  theme  that  continued  until  the  war  ended. 
The  result  of  the  high  casualty  rate  was  not  only  a  strain  on  the  home  reinforcement  system, 
but  on  the  very  nature  of  the  division  and  the  level  of  collective  experience  it  brought  to  the 
front.  Abundant  evidence  records  the  shattering  of  units;  in  October  1917,  Major  Willie  Doig 
stressed  that,  `Captains  Mair  and  Fysh,  and  Lieutenant  Ian  Robertson  were  the  last  of  those 
officers  of  the  Battalion  who  had  crossed  the  Channel  in  1915  and  were  at  this  time  on  the 
strength',  and  Captain  MacKenzie  added  that:  67 
The  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1918  saw  many  changes,  both  in  the  Battalion  and  in  the  Brigade. 
In  April,  1917,  Lt-Col  J.  Rawson,  D.  S.  O.,  had  been  severely  wounded.  He  was  one  of  the  few 
officers  of  the  original  Battalion  who  had  survived......  Death  had  removed  many  familiar 
figures.  8 
Officer  fatalities  in  the  1/5`h  and  1/6`h  Seaforth  Highlanders  over  the  course  of  the  war  testify 
to  the  heavy  losses  across  battalions  and  verify  that  senior  officer  casualties  were  amongst 
them.  The  1/6th  Seaforths  lost  2  majors,  10  captains,  13  lieutenants,  and  20  subalterns,  69 
whilst  the  1/5`h  Seaforths  lost  1  colonel,  6  captains,  10  lieutenants,  and  23  subalterns.  70 
65  Peel,  and  MacDonald,  6`h  Seaforth  Highlanders,  Campaign  Reminiscences,  p.  27. 
66  MacEchern,  The  Sword  of  the  North,  p.  21. 
67  Peel,  and  MacDonald,  6"  Seaforth  Highlanders,  Campaign  Reminiscences,  p.  51. 
68  D.  MacKenzie,  The  6`h  Gordons  in  France  and  Flanders  (Aberdeen,  1921),  p.  138. 
69  MacEchern,  The  Sword  of  the  North,  p.  403. 
7°  MacEchern,  The  Sword  of  the  North,  pp.  382-3. 
126 To  give  added  substance  to  the  above,  the  actual  casualty  figures  for  the  division  by  month, 
can  be  calculated  from  the  A  and  Q  war  diaries.  However,  it  must  be  noted  that  in  some  cases 
the  record  is  incomplete.  7' 
Fig.  17 
War  Diaries.  Casualty  statistics 
June  1915 
August 
September 
October 
Officer  Killed  Officers  Wounded  Officers  Missing 
3 
3 
1 
2 
24 
14 
5 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Jan  1916  14 
February  00 
March  3  12 
April  0  18 
May  3  22 
June  5  22 
July  20  124 
August  3  24 
September  5  17 
October  66 
January  1917  00 
February  11 
March  3  18 
April  2  14 
June  11 
July  15  61 
August  1  22 
71  NA,  WO  95  2848-9,51"'  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
127 September 
October 
November 
December 
14  47 
48 
20  42 
3  14 
4 
0 
6 
0 
January  1918  020 
February  050 
March  25  92  100 
April  19  71  47 
May  0  31  3 
June  2  12  0 
July  35  134  5 
August  4  32  0 
September  1  19  0 
October  22  82  6 
November  020 
O/R  Killed  O/R  Wounded  O/R  Missing 
June  1915  78  430  12 
August  49  238  3 
September  24  187  0 
October  30  163  2 
January  1916  180 
February  6  12  0 
March  55  212  37 
April  49  308  34 
May  54  354  12 
June  103  584  13 
July  391  2424  313 
August  74  588  7 
128 September  37  222 
October  42  213 
3 
3 
January  1917  9  66  0 
February  1  18  0 
March  52  227  11 
June  26  127  1 
July  345  1621  126 
August  87  3  82  15 
September  327  1431  137 
October  54  196  4 
November  184  1174  143 
December  62  381  3 
January  1918  5  53  0 
February  2  88  0 
March  322  1679  2715 
April  197  1419  1213 
May  56  580  2 
June  18  169  0 
July  402  2949  418 
August  74  938  108 
September  25  274  6 
October  296  2280  186 
November  0  22  0 
These  statistics  show  that  there  was  a  relatively  low,  but  steady  death  rate  during  1915,  and 
that  a  similar  pattern  can  be  determined  for  1916  with  the  exception  of  July  and  November 
when  the  division  was  involved  in  battle.  However,  after  Beaumont  Hamel,  the  casualty  rates 
increased  `across  the  board'  as  the  51St  was  more  active,  with  1918  indicating  the  greatest 
death  and  injury  toll. 
It  is  not  possible  to  compare  directly  the  casualty  rates  with  the  statistics  for  reinforcement  as 
the  latter  would  have  also  included  replacements  for  the  long-term  sick,  the  transferred,  or  the 
129 promoted.  The  number  of  losses  due  to  these  factors  could  be  significant,  such  as  occurred  at 
Courcelette  during  the  winter  of  1916-17: 
At  this  time  the  strength  of  the  battalion  [1/6th  Black  Watch]  had  dwindled  to  17  officers  and  426 
other  ranks.  Officers,  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  were  borrowed  from  the  two  companies 
in  support  to  bring  the  two  companies  in  the  front  line  to  a  strength  of  fifty  each;  thus  one  hundred 
men  held  over  a  thousand  yards  of  line,  the  fighting  strength  of  the  battalion  being  under  two 
hundred  rifles........  On  January  8th,  1917  the  6  bade  farewell  to  the  sector.  Illness,  rheumatism 
and  trench  foot,  brought  on  by  living  for  days  under  wet  sodden  conditions  had  caused  more  losses 
than  were  suffered  by  the  battalion  in  the  Battle  of  Beaumont  Hamel.  72 
However,  it  is  useful  to  understand  the  general  trends,  such  as  heavy  losses  and  numerous 
reinforcements. 
For  the  reinforcement  statistics,  two  sources  were  utilised.  The  first  was  the  Adjutant 
General's  office  at  GHQ  and  the  second  was  the  divisional  war  diaries.  73  The  Adjutant 
General's  record  is  doubly  useful  as  it  also  gives  figures  for  every  other  formation  serving  in 
the  BEF.  This  is  significant  for  comparing  the  level  of  reinforcements  for  the  division  against 
the  general  trend. 
The  war  diaries  show  that  the  reinforcement  process  met  the  51St's  demand  and  the  general 
trend  in  reinforcements  reflected  positively  on  the  system  for  reinforcing  the  division. 
Fig.  18 
Officers  Other  Ranks 
October  1915  5  297 
December  1  370 
January  1916  24  63  8 
February  36  1018 
March  49  396 
April  14  408 
May  66  473 
72  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  pp.  155-156. 
's  The  former  record  in  the  National  Archive  only  covers  the  1917  period,  whereas  the  war  diaries  are 
comprehensive  throughout  most  of  the  war.  However,  the  figures  from  the  war  diaries  are  based  on  calculations 
made  for  this  study  and  may  therefore  reflect  the  incomplete  nature  of  the  record. 
130 June  105  2242 
July  52  1539 
August  94  2795 
September  69  1371 
October  74  1285 
January  1917  138  3225 
February  56  1527 
March  59  1332 
April  138  3179 
May  126  2131 
June  51  3105 
July  97  692 
August  83  3091 
September  44  1990 
October  85  1378 
December  83  1368 
January  1918  57  1846 
February  21  835 
March  52  1055 
April  241  7766 
May  117  1317 
June  70  873 
July  58  935 
August  123  2039 
September  91  3010 
October  77  1155 
November  83  257974 
74  NA,  WO  95  2846-7,5  1st  Division  G  War  Diary. 
131 The  Adjutant  General's  records  indicate  that  the  research  data  from  the  war  diaries,  at  least 
for  1917,  is  broadly  accurate.  The  figures  substantiate  the  theory  that  reinforcement  was 
steady,  but  was  in  decline  throughout  1917.  Figures  for  the  9th  and  15th  divisions  also  show 
that  the  Scottish  divisions  were  well  supplied  with  reinforcements  throughout  1917,  and  at 
the  end  of  the  year,  when  there  were  widespread  shortages  of  reinforcements,  the  Scottish 
divisions  continued  to  be  relatively  strong.  This  is  contrary  to  Martin  Middlebrook's  assertion 
that  `Scotland  was  another  area  whose  population  could  not  replace  its  casualties,  particularly 
those  at  Loos  in  1915,  as  well  as  maintain  all  of  its  units.  All  Scottish  units,  Regular,  New 
Army  and  Territorial,  would  be  short  of  reinforcements  in  the  second  half  of  the  war.  '75 
Fig.  19. 
Reinforcements 
Officers 
March  1917  58 
April  n/a 
May  102 
June  51 
July  86 
August  83 
September  37 
October  87 
November  27 
December  76 
Other  Ranks 
1551 
n/a 
1720 
3099 
1279 
2362 
2162 
1013 
684 
134076 
The  casualties  and  reinforcement  figures  would  provide  incomplete  evidence  if  not  based  on 
a  point  of  reference  and  that  point  must  lie  in  the  actual  strength  of  the  (Highland)  Division 
throughout  the  war.  77  The  51St  Division  was  close  to  full  war  establishment  upon  embarkation 
for  France  in  April  1915  when  figures  for  the  division  show  a  strength  of  570  officers  and 
15,729  other  ranks.  At  all  points  of  reference  thereafter,  the  division  never  operated  at  full 
strength  as  the  wastage  of  men  consistently  outpaced  the  system  for  reinforcement.  The 
￿  M.  Middlebrook,  Your  Country  Needs  You,  From  Six  to  Sixty-Five  Divisions  (Barnsley,  2000),  pp.  128-129. 
76  NA,  WO  95  26,  Adjutant  General  War  Diary. 
132 fighting  strength  of  the  division  on  17  July  1915  was  483  officers  and  13,626  other  ranks  and 
this  strength  dropped  in  just  one  week  to  476  officers  and  13,415  other  ranks.  78  However, 
these  figures  show  a  decline  in  a  period  when  the  51St  did  not  receive  any  reinforcements  as 
troops  from  the  second-line  units  were  not  sufficiently  well  trained,  and  by  October  1915,  the 
drafts  began  to  arrive  on  a  regular  basis.  Evidence  indicates  that  throughout  the  war  the  51st 
was  supported  relatively  well  by  the  system  for  replacing  casualties. 
The  Adjutant  General's  records  for  1917  show  that  the  war  establishment  of  the  division 
declined  consistently.  However,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that  this  was  more  evident  in  other 
ranks  than  in  officers.  In  fact,  officer  strength  remained  relatively  constant,  even  with  the 
high  officer  casualty  rates  of  1917.  This  may  give  substance  to  the  theory  that  there  were 
more  promotions  from  the  lower  echelons,  thus  contributing  to  the  difficulty  in  providing  and 
sustaining  the  overall  number  of  other  ranks.  The  general  decline  in  other  ranks  followed  a 
trend  throughout  the  British  Expeditionary  Force  that  ultimately  provided  the  justification  for 
the  infantry  reorganisation  of  1918.  Although  the  51St  followed  the  overall  trend  of  having 
increasingly  understrength  units  during  1917,  it  was  relatively  better  supplied  with 
reinforcements  and  existed  at  a  relatively  greater  establishment  than  most  of  the  other 
divisions  on  the  Western  Front.  It  is  interesting  that  other  divisions  that  were  also  favoured  in 
this  way  were  the  Guards  and  the  remaining  Scottish  formations. 
Fig.  20 
Statement  of  Strength 
Officers 
31  March  1917  578 
30  April  406 
31  May  469 
30  June  494 
31  July  548 
31  August  521 
30  September  499 
31  October  555 
Other  Ranks 
13324 
10573 
10124 
12782 
12578 
12843 
12789 
13237 
77  There  is  no  record  of  the  war  establishment  of  the  51st  Division  by  month  in  any  of  the  sources  investigated. 
However,  there  is  evidence  for  isolated  months,  or  whole  series  of  months. 
78  NA,  WO  95  2848,5  15t  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
133 30  November  500  11661 
31  December  539  11758  79 
Amalgamations 
Pre-conscription  reinforcements  to  units  of  the  (Highland)  Division  were  kept  within  the 
same  regiment  where  possible.  It  has  also  been  shown  that  this  was  the  case,  with  less  of  a 
success  ratio,  for  the  post-conscription  phase.  However,  amalgamation  of  Scottish  battalions 
was  another  measure  that  could  be  employed  when  direct  reinforcements  were  not  available. 
This  would  further  indicate  that  the  military  authorities,  wherever  possible,  attempted  to 
retain  a  healthy  proportion  of  Scottish  troops  in  Scottish  units. 
In  October  1918,  the  losses  in  all  units  that  had  been  closely  engaged  with  the  enemy  had 
been  heavy,  and  battalions  were  often  reduced  to  little  more  than  half  their  strength.  The  1/6th 
and  1/7t'  Gordons  were  in  this  situation,  and,  to  ensure  one  strong  battalion,  the  two  units 
were  amalgamated  from  midnight  on  5-6  October.  From  then,  the  battalion  was  called  the 
6/7th  Gordon  Highlanders.  MacKenzie  stated: 
The  change  meant  less  to  the  6th  than  to  the  Vh  Gordons,  as  Headquarters  and  the  administrative 
services  of  the  Banffshire  and  Donside  Battalion  remained  substantially  unchanged  and  took  over 
the  same  duties  in  the  new  unit.  Fortunately  the  change  did  not  create  dissention  or  jealousy  in  the 
80  ranks. 
The  impact  of  amalgamation  was  definitely  lessened  if  a  unit  merged  with  another  from  the 
same  regiment.  When  the  Adjutant  General  interviewed  the  commanding  officers  of  the  1/4`h 
and  115`h  Black  Watch,  the  1/9`h  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  and  the  1/4'h  Camerons, 
with  a  view  to  amalgamating  the  two  former  battalions  and  employing  the  latter  two  for 
drafts  for  the  Regular  battalions  (considered  necessary  owing  to  their  weak  strength  (about 
500  each)  and  the  unlikelihood  that  drafts  would  be  sent  out  to  make  them  up  to  full  strength 
in  the  future),  the  commanding  officers  thought  there  would  be  no  great  objections  on  the  part 
of  the  men  to  the  proposal  being  carried  out.  8' 
79  NA,  WO  95  26,  Adjutant  General  War  Diary. 
80  MacKenzie,  The  6h  Gordons  in  France  and  Flanders,  p.  177. 
81  NA,  WO  95  26,  Adjutant  General  War  Diary,  14  February  1918. 
134 The  amalgamation  of  units  caused  quite  an  upheaval.  However,  this  would  be  dependent  on 
the  state  of  the  unit  and  many  units  that  were  amalgamated  were  low  in  numbers  and  short  on 
morale.  It  was  also  true  that  variations  in  the  number  of  battalions  within  each  regiment 
impacted  on  their  ability  to  retain  a  local  focus.  The  Territorial  Association  of  Elgin  on  22 
November  1915  minuted: 
in  consequence  of  the  3`d  Line  units  not  being  able  to  furnish  sufficient  reinforcements,  the  2nd  Line 
Regiments  were  to  be  reorganised,  and  that  for  this  purpose  the  2/5`''  and  2/6`"  Seaforths  were  to  be 
reorganised,  and  that  for  this  purpose  the  2/5t'  and  2/6`x'  Seaforths  were  to  be  amalgamated.  The 
establishment  of  the  2nd  Line  Regiment,  as  reconstituted,  is  29  Officers  and  600  men,  and  the 
strength  above  this  number  will  pass  to  the  3rd  Line.  In  the  case  of  the  2/60'  Seaforths  there  would 
be  21  Officers  and  231  men  available  to  pass  to  the  3`d  Line  unit.  In  the  information  sent  to  the 
Association,  it  was  explained  that  the  main  object  of  the  reorganisation  is  to  obtain  at  as  early  a 
date  as  possible  all  available  Non-Commissioned  Officers  and  men  as  reinforcements  for  the 
82  Front. 
The  2/8th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  were  also  broken  up  during  1916  and  used  as 
drafts.  Some  of  the  men  went  to  the  (Highland)  Division: 
When  the  process  of  turning  the  drafts  into  four  squads  was  completed,  they  were  led  away  in 
different  directions.  It  was  not  a  very  pleasant  moment  nor  was  the  process  of  separation 
completed.  The  squads  were  again  broken  up  among  platoons:  thus  it  was  that  Private  Finlay 
Mackenzie,  Sandbank  and  the  writer  found  themselves  being  led  down  into  a  dug-out,  to  be 
numbered  herewith  as  II  platoon,  C Company  of  the  6t'  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders.  83 
Quality 
The  quality  of  reinforcements:  the  level  of  training,  the  physical  standards,  and  the  morale  of 
the  troops  impacted  on  (Highland)  Division  performance.  It  was  a  commonly  held  belief  that 
the  quality  of  reinforcements  to  the  British  Army  as  a  whole  grew  poorer  as  the  war 
progressed84  and  there  is  clear  evidence  that  this  decline  included  the  (Highland)  Division. 
Nicholson  stated  that  by  the  end  of  1917,  the  new  drafts  were  not  as  good  as  the  year  before 
and  those  that  were  left  in  the  division  were  exhausted.  85  Haldane  of  the  1/4t'  Seaforths 
supported  this  view,  pointing  out  that,  `The  appearance  of  the  Battalion  had  changed  greatly, 
for  most  of  the  new  recruits  were  undersized  men'.  86  This  notion  of  decline  was  consistently 
82  NAS,  MD8/3,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Elgin. 
83  J.  McLean,  Active  Service  with  the  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  (Edinburgh,  1927),  p.  17. 
84  S.  Bidwell,  and  D.  Graham,  Firepower,  British  Army  Weapons  and  Theories  of  War  1904-1945  (London, 
1982),  p.  118. 
8s  W.  N.  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  An  Account  of  Administrative  Staffwork  in  the  British  Army  1914-18 
(Stevenage,  1939),  p.  129. 
86  M.  M.  Haldane,  A  History  of  the  Fourth  Battalion  The  Seaforth  Highlanders  (London,  1927),  p.  264. 
135 reinforced  by  those  who  had  volunteered  to  fight  who  thought  they  were  superior  to 
conscripts  and  Wimberley,  whilst  back  in  training  at  Grantham,  stated: 
The  men,  passing  through  the  ranks  of  the  unit  to  be  trained,  were  by  now  nearly  all  conscripts, 
who  had  failed  to  volunteer  for  Kitchener's  volunteer  armies  earlier  in  the  war,  and  the  officers 
seemed  to  me  to  be  of  poor  quality;  and  for  the  first  time,  in  all  my  soldiering,  I  felt  unhappy  and 
depressed.  87 
The  necessity  to  replace  heavy  losses  at  key  stress  points,  particularly  in  the  latter  stages  of 
the  war  exacerbated  this  problem  as  drafts  were  rushed  through  the  system.  In  April  1918,  as 
the  reinforcement  process  struggled  to  meet  the  demands  of  an  understrength  Expeditionary 
Force,  units  of  the  5  1S`  began  to  break  down: 
Colonel  Scott  and  the  O.  C.  King  Edward's  Horse  had  little  rest  from  their  responsibilities  that 
night.  So  heavy  had  been  the  casualties  in  the  Somme  fighting  in  the  5`h  Seaforths  that  Colonel 
Scott  only  had  one  other  officer,  besides  himself,  in  the  battalion  who  had  seen  recent  fighting  in 
France.  His  men,  for  the  most  part  were  just  raw  recruits  rushed  up  to  the  unit  from  the  base.  88 
The  result  was  that  the  line  broke  as  they  were  outflanked:  "`there  is  a  proper  beat  on" 
reported  a  messenger  on  horseback  to  the  Commanding  Officer  of  the  King  Edwards  Horse, 
"Who"  asked  the  CO  "The  Boche?  "  "No,  the  Jocks!  "  was  the  reply'.  89  Experience  was 
lacking  and  many  of  those  who  would  have  served  as  an  example  were  dead. 
Even  when  crisis  points  passed  and  the  division  had  time  to  train  and  reorganise,  there  were 
still  huge  difficulties  to  be  overcome  and  units  had  to  largely  reconstruct  themselves.  After 
the  division  suffered  crushing  blows  in  March  and  April  1918: 
The  whole  of  May  was  spent  on  ordinary  trench  warfare  and  the  battalion  had  time  to  recover  from 
the  effects  of  the  recent  fighting.  The  7`h  was  now  practically  a  new  battalion;  the  gaps  caused  by 
the  recent  losses  were  filled  by  young  and  inexperienced  men,  and  few  of  the  original  non- 
commissioned  officers  had  survived  the  two  battles  of  March  and  April.  Only  six  officers  had 
come  through  the  two  battles  unwounded,  and  many  of  those  who  now  joined  as  reinforcements 
had  never  seen  each  other  before.  90 
87  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  126. 
88  L.  James  (ed),  The  History  of  King  Edwards  Horse  (London,  1921),  p.  303. 
89  James  (ed),  The  History  of  King  Edwards  Horse,  p.  321. 
90  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  p.  306. 
136 Second-line 
Although  it  is  not  within  the  scope  of  this  study  to  undertake  in-depth  research  into  units  and 
formations  not  of  the  51St  Division,  it  is  important  to  give  some  consideration  to  the 
mechanisms  that  were  in  place  to  supply  drafts  to  it.  Second-line  line  units  were,  in  effect, 
crucial  to  the  maintenance  of  regional  and  regimental  homogeneity  through  the  reinforcement 
system,  but  they  did  need  to  function  effectively  for  the  first-line  battalion  to  benefit  from 
well-trained  troops  when  they  were  required. 
The  War  Office  issued  an  order  on  21  August  1914,  which  it  re-issued  in  an  amended  form 
on  31  August  and  21  September,  that  gave  county  associations  the  authority  to  form  a 
second-line  unit  for  every  battalion  that  had  accepted  the  Imperial  Service  Pledge.  91  G.  I. 
Malcolm  stated: 
It  is  a  fact  that,  on  mobilisation,  many  of  those  on  the  strength  were  found  to  be  medically  unfit  by 
Army  standards  (as,  you  will  remember,  they  were  in  the  Boer  War).  Therefore  a  Depot  was 
opened  at  Dunoon,  and  a  2/8`h  Battalion  raised  there  to  which  the  unfit  were  posted.  This  later 
became  a  drafting  battalion  for  the  1/80",  and  to  it  were  sent  drafts  recruited  by  the  1s`  Battalion  in 
Bedford,  Manchester  and  even  Ireland.  These  men  evidently  completed  their  initial  training  early, 
because  by  the  time  (22"d  October)  that  H.  M.  King  George  V  reviewed  the  Highland  Division  at 
Bedford,  the  Battalion's  Strength  was  28  officers  and  990  men.  92 
This  system  allowed  the  second-line  units,  still  under  the  control  of  the  Territorial 
associations,  to  recruit  in  local  areas  and  send  reinforcements  to  the  first-line. 
The  units  of  the  51  S`  Division  were  initially  raised  and  administered  by  local  county 
associations,  although  overall  command  lay  with  the  War  Office  and  the  Army  Council.  The 
county  associations  themselves  were  composed  of  representatives  from  the  local  community 
and  members  of  the  military  who  were  supported  by  a  small  staff.  The  responsibility  of  the 
associations  lay  predominantly  in  housing,  equipping,  recruiting,  and  clothing  the  troops  of 
the  division: 
An  Association  would  be  entrusted  with  the  organisation  and  administration  of  the  Territorial  units 
in  its  area,  at  all  times  except  when  they  were  called  out  for  training,  embodied  or  required  for 
actual  military  service,  but  it  would  be  responsible  for  the  recruitment  of  local  Territorial 
formations,  both  in  peace  and  in  war.  The  associations  were  empowered  to  provide  and  maintain 
91  In  November  1914,  further  instructions  issued  from  the  War  Office  stating  that  if  one  battalion  was  sent 
overseas  the  second-line  unit  should  form  a  third-line. 
92  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960,  p.  21. 
137 rifle  ranges,  buildings,  camp  sites  and  magazines;  to  secure  the  use  of  special  areas  for 
manoeuvres;  to  establish  and  help  rifle  clubs  and  cadet  corps;  to  negotiate  with  employers  so  that 
men  could  be  given  time  off  for  training;  to  pay  separation  allowances  to  the  families  of  territorials 
when  the  need  arose;  and  to  supply  all  the  horses,  arms  and  equipment  required  by  their  units  on 
mobilisation.  3 
Beckett  asserts  that,  in  1914  and  1915,  Kitchener  diverted  resources  of  manpower  away  from 
the  Territorial  Force  to  ensure  priority  was  given  to  the  New  Armies,  and  because  he  was 
convinced  that  the  Territorial  associations  were  too  slow  in  raising  reserves.  94  It  is  clear  that 
some  associations  did  not  function  as  effectively  as  others,  either  as  a  result  of  inefficiency  or 
through  material  shortages  in  the  Territorial  area,  and  Major-General  Bannatine-Allason  was 
critical  on  31  October  1914: 
There  is  still  a  very  great  delay  in  getting  recruits  from  Scotland  to  Bedford  due  apparently  to  the 
apathy  of  county  associations  in  clothing  and  equipping  them.  Every  endeavour  has  been  made  to 
induce  these  bodies  to  obtain  clothing  and  equipment  with  as  little  delay  as  possible,  but  without 
much  success.  95 
However,  many  associations  did  function  well,  such  as  in  Aberdeen,  where: 
it  made  arrangements  for  mobilisation,  and  raised  fifteen  units  with  first,  second,  third,  and 
sometimes  fourth,  lines---a  total  of  8,380  recruits,  besides  providing  their  clothing  and 
accoutrements.  When  these  figures  are  considered,  and  when  it  is  remembered  that  the  Gordon 
Highlanders  had  four  Territorial  battalions  in  the  51st  Division,  these  forming  a  third  part  of  the 
whole  division,  the  significance  of  the  work  of  the  Aberdeen  Territorial  Association  and  its 
Secretary  will  appear......  Schools  were  also  secured  and  maintained  as  hospitals;  and  a  Territorial 
Force  Nursing  Association,  and  a  Ladies  Needlework  Guild  were  organised.  A  Volunteer  Corps 
was  also  organised.  96 
The  War  Office,  whilst  increasingly  moving  towards  centralisation  as  the  war  progressed, 
often  respected  and  appreciated  the  work  carried  out  by  the  associations.  A  War  Office  policy 
paper  entitled  `The  Territorial  Force  During  The  Great  War'  stated  that: 
The  work  of  the  Territorial  Force  County  Associations  in  providing  men  and  material  for  the  war 
is  so  largely  carried  on  beneath  the  surface  that  it  is  in  danger  of  being  overlooked  altogether.  It 
has,  however,  entailed  an  immense  amount  of  labour  on  many  people  throughout  the  Country, 
chiefly  voluntary  and  therefore  unpaid,  in  connection  with  the  raising,  equipping  and  administering 
of  the  Territorial  Force.  All  the  labour  is  in  danger  of  being  unrecognised,  and  at  the  same  time 
recognition,  however  slight,  would  greatly  gratify  those  who  have  performed  it  for  the  public  good. 
93  Simkins,  Kitchener's  Army,  p.  13. 
94  Beckett,  in  Beckett,  and  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  in  Arms,  p.  viii. 
95  NA,  WO  95  2848,518`  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
96  MacEchern,  The  Sword  of  the  North,  p.  109. 
138 One  way  of  securing  such  recognition  is  by  creating  and  printing  a  record  of  the  work  done.  Such  a 
record  would  take  the  form  of  a  history  of  the  Territorial  Force  in  the  War........ 
One  of  the  main  sources  of  strength  of  the  Force  is  its  high  degree  of  localisation.  The  County 
units  tap  all  the  best  County  material,  and  the  system  under  which  the  Territorial  Force  County 
Associations,  on  which  all  important  County  interests  are  generally  represented,  stand  in  loco 
parentis  to  the  Units  which  they  administer,  tends  to  promote  pride  of  County  and  to  create  the 
esprit  de  corps  which  is  so  vital  to  the  efficiency  of  the  Armies.  It  is  probably  true  that  in  this 
country  the  local  patriotism  which  leads  a  man  to  place  his  own  County,  Town  or  even  Village  or 
Hamlet  with  its  special  feelings  on  a  platform  above  the  rest  is  generally  a  stronger  bond  than  that 
Imperial  or  National  patriotism  that  inspires  Continental  people.  ' 
The  introduction  of  conscription  swept  away  many  of  the  powers  formally  held  by  the 
associations,  although  they  still  existed  in  a  neutered  form.  However,  they  did  not  relinquish 
their  hold  on  the  responsibilities  for  the  Territorial  Force  without  a  fight: 
The  Secretary  reported  that  the  meeting  had  been  ssecially  called  to  consider  the  position  of  the 
Territorial  Force  in  view  of  the  fact  that  after  the  11  December  all  soldiers  must  be  attested  to  the 
General  Attestation  form  and  that  the  Territorial  Force  will  in  future  be  dispensed  with.  The 
meeting  was  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  this  was  most  undesirable  and  would  have  the  most 
adverse  effect  on  voluntary  recruiting,  and  the  Secretary  was  instructed  to  write  to  the  Right 
Honourable  The  Earl  of  Derby,  and  Lieutenant-General  Sir  E.  Bethune,  Director-General  of  the 
Territorial  Force  at  the  War  Office  protesting  against  this  alteration.  98 
The  General  Council  of  Territorial  Associations  in  Scotland  met  to  discuss  and  form  a 
common  reaction  to  this  state  of  affairs.  However,  the  course  could  not  be  altered. 
After  February  1916,  the  direct  reinforcement  principle  stopped  from  second  to  first  lines,  the 
second  lines  being  used  as  viable  units  in  their  own  right,  first  to  guard  areas  of  import,  then 
to  go  to  a  theatre.  The  responsibility  for  the  provision  of  drafts  for  both  the  first  and  second- 
lines  passed  to  the  third-line  battalion.  With  conscription,  the  responsibility  for  the  posting  of 
drafts  fell  to  the  General  Reserve  and  the  relevance  of  the  associations  increasingly 
diminished  throughout  the  remainder  of  the  war.  99 
As  demonstrated  elsewhere  in  this  chapter,  reinforcements  were  not  always  available  to  join 
the  units  of  the  (Highland)  Division  in  sufficient  numbers,  at  a  specific  time,  but  on  the  whole 
the  authorities  did  attempt  to  restrict  admission  to  men  of  Scottish  origin.  As  the  Army 
Council  Instructions  explained: 
97  NA,  WO  161/110,  Note  from  Captain  A  Williams  to  Mr  King  at  the  War  Office. 
98  NAS,  MD6/20,  Minutes  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  of  the  County  of  Stirling,  6  November  1915. 
99  McCartney,  `The  1/6`h  and  1/10`h  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War'.  P.  91. 
139 All  general  service  recruits  raised  in  an  area  and  allotted  to  infantry  will  be  appointed  to  the 
regiment  affiliated  to  that  area,  and  posted  to  a  reserve  battalion,  Regular  or  TF,  of  that  regiment  so 
long  as  there  are  vacancies  in  the  establishment  of  the  regimental  reserves;  surplus  recruits  in  any 
area  will  then  be  allotted  to  other  regiments  of  the  same  Command  which  have  insufficient  recruits 
in  their  area  to  fill  the  regimental  reserves.  100 
Whilst  highly  localised  recruitment  for  individual  battalions  was  unsustainable,  the  general 
posting  policy  for  new  recruits  continued  to  be  based  on  the  regimental  system.  Therefore, 
the  regimental  reserves  for  the  units  of  the  51  S`  were  likely  to  be  composed  of  either  men 
from  the  region  or  wider  Scotland. 
In  Conclusion,  the  recruitment  and  reinforcement  process  in  all  formations  that  served  in  the 
BEF  evolved  and  adapted  as  the  war  progressed  and  the  demands  on  Britain's  manpower 
increased.  However,  the  degree  of  variation  within  each  formation  was  often  dependent  on 
particular  divisional  circumstances. 
For  the  (Highland)  Division,  it  is  evident  that  all  units,  apart  from  the  small  number  that  had 
served  within  the  formation  early  in  the  war,  were  from  Highland  regiments  or  regiments 
associated  with  the  Highlands.  It  is  also  clear,  that,  until  at  least  the  conscription  period,  the 
majority  of  recruits  were  from  the  local  regimental  recruitment  areas. 
However,  increasing  strains  were  placed  on  the  system  for  reinforcing  (Highland)  Division 
units  and  analysis  has  demonstrated  that  there  was  a  proportional  dilution  of  local  men  to 
local  battalions  as  the  war  progressed.  This  was  particularly  evident  in  units  that  traditionally 
recruited  in  areas  with  low  population  density.  The  most  marked  change  for  the  51St  Division 
was  not  with  conscription  in  1916,  but  in  1917  and  1918  when  almost  all  units  had  more 
serving  soldiers  (born  or  enlisted)  from  wider  Scotland  than  from  local  battalion  recruiting 
areas.  However,  it  is  important  to  note  that  the  51St  did  not  sustain  particularly  heavy 
casualties  during  1916.  If  the  casualty  rates  had  been  higher  and  demands  on  reinforcements 
from  local  areas  had  been  greater,  then  a  higher  proportional  dilution  of  men  from  local  areas 
might  have  occurred  earlier  than  it  did.  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  in  the  case  of  the 
(Highland)  Division,  the  drafting  system  (at  War  Office  and  GHQ  level)  recognised  the  value 
of  local,  regional,  and  national  allegiances,  and  perhaps  also  the  obligations  of  the  Territorial 
140 Force  Act,  and  did  attempt  to  maintain,  where  possible,  during  both  the  voluntary  and 
conscription  phases  of  the  war,  a  local  and  wider  Scottish  emphasis  in  recruiting  and 
reinforcing. 
Over  the  course  of  the  war,  the  (Highland)  Division  did  suffer  many  casualties  and  that  made 
it  difficult  to  consistently  supply  Highland/Scottish  reinforcements.  However,  the  provision 
of  a  steady  stream  of  reinforcements  from  Highland/Scottish  areas  was  marked,  particularly 
when  contrasted  with  other  non-Scottish  formations.  As  all  Scottish  formations  were 
`relatively'  well  supplied  with,  at  worst,  national  reinforcements  (as  opposed  to  local),  it 
would  appear  that  the  reinforcement  system  was  biased  towards  Scottish  units  and 
formations. 
Significantly,  throughout  the  war,  the  senior  and  middle-ranking  officers  in  the  division  were 
predominantly  from  Highland/Scottish  regiments. 
It  was  notable  that  the  quality  of  recruit  to  the  (Highland)  Division  declined  as  the  war 
progressed,  and  was  most  acute  in  1918,  but  this  was  reflective  of  widespread  manpower 
shortages. 
ioo  McCartney,  `The  1/60'  and  1/10th  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the  First 
World  War',  p.  95. 
141 Chapter  3  The  Esprit  de  Corps  of  the  515  (Highland)  Division 
This  chapter  will  analyse  the  importance  of  esprit  de  corps'  in  the  51St  (Highland) 
Division  and  define  the  essential  elements  of  its  nature.  It  will  seek  to  demonstrate  that 
over  the  course  of  the  war,  (Highland)  Division  esprit  de  corps  evolved  and  adapted;  that 
an  esprit  de  corps  was  always  a  prominent  factor  within  the  division,  but  became  more 
defined  as  the  war  progressed;  that  the  esprit  de  corps  was  vital  to  the  divisional  way  of 
being  and  way  of  thinking;  and  that  a  significant  contribution  to  the  successes  of  the 
(Highland)  Division  during  the  war  was  through  its  esprit  de  corps. 
For  the  (Highland)  Division,  esprit  de  corps  was  a  complex  and  inter-related  affair.  In 
order  to  examine  the  impact  and  form  of  that  esprit  de  corps,  it  is  essential  that  we  look 
at:  the  internal  identity  of  the  division;  the  dynamics  throughout  the  chain  of  command; 
the  nature  of  life  in  the  division;  how  the  (Highland)  Division  interacted  with  other 
formations  and  national  groups;  and  how  esprit  de  corps  changed  and  evolved  over  time. 
Internal  identity 
Identity  was  an  extremely  powerful  factor  in  defining  conduct,  approach,  and  attitude. 
Any  study  of  (Highland)  Division  esprit  de  corps  must  establish  how  officers  and  men 
perceived  themselves  and  their  place  in  the  formation,  what  loyalties  tied  them  together, 
to  what  they  owed  allegiance,  what  outward  form  that  allegiance  took,  and  how  much  of 
an  impact  external  factors  had  on  their  internal  identity. 
Formation  and  sub-formation  loyalty 
Divisional  loyalty,  although  subject  to  change  in  emphasis,  was  a  prominent  feature 
within  the  (Highland)  Division  from  mobilisation  until  the  end  of  the  war. 
Prior  to  mobilisation  in  August  1914,  the  (Highland)  Division  existed  as  a  disparate 
collection  of  units  that  grouped  together  in  various  locations  in  Scotland.  It  functioned  as 
a  formation  on  a  once-a-year  basis  at  the  annual  camp.  As  a  new  Territorial  formation, 
1  Spirit  of  fellowship,  or  feeling  of  mutual  support  or  team  spirit  among  the  members  of  a  group. 
142 the  (Highland)  Division  had  no  historical  tradition  to  reflect  on  and  upon  which  to  focus  a 
collective  belief.  However,  at  mobilisation  the  division  came  together  with  the  common 
focus  of  fighting  a  war  and  over  the  coming  months  developed  a  corporate  identity. 
Shortly  after  arrival  in  Bedford,  the  officers  and  men  of  the  units  were  identified  by  the 
local  populace  as  men  of  the  (Highland)  Division  and  they  took  that  association  to  heart, 
proud  of  the  collective  image  that  this  conveyed.  This  public  recognition,  combined  with 
the  realities  of  unit  interaction  and  integration  in  a  confined  area,  both  during  official  and 
unofficial  activities,  over  the  course  of  time  contributed  to  an  increased  divisional  loyalty. 
That  the  officers  and  men  were  far  from  home,  surrounded  by  an  unfamiliar  culture,  in  a 
country  at  war,  had  a  major  impact  on  stimulating  a  sense  of  unity. 
The  move  to  France  in  April  1915  further  increased  this  sense  of  corporate  unity  as  the 
division  became,  even  more  than  in  south-east  England,  one  of  many  military  formations 
in  a  world  where  identity  was  established  by  formation  and  unit.  For  officers  and  men 
alike,  as  it  moved,  fought  and  rested,  the  division  became  their  world. 
Shortly  after  arriving  on  the  Western  Front,  the  division  was  quick  to  realise  that  it  was  to 
be  employed  largely  as  a  `holding  formation'.  The  inferiority  complex  that  this  generated 
was  compounded  by  military  failures  at  Givenchy  in  1915  and  High  Wood  in  1916,  as  a 
result  of  which  the  division  became  known  as  'Harper's  Duds'.  During  this  period, 
however,  the  regularity  of  trench  warfare,  a  gradual  building  of  experience,  a  growing 
familiarity  between  the  units,  and  a  strong  central  leadership  during  1915  and  much  of 
1916  assisted  in  forging  a  more  focused  formation  spirit. 
After  the  divisional  success  at  the  battle  of  Beaumont  Hamel in  November  1916,  the  51St 
rapidly  developed  a  strong  self-belief  which  was  sustained  throughout  the  war,  and  by 
late  1917  the  division  had  also  significantly  enhanced  its  external  reputation. 
In  early  1917,  upon  arrival  in  France,  Captain  D.  N.  Wimberley  and  the  machine  gun 
company  under  his  command  received  an  order  to  attach  itself  to  5  1St  Division.  A  number 
143 of  his  men  complained  that  they  wished  to  be  sent  to  a  Regular  formation.  However, 
Wimberley  stated  that  within  `three  months  they  wouldn't  swap  the  Highland  Division 
for  the  Guards'.  2  This  shows  as  much  about  anti-Territorial  bias  as  it  does  about  the 
reputation  of  the  51St  Division,  but  it  clearly  indicates  that  the  strength  of  feeling  within 
the  division  after  the  victory  at  Beaumont  Hamel  was  not  yet  supported  by  the  rest  of  the 
military  world.  However,  it  also  indicates  the  strength  of  divisional  loyalty  in  the  51St  by 
this  time. 
An  example  of  the  extent  of  this  loyalty  by  1918  can  be  determined  from  the  writings  of 
the  journalist,  Alexander  Catto,  who,  whilst  attached  to  the  (Highland)  Division  in  the 
front  line  wrote: 
in  conversations  with  officers,  non-corns,  and  privates-the  only  means  I  had  of  getting 
information-their  talk  of  all  the  fighting  that  had  taken  place  since  the  birth  of  the  new  army 
centred  on  the  division,  and  not  the  battalion.  It  was  not  that  the  Gordons  did  that,  or  the 
Seaforths  did  this,  but  the  division. 
This  loyalty  and  sense  of  unity  was  further  emphasised  by  F.  W.  Bewsher  when  he 
claimed  that  after  suffering  heavy  losses  in  April  1918: 
it  was  particularly  noticeable  to  the  officers  who  were  sorting  the  men  into  different  Divisions 
and  units  in  the  dark,  that  when  a  group  of  men  were  asked  who  they  were,  the  Jocks  almost 
invariably  replied,  not  by  giving  the  name  of  their  battalion,  but  "518"  Division",  strong 
°  evidence  that  the  Divisional  esprit,  in  spite  of  the  last  five  days,  was  still  unimpaired. 
The  strength  of  feeling  for  the  division  was  not  confined  merely  to  the  combat  units,  but 
was  also  evident  amongst  divisional  troops.  Nicholson,  a  staff  officer,  on  being  promoted 
from  the  (Highland)  Division  to  the  divisional  headquarters  of  17th  Division  in  1917, 
stated,  `All  the  way  down  I  forgot  the  country  and  the  sun  and  the  showers,  and  only 
2  National  Library  of  Scotland,  ACC6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  The  Papers  of  Major-General 
D.  N.  Wimberley,  p.  59. 
3  A.  Catto,  With  the  Scottish  Troops  in  France  (Aberdeen,  1918),  p.  24. 
4  F.  W.  Bewsher,  History  of  the  51''  (Highland)  Division,  1914-1918  (Edinburgh,  1921),  p.  294. 
144 thought  what  a  fool  a  man  is  to  wish  to  "get  on"-and  thereby  lose  much  happiness'.  5  The 
happiness  he  referred  to  was  inspired  by  a  loyalty  to  the  5  15". 
It  is  also  clear  that  post-war  accounts  largely  associated  divisional  loyalty  in  the 
(Highland)  Division  as  the  key  loyalty.  After  the  Second  World  War,  Eric  Linklater,  who 
served  in  the  famed  `U'  Company  of  the  1/4th  Gordons,  wrote  that: 
to  the  Highland  Territorials  who  composed  the  Fifty  First  Division  in  the  earlier  German  War, 
a  strange  thing  happened:  regimental  loyalty-the  normal  sentiment  of  a  soldier-was  to  a  large 
extent  replaced  by  their  greater  pride  in  the  Division.  Like  other  divisions  with  a  consistently 
good  record,  it  became  corporate,  and  in  a  few  years  time  it  acquired  such  a  tradition  as  many 
a  regiment  has  hardly  won  by  a  century  of  fortunate  campaigning.  6 
A  strong  formation  loyalty  and  a  strong  sub-formation  loyalty  were  not  mutually 
exclusive  properties  in  the  (Highland)  Division.  Both  loyalties  worked  in  synchronicity 
and  the  interactive  network  of  associations  and  allegiances  forged  very  potent  bonds. 
Although  sub-formation  loyalties  were  a  prominent  feature  of  esprit  de  corps  in  the  51St 
Division,  the  three  brigades  of  the  51St  never  commanded  anything  like  the  same  level  of 
loyalty  from  officers  and  men  as  that  which  was  bestowed  on  the  division.  However,  that 
is  not  to  say  that  the  brigade  did  not  provide  a  focus  for  esprit  de  corps.  Brigades  of  the 
51St  did  establish  their  own  traditions  over  the  course  of  the  war,  largely  through  a 
particular  combination  of  battalions  or  following  one  or  more  attacks,  and  strong  brigade 
commanders  also  assisted  in  focusing  recognition  of  a  particular  brigade  amongst  the 
troops.  Essentially,  the  main  function  of  the  brigade  was  to  act  as  a  level  of 
administration,  and  was  crucially  viewed  as  such  by  (Highland)  Division  officers  and 
men. 
Battalions  operated  as  part  of  brigades,  and  battalion  esprit  de  corps  was  very  strong  in 
the  (Highland)  Division.  It  is  clear  that  esprit  could  differ  from  unit  to  unit  and  was 
subject  to  change  over  time,  much  in  the  way  that  Nicholson  referred  to  the  17'h  Division 
5  W.  N.  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  An  Account  ofAdministrative  Staff  vork  in  the  British  Army  1914-18 
(Stevenage,  1939),  p.  168. 
6  E.  Linklater,  The  Highland  Division  (London,  1942),  p.  7. 
145 shortly  after  transferring  from  the  51St:  `only  one  or  two  of  the  battalions  of  the  17th 
Division  kept  throughout  this  magnificent  esprit  de  corps  as  units.  The  remainder  varied 
appreciably  as  successive  officers  commanded  them,  and  as  reinforcements  filled  their 
ranks'.  7  S.  Bradbury  also  emphasised  differences  between  units  when,  upon  transferring 
from  his  (Highland)  Division  battalion  to  a  newly-formed  machine  gun  unit  also  within 
the  51St,  he  stated  that  he  `felt  like  a  fish  out  of  water  and  wished  with  all  my  heart  I  was 
back  with  the  old  battalion'.  8 
Regimental  and  battalion  histories  for  the  51st  invariably  refer  to  unit  esprit  de  corps  in  a 
similar  way,  as  A.  G.  Wauchope  stated  of  the  1/7th  Black  Watch:  `officers  and  men  were 
therefore  in  good  trim  and  conscious  of  the  fine  spirit  that,  from  the  start  to  the  end  of  the 
war,  had  animated  the  battalion,  '9  or  G.  I.  Malcolm  when  he  referred  to  the  1/8t'  Argylls 
regarding  itself  as  `unique'.  10  In  effect,  this  form  of  promotion  emphasised  the  strength 
and  individual  nature  of  the  units. 
Of  greater  interest  are  the  contemporary  or  personal  accounts  of  both  officers  and  men 
who  served  with  the  (Highland)  Division.  These  also  emphasise  the  importance  of  a 
strong  battalion  ethos  and  identity  within  the  51".  Private  A.  E.  Wrench,  a  Seaforth,  was 
evidently  proud  of  the  martial  traditions  of  his  unit  when  he  wrote,  `there  was  a  rumour 
that  we  were  going  back  to  the  line  to  rest,  a  real  rest  this  time,  but  the  Seaforth's  don't 
point  that  way'.  " 
As  a  result  of  the  individually  distinctive  esprit  de  corps  of  many  (Highland)  Division 
units,  there  was  often  an  intense  rivalry  between  different  battalions.  These  rivalries 
could  be  either  inter-regimental  or  not.  The  reasons  for  these  rivalries  were  manifold; 
some  trivial,  some  territorial,  some  traditional. 
'Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  152. 
8  Imperial  War  Museum,  81/35/1,  Memoir  of  S.  Bradbury,  p.  59. 
9  A.  G.  Wauchope,  The  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  II,  Territorial  Forces  (London, 
1926),  p.  311. 
10  G.  I.  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960  (Glasgow,  1960),  p.  27. 
11  IWM,  85/51/1,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  II,  p.  173. 
146 Of  inter-regimental  rivalry,  Malcolm  wrote  with  some  feeling  that  the  1/8`h  Argylls  were 
,  the  only  true  Highland  battalion  in  the  Regiment'.  12  This  distinction  between  the  1/8t' 
Battalion  and  the  others  in  the  regiment  was  essentially  to  set  apart  the  1/8th  as  a  purer 
body  of  fighting  men  in  the  proper  martial  traditions  of  the  Highland  clansmen.  This 
elitism  and  rivalry  could  lead  to  bitter  feuds  within  the  division: 
No  one  recalled  the  origins  of  the  feud  between  the  6'h  and  8m  Battalions  of  the  Argyll  and 
Sutherland  Highlanders  but,  after  several  estaminets  had  been  wrecked  in  the  course  of  wild 
rumpuses  for  which  the  Army  was  obliged  to  foot  the  bill,  it  had  been  generally  recognised 
that,  when  the  Division  was  out  at  rest,  those  in  charge  of  the  billeting  arrangements  of  the 
three  Brigades  would  be  well  advised  to  make  sure  that  the  6`h  and  8`h  Argylls  were  separated 
by  a  considerable  distance.  The  8th  Argylls,  who  came  from  Argyllshire  itself,  were  largely 
Gaelic  speaking,  and  sneered  at  the  idea  that  the  6`h,  who  hailed  from  Paisley  in  Renfrewshire, 
should  pass  as  Highlanders  at  all.  13 
However,  a  very  interesting  contrast  to  this  view  of  the  two  battalions  is  given  by  a 
soldier,  who  belonged  to  the  1/8th  Argylls  but  was  attached  to  the  1/6th  Argylls  for  a 
period  of  time.  He  stated  that,  `All  of  us  belonging  to  Argyllshire  now  attached  to  the 
heroic  "Fighting  Sixth"  are  well'  and  `We  are  getting  on  splendidly  with  the  6th,  and  quite 
happy  in  all  respects.  Our  own  county  unit  is  not  far  from  us.  '  14  This  would  suggest  that 
rivalries  would  break  down  when  battalion  barriers  were  breached.  Captain  J.  C.  Dunn  in 
his  book,  The  War  the  Infantry  Knew,  stated  that  battalion  rivalry  was  not  confined 
merely  to  the  (Highland)  Division,  but  was  widespread  amongst  all  Scottish  units,  `A 
Scotch  vendetta,  inter-regimental  or  inter-battalion  of  the  same  regiment,  is  a  terrible 
thing  when  seen  out  here. 
.. 
Three  weeks  ago  the  xxxx  [sic]  let  an  officer  of  the  xxxx  [sic] 
lie  in  their  midst,  an  offence,  rather  than  bury  him.  '15 
Relations  between  battalions  from  different  Scottish  regiments  in  the  (Highland)  Division 
could  be  equally  strained.  Nicholson  said  of  the  division  when  it  was  stationed  in 
Bedford,  `there  was  a  soldier  scrap  between  two  neighbouring  battalions,  such  as 
occasionally  happens  in  Regular  military  circles.  They  attacked  each  other,  first  with 
12  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960,  p.  13. 
13  L.  MacDonald,  Somme  (London,  1983),  p.  341. 
14  J.  McLean,  On  Active  Service  with  the  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  (Edinburgh,  1927),  p.  69. 
15  J.  C.  Dunn,  The  War  the  Infantry  Knew  1914-1918  (London,  1989),  p.  343. 
147 fists,  and  then  with  entrenching  helves.  '  16  Rivalry  could  take  a  more  benign  and 
productive  form  where  `each  battalion  vied  with  its  neighbours  in  an  effort  to  show  that  it 
was  the  pick  of  a  first-class  lot'.  17  Particularly  `inspiring  was  the  news  that  the  2nd 
Gordons  had  attacked  that  morning  with  signal  success.  The  spirit  of  emulation  was 
aroused'.  18 
In  many  instances  a  good  camaraderie  existed  between  units  of  the  same  regiment  and 
also  between  units  of  different  regiments.  Captain  R.  B.  Ross  explained: 
we  were  relieved  by  the  5`''  Seaforths,  with  whom  we  were  soon  to  have  very  intimate 
relations  in  the  routine  matter  of  relieving,  when  confidence  in  the  efficiency  of  both  parties 
meant  a  heartier  co-operation.  If,  for  example,  one  battalion  regarded  its  successor  in  the  line 
with  disfavour,  if  there  existed  any  petty  rivalry  (for  this  was  not  unknown),  or  if  reliance 
could  not  be  placed  on  the  undertaking  of  the  incoming  unit  to  continue  the  work  in  progress, 
then  there  was  not  the  same  incentive  to  honest  labour.  But  the  greatest  cordiality  marked  our 
relations  with  the  5t'  Seaforths.  19 
Spiers  argues  that  esprit  de  corps  existed  and  was  sustained  not  only  at  battalion,  but  also 
at  company  level.  20  Inter-unit  relationships,  both  positive  and  negative  developed  (similar 
to  those  at  battalion  level).  Private  A.  E.  Wrench  testified  that  this  existed  within  the 
(Highland)  Division  and  across  the  British  Army,  `and  so  I  was  treated  to  a  thousand 
eulogisms  on  this  company's  merits  over  the  others,  and  had  to  agree  even  when  they 
said  that  "Number  one  company's  no  worth  a  damn".  I  wouldn't  argue  in  any  case,  for 
it's  the  same  old  story  all  over  the  army.  '  21  It  is  logical  to  posit  that  a  variation  of  this 
form  of  esprit  de  corps  would  also  be  evident  at  section  level. 
These  forms  of  positive  and  negative  relationships  did  not  solely  exist  between  infantry 
units.  There  were  also  rivalries  and  perceived  differences  between  the  various  arms  and 
branches  in  divisional  formations.  The  (Highland)  Division  was  no  different  from  any 
16  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  43. 
17  NLS,  ACC  11595,  Papers  relating  to  the  service  of  James  Laing  Henderson. 
18  R.  B.  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France  (London,  1918),  p.  220. 
19  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  p.  135. 
20  E.  Spiers,  `The  Scottish  Soldier  at  War',  in  I.  Beckett,  and  K.  Simpson  (eds),  A  Nation  In  Arms,  A  Social 
Study  of  the  British  Army  in  the  First  World  War  (Manchester,  1985),  p.  55. 
21  IWM,  85/51/5,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  I,  p.  93. 
148 other  formation  in  this  respect  and  each  arm  had  something  to  say  about  the  other.  There 
are  many  accounts  in  (Highland)  Division  sources  of  the  infantry  soldier's  animosity 
towards  trench  mortar  units  for  avoiding  fatigues  and  risking  lives,  and  the  staff  and 
administration  branches  are  repeatedly  accused  of  incompetence  or  risk-avoidance.  A.  E. 
Wrench  wrote  in  his  diary  of  an  argument  between  orderlies  and  engineers:  `the  R.  E's 
think  they  are  so  much  superior  and  are  entitled  to  rule  the  roost  whereas  the  orderlies 
object'.  22  F.  W.  Webster  stated  that  he  was  happy  to  serve  in  a  (Highland)  Division  Royal 
Artillery  battery  as  all  were  aware  that  the  infantry  battalions  bore  the  brunt  of  the 
fighting.  23  References  are  legion,  and  animosities  could  be  one-sided  or  mutually 
enforced  affairs.  Ultimately,  as  an  integrated  body,  the  units  of  the  51st  Division 
functioned  within  a  world  of  interactive  relationships.  Certain  elements  in  the  Royal 
Artillery  would  be  thankful  that  they  were  not  in  the  infantry  and  certain  elements  in  the 
infantry  could  feel  resentment  against  the  RA  for  fighting  the  war  `behind  the  lines',  but 
as  the  divisional  historian  explained  `all  the  Highland  Division  trusted  the  divisional 
artillery'.  24  They  trusted  them  because  they  had  to.  There  was  no  other  option. 
There  was  also  a  friction  and  distrust  between  regimental  and  staff  officers.  This  was  a 
traditional  animosity  in  the  British  Army  and  the  51St  was  no  different.  However, 
animosity  against  the  staff  is  understandable  as  there  were  certainly  benefits  to  holding  a 
staff  post.  Bradbury  tells  of  how  his  living  conditions  improved  when  given  a  staff  post,  25 
and  he  further  commented  on  the  occasion  when  staff  slept  soundly  whilst  the  division 
attacked.  26  Regimental  officers  thought  the  staff  was  safe  from  harm  and  prone  to  making 
mistakes,  but  the  majority  actually  worked  extremely  hard  and  often  felt  harshly  treated. 
Colonel  Nicholson  pointed  out,  `that  the  great  majority  of  the  staff  were  at  heart 
regimental  officers;  they  were  doing  their  best,  serving  in  the  posts  wherever  it  was 
considered  they  would  be  useful'  27 
22  IWM,  85/51/5,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  I,  p.  83. 
23  IWM,  N/A,  The  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W.  Webster,  p.  103. 
24  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  Sls'  Highland  Division,  p.  71. 
25  IWM,  81/35/1,  Memoir  of  S.  Bradbury  p.  58. 
26  IWM,  81/35/1,  Memoir  of  S.  Bradbury  p.  83. 
27  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  186. 
149 Regimental  traditions 
Regimental  traditions,  although  not  as  pivotal  in  the  Territorial  Force  as  they  were  in  the 
Regular  Army,  were  still  very  relevant  to  the  units  constituting  the  (Highland)  Division 
and  did  contribute  to  the  divisional  esprit  de  corps.  They  were  also  part  of  the  interactive 
mechanism  within  the  division  creating  and  maintaining  bonds  and  allegiances,  and 
providing  links  to  wider  army  traditions. 
Hew  Strachan  in  The  Politics  of  the  British  Army,  whilst  describing  the  nature  of 
regimental  traditions,  posited  that  the  Cardwell  reforms of  1881  solidly  entrenched  the 
regimental  ethos  across  the  British  Army.  28  Field  Marshal  Earl  Wavell,  in  writing  of  the 
Black  Watch  stressed,  `Nowhere  is  this  regimental  spirit  stronger  than  in  Highland 
regiments'.  29  Lieutenant-General  B.  Horrocks  stated  of  the  Black  Watch,  `All  Regiments 
develop  their  own  esprit  de  corps  but  it  was  impossible  to  live  with  the  Black  Watch  and 
not  realise  that  every  officer  and  man  whether  Highlander  or  Lowlander  belonged  to  one 
family,  or  rather  to  one  clan'.  He  qualified  this  by  further  stating  that  `the  clan  pride  of 
the  Black  Watch  is  still  handed  down  as  a  form  of  spiritual  inheritance'.  30 
Many  of  the  senior  officers  in  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  were  career  soldiers  and  they 
set  much  store  by  regimental  tradition.  However,  it  is  vital  to  understand  that  for  many 
`temporary'  officers  and  men  the  regiment  was  viewed  in  a  different  way.  For  the  career 
soldier,  the  regiment  meant  defining  a  place  of  belonging  within  an  established  military 
system  and  the  bonds  that  developed  within  it  were  strong  and  permanent.  Often  there 
was  a  connection  between  the  soldier  and  the  regiment  before  joining.  As  D.  N. 
Wimberley  pointed  out,  `I  badly  wanted  my  grandfather's  regiment,  and  the  regiment  of 
the  county  in  which  I  had  been  born,  and  so  I  was  much  relieved  to  find,  on  checking  the 
list  myself,  that  I  was  now  a  Cameron  Highlander'.  31  He  later  tells  of  lunching  with  an 
officer  whom  he  had  never  previously  met  merely  because  he  was  also  a  Cameron32  and 
28  H.  Strachan,  The  Politics  of  the  British  Army  (Oxford.  1997). 
29  B.  Fergusson,  The  Black  Watch  and  the  King's  Enemies,  (London,  1950),  p.  13. 
30  P  Howard,  The  Black  Watch  (London,  1968),  p.  7. 
31  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  'A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  19. 
32  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  108. 
150 further  pointed  out  that  Brigadier-General  Pelham  Burn  of  152nd  Brigade  was  `very  thick' 
with  officers  from  his  own  regiment.  33 
The  traditions  of  the  Scottish  regiments  were  held  in  high  esteem  in  the  British  Army. 
When  at  a  theatre,  Wimberley  and  a  friend  attempted  to  take  two  of  the  stage  girls  out  to 
dinner  by  sending  down  calling  cards  with  regimental  names  engraved  on  them. 
However,  they  were  shocked  to  find  that  this  was  unsuccessful: 
I  did  not  then  know  much  about  women,  for  it  seemed  to  me  perfectly  extraordinary  that  when 
this  giel  [sic]  had  two  officers  of  the  Highland  Brigade,  she  could  possibly  have  the  bad  taste 
to  go  off  with  a  mere  Lowland  officer,  when  all  the  world  knew,  I  thought,  that  all  Scotsmen 
then  tried,  from  Sandhurst,  for  Highland  Regiments  and  the  Lowland  Regiments,  I  considered, 
took  those  for  whom  we  had  no  vacancies.  34 
However,  at  the  outset  of  the  war,  many  of  the  Territorial  soldiers  within  the  Territorial 
units  of  the  (Highland)  Division  were  only  vaguely  aware  of  the  distinctive  regimental 
ethos.  `The  Territorial  and  New  Army  mobilised  and  trained  with  none  of  these  class 
distinctions  and  with  practically  none  of  the  tradition  of  the  Regular  units  to  which  they 
were  affiliated.  '35  But,  if  the  Territorial  soldier  in  the  (Highland)  Division  had  not  been 
indoctrinated  in  regimental  traditions  to  the  same  extent  as  pre-war  Regular  soldiers,  the 
onset  of  war  provided  the  opportunity  for  officers  and  men  to  develop  their  knowledge 
and  understanding.  Many  `temporary  gentlemen'  would  readily  endorse  these  traditions 
to  cement  their  positions  as  officers.  Once  established,  it  became  one  of  the  self- 
perpetuating  factors  that  maintained  a  divisional  esprit  de  corps.  In  the  vast  number  of 
primary  and  secondary  accounts,  reference  is  made  to  regimental  tradition.  Of  the  1/6th 
and  1/70i  battalions  of  the  Gordon  Highlanders,  it  was  written,  `Both  battalions  had 
fought  together  for  two-and-a-half  years  in  the  515`  Division,  and  both  had  proudly 
cherished  and  gallantly  upheld  the  honourable  traditions  of  the  regiment'.  36 
33  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  'A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  1,  p.  100. 
34  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  23. 
35  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  139. 
36  D.  MacKenzie,  The  6th  Gordon  In  France  and  Flanders  (Aberdeen,  1921),  pp.  177-8. 
151 National  identity 
A  common  view  of  the  (Highland)  Division  is  that  it  was  made  up  solely  of  officers  and 
men  from  the  Highlands,  and  A.  V.  Sellwood  has  stated  that  the  division  `was  originally 
dependent  for  its  strength  on  the  pride  of  the  clan  spirit  or  the  ties  of  local  interest.  They 
were  to  be  replaced,  or  maybe  sublimated,  by  a  sense  of  unity  as  Highlanders'.  However, 
he  goes  on  to  break  down  the  popular  model,  `as  the  battle  exerted  an  even  greater  toll, 
and  reserves  were  drafted  in  from  the  more  populous  areas,  even  this  was  to  be  replaced 
by  the  broader  pride  of  being  Scots,  and  especially  Scots  of  the  51st,.  37 
Sellwood  is  correct  in  his  summary,  but  one  point  must  be  stressed.  At  the  beginning  of 
the  war,  the  51St  Division  was  already  essentially  a  Lowland  division  that  happened  to 
have  a  large  number  of  Highlanders  in  it.  Of  the  143  active  list  battalions  in  Scotland  at 
one  stage  in  the  war,  86  held  the  appellation  `Highland',  `even  though  the  population 
north  of  the  Highland  Line  was  only  about  8  per  cent  of  the  whole'.  38  Specifically,  of  the 
nineteen  battalions  that  constituted  the  Scottish  infantry  component  of  the  (Highland) 
Division  during  the  war,  twelve  were  based  south  of  the  Highland  Line  and  many  of  the 
supporting  troops  were  also  from  Lowland  areas  (three  brigades  of  artillery  and  most  of 
the  engineers,  etc,  from  Aberdeen,  Edinburgh,  and  Dundee).  As  the  war  progressed  and 
the  men  of  the  original  units  were  replaced  by  reinforcements  from  across  Scotland  and 
elsewhere,  that  Highland  proportion  grew  even  smaller,  as  the  Highland  recruitment  areas 
simply  did  not  have  the  men  to  reinforce  the  51St  Division  (as  well  as  the  9t''  and  15  th 
divisions,  and  the  Regular  battalions).  39  A  similar  situation  occurred  during  the  Second 
World  War  and  Scottish  Command  wrote  to  the  GOC  of  the  51St  Division  in  1943 
emphasising  that  all  of  Scotland  had  a  vested  interest  in  the  (Highland)  Division  because 
many  of  the  men  hailed  from  the  Lowland  areas,  just  as  they  had  done  over  25  years 
before:  `They  predominate,  as  indeed  they  have  predominated  in  all  arms  of  the  51st 
Division  in  the  last  Great  War'  40 
37  A.  V.  Sellwood,  The  Saturday  Night  Soldiers  (London,  1966),  p.  163. 
38  J.  G.  Fuller,  `Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies  1914-1918  (Oxford, 
1991),  p.  164. 
39  A.  F.  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A  (London,  1936),  pp.  104-105. 
40  NLS,  ACC  7380,  box  2  File  32,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
152 The  division  was  full  of  men  who  were  not  from  the  Highlands  or  hold  the  traditions  of 
the  region  through  birth.  Why  did  the  image  of  the  Highlander  prove  to  be  such  an 
alluring  one  if  the  men  were  not  true  Highlanders?  It  was  because  the  iconic  image  of  a 
Highland  identity  was  not  evocative  of  Highlanders  alone.  The  sole  ownership  of 
Highland  symbols  belonged  to  a  bygone  age.  The  patronage  of  Sir  Walter  Scott,  amongst 
others,  had  seen  to  that.  The  Highland  imagery  had  assumed  the  status  of  a  wider  Scottish 
imagery,  evidenced  by  the  adoption  of  the  Highland  `trappings'  by  Lowland  units  to  form 
their  own  military  identities.  1 
The  officers  and  men  of  the  division  assumed  this  common  identity  and  it  was  all  the 
more  accessible  because  of  the  almost  mythical  martial  status  of  the  Highland  regiments. 
This  was  greatly  assisted  by  the  early  impact  of  Scottish  units  and  formations  in  1914  and 
1915  when  they  were  commonly  held  to  have  fought  heroically.  For  those  who  became 
associated  with  (Highland)  Division  identity,  the  rewards  were  evident;  they  wore  the 
traditional  garb,  they  soldiered  in  a  historic  regiment,  they  could  be  called  Highlander. 
Non-Highlanders  felt  privileged  to  fight  in  such  esteemed  company.  Genuine 
Highlanders  did  not  object  as  they  ultimately  achieved  battle  success  and  widespread 
fame. 
There  are  a  great  many  references  in  the  sources  to  the  symbiosis  of  Highland  with 
Scottish  identity.  Scottish  soldiers  were  commonly  referred  to  as  `Jocks'.  But  what  did 
this  identify?  Fuller  has  qualified  it  by  looking  at  the  `Jock'  through  the  eyes  of  the 
Australians  42 
The  Australians  did  not  define  precisely  whom  they  subsumed  under  the  heading  `Jocks',  but 
it  is  tempting  to  suppose  that  the  most  conspicuous  of  Scots,  the  distinctly  uniformed, 
renowned,  and  lionised  Highlanders,  played  a  disproportionate  part  in  establishing  the  image 
of  their  nationality  in  the  Dominion  troops'  minds.  3 
41  T.  Devine,  The  Scottish  Nation  (London,  1999),  p.  231. 
42  Many  of  the  Dominion  regiments  were  associated  with  Scotland,  and  wore  much  of  the  traditional  attire. 
43  Fuller,  Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies  1914-1918,  p.  162. 
153 Again,  the  martial  tradition  of  the  Highlander  and  the  Scot  were  mixed  and  became  fused 
in  the  (Highland)  Division  legend: 
A  French  officer  who  witnessed  the  charge  of  the  Highlanders  [9`''  Division]  at  Loos  said,  "I 
don't  know  what  effect  it  had  on  the  Boche,  but  it  made  my  blood  run  cold".  Many  a  time 
since  Beaumont  Hamel  our  kilted  lads,  Regulars  and  Territorials,  have  made  the  Boche  blood 
as 
run  cold.  The  virtue  in  which  our  Scottish  soldiers  perhaps  excel  any  other  is  fortitude 
The  blurring  of  the  lines  between  what  was  Highland  and  what  was  more  broadly 
Scottish  in  the  division  was  further  endorsed  through  official  communications.  On  14 
July  1915,  the  General  Officer  Commanding  read  out  the  following  order  to  all  units  of 
the  5  1St  Division: 
In  passing  to  the  offensive  the  G.  O.  C.  is  confident  that  the  men  of  the  Highland  Division  will 
maintain  the  traditions  of  Scotland,  and  will  show  the  same  superb  spirit  in  attack  as  they  have 
done  in  defence.  Remember  the  honour  of  your  country,  and  remember  the  tartan  you  wear.  45 
Along  with  Lowland  Scots,  the  51St  integrated  non-Scots  into  the  division  and  they 
became  honorary  `Heilanders'.  It  was  not  essential  to  be  a  Highlander  or  Scottish  to  serve 
in  the  (Highland)  Division.  In  fact  Major-General  Harper  was  an  Englishman,  but  it  was 
essential  to  believe  in  the  Highland  idea  and  accept  the  trappings.  If  these  were  accepted, 
`Even  the  Englishmen  loved  the  Balmoral  eventually'.  46 
Indeed,  many  Englishmen  were  attracted  to  the  Scottish  regiments.  A  story  from  one 
history  recalls  one  Lancashire  soldier  telling  another,  `Ah've  been  a  Jock  longer  than 
thee'.  7  Officers  were  as  influenced  as  the  men: 
I  had  the  satisfaction,  being  a  Scot,  of  dancing  down  my  partner,  the  Colonel-who  is  as  near 
Scottish  as  it  is  possible  to  be.  He  is  a  Northumbrian,  but  Scottish  by  many  associations,  and 
no  Aberdeen  man  could  be  more  perfervid  in  upholding  the  traditions  and  good  fame  of  the 
Gordon  Highlanders.  He  is  proud  of  his  battalion,  as  he  has  every  right  to  be,  and  his  battalion 
is  proud  of  him  48 
44  Catto,  With  the  Scottish  Troops  in  France,  p.  21. 
45  Catto,  With  the  Scottish  Troops  in  France,  p.  28. 
46NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  69. 
47  M.  Chappell,  Scottish  Units  in  the  World  Wars  (London,  1994),  p.  5. 
48  Catto,  With  the  Scottish  Troops,  p.  55. 
154 The  Colonel  in  question  was  Colonel  McTaggart,  who  according  to  Nicholson: 
came  to  us  from  the  5`h  Lancers.......  The  change  in  the  unit  was  extraordinary;  they  caught  his 
enthusiasm,  stuck  out  their  chests  and  rightly  regarded  themselves  as  a  very  fine  body  of  men. 
How  pernickety  the  little  man  was  about  the  set  of  his  kilt,  the  size  of  his  Glengarry;  I  fancy 
he  had  never  worn  either  before  in  his  life.  49 
There  was  occasionally  an  anti-outsider  (particularly  English)  bias,  though,  and  it  could 
be  difficult  for  the  individual  who  did  not  integrate.  The  divisional  history  stated  that  two 
new  brigadiers  were  appointed  to  command  (Highland)  Division  brigades,  but  one  was 
removed  because  he  was  not  Scottish.  50  Four  English  battalions  also  served  for  a  period 
of  time  under  the  banner  of  the  51S`  Division,  but  remained  together  in  1540'  Brigade.  The 
non-Scottish  bias  is  clear  when,  after  the  war,  a  515  (Highland)  Division  Old  Comrades 
Association  was  formed  and  amongst  the  early  papers  on  its  formation  was  a  section  on 
`membership'.  It  was  stated  that  `all  units  who  have  served  with  the  Division  since 
mobilisation,  except  the  four  English  Battalions  who  formed  1540'  Brigade  for  a  short 
period,  should  be  admitted  to  the  Association'.  This  proposal  was  vetoed  by  the  GOC  of 
the  5  1st  Division  and  the  English  battalions  were  included.  51 
To  an  extent  Scottish  identity  was  maintained  in  part  because  it  was  not  English.  `Hands 
up  Englishman'  ordered  a  party  of  surrounding  Germans.  `I'm  a  Scotsman'  replied  the 
enraged  Flynn  and  hurled  his  grenade  with  all  his  force,  putting  them  to  flight.  '52 
Territorial  identity 
A  factor  that  fundamentally  influenced  the  evolution  of  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  515` 
Division  was  the  established  negative  perception  of  the  Territorial  Force.  Immediately 
before  the  First  World  War,  the  Territorial  Force  was  referred  to,  amongst  other 
disparaging  remarks,  as  the  `Dog-shooters',  'Haldane's  Horse',  and  the  `Featherbed 
49  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  148. 
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155 Heroes'.  Jibes  at  its  expense  were  public  and  plentiful,  and  often  ill-natured.  3  Certainly 
many  within,  and  without,  the  British  Army  were  critical  of  the  force  for  what  were 
considered  to  be  poor  standards  of  training  and  low  levels  of  recruitment,  but  `this  cannot 
excuse  the  superior  manner  the  army  adopted  towards  the  Militia,  Territorials  and  other 
organisations  that  formed  its  natural  reserves'.  54 
The  Territorial  Force  continued  to  suffer  during  the  early  months  of  the  First  World  War, 
with  priority  being  given  to  the  New  Armies.  Paddy  Griffith  has  postulated  that  over  the 
course  of  the  war,  based  on  the  regularity  of  attack  and  strategic  positioning  of 
formations,  the  military  authorities  were  not  entirely  convinced  of  the  trustworthiness  of 
the  Territorial  divisions  in  battle  on  the  Western  Front.  55  However,  overall  the  Territorial 
Force  did  have  a  solid  record  of  achievement  during  the  war.  Seventy  one  Territorial 
soldiers  were  awarded  the  Victoria  Cross,  and  the  force  fought  in  all  theatres  of  war 
eventually  winning  praise  from  many  quarters.  Long  before  New  Army  units  were  ready 
for  battle,  the  Territorial  Force  had  been  in  action,  and  had  suffered  heavy  casualties.  Lyn 
MacDonald  relates  that  `on  the  door  of  a  broken-down  barn  a  little  way  behind  the  front, 
some  wag  with  nothing  better  to  do  had  chalked  a  notice:  `LOST,  STOLEN  OR 
STRAYED.  KITCHENERS  ARMY.  £5  REWARD  TO  FINDER.  06  This  was  considered 
to  be  a  good  joke  and  similar  notices  appeared  in  numerous  villages  behind  the  line. 
It  was  in  this  context  that  the  (Highland)  Division  arrived  in  France.  The  division  was 
aware  of  its  Territorial  status  and  was  also  militarily  insecure,  but  the  men  did  consider 
themselves  more  extensively  trained  in  tactics  and  the  use  of  equipment  than  the  New 
Armies.  However,  the  bulk  of  public  and  media  focus  was  directed  at  the  Kitchener 
constructs.  This  perceived  favour  towards  the  New  Armies  at  the  expense  of  the 
Territorial  Force  caused  friction,  and  the  divisional  history  stated  of  1915  that 
`Throughout  this  period  the  rivalry  between  the  Territorial  and  New  Army  Divisions  was 
53  Sellwood,  Saturday  Night  Soldiers,  p.  10. 
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156 acute'.  57  Captain  Ross  also  chronicled  that  `the  times  were  anxious,  because  there  were 
entrusted  to  our  hands  to  be  moulded  to  the  necessities  of  the  trenches  the  first  drafts  of 
K1.  Proud,  indeed,  did  we  feel  in  our  office  of  instructors.  It  was  a  rare  compliment  to  a 
'S8  Territorial  Division. 
During  the  war, and  particularly  in  the  early  years,  the  Regular  units  of  the  British  Army 
were  considered  to  be  militarily  the  most  efficient  and  effective,  and  Regular  officers  and 
men  expected,  and  were  often  accorded,  that  seniority  by  the  volunteer  and  later  the 
conscript.  Nicholson  stated  that  the  `Regular  soldier  made  his  voice  heard  the  loudest  on 
strategy  and  tactics,  and  the  Civilian  was  apt  to  defer  to  his  opinion'.  59  The  superior 
status  of  the  Regular  soldier  is  evidenced  by  D.  N.  Wimberley,  who  wrote  of  a  visit  to 
London: 
we  were  all  in  uniform,  and  were  immensely  proud  that  we  were  now  in  the  Regular  and  not 
the  Territorial  or  Kitchener  Army.  We  took  considerable  delight  in  `throwing'  our  smartest 
salutes.  Right  across  a  London  street,  if  we  saw  an  officer  in  uniform  with  medals,  that  we 
considered  to  belong,  also,  to  the  Regular  Army.  Then  if  we  saw  a  callow  young  man,  dressed 
as  a  subaltern  in  Kitchener's  Army,  or  the  Territorials,  we  merely  gave  him  a  supercilious 
bo  look. 
However,  as  the  war  progressed  the  differences  in  experience  and  battle-worthiness  were 
less  obvious,  and  new  reputations  overcame  the  old  prejudices.  Simpson  endorsed  this 
view  when  examining  the  officer  class,  positing  that  many  of  the  professional  and  social 
differences  between  Regular,  temporary,  and  Territorial  officers  disappeared  or  seemed 
less  important  on  active  service.  61  The  51St  had  direct  experience  of  the  initial 
indifference  of  the  Regulars  and  the  subsequent  breaking  down  of  barriers  at  Givenchy  in 
May  1915.  Before  the  battle,  the  Regular  battalions  couldn't  believe  they  were  being 
relieved  by  mere  Territorials  of  the  (Highland)  Division.  However,  after  the  battle  they 
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157 had  changed  their  opinion.  Webster  stated  that  the  Regulars  were  impressed  by  `the 
Terriers'  and  invitations  to  fraternise  soon  followed.  62 
The  Territorials  of  the  51St  never  considered  themselves  professional  soldiers.  Even  after 
news  that  the  German  Army  thought  it  the  finest  of  the  British  divisions,  the  men  still 
thought  of  themselves  as  `only  territorials'  and  that  they  were  `soldiers  for  the  time-being 
and  would  much  rather  not  be  soldiers  at  all'.  3  However,  it  was  still  a  matter  of  pride  to 
the  (Highland)  Division  and  its  constituent  units  that  it  earned  the  respect  and  recognition 
of  the  Regulars.  The  1/6th  Gordons,  on  leaving  the  7th  Division,  proudly  stated  that  it  had 
succeeded  in  gaining  that  respect  and  recognition: 
For  fourteen  months  the  battalion  had  been  a  unit  in  one  of  the  greatest  of  fighting  divisions. 
From  the  regular  soldiers  it  had  learned  much-discipline,  comradeship,  and  battle  wisdom.  By 
its  native  courage,  endurance  and  tenacity  it  had  won  the  highest  tribute  the  old  soldier  could 
give,  a  frank  admiration  and  admission  of  equality.  64 
Symbolism 
The  use  of  symbols  can  be  a  potent  and  powerful  mechanism  to  assist  in  the  creation  and 
maintenance  of  a  common  belief,  and  symbolism  was  important  to  the  51St  Division.  The 
visible  symbols  included  identification  badges,  the  allocation  of  honours,  signs  and 
clothing,  but  also  invisible  symbolism  such  as  the  use  of  names.  These  symbols  were 
increasingly  recognised  and  recognisable  as  the  self-belief  and  the  fame  of  the  (Highland) 
Division  grew. 
After  the  defeat  at  Culloden  in  1746,  Highland  symbols  such  as  the  kilt,  the  pipes,  and  the 
Gaelic  language,  were  banned  in  an  attempt  to  suppress  distinctive  aspects  of  Highland 
culture.  However,  as  Highland  regiments  took  their  place  within  the  British  Army, 
symbols  of  Highlandism  were  again  used  for  a  military  purpose.  This  ensured  a 
continuity  with  the  pre-Culloden  Highland  culture,  and,  with  the  widespread  cultural 
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158 symbiosis  of  a  Highland  into  a  Scottish  identity  during  the  19th  Century,  the  symbols 
further  developed  their  significance. 
During  1915  and  1916,  the  two  Scottish  divisions  of  the  New  Army  (the  9th  and  the  151h) 
were  both  better  known  and  more  respected  as  fighting  formations  than  the  51st. 
Nevertheless  the  (Highland)  Division  possessed  an  advantage  over  the  other  two.  For  it 
was  the  only  division  in  the  whole  British  Army  of  which,  for  long  periods,  all  the 
infantry  wore  kilts,  and  it  was  the  only  one  to  which  the  name  Highland  was  attached. 
This  was  tremendously  significant  in  reinforcing  the  divisional  identity  of  the  51st,  as 
other  all-Scottish  divisions  did  not  have  the  benefit  of  this  emotive  and  distinctive  title. 
The  wholesale  wearing  of  the  kilt  was  a  defining  characteristic  for  the  officers  and  men 
of  the  division,  and  assisted  in  promoting  its  corporate  image  to  the  world  outside  the 
formation.  Sellwood  has  emphasised  the  former  by  stating  that  an  oft  repeated  boast  of 
the  51St  was,  `A  Highlander  in  his  kilt  is  a  man  and  a  half'.  65  Captain  Dunn,  a 
Glaswegian,  offered  a  more  backhanded  compliment  when  referring  to  the  latter,  `we 
passed  the  51s'  Division  going  up  [to  High  Wood].  They  were  a  fine  body  of  men, 
although  the  kilt  is  a  costume  that  flatters'.  66 
However,  although  it  had  an  undoubted  impact  as  a  visible  symbol,  the  kilt  was  not 
universally  popular  with  officers  and  men  of  the  division  because  of  its  impracticality  on 
the  Western  Front.  For  many,  the  advantages  of  being  the  only  division  to  have  all  its 
infantry  battalions  in  the  kilt  were  outweighed  by  this  fact.  Major-General  Harper  was 
one  of  them  and  he: 
entirely  agreed  with  the  wish  of  the  division  to  abolish  the  kilt.  It  was  in  fact  inconceivable 
that  in  such  a  war  a  kilt  should  be  worn.  With  water  up  to  the  waist  in  some  parts  of  the 
trenches,  the  kilt  got  soaked  and  caked  with  mud,  and  the  man  became  exhausted  by  the 
weight  of  the  dress.  There  is  no  uniform  more  conspicuous  than  a  kilt;  or  easier  to  identify  by 
an  enemy;  none  more  expensive,  or  took  up  more  space  in  ordnance  trains  and  wagons.  It  was 
65  Sellwood,  The  Saturday  Night  Soldiers,  p.  129. 
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159 beloved  of  lice.  The  kilt  had  been  adapted  by  us  to  meet  war  necessities  by  stripping  off  all 
national  characteristics  such  as  sporran  and  tartan.  7 
Wimberley,  a  future  GOC  of  the  51S`  and  a  general  advocate  of  the  use  of  the  kilt  as  a 
tool  for  maintaining  esprit  de  corps  in  the  (Highland)  Division,  when  considering  the 
specific  conditions  under  which  the  men  of  the  division  existed  in  France  and  Belgium, 
stated: 
As  a  dress,  however,  particularly  suited  for  freedom  of  movement  and  activity,  it  came  under 
plenty  of  adverse  criticism  by  many  of  those  who  wore  it,  during  static  warfare,  in  the  dank 
muddy  water  logged  trenches  in  winter,  on  the  grounds  of  its  coldness,  particularly  when 
sleeping.  It  was  also  critisised  as  aiding  the  harbouring  of  lice  in  the  pleats,  which  the  filthy 
dugouts  and  billets  of  that  campaign  had  bred  in  plenty,  and  again  sometimes  for  flicking  the 
back  of  the  knee  when  wet.  Later  in  1917,  came  the  use  of  mustard  gas,  and  with  it  the  much 
more  serious  criticism  against  an  unnecessary  exposure  of  naked  flesh  to  burns  68 
Private  Wrench  offered  a  rather  more  candid  appraisal  of  the  view  at  the  other  end  of  the 
chain  of  command  when  he  was  horrified  to  discover  that,  as  a  battalion  runner,  he  was 
expected  to  cycle  `bare  arsed'  in  the  winter.  69  In  his  opinion  the  kilt  was  only  useful  if  a 
man  was  stricken  with  diahorrea.  70 
But  if  it  was  attacked,  in  some  quarters,  as  an  unsuitable  dress  for  the  trenches,  it  was  also 
robustly  defended  by  others.  There  was  an  under-pinning  fear  that,  if  the  kilt  was 
withdrawn  from  use  on  the  Western  Front,  it  would  never  be  returned.  As  a  form  of 
insurance  against  this  extinction,  `we  never  covered  our  knees  without  having  some 
guarantee  for  the  return  of  the  kilt-  and  we  were  never  disappointed'.  7'  The  fear  that  the 
kilt  would  not  be  returned  was  very  real  as  evidenced  by  its  removal  from  service  during 
the  Second  World  War. 
To  prevent  the  German  Army  discovering  that  the  51"  Division  had  extended  its  front, 
units  of  the  152nd  Brigade  had  their  kilts  and  Balmoral  bonnets  taken  from  them  and  were 
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160 kitted  out  with  Khaki  trousers  and  field  service  caps,  `much  to  the  disgust  of  the  men, 
who,  suspicious  of  some  Sassenach  plot  to  strip  them  forever  of  the  kilt,  grumbled  very 
much  and  protested  to  the  officers'.  72  Again  the  strength  of  feeling  on  this  occasion  can 
be  detected  from  an  account  by  an  officer  of  the  1/6th  Gordons: 
For  some  reason  which  satisfied  Higher  Command,  the  kilt  was  discarded  in  the  trenches  in 
this  area,  and  all  the  ranks  wore  the  ordinary  service  dress-khaki  trousers  and  square  caps.  The 
fondness  for  the  Highland  uniform  was  seen  in  rest  billets,  when  the  tartan  reappeared  on  the 
slightest  of  excuses.  73 
Of  course,  kilts  were  not  the  only  form  of  dress  that  could  be  distinctive  and  add  to  the 
sense  of  corporate  identity.  The  Balmoral  hat  was  another  iconic  symbol  and  Wimberley 
explained  that  it  was  essential  for  the  officers  and  men  to  adopt  this  symbol  to  become 
fully  a  member  of  the  (Highland)  Division: 
All  around  us  were  bivouacs,  the  yellow  kilt  of  the  Gordons  mingling  with  the  dark  green  of 
the  Argylls,  and  the  white  red  of  the  Seaforths;  near  us  too  were  the  154  M.  G.  Company,  the 
O.  C.  of  the  Company,  so  soon  to  be  shot  by  a  sniper,  poor  fellow,  who  very  kindly  helped  me 
with  his  local  knowledge  and  offered  us  a  meal.  One  of  the  first  things  he  said  to  me  was  how 
glad  he  was  that  we  had  arrived  in  flat  hats,  as  his  was  the  only  other  Company  in  the 
Highland  Division  that  wore  them,  and  that  we  would  keep  him  company;  I  soon  enlightened 
him,  however,  by  vowing  that  we  too  should  be  in  Balmorals  and  at  the  first  instant  my 
C.  Q.  M.  S.  should  obtain  them.  74 
Military  piping  was  another  signifier  of  Scottish  culture  and  was  very  prominent  in  the 
51s`  Division  during  the  First  World  War.  The  sight  of  the  piper  and  the  sound  of  the 
pipes  often  affected  officers  and  men  in  a  highly  emotional  way,  conjuring  up  an  array  of 
images  that  inspired  them  to  `do  their  duty'. 
The  pipers  were  responsible  for  creating  panegyrics  to  celebrate  and  commemorate  unit 
and  division  exploits.  Formation  and  unit  parades,  marches,  and  other  events,  such  as  the 
divisional  sporting  occasions,  fully  involved  the  pipe  band.  Harper  exhibited  the  type  of 
approach  that  was  common  within  the  5  lst: 
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161 he  was  decidedly  the  right  man  for  this  somewhat  feudal  gathering  of  the  clans.  Moreover,  he 
knew  how  to  stimulate  this  feeling.  For  state  and  other  occasions  he  massed  the  pipers  of  his 
three  infantry  brigades-a  retreat  played  by  a  hundred  and  more  piers  was  worth  coming  some 
distance  to  hear.  Once  heard  and  seen  it  was  not  easily  forgotten. 
During  the  cacophony  that  surrounded  a  battle,  the  pipes  were  often  inaudible,  but  as  a 
visual  symbol  that  stimulated  motivation,  they  were  invaluable.  However,  the  manpower 
costs  were  disproportionately  high  as  pipers  made  attractive  targets. 
The  naming  of  persons  and  of  things  was  another  contributor  to  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the 
(Highland)  Division.  They  could  sustain  common  mechanisms  of  recognition  and  assist 
in  creating  and  maintaining  a  common  cultural  heritage. 
The  divisional  history  asserted  that  the  division's  own  troops  were  the  originators  of  the 
less  than  flattering  nickname  'Harper's  Duds'  after  the  initials  `H.  D.  '  in  (Highland) 
Division.  6  This  was  substantiated  by  Captains  Peel  and  MacDonald77  and  Major-General 
D.  N.  Wimberley,  78  although  other  sources  refer  to  that  nickname  being  allocated  by  other 
British  Army  troops.  Whatever  the  explanation,  the  application  of  the  nickname  abruptly 
ceased  after  the  battle  of  Beaumont  Hamel,  when  an  infantryman  of  the  51St  stated  that, 
`they  winna  ca'  us  Hairper's  Duds  noo'.  79  In  fact,  after  that  battle,  the  division  then  began 
to  create  and  circulate  altogether  more  charismatic  and  martial  nicknames  for  itself,  such 
80  as  `the  Ladies  from  Hell'. 
Individual  units  within  the  division  collected  nicknames  also.  The  1/6`h  Seaforths  were 
referred  to  as  the  `Moray  Loons',  81  the  1/6th  Argylls  were  known  as  the  `Fighting 
Sixth',  82  and  the  1/9t'  Royal  Scots  were  known  as  the  `Dandy  Ninth'  or  `Edinburgh's 
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162 Highland  Unit'.  83  Prominent  individuals  such  as  Major-General  `Uncle'  Harper, 
Brigadier-General  `Bogie'  Bogart,  or  Major-General  Bannatine-Allason,  who  was  known 
as  the  `Nurse',  were  frequently  addressed  by  nickname.  Another  example  of  a  common 
recognition  in  the  division  was  through  appellations  for  other  formations  such  as  `the 
Market  Gardeners',  which  the  5  1s`  named  a  Lancashire  Division.  84 
In  a  landscape  as  harsh  and  brutal  as  that  on  the  Western  Front,  it  is  understandable  that 
the  men  would  attempt  to  recreate  a  familiar  landscape  through  the  common  application 
of  names,  and  Captain  Ross  noted  that  the  1/60'  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  with 
`a  singular  disregard  for  the  appropriateness  of  the  original  titles,  altered  them  [trenches] 
to  Sauchiehall  Street,  Greenock  Avenue,  Buchanan  Avenue,  Paisley  Avenue  and  so  on'.  85 
In  many  instances,  units  would  be  associated  with  an  event,  and  many  of  those 
associations  could  become  identifying  symbols  which  when  employed  by  the  whole 
division  assisted  in  developing  common  reference  points.  When  the  1/7th  Gordons 
experienced  heavy  trench  mortar  fire  in  the  line,  `windiness'  was  evident:  `the  story 
quickly  went  round  the  Division,  but  the  battalion  soon  lived  it  down'.  However,  `Fa  shot 
the  cheese'  was  oft  shouted  at  the  men  of  the  1/70'  Gordons  `and  is  still  shouted  25  years 
on'.  86  Often,  individuals  could  also  be  common  reference  points  if  they  were  known  to  all 
within  the  division  and  to  others  without.  Some  men  achieved  legendary  status,  such  as 
`Sniper  Sandy'  of  the  115th  Seaforths  who  was  reputed  to  have  killed  97  German 
soldiers.  87 
As  a  central  element  in  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  the  (Highland)  Divisional 
`legend',  a  potent  act  of  symbolism  was  the  establishment  of  `Beaumont  Hamel  Day'. 
Major-General  Harper  inaugurated  an  annual  divisional  holiday  on  13  November  and 
ensured  that  commemorative  events  marked  the  occasion.  The  GOCs  that  followed  also 
observed  this  tradition.  This  event  was  frequently  mentioned  in  primary  and  secondary 
83  D,  MacEchern,  The  Sword  of  the  North  (Inverness,  1923),  p.  8. 
84  NLS,  'A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  82. 
85  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  p.  154. 
86  NLS,  ACC  7380,  Book  2  of  `The  Highland  Division',  p.  6. 
87  Sutherland,  War  Diary  of  the  S`"  Seaforth  Highlanders,  p.  62. 
163 records  and  was  a  continuing  validation  to  the  51St  and  to  others  of  an  outstanding 
achievement  that  reflected  the  martial  power  of  the  (Highland)  Division. 
Other  visible  symbols  were  common  in  the  515`  Division  and  also  assisted  in  the  creation 
of  a  common  bond  and  identity.  Officers  and  men  were  issued  with  a  divisional  badge 
embodying  the  letters  `H.  D.  '  with  a  square  of  tartan  below  identifying  the  battalion.  88 
Billets,  divisional  transport,  and  headquarters  were  stamped  with  the  initials  `H.  D.  ',  89  and 
where  appropriate  units  would  also  often  add  their  own  battalion  symbols.  90 
Medals  were  also  visible  symbols  of  prestige.  These  were  not  so  prominent  in  1915,  but 
as  the  war  progressed  became  increasingly  prevalent,  sponsored  by  the  higher  echelons  of 
command  and  recognised  throughout  the  military  hierarchy.  Officers  at  different  stages  in 
the  command  chain  could  authorise  the  receipt  of  medals  dependent  on  the  medal  type. 
The  Military  Medal,  which  was  awarded  to  non-commissioned  officers  and  other  ranks, 
and  the  Military  Cross,  which  was  awarded  to  officers,  could  be  authorised  at  divisional 
level,  the  51S`  accumulating  1633  and  313  respectively  over  the  course  of  the  war, 
whereas  an  award  such  as  the  Victoria  Cross,  of  which  the  51st  received  4,  or  the  DSO, 
of  which  it  received  54,  had  to  be  authorised  at  a  higher  command  level.  91  Divisional  and 
unit  war  diaries  and  divisional  routine  orders  regularly  mentioned  medal  ceremonies  and 
the  routine  orders  in  particular  promoted  medal  winners.  The  presentations  of  medals 
were  elaborately  staged  ceremonies,  often  held  as  composite  parts  of  larger  events  where 
maximum  impact  could  be  derived.  Major-General  Harper  was  a  firm  advocate  of  this 
type  of  event: 
The  parade  was  a  central  function  held  on  a  piece  of  grass  ground,  sloping  away  from  the 
Haute-Avesnes  Hill,  where  we  formed  up  the  three  battalions  in  a  hollow  square,  with  the 
recipients  in  line  in  the  middle.  The  General  and  staff  rode  on  to  parade;  the  General  made  a 
speech,  saying  that  the  Huns  made  use  of  blackguard  tricks;  but  our  turn  would  come  when  we 
attacked  them.  Then  he  dismounted;  and  each  man  advanced  in  turn,  received  his  medal 
ribbon  and  shook  hands  with  the  General.  Finally  the  three  battalions  marched  past  in  fours. 
All  went  perfectly,  even  to  my  mind  the  questionable  `See  the  Conquering  Hero  comes'  which 
88  IWM,  85/23/1,  The  Papers  of  Major  A.  Anderson,  undated  (c.  mid-1916). 
89  NLS,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  86. 
90  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960,  p.  23. 
91  NLS,  ACC  7380,  No.  4,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley.  Divisional  honours. 
164 the  General  insisted  should  be  played  while  he  presented  the  medals.  Afterwards  at  the  theatre 
the  ten  medal  winners,  seated  in  the  front  row,  were  received  with  a  tremendous  cheer  as  they 
entered  92 
Many  of  the  men  were  more  terrified  about  the  medal-giving  ceremonies  than  they  had 
been  when  they  were  earning  the  right  to  receive  one!  93  An  indication  of  the  prominence 
of  these  medal-giving  ceremonies  in  the  51St  is  evidenced  by  the  attendance  of  very senior 
army  officers  such  as  Field  Marshal  Haig  and  General  Byng. 
However,  the  allocation  of  military  awards  to  particular  individuals  was  not  always 
understood.  On  congratulating  another  soldier  on  his  award,  Private  Wrench  was 
informed  `that  I  was  the  only  one  who  had  done  so,  and  not  even  his  own  particular  pals. 
Everybody  is  wondering  why  he  is  the  chosen  one,  and  some  even  say  it  should  have 
been  me.  But  what  did  I  do  at  the  Somme  more  than  anyone  else'.  94  From  the  officer's 
perspective,  Captain  Lusk  tells  of  how  he  was  ashamed  to  accept  a  French  decoration 
when  so  many  others  deserved  it  more  95 
As  a  formation,  the  (Highland)  Division  was  also  awarded  a  number  of  very  prestigious 
foreign  honours  such  as  the  French  Chevalier  of  the  Legion  d'  Honneur  and  the  Croix  de 
Guerre,  the  Italian  Order  of  St.  Maurice  and  St.  Lazarus,  the  Belgian  Chevalier  of  the 
Order  of  Leopold,  and  the  Montenegrin  Order  of  St.  Daniele.  96  The  latter  of  these  awards 
was  actually  presented  to  an  officer  of  the  division  by  the  King  of  Montenegro.  97 
The  home  front 
The  home  front  was  important  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  51St  Division  for  the 
principal  reason  that  they  were  in  the  trenches  fighting  to  defend  it,  in  both  the  abstract 
92  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  144. 
93  IWM,  N/A,  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W.  Webster,  p.  176. 
94  IWM,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  I,  27  August  1916. 
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96  NLS,  ACC  7380,  No.  4,  The  Papers  of  Major-General  D.  N.  Wimberley.  Divisional  honours. 
97  National  Archive,  WO  95/2849,5  1"  Division  A  and  Q  General  Routine  Order  683. 
165 and  the  real  sense.  In  this  context,  it  is hardly  surprising  that  it  widely  influenced  esprit 
de  corps. 
McCartney  asserts  that,  `Whether  actively  subscribing  to  the  ideas  of  alienation  from 
home  or  not,  most  historians  have  concentrated  on  factors  internal  to  the  military  unit,  to 
the  exclusion  of  those  related  to  the  home  front  and  political  ideology'.  98  External 
influences  were  powerful  levers  in  shaping  (Highland)  Division  esprit  de  corps  and  the 
traditional  view  that  there  was  little  contact  between  the  home  and  the  Western  Front  has 
increasingly  been  challenged.  In  reality,  officers  and  men  at  the  front  employed  every 
means  of  communication  at  their  disposal  to  maintain  contact  with  family  and 
community. 
News  from  Britain  was  routed  to  the  front  through  an  interactive  communication  system. 
National  and  regional  newspapers  were  received  within  days  of  publication.  Unofficial 
news  also  travelled  swiftly,  as  evidenced  in  a  letter  to  Lieutenant  J.  N.  Dandie  from  his 
brother  dated  22  May  1915,  which  referred  to  the  rail  collision  at  Gretna  the  night 
before.  99  Notable  events  were  also  communicated  to  the  troops  through  routine  orders 
and  parades.  A  large  quantity  of  correspondence  was  published  at  home,  such  as  the 
letters  from  U  Company  which  appeared  in  Aberdeen  University's  Alma  Mater.  In  some 
instances  relatives  were  permitted  to  visit,  and  parcels  could  be  sent  from  the  home  area, 
via  the  Red  Cross,  to  behind  the  German  lines  for  (Highland)  Division  prisoners  of 
war.  100  This  interchange  of  information  and  views  played  a  vital  role  in  maintaining  the 
morale  of  the  men  in  the  trenches.  It  permitted  recognition  of  the  men's  sacrifice,  and 
created  and  sustained  a  mutual  understanding  of  the  common  hardships  at  home  and  at 
the  front. 
Censorship  was  enforced  but  could  not  always  be  rigorously  applied.  Many  officers  in  the 
division  had  vast  amounts  of  mail  to  censor  whilst  carrying  out  their  other  duties  and 
98  H.  McCartney,  'The  1/6th  and  1/10th  Battalions  of  the  King's  (Liverpool)  Regiment  in  the  Period  of  the 
First  World  War'  (Cambridge  University  Ph.  D,  2000),  p.  5. 
99  NLS,  ACC  9530,  No  2,  Papers  of  James  Naughton  Dandie. 
100  IWM,  97/41/1,  Papers  of  Captain  I.  Cumming.  Various  letters  post  March  1918. 
166 thorough  censorship  meant  checking  that  there  was  no  mention  of  casualty  details, 
armament  figures,  place  and  unit  names,  and  poor  morale.  It  is  perhaps  understandable 
that  there  were  lapses.  Captain  Ross  typified  this  by  stating  that  there  was  a  laxness  in  the 
division  when  it  first  arrived  in  France,  `Nowhere  was  this  more  so  than  in  the  letters 
which  we  were  forced  to  censor'.  101  Letters  could  also  bypass  the  censor  entirely  by 
going  `down  the  line'  with  the  wounded  or  with  those  departing  on  leave.  Green 
envelopes,  of  which  there  was  `nothing  more  important  to  an  active  soldier',  102  could  also 
ensure  that,  even  when  censorship  was  rigorously  applied,  the  men  would  find  a  way  to 
get  news  out.  Bradbury  related: 
On  this  day  we  were  informed  that  we  would  not  be  allowed  to  send  any  more  letters  owing  to 
a  breach  of  the  censorship  regulations  by  one  of  the  men.  We  got  over  this  difficulty,  however, 
by  inducing  the  men  of  a  neighbouring  battalion  to  pass  our  letters  in  with  theirs  and  in  order 
not  to  get  caught  we  signed  fictitious  names.  These  letters  I  learnt  later  got  through  alright.  'o3 
Soldiers  on  leave  would  help  to  disseminate  information  to  families  of  those  serving  in 
the  trenches  and  on  return  to  the  front  could  impart  the  latest  news  from  the  home. 
However,  in  the  early  stages  of  the  war,  the  system  for  leave  was  not  without  problems. 
Men  from  the  north  of  Scotland  or  the  islands  of  the  west  found  that  their  seven  days 
leave  passed  almost  entirely  in  travelling  to  and  from  their  destination: 
It  took  them  fifty  hours  to  get  to  Aberdeen,  and  Aberdeen  was  a  very  long  way  short  of  Wick. 
We  had  a  case  of  a  man  who  got  as  far  as  the  opposite  shore  to  his  island-and  then  it  was  time 
for  him  to  return.  Not  much  rest  this  from  the  trenches.  That  was  before  leave  was  extended  to 
suit  such  cases.  '°4 
By  1916  the  system  was  more  efficient  and  by  1918  there  was  even  a  form  of  substitution 
leave.  There  were  occasions  though,  when  the  (Highland)  Division  was  under  stress, 
when  leave  was  refused  `even  on  news  that  a  man's  mother  was  dying'.  105  However,  for 
some,  leave  was  a  strange  and  uneasy  experience  when  adjustment  could  be  difficult. 
Webster  found  it  bizarre  that,  whilst  on  a  trip  to  the  cinema  in  London,  no-one  seemed 
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167 interested  in  footage  of  the  opening  day  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme.  106  To  add  to  this 
feeling  of  unease,  civilians  on  the  home  front  could  often  make  the  soldier  angry: 
still  meeting  lots  of  folks  who  are  a  damned  nuisance  asking  so  many  things  about  the  war  as 
if  I  could  really  know,  or  as  if  I  had  no  right  to  forget  about  it  for  the  time  being.  After  all, 
they  all  seem  to  know  more  about  the  business  than  any  of  us  do,  so  it  is  they  who  should  tell 
me  all  about  it.  107 
There  were  strong  bonds  between  young  men  who  left  home  for  the  first  time  and  their 
families,  and  these  bonds  could  be  very  emotional.  Webster  served  with  a  soldier  who 
refused  to  give  up  his  tunic  that  had  a  photograph  of  his  mother  in  the  pocket  even  though 
an  unexploded  bomb  had  landed  on  it.  108 
Soldiers  did  get  the  sense  that  they  were  in  the  thoughts  of  their  communities  as  they 
received  parcels  from  local  committees  and  fundraisers.  Gifts  sent  out  for  the  1/7th  Black 
Watch  by  the  Committee  of  the  Battalion's  Comfort  Fund  organised  by  the  Ladies  of  Fife 
`proved  of  incalculable  value  to  the  battalion  throughout  the  war',  109  and  items  were  sent 
from  the  Territorial  recruiting  area  of  the  1/6th  Seaforths  for  which  the  troops  were  very 
grateful.  "" 
Perceptions  of  the  home  front  about  what  went  on  in  France  and  Belgium  were  often  out 
of  touch  and  did  irritate  the  troops  of  the  division.  For  many,  there  was  a  marked  contrast 
in  the  `idealism'  that  was  prevalent  at  home  and  the  `realism'  that  they  experienced  at  the 
front.  Private  A.  E.  Wrench  stated  that  `the  two  are  as  far  apart  as  the  poles'.  '  11  This  was 
further  emphasised  late  in  the  war  by  a  sergeant-major  of  the  51St  Division's  artillery  who 
recalled  of  1914  that,  `A  lot  has  happened  since  that  time.  A  lot  has  happened,  far  more 
than  the  people  at  home  have  any  idea  of.  '  112  Public  attitudes  to  the  war  did  change 
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168 though,  as  the  war  effort  demanded  increased  rationing,  substantial  casualties  figures 
became  the  norm,  and  its  duration  extended  almost  indefinitely.  113 
Newspaper  reporting  often  incensed  the  division  either  by  its  jingoism  or  for  what  were 
perceived  as  untruths,  a  typical  entry  in  private  accounts  being,  `your  [sic]  not  to  believe 
half  the  lies  you  read  in  the  papers'.  114  In  support  of  this,  Fuller  has  posited  that  the 
troops  held  a  disdain  for  the  press  and  argued  that,  although  newspapers  continued  to  be 
read,  they  were  read  with  scepticism.  115  Beckett  has  further  substantiated  the  view  of 
media  bias,  stating  that  the  press  was  not  completely  free  to  publish  what  it  liked  and  that 
both  national  and  provincial  newspapers  remained  patriotic,  and  therefore  not  wholly 
objective,  for  most  of  the  war.  116  An  example  of  the  type  of  journalism  that  irritated  the 
troops  of  the  51  S`  can  be  seen  in  the  following: 
and  tonight  newspapers  reach  us  containing  the  accounts  of  the  Glasgow  and  Edinburgh 
Provosts'  experiences  'IN  THE  TRENCHES'.  My  God,  they  should  be  shot.  They  tell  all  the 
folks  at  home  we  are  spoiled  and  get  more  than  we  can  eat,  and  advise  them  not  to  send  us  so 
much  food  stuff.  Also  that  we  are  all  well  and  happy.  Well,  we  are  happy  just  because  it  is  our 
will  to  be  so,  as  otherwise  this  awful  life  would  soon  drive  us  all  crazy.  After  all  we  are  human 
beings,  and  we  are  not  just  out  here  for  the  visit.  So,  we  say  to  hell  with  you,  and  wish  you 
were  here  IN  the  trenches  some  night  when  a  mine  is being  put  up.  Then  perhaps  they  would 
understand  what  it  is  to  be  HAPPY.  '" 
However,  the  troops  themselves,  often  putting  on  `a  brave  face'  to  protect  their  loved 
ones  at  home,  increased  the  erroneous  perception  on  the  home  front.  Captain  J.  Lusk,  in 
sending  two  letters  immediately  after  a  battle,  permits  a  contrast.  One  of  these  letters  was 
to  his  mother  and  the  other  was  to  his  commanding  officer.  The  tone  and  style  of  those 
letters  differs  dramatically  as  his  mother  is  spared  any  of  the  horrors  of  the  battle,  whilst 
the  commanding  officer  is  given  a  full  and  bloody  account.  118 
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169 Soldiers  were  often  incensed  by  what  they  perceived  to  be  wide-scale  incidences  of 
profiteering  on  the  home  front.  In  many  cases  concerns  were  genuine,  Bradbury  stated 
that: 
Whilst  overseas,  we  read  with  disgust  in  the  papers  the  constant  troubles  with  the  Labour 
section  at  home;  of  the  Engineers,  Miners,  Railwaymen  and  Co,  threatening  to  strike  for 
increases  in  their  wages,  whilst  we  in  the  Army  had  not  even  the  option  of  lodging  a  complaint 
and  in  addition  to  existing  on  very  meagre  rations  and  experiencing  the  hardships  of  a  bitter 
campaign  were  daily  risking  our  lives  for  a  mere  pittance.  And  yet  these  men,  who  were 
willing  to  sacrifice  the  lives  of  their  fellow  countymen  for  their  own  personal  gain,  have  on 
many  occasions  had  the  audacity  to  say  it  was  through  their  superhuman  efforts  that  the  war 
was  won-  I  admit  that  their  work  was  an  essential  part  of  the  campaign,  but  it  must  not  be 
overlooked  that  they  got  well  paid  for  their  labours,  had  good  food  and  plenty  (compared  with 
the  quality  and  quantity  meted  out  to  the  British  Tommy)  and  always  had  a  comfortable  billet 
to  return  to  after  their  days  [sic]  labour.  Therefore,  they,  least  of  anyone,  had  cause  to 
complain.  119 
As  Fuller  pointed  out,  troop  journals  also  pointed  towards  a  mistrust  of  politicians  and 
officers  and  men  of  the  (Highland)  Division  held  a  similar  opinion.  120  Wrench  asserted: 
`To  hell  with  all  the  rotten  selfish  politicians  who  make  war.  Such  creatures  cannot  be  in 
their  right  senses,  or  half  civilised  only.  '  121 
These  feelings  of  negativity  towards  the  home  front  were  not  only  to  be  found  in  British 
soldiers.  Stephane  Audoin-Rouzeau  has  stated  that  many  in  the  French  Army  felt 
disenfranchised  from  civilian  life:  `It  included  a  definite  feeling  of  rupture  between  the 
rear  and  the  front,  and  the  breach  was  so  painful  to  the  French  troops,  that  it  threatened 
the  cohesion  of  French  society  faced  with  the  four-year  ordeal  of  war.  '  122  However,  he 
goes  on  to  explain  that:  `thanks  to  the  ties  created  and  sustained  between  the  soldiers  and 
their  families,  the  trauma  of  separation  between  the  rear  and  the  front  had  only  limited 
consequences.  '  123  Audoin-Rouzeau's  conclusions  could  very  well  apply  to  the  troops  of 
the  5  1St  Division. 
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170 Press  attention 
By  the  onset  of  the  First  World  War,  daily  and  weekly  newspapers  and  magazines,  both 
with  local  and  national  circulations,  were  becoming  more  popular  with  an  increasingly 
educated  society.  We  have  seen  that  news  did  flow  from  the  home  to  the  western  fronts, 
albeit  with  some  restrictions  (the  Press  Bureau,  editorial  and  newspaper  owner 
interference,  and  self-censorship  by  some  correspondents).  However,  these  restrictions 
did  not  impact  on  local  newspapers  in  the  same  way  as  they  often  had  a  different 
emphasis  and  tended  to  operate  under  minimal  censorship.  Local  newspapers  carrying 
stories  of  local  battalions  were  a  constant,  and  officers  and  men  could  interact  more 
readily  with  the  local  media.  On  27  February  1915,  a  request  from  the  Lennox  Herald 
read  as  follows: 
The  9`h  (Dumbartonshire)  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  being  now  with  the 
Expeditionary  Force  in  France,  the  record  of  their  doings  there  will  be  extremely  interesting  to 
county  people,  and  can  only  be  preserved  from  the  letters  sent  home  by  officers  and  men.  We 
will  be  glad  to  publish  descriptive  excerpts  from  such  letters,  if  those  receiving  them  forward 
them  to  US.  124 
Through  the  press,  a  crucial  link  was  maintained  between  home  and  front  and  the  media 
focus  often  helped  troops  to  maintain  a  self-belief,  lifted  their  morale  and  contributed  to 
enhancing  esprit  de  corps. 
In  Scotland,  public  perception  and  media  opinion  changed  as  the  war  progressed.  In 
1914-1915,  the  press  very  much  backed  the  patriotic  line,  but  by  mid-1915  this  position 
began  to  shift.  The  significant  Scottish  losses  at  the  battle  of  Loos  brought  about  a  further 
profound  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  press  to  the  war.  However,  the  commitment  of  the 
soldier  was  never  in  doubt. 
The  local  press  in  Scotland,  and  also  in  Bedford,  provided  the  most  consistent  coverage 
of  the  515`  during  1914  and  1915.  However,  not  all  of  the  coverage  was  positive  and 
constructive,  with,  in  early  1915,  the  Scottish  local  press  questioning  why  the  division 
124  'The  Great  War,  Impact  on  Dumbarton'  (Jordanhill  College,  1978),  p.  41. 
171 was  not  yet  in  action.  125  The  officers  and  men  of  the  51st  were  aware  of  this  press 
criticism  and  were  also  worried  that  they  didn't  get  enough  home  coverage  due  to  a  focus 
on  the  New  Armies.  126  However,  press  interest  in  Bedford  was  very  positive  and  raised 
the  divisional  profile  and  generated  a  sense  of  unity  and  pride.  127  During  much  of  1916, 
press  coverage  was  again  confined  to  the  Scottish  media,  and  it  was  only  after  Beaumont 
Hamel  that  national  and  other  regional  newspapers  took  a  more  active  interest  in  the 
fortunes  of  the  division.  A  divisional  history  records  a  typical  post-1916  journalistic 
comment;  `wherever  the  battle  rages  hottest,  there  is  the  Fifty-first......  the  French  now 
talk  of  it  with  almost  religious  fervour'.  A  further  sensationalist  account  was  written  by 
this  particular  journalist,  who  was  an  Englishman,  in  July  of  1918,  `it  walked  across  a 
valley  swept  by  a  thousand  machine  guns,  stormed  Marfaux,  and  clinched  the  German 
defeat'.  This  correspondent  further  promoted  the  (Highland)  Division  as  a  premier 
formation  by  testifying  to  hearing  officers  from  other  divisions  say,  `Thank  God,  the 
Fifty-first  is  next  to  us'.  128  The  Times  provided  a  national  view  on  30  August  1918  with 
an  article  entitled  `Famous  Highland  Division',  where  the  copy  read: 
I  have  already  told  of  the  advance  of  the  Scottish  51"  Division.  The  5181(Highland)  Division  is 
already  so  famous  that  even  its  recent  performances  can  add  little  to  the  splendour  of  its 
record.  Last  year,  it  had  already  established  such  a  reputation  that  the  Germans  placed  it  first 
in  formidableness  on  the  list  of  hard-fighting  British  Divisions.  129 
The  Yorkshire  Evening  Post  published  another  panegyric  in  March  1918  entitled  `the 
Gallant  Fifty  First',  which  stated  that: 
Once  again  the  51$`  Division  is  singled  out  in  the  Headquarters  report  for  dogged  and 
successful  fighting.  This  Highland  Territorial  Division,  in  which  are  relics  of  some  of  the  old 
regular  regiments,  was  the  division  which  fought  its  way  nearest  to  Cambrai  on  that  offensive. 
It  was  commended  for  "a  very  gallant  fight"  in  defending  the  Bapaume-Cambrai  road  on 
March  22,  when  the  German  losses  were  especially  heavy.  They  must  have  been  fighting 
continuously  there  for  about  ten  days,  and  yet  now  we  find  them  at  another  part  of  the  line,  in 
another  army,  fighting  like  the  best  of  the  French  troops.  130 
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172 The  Yorkshire  Post  article  gives  an  extremely  important  example  of  the  bolstering  of  the 
reputation  of  the  (Highland)  Division  even  when  it  had  suffered  a  reverse. 
Positive  press  material  was  circulated  to  units  to  improve  or  sustain  morale  and  enhance 
esprit  de  corps.  A  document  issued  by  the  staff  of  divisional  headquarters  on  25  February 
1918  ensured  that  `the  following  extracts  from  the  Evening  Standard  and  the  Pall  Mall 
Gazette  are  forwarded  for  distribution  down  to  Companies,  Batteries,  etc',  131  and  other 
references  to  press  articles  can  be  found  throughout  the  series  of  routine  orders. 
The  51St  Division  was  not  universally  popular  with  the  press  however.  Some  journalists 
felt  that  `the  Scottish  troops  got  too  much  credit  for  their  work'.  '  32  Beach  Thomas  who 
wrote  for  the  Daily  Mail,  was  one,  and  he  pointedly  ignored  the  (Highland)  Division.  The 
51St  was  only  too  aware  of  this  and  commonly  despised  him.  133  Another  hate-figure  was 
Horatio  Bottomley.  When  he  was  attached  to  the  51st  in  September  1917,  he  was  not  a 
favourite  and  did  not  impress:  `we  all  kowtowed  to  the  little  brute,  yet  despised  him 
intensely-all  save  the  cinema  sergeant,  who  on  hearing  it  was  Bottomley,  said,  `Shall  I 
get  my  gun?  ".  134 
The  Evening  Standard  on  23  February  1918  stated: 
The  Germans,  as  is  well  known,  are  a  plodding  race  and  make  up  some  lengthy  statistics  on 
every  conceivable  subject,  some  useful,  some  purely  pedantic.  Amongst  others,  according  to  a 
German  prisoner,  statistics  have  been  compiled  from  all  fronts  showing  what  enemy  troops 
kill  most  Germans.  It  will  be  gratifying  to  our  brethren  across  the  Tweed  to  hear  that  at  the 
head  of  all  nations  and  all  troops  is  placed  a  certain  Scottish  Division.  An  American  officer, 
on  hearing  this,  remarked  "wal  that's  bully,  and  now  its  up  to  us  to  go  one  better.  "  Which  is  an 
excellent  sentiment  from  the  Allie's  [sic]  point  of  view,  for  killing  power  on  the  moral  [sic]  of 
an  enemy  is  a  very  potent  factor.  But  one  wonders  at  this  form  of  German  home  propaganda; 
for  it  adds  50  per  cent  to  the  fighting  value  of  the  said  Scots,  while  it  gingers  up  other 
Divisions  to  terrify  the  foe  still  more.  135 
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173 The  relationships  between  officers  and  men 
As  Simkins  has  stressed  in  his  chapter  in  British  Fighting  Methods  in  the  Great  War, 
relationships  between  officers  and  men  fluctuated  over  the  course  of  the  war  as  the  army 
developed  and  altered.  136  However,  it  is  clear  that  there  were  constants  in  these 
relationships  and  certain  key  expectations  remained.  Command  depended  not  only  on  the 
commander  but  also  on  the  commanded,  and  officers  needed  to  understand  the  nature  of 
the  men  and  the  men  needed  to  respect  their  officers.  Each  had  an  idea  of  what  the  other 
should  be. 
Gary  Sheffield  posits  that  the  British  Army  was  a  structured  hierarchy  within  which 
officers  bestowed  a  form  of  paternalism  on  other  ranks  in  exchange  for  deference.  137  He 
furthers  asserts  that  both  officers  and  men  in  the  pre-war  Regular  Army:  `recognised  that 
their  relationship  was  governed  by  certain  unwritten  rules,  the  relationship,  although 
devoid  of  intimacy,  was  nonetheless  effective.  '  138 
Within  the  Territorial  formations  of  the  Great  War,  variants  of  the  paternal-deferential 
exchange  existed  which  were  dependent  on  the  social  make-up  of  the  constituent  units. 
However,  the  basic  principles  of  exchange  and  the  frameworks  for  its  operation  were 
constants.  McCartney  posits  that: 
Unlike  the  Regulars,  Territorial  soldiers  retained  a  stake  in  civilian  society.  They  had  families, 
jobs  and  interests  that  were  unconnected  with  the  military....  and  maintained  their  connections 
to  the  home  front  throughout  their  service.  Alternative  interests  gave  the  Territorials  different 
attitudes  towards  the  war  compared  with  the  Regular  soldier.  '39 
The  Territorial  units  had  to  take  these  civilian  ties  into  account  when  operating  in  the 
field,  enforcing  discipline  and  commanding  in  a  different  manner. 
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174 Many  of  the  characteristics  that  motivated  the  Regular  Army  paternalistic  relationship 
were  also  inherent  in  Territorial  paternalistic  relationships.  After  the  Second  World  War, 
Major-General  Wimberley  lectured  at  Sheerness  Officers  School  on  his  theories  of 
leadership.  These  theories  were  based  on  his  experience  with  the  battalions  of  the  51sc 
during  the  First  World  War.  He  stated  that  officers  must  be:  strict  with  private  soldiers, 
but  allow  no-one  else  to  interfere  with  them;  be  loyal  to  each  man  and  fight  for  his  rights 
and  comforts;  explain  the  reasons  for  every  unpopular  action;  praise  him  when  he  does 
well;  and  be  proud  of  him  and  always  appeal  to  that  which  is  best  in  him.  140  These 
principles  required  an  understanding  of  the  Territorial  soldiers  and  provided  protection 
for  them  within  the  military  system.  One  example  of  an  officer  fulfilling  a  fairly  typical 
paternalistic  role  in  the  (Highland)  Division  is  evident  in  the  remedy  for  the  abuse  of  a 
soldier  by  a  non-commissioned  officer.  The  Sergeant: 
detailed  him  for  duty  as  a  mess  orderly  one  day,  which  was  quite  wrong,  he  being  a  member 
of  the  battery  staff........  Whilst  thus  engaged  he  was  spotted  by  one  of  his  officers  who 
stopped  in  astonishment  and  said  "what  the  hell  are  you  doing  in  the  cookhouse  Webster?  " 
Webby  said  he  had  been  detailed  by  his  Sgt.  The  officer  departed  in  fury  and  rooted  out  the 
Sgt,  who  was  enjoying  a  nap  in  his  billet,  gave  him  a  severe  rocket  and  told  him  to  go  to  the 
cookhouse  and  get  Webster  off  that  duty  instantly  and  not  interfere  with  his  staff  again.  141 
Another  example  which  exhibits  the  clear  difference  between  the  Regular  and  volunteer 
paternalistic-deferential  relationship,  concerned  a  dispute  between  officers  and  men  in  an 
artillery  brigade  of  the  51St.  The  dispute  developed  over  the  name  of  a  mule  that  had  been 
killed  and  was  to  be  duly  buried  with  ceremony.  A  conflict  arose  over  the  name  to  be 
carved  on  the  cross.  Officers  ordered  that  one  name  be  carved.  `This  did  not  please  the 
gunners  at  all  and  a  meeting  was  held  to  discuss  ways  and  means  to  have  the  name 
altered'.  A  written  request  was  made  to  the  officers  and  the  men  were  granted  their  wish. 
`This  was  a  real  sporting  gesture  by  their  officers  and  if  the  men  had  admired  them 
before,  they  did  so  even  more  after  this.  No  unit  in  the  British  Army  could  have  had  a 
finer  set  of  officers  than  `A'  Battery  and  one  and  all  would  have  done  anything  for 
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175 them.  '  142  This  shows  a  form  of  negotiation  and  compromise  prevalent  in  the  command 
and  control  system  of  the  (Highland)  Division. 
Major-General  Harper  set  an  example  as  the  most  senior  officer  in  the  division: 
There  were  strong  feelings  towards  the  General  which  animated  the  Division  other  than  those 
of  confidence  in  his  command,  and  the  deep  respect  for  his  qualities  as  a  soldier.  General 
Harper's  personality  was  one  which  won  for  him  the  genuine  affection  of  all  ranks  with  whom 
he  came  in  contact.  In  constant  touch  with  his  troops,  both  in  and  out  of  the  line,  he  was 
known  personally  to  many  of  them.  He  never  confined  his  conversation  with  them  to  matters 
of  military  interest  alone,  and  in  consequence  they  appreciated  that  he  regarded  them  in  the 
light  of  normal  sympathies,  and  not  merely  as  units  in  a  fighting  machine.  It  can  safely  be  said 
that  the  Jocks  regarded  "Uncle"  or  "Daddie",  as  the  General  was  known  to  them,  not  merely 
as  a  commander  in  whom  lay  the  origin  of  their  success,  but  as  a  friend  who  had  their  constant 
welfare  in  mind.  '43 
As  part  of  the  paternalist-deferential  exchange  in  the  (Highland)  Division,  officers  were 
expected  to  exhibit  characteristics  such  as  leadership,  bravery,  and  efficiency.  Only  then 
could  they  earn  the  respect  of  the  men.  Failure  to  act  `appropriately'  would  lead  to  a  lack 
of  respect.  Officers  were  not  expected  to  rob  prisoners  of  war,  but  `Our  own  officer  then 
did  a  thing  which  I  did  not  approve  of;  he  covered  each  man  with  his  revolver  whilst  he 
searched  him  and  removed  everything  of  value'.  144  In  another  instance,  Private  Wrench 
`Met  an  officer  from  Corps  HQ  at  Anzin  Church  at  I  Iam  and  conducted  him  round  the 
line.  Was  with  him  till  6pm  and  the  wretch  never  thought  that  I  ought  to  have  anything  to 
eat,  though  he  was  suitably  treated  at  the  different  H.  Qrs'.  145 
For  inexperienced  officers,  the  harsh  conditions  and  the  expectations  of  the  men  could 
pose  significant  problems.  Officers  were  regularly  ridiculed  or  even  ignored  if  considered 
less  than  able.  Webster  gave  an  account  of  a  subaltern  `straight  from  cadet  school'  who 
attempted  to  ensure  that  everything  was  done  `by  the  book'.  The  result  was  that,  `The 
men  think  he  is  a  pain  and  they  know  better,  so  they  play  practical  jokes  on  him'.  146  Rank 
was  no  barrier,  as  the  commanding  officer  of  the  3/6`h  Seaforth  Highlanders  discovered 
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176 when  he  arrived  in  France  and  visited  the  1/6`h  Seaforths.  The  officers  of  the  1/6`h  wrote 
that  he  did  not  have  a  clue,  but  was  trying  to  convince  them  that  he  did.  147  Cowardice  was 
inexcusable  and  S.  Bradbury  tells  of  a  divisional  officer  who  became  a  laughing  stock 
because  he  panicked.  148 
The  strains  on  the  officers  could  be  significant.  Many  worked  extremely  hard  to  ensure 
that  their  duties  were  carried  out  and  the  men  were  taken  care  of: 
I  envy  the  men  at  these  particular  times:  they  parade  when  they  are  told,  take  the  few  articles 
given  them,  and  break  off.  Each  of  these  parades  may  mean  hours  of  previous  work  to  their 
`superiors'.  I'm  afraid  I  drift  into  rather  a  drivelling  whine,  but  the  fact  is  that  most  of  the 
officers  are  feeling  the  strain  physically.  '49 
Young  officers,  exposed  to  the  rigours  of  war  and  carrying  the  expectations  of  their  men, 
could  often  question  their  own  abilities.  On  visiting  a  friend,  an  officer  in  the  1/7th 
Seaforths,  Private  Wrench  explained: 
I  saw  Bob,  and  officer  or  not,  like  everyone  else,  he  had  that  disease  common  to  us  all  at 
times,  `Wind  Up'........  at  first  I  thought  he  was  inclined  to  be  stand-offish,  it  was  just  his 
nervousness  on  realising  how  inexperienced  he  was,  and  yet  he  was  an  officer  there  to  lead 
men,  experienced  ones  too,  into  what  and  where  he  had  no  idea.  Told  me  he  thought  it  wasn't 
fair  that  he  should  feel  responsible  for  these  mens'  lives,  nor  right  that  he  should  be  an  officer 
and  all  the  time  he  was  showing  this  lack  of  confidence  in  himself  and  feeling  of 
incompetency  and  added,  "Why,  they  should  be  leading  me.  "  Well  I  feel  I  must  agree  with 
him  for  secretly,  I  believe  it  is  just  thus  why  so  many  young  men  have  gone  west,  because  of 
weak,  or  sometimes  headstrong  young  officers.  It  worries  him  too  that  his  men  know  he  is 
inexperienced.  But  you  cannot  hide  that  fact  from  those  here  any  more  than  you  can  hide 
yourself  from  the  sight  of  God.  He  hates  to  be  saluted  so  often;  it  gives  him  the  feeling  of 
inferiority  to  his  men,  and  he  is  obsessed  with  the  idea  that  his  men  resent  him,  don't  want  him 
and  don't  trust  him.  "" 
Another  strong  link  in  the  chain  of  command  were  non-commissioned  officers.  NCOs 
could  be  very  influential  and  John  Keith  Forbes  of  `U'  Company  of  the  1/4`h  Gordon 
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177 Highlanders  was  happy  to  remain  an  NCO  because  `he  would  be  able  to  exercise  a 
greater  moral  influence  on  his  men'.  151 
Partnership  was  the  secret  to  a  successful  relationship  between  officer  and  NCO.  The 
non-commissioned  officers  were  frequently  more  experienced  than  the  subalterns  and  it 
was  important  that  officers  treated  the  non-commissioned  officers  with  a  degree  of 
wariness.  Upon  assuming  command  of  a  machine  gun  unit,  Captain  Wimberley  and  his 
subaltern  had  to  work  with  a  Sergeant  Souter  DCM,  the  senior  sergeant: 
We  had  both  got  on  well  with  Souter,  but  I  had  some  trouble  with  him  at  first,  as  with  some  of 
the  other  ncos.  The  section  had  been  for  some  weeks  without  an  officer  and  so  had  got,  as  is 
always  the  case,  rather  slack.  I  being  young  and  inexperienced  started  by  being  very  strict,  and 
this  coupled  with  my  knowledge  of  my  inexperience  was  probably  very  galling  for  them.  I 
remember  on  one  occasion  ordering  Sergeant  Souter  to  rub  his  feet  in  front  of  me,  as  by  the 
letter  of  the  law  an  officer  was  supposed  to  see  the  feet  of  all  his  command  rubbed  with  anti- 
frostbite  grease  every  24  hours-that  annoyed  him  very  much.  I  would  never  think  of  giving  an 
order  like  that  now,  but  young  subalterns  are  often  very  strict  when  they  should  stretch  a  point 
and  slack  when  they  should  be  firm.  '52 
Edgar  Wallace  in  his  book  on  the  New  Armies  and  the  Territorial  Force,  emphasised  that 
care  must  be  taken  in  the  officer-NCO  relationship.  He  stated  that  a  junior  officer  should: 
Remember  that  he  knows  a  great  deal  more  about  the  business  of  soldiering  than  you  do  or 
you  will  for  a  very  long  time.  He  will  salute  you  and  pay  you  every  mark  of  respect,  but  for 
quite  a  while  his  mental  attitude  towards  you  will  be  one  of  derision  and  pity.  Remember  that 
if  you  catch  a  non-commissioned  officer  napping  once,  you  must  keep  the  fact  to  yourself.  The 
joyous  impulse  to  correct  the  N.  C.  O.  before  his  men,  if  given  way,  will  induce  him  at  some 
future  occasion  to  correct  you  by  inference,  because  you  may  be  sure  that  for  every  mistake  he 
makes  you  will  make  twenty.  Do  not  be  familiar  with  a  non-commissioned  officer  in  order  to 
gain  his  approval,  because  the  result  will  be  the  reverse  of  what  you  desire.  153 
Officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  were  very  influential  and  the  relationships  that 
were  formed  with  the  men  assisted  in  the  creation  and  maintenance  of  formation  and  unit 
identities  and  loyalties.  The  code  of  understanding  that  was  established  between  them 
was  based  on  shared  beliefs  and  mutual  expectations. 
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178 General  officer  commanding  and  senior  officers 
In  the  515,  the  General  Officer  Commanding,  brigadier-generals  and  battalion 
commanders,  along  with  other  senior  officers,  were  key  iconic  figures  that  had  a 
substantial  influence  over  the  divisional  esprit  de  corps.  As  an  integral  part  of  the 
decision-making  process  through  the  recognised  chain  of  command,  their  positions  were 
prominent  and  the  postholders  were  known  by  most,  if  not  all,  of  the  officers  and  men  in 
the  division,  and  are  frequently  mentioned  in  regimental  histories  and  private  accounts. 
Crucially,  those  officers  balanced  their  need  to  employ  their  own  style  within  the 
confines  of  the  command  and  control  system  of  the  515.  That  balance  altered  during  the 
war,  but  continued  to  function  for  the  most  part  effectively  and  efficiently. 
GOCs  were  crucial  actors:  as  John  Bourne  has  stated  the  `men  who  were  chosen  to 
command  these  divisions  are  key  figures  in  any  understanding  of  the  British  Army's 
performance  during  the  war'.  154  At  the  top  of  the  command  pyramid,  GOCs  could  and  did 
have  direct  influence  on  brigadiers  and  other  officers  and  across  the  whole  range  of 
divisional  activities  from  combat  to  supplies.  The  extreme  contrasts  of  the  range  of  this 
influence  can  be  determined  by  the  two  following  official  communications,  the  first  being 
a  personal  message  from  Carter-Campbell  to  the  officers  and  men  of  the  (Highland) 
Division  during  March  1918  urging  them  to  `hold'  against  sustained  German  attacks,  '55 
whilst  another  from  the  same  GOC  considers  that  not  enough  dripping  was  being 
returned  to  stores.  156 
Major-General  Bannatine-Allason  had  a  particular  role  in  the  division.  His  tenure  of 
command  through  the  early  months  of  the  war  until  24  September  1915  elicited  a  distinct 
type  of  leadership.  He  was,  according  to  one  of  his  staff  officers,  `a General  of  the  old 
school;  relying  on  force  of  character  rather  than  knowledge.  A  man  with  the  Khandahar 
154  J.  Bourne,  `British  Divisional  Commanders  During  the  Great  War:  First  Thoughts',  in  Gunfire,  No.  29, 
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179 Star  for  Lord  Roberts  march  in  Afghanistan.  '  157  This  is  not  an  altogether  positive 
descriptor  as  the  inference  is  that  he  was  out  of  his  depth  in  modern  war.  However, 
leadership  he  did  provide. 
His  successor,  Major-General  Harper  was  certainly  influential  in  the  development  of  the 
division.  Accompanied  by  his  `enormous  dog',  Rip,  and  described  as  `lordly',  158  he 
presided  over  the  51St  for  much  of  the  war.  Further  accounts  stated  that  `The  magnificent 
esprit  de  corps  of  the  51St  Division  was  largely  due  to  Uncle's  personality.  There  was  no 
happier  selection  than  the  choice  of  General  Harper  for  the  51St  Highland  Division.  They 
exactly  suited  one  another.  '  159  General  Harper: 
inspired  all  ranks  with  such  confidence  that  it  is  difficult  to  express  the  high  regard  in  which 
he  was  held  in  the  Division.  The  success  and  consequent  reputation  gained  by  the  Highland 
Division  can  be  attributed  to  the  happy  combination  of  the  particular  qualities  of  the 
commander  and  his  troops,  and  to  the  brilliant  manner  in  which  the  directing  genius  of  the 
former  was  seconded  by  the  genius  for  fighting  of  the  latter.  ico 
Major-General  G.  T.  C.  Carter-Campbell  was  in  command  from  March  1918  until  after  the 
Armistice.  He  took  over  command  of  the  division  at  a  significant  time  as  within  a  few 
days  of  his  arrival  tremendous  losses  were  sustained  in  the  German  offensive  in  March 
1918,  only  to  be  followed  by  a  further  engagement  in  April  with  a  similar  number  of 
casualties.  The  losses  were  such,  particularly  in  senior  officers,  that  the  old  division 
virtually  disappeared.  `In  spite  of  these  misfortunes  under  General  Carter-Campbell's 
command,  the  efficiency  of  the  Division  continued.  It  became  as  heavily  engaged  as  ever, 
yet  in  spite  of  its  losses  fully  maintained  its  reputation  to  the  end.  '  161 
A  full  analysis  of  the  impact  of  every  senior  officer  that  served  in  the  51S`  is  outwith  the 
scope  of  this  study.  However,  the  following  examples  of  influential  figures  are  suggestive 
enough  to  demonstrate  that  the  GOCs  were  assisted  in  creating  and  maintaining  an  esprit 
de  corps  in  the  division  by  a  number  of  prominent  senior  officers. 
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180 Brigadier-generals  had  a  significant  influence  within  the  divisional  formation.  Again  they 
were  prominent  figures,  Bradbury  (a  gunner)  referring  to  the  division's  brigadier-generals 
as  `awe  inspiring'.  162  The  brigadier-general  would  be  visible  to  troops  through  various 
channels,  such  as  communiques  to  men  through  unit  commanding  officers:  `the  Brigadier 
General  Commanding  wishes  to  congratulate  the  Commanding  Officer  and  all  ranks  of 
the  5th  Seaforth  Hrs  on  the  very  creditable  appearance  of  the  Battalion  on  parade 
today'.  163  However,  their  influence  was  not  just  top-down  command  and  control.  Regular 
meetings  were  held  with  the  GOC  and  other  senior  officers  to  discuss  a  range  of  issues, 
and  formal  submissions  could  be  made  to  the  GOC  on  tactics,  such  as  Brigadier-General 
Pelham  Burn's  paper  on  `the  best  way  of  dealing  with  the  defensive  organisation  laid 
down  by  the  German  Fourth  Army'.  164  Pelham  Burn,  commanding  the  152nd  Brigade, 
even  attempted  to  influence  higher  command  procedure  by  complaining  to  divisional 
headquarters  about  the  leave  system  for  the  Scots  troops  who  lived  too  far  away  for  the 
standard  leave  period.  165 
Bewsher  stated: 
Just  prior  to  the  arrival  of  the  Division  on  the  Somme,  two  officers  joined  it  who,  second  only 
to  General  Harper,  were  most  responsible  for  the  high  standard  of  efficiency  which  it  attained. 
These  were  Brigadier-General  L.  Oldfield,  D.  S.  O.,  R.  A.  and  Brigadier-General  H.  Pelham 
Burn,  D.  S.  O.,  Gordon  Highlanders.  '66 
Brigadier-General  Oldfield,  the  youngest  CRA  [Commander  Royal  Artillery]  in  the 
British  Army  at  the  time  of  his  promotion,  167  had  the  respect  of  his  men  as  he  `set  a  very 
high  standard  to  his  officers,  to  which  they  admirably  responded',  and  of  other  officers, 
`all  infantry  commanders  had  complete  confidence  both  in  the  artillery  and  in  the  artillery 
arrangements'.  168  The  men  of  the  5  15`  also  had  a  great  respect  for  General  Oldfield  and  he 
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181 for  them.  `His  Highlanders  were  not  like  Englishmen,  good  housekeepers  by  nature,  and 
continued  training  and  vigilance  were  needed.  That,  and  the  unsuitability  of  the  kilt  for 
wire  and  mud,  were  about  the  only  criticism  he  ever  made  of  them.  '  169  Oldfield 
commanded  the  (Highland)  Division  in  the  absence  of  the  GOC  and  was  in  command 
when  the  divisional  flag  was  brought  down  for  the  last  time  before  the  division  `broke- 
up'  in  1919.170 
Brigadier-General  Pelham  Burn  was  the  youngest  brigadier  in  the  British  Army  at  the 
time  of  his  appointment  (34): 
He  is  best  described  by  a  Jock,  who  said,  in  speaking  of  him,  "They  a'  have  their  fads,  and  his 
fad  is  effeeciency"......  In  every  direction,  even  in  the  smallest  points,  he  accepted  only  one 
standard-namely  the  highest;  nothing  less  was  tolerated.  He  spared  himself  no  pains  to  attain 
this  standard.  Holding  these  principles  as  strongly  as  he  did,  it  is  natural  that  he  found  it 
frequently  necessary  to  check  officers  and  N.  C.  O.  's.  They,  however,  bore  him  no  ill-will  for 
this,  and  officers  were  frequently  heard  to  say,  "You  can't  argue  with  P.  B.  when  he  strafes, 
because  he's  always  right.  "  71 
It  is  doubtful  that  many  would  question  the  brigadier-general  as  Wimberley  stated  that  he 
ordered  his  `very  different  types'  of  battalion  commander  around  as  company 
commanders  would  order  their  platoons.  172  Pelham  Bum,  for  health  reasons,  gave  up 
command  of  the  152"d  Brigade  in  April  1918  and  the  divisional  history  stated  that  `it  was 
difficult  to  estimate  the  loss  which  not  only  his  brigade  but  the  whole  Division  sustained 
at  his  departure'.  173 
The  latter  assumed  command  of  the  152"d  Infantry  Brigade  in  place  of  Brigadier-General 
W.  C.  Ross,  C.  B.,  who  took  up  an  appointment  at  home,  and  later  commanded  a  brigade 
in  Salonika.  Bewsher  stated  that: 
General  Ross's  departure  from  the  152nd  Brigade  caused  the  deepest  regret  to  all  ranks.  He  had 
been  intimately  known  in  peace  time  to  many  of  the  officers,  N.  C.  O.  s,  and  men  whom  he  now 
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182 commanded  in  war.  He  was  secretary  of  the  Territorial  Force  Association  for  his  county,  and 
he  had  commanded  his  Brigade  since  November  1914.  General  Ross  had  a  personality  which 
won  for  him  the  friendship  of  all  who  came  into  contact  with  him.  The  Highland  soldier  had 
become  one  of  his  great  interests,  and  he  possessed  a  great  knowledge  and  understanding  of 
him.  Further,  no  one  could  fail  to  admire  his  natural  courage. 
General  Ross  spent  so  much  of  his  time  amongst  his  men  that  he  was  a  familiar  figure  to 
them  all,  while  he  knew  numbers  of  them  by  name,  and  in  many  cases  knew  also  their 
parents,  families,  homes,  and  employers.  174  Colonel  Nicholson  added: 
Wattie  Ross  had  a  high  spirit  of  adventure,  a  love  of  danger.  The  little  man  with  the  straggling 
grey  beard  that  hid  his  lower  jaw,  was  the  life  and  soul  of  the  trench  line;  his  whole  brigade 
caught  his  enthusiasm.  If  there  had  been  more  like  Wattie  Ross  the  war  would  have  ended 
sooner.  175 
However,  the  GOC's  authority  was  unquestioned,  as  even  the  most  popular  and  effective 
senior  officers  found  to  their  cost.  Brigadier  General  Ross  actually  left  the  division 
because  of  a  disagreement  with  Major-General  Harper.  176 
Some  other  senior  officers  that  are  frequently  mentioned  as  being  influential  are 
Lieutenant-Colonel  L.  M.  Dyson,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fleming,  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  D. 
Rorie.  Dyson: 
who  had  commanded  the  255th  Brigade,  R.  F.  A.,  for  some  years,  very  reluctantly  gave  up 
command  of  his  brigade,  ill-health  and  two  severe  wounds  compelling  him  to  do  so.  He  may 
be  said  to  represent  the  best  type  of  modern  gunner  lieut.  -colonel.  Always  willing,  cheerful, 
and  untiring,  he  was  the  best  possible  companion  to  the  infantry  brigade  with  which  he 
worked.  At  the  same  time,  he  kept  well  abreast  of  modern  developments  in  artillery.  It  is 
difficult  to  estimate  the  debt  the  Division  owed  to  colonels  like  Dyson,  Dawson  and  Rorie.  " 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Rorie  succeeded  Lieutenant-Colonel  Fleming  as  Assistant  Director 
Medical  Services  when  the  latter  was  killed  in  action.  Fleming  had  been  ADMS  of  the 
(Highland)  Division  for  over  two  years  and  had  been  with  it  through  all  its  chief 
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183 engagements.  Colonel  Rorie  was  at  the  time  commanding  a  field  ambulance  in  the  51St 
and  he  `was  one  of  the  best  known  and  most  popular  officers  in  the  division.  '  178 
It  is  no  accident  that  these  senior  officers,  and  others  which  space  precludes  mentioning, 
had  similar  influential  qualities.  Strong  character,  longevity  of  command,  a  particular 
style  of  leadership,  personal  renown  amongst  the  men,  and  a  belief  in  the  traits  of  the 
(Highland)  Division,  were  common  features. 
Life  in  the  division 
The  day-to-day  conduct  of  the  officers  and  men  in  the  (Highland)  Division  reflected  the 
balance  between  artificial  construct  and  pre-war  environment.  The  balance,  which 
combined  official  military  practice  with  the  expectations  from  civilian  life,  permitted  a 
further  expression  of  divisional  character  and  positively  contributed  to  a  strong  esprit  de 
corps. 
Social  factors 
The  divisional  social  system  was  very  important  in  improving  and  sustaining  morale, 
assisting  in  the  maintenance  of  discipline,  and  creating  bonds  between  individuals  and 
units.  It  was  also  a  key  component  of  the  development  of  esprit  de  corps.  Social  elements 
are  particularly  interesting  as  a  gauge  of  esprit  as  they  were  not  dictated  by  GHQ  or  the 
War  Office,  although,  as  the  war  progressed,  there  were  more  directives  on  recreation. 
The  social  system  was  frequently  mentioned  in  both  official  and  non-official  documents 
at  various  levels  in  the  divisional  hierarchy.  Routine  orders  tell  of  cinema  attractions, 
canteen  offers,  and  sporting  events,  whilst  unofficial  diary  entries  highlight  events  such 
as  the  1/8`h  Argylls  losing  4-0  to  the  1/6th  Argylls  at  football.  179  These  accounts  signal  an 
endorsement  and  promotion  at  official  levels  whilst  emphasising  the  personal 
significance. 
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184 Support  for  a  formation  or  unit  team,  or  individual,  was  beneficial  to  the  creation  and 
reflection  of  esprit  de  corps.  The  officers  and  men  of  the  51s`  Division,  as  one,  were 
proud  to  support  the  `Highlander'  who  faced  the  legendary  `Bombardier  Billy  Wells'  in  a 
boxing  bout.  As  in  civilian  life,  sport  relieved  boredom,  improved  fitness  and  provided  an 
affirmation  of  community.  It  was  also  crucially  an  area  away  from  the  rigid  obedience  of 
military  existence  which  permitted  a  degree  of  creativity  and  relieved  anxiety. 
Concert  parties  provided  similar  avenues  of  expression.  Frequently,  a  great  deal  of  effort 
went  into  the  building  of  theatres  and  concert  halls,  and  the  division  would  often  pay  for 
it.  All  four  of  the  Scottish  divisions  had  an  official  troupe  and  each  was  very  popular.  The 
concert  party  of  the  51s`  was  named  `the  Balmorals'  and  it  had  a  top  reputation,  so  much 
so  that  Major  A.  Anderson  of  the  1/9th  Royal  Scots  tells  that  his  whole  company  went  to 
see  them.  180  Bonding  was  prevalent  at  a  Balmorals'  show,  with  all  attendees  joining  in 
with  the  words  and  music  of  the  divisional  song,  `the  Heilan  Division'.  181  The  shows 
would  also  frequently  endorse  the  virtues  of  the  division,  and  not  unsurprisingly  could  be 
rather  unrefined.  182  These  shows  were  very  much  a  link  to  the  home  front  for  the  officers 
and  men,  with  the  Balmorals'  production  of  `Turnip  Tops'  being  described  as  `a  very 
laughable  music  hall  farce'.  183 
The  (Highland)  Division  also  had  a  cinema,  but  this  had  a  more  limited  popularity.  By 
April  1916,  the  cinema  drew  an  average  of  only  250  troops.  184  There  was  also  a  theatre, 
at  which,  Brigadier-General  G.  T.  C.  Edwards  wrote  in  his  diary,  he  saw  `a  very  good 
performance',  185  and  this  was  also  popular  with  the  troops,  the  `great'  success  of  the 
opening  night  at  Senlis  being  the  norm.  186 
180  IWM,  85/23/1,  Journal  of  Major  A.  Anderson.  undated. 
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183  IWM,  81/35/1,  Memoir  of  S.  Bradbury,  p.  69. 
184  NA,  WO 95  2848,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  29  April  1916. 
185  IWM,  78/42/1,  Diary  of  Brigadier-General  G.  T.  C.  Edwards,  3  December  1915. 
186  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  30  November  1915. 
185 Rather  surprisingly,  the  51St  did  not  have  a  trench  journal  but  individual  units  did  produce 
publications  and  Webster  tells  of  a  battery  news  sheet  produced  in  the  spring  of  1916.187 
The  Regular  divisions  often  led  the  way  in  establishing  or  improving  practical  systems  of 
recreation  and  it  was  from  the  4th  Division  that  the  51St  copied  the  divisional  canteen.  It  in 
turn  passed  on  this  knowledge  to  17th  Division.  Of  course,  there  was  nothing  new  in  the 
canteen  idea188  and  divisions  readily  adopted  them.  Canteens  were  occasionally 
sponsored  by  religious  organisations  from  the  home  front,  such  as  the  YMCA  and  the 
Church  Army,  and  operated  at  both  divisional  and  unit  level.  Under  certain  circumstances 
they  made  a  profit,  which  was  reinvested  in  the  division  and  was  spent  on  sports 
events.  189  They  also  served  as  common  meeting  places  for  the  men  where  interaction  and 
bonding  took  place. 
Mess  life  for  officers  was  very  important  also  and  could  be  a  relative  luxury.  `It  is  the 
nerve  centre  of  the  army.  In  the  circle  of  officers  gathered  round  the  camp  fire  or  in  the 
farm-house  kitchen,  victory,  stalemate  or  defeat  is  brewed  with  the  tea.  '  190 
Social  attitudes 
It  may  be  true  that  the  harsh  realities  of  war  may  drive  men  to  drink,  and  drunkenness 
was  not  unusual  and  remained  relatively  high  in  the  British  Army  throughout  the  war.  191 
Nerves  were  constantly  under  great  strain  and  it  was  natural  that  the  majority  drank  more 
than  in  peacetime.  However,  the  excessive  consumption  was  usually  confined  to  such 
periods  as  units  were  out  of  the  line. 
Hard  drinking  was  already  common  in  pre-war  Scotland,  even  more  so  in  the  inner  cities 
where  life  could  be  particularly  harsh.  192  Captain  Dunn  gave  an  account  of  a  Cameronian 
who  was  found  to  be  drunk  on  duty,  whilst  at  the  front,  by  an  officer  from  another  unit. 
187  IWM,  N/A,  The  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W.  Webster,  p.  103. 
188  The  canteen  system  was  established  in  the  19th  Century  to  counteract  the  high  incidences  of  drunkenness 
when  troops  went  outside  the  formation  or  unit  to  eat  and  drink. 
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191  I.  Beckett,  A  Nation  in  Arms,  p.  23 
192  T.  C.  Smout,  A  Century  of  the  Scottish  People  (London,  1986),  p.  136. 
186 When  he  was  reported  to  his  commanding  officer,  the  response  was  that  he  was  not 
`drunk'  as  the  term  was  used  in  Scotland.  193  Any  man  who  did  not  participate  in  heavy 
drinking  was  suspected  of  being  odd.  On  being  offered  a  drink  by  an  officer,  Wrench 
refused  and  the  shocked  officer  expressed  doubts  as  to  his  Scottish  origins: 
Captain  Maxwell  of  the  T.  M.  B.  was  sitting  in  his  pyjamas  as  were  the  other  officers  there. 
And  when  I  entered  his  tent  he  turned  and  said,  "Just  the  man  we're  waiting  for.  Here,  have  a 
drink.  "  "No,  thanks  you,  sir.  "  I  replied  "I  don't  drink.  "  "Have  a  cigarette  then,  "  he  said  then, 
offering  his  case.  "Sorry,  sir,  I  don't  smoke  either,  "  I  told  him,  when  he  looked  surprised,  and 
remarked,  "What?  You  neither  smoke  nor  drink?  Then  my  God,  what  the  Hell  DO  you  do"?  '94 
However,  real  dangers  arose  with  those  who  needed  excessive  alcohol  before  battle.  A 
`nip'  before  battle  (the  rum  ration  for  `Dutch  courage')  or  being  drunk  when  out  of  the 
line  was  one  thing,  but  it  was  viewed  as  a  serious  offence  if  officers  or  men  were  found  to 
be  drunk  on  duty.  Wimberley  tells  of  some  men  being  drunk  on  duty  whilst  at  Cambrai  in 
1917,  resulting  in  a  man  losing  his  stripes  and  another  four  undergoing  Field  Punishment 
No.  2.195  However,  many  men  got  away  with  it.  Bradbury  tells  of  a  sergeant-major,  `dead 
drunk'  taking  orders  from  his  commanding  officer,  then  issuing  those  orders  to  his  men 
before  collapsing.  196  Discipline  could  break  down  when  too  much  alcohol  was  involved. 
On  one  occasion,  units  of  the  division  were  ordered  to  stay  out  of  a  village  to  avoid 
looting,  but  nonetheless  some  men  disobeyed  and  returned  from  the  village  laden  with 
alcohol,  and  `it  was  rumoured  that  one  of  the  6`h  Seaforths  had  bayoneted  a  French 
civilian  who  had  tried  to  stop  the  Highlander  obtaining  wine'.  197  During  the  battle  of  the 
Lys  in  April  1918,  when  front  line  units  of  the  division  were  fighting  a  rearguard  action, 
some  units  were  conducting  other  manoeuvres: 
We  discovered  the  cellar  of  the  chateau  was  full  of  bottles  of  wine  etc.,  therefore,  we  brought 
as  many  as  we  could  carry  up  into  the  daylight  and  later  at  night  our  regimental  quartermaster 
Sergeant  (whom  I  was  very  friendly  with)  and  his  assistant  arrived  and  the  four  of  us  (those 
two,  the  Corporal,  and  myself)  had  a  rollicking  night  which  ended  in  oblivion.  198 
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187 As  part  of  the  culture,  swearing  was  also  extremely  prominent  in  the  division: 
With  all  the  swearing  that  goes  on  among  the  soldiers,  sometimes  even  yet  the  fact  that  I  never 
swear  is  occasionally  commented  upon.  They  are  all  used  to  it  by  now,  yet  it  might  be  strange 
in  such  a  diverse  masculine  community  where  so  much  happens  to  make  you  swear.  So  I  am 
reminded  of  the  time  away  back  at  Montanvillers  when  one  of  the  Black  Watch  orderlies 
suddenly  turned  to  me  and  said,  "Here,  they  tell  me  you  never  swear,  but  by  Christ  I'll  never 
believe  it.  "  "Why?  "  I  replied,  "I  think  if  a  man  can  control  his  tongue  there  won't  be  any  need 
for  him  to  swear".  So  he  just  laughed  and  said  it  was  impossible  for  anybody  to  be  out  here 
and  not  to  swear.  199 
Religion  and  superstition 
At  the  official  level,  religion  was  fully  endorsed  within  the  51St  Division  and  there  were 
constant  references  to  it  in  the  war  diaries.  There  were  regular  church  parades  and  the 
services  were  often  attended  by  senior  officers  of  the  division.  200  The  provision  of 
religious  services  was  inter-denominational,  and  Routine  Order  No.  736  referred  to  seven 
Presbyterian,  three  Roman  Catholic,  and  two  Church  of  England  services  on  the  same 
day.  01  Routine  Order  No.  821  also  referred  to  a  Jewish  service.  202  The  promotion  of 
further  religious  services  was  also  endorsed  by  external  organisations  such  as  the  Scottish 
Church  Guild  which  supplied  tents  for  worship.  203 
However,  on  a  personal  level  many  troops,  including  officers,  had  mixed  feelings 
towards  religion  given  the  war  context.  It  seemed  scarcely  appropriate  to  a  soldier's  life 
of  killing,  profanity,  drinking,  swearing  and  gambling.  204  The  letters  of  Captain  Stewart 
of  the  1/6`"  Seaforths  to  his  family  in  Scotland  showed  a  marked  disregard  for  religion.  05 
Wrench  also  stressed  that,  `The  general  impression  of  church  parades  in  times  like  the 
present  when  religion  seems  to  be  a  mockery,  is  that  they  are  a  farce.  When  you  try  to 
discover  just  how  the  mercy  of  God  applies  here,  or  raise  the  subject  as  a  matter  of 
199  IWM,  85/51/1,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  11,  p.  131. 
200  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  p.  143. 
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205  IWM,  Con  Shelf,  'An  Account  of  the  Service  of  Captains  G.  Stewart  and  W.  Stewart  in  the  6  Seaforth 
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188 discussion,  you  are  only  laughed  at.  206  But  this  view  is  balanced  by  others  such  as 
Lieutenant  W.  Paterson  who  believed  that  a  genuine  religious  spirit  pervaded  the 
(Highland)  Division.  07 
However,  belief  as  distinct  from  organised  religion  became  more  marked  prior  to  battle. 
`The  voluntary  communion  service  before  battle  was  a  more  sincere  and  more  intense 
affair  than  compulsory  church  parade.  '208  Even  the  very  typical  style  of  officer  account 
found  in  Captain  Ross'  book  cannot  hide  the  oddity  of  official  religion  in  such  an 
environment: 
Before  the  operation  was  carried  out,  the  men  were  addressed  by  the  Right  Rev.  Sir  G.  A. 
Smith,  Moderator  of  the  Church  of  Scotland,  and  simultaneously  a  massed  Presbyterian 
service  was  held  in  Forceville  in  the  presence  of  the  G.  O.  C.  in  C.  Above  the  strains  of  the 
psalms,  so  grandly  sung,  the  guns  never  ceased  to  growl.  Listening  to  those  solemn  words, 
whose  syllables  were  punctuated  by  the  distant  bark  of  the  field  pieces,  and  sometimes 
drowned  by  the  earth-shaking  roar  of  howitzers,  an  intense  appreciation  of  the  divine  message 
could  not  fail  to  impress  the  spectator.  The  scene  was  so  utterly  incongruous;  the  persons  so 
seemingly  mistranslated:  ministers  from  the  quiet  Scottish  pulpits  to  the  riot  of  the  battlefield, 
mud-stained  fighters  from  the  hell  of  the  trenches  to  the  heaven  of  a  new  congregation.  Never 
was  Assembly,  even  in  the  sanctuaries  of  Edinburgh,  more  solemn  and  impressive  than  this  209 
The  differences  in  faiths  were  evident  when  men  of  one  religious  denomination  visited 
the  place  of  worship  of  another,  `Two  of  us  poked  our  noses  into  St.  Peter's  church  here 
today  (Corbie).  It  is  quite  nice  inside,  but  why  so  many  cheap  looking  painted  statues  of 
`upteen'  saints?  There  are  plenty  offering  boxes  too,  but  we  weren't  offering.  '210 
The  organised  churches  were  often  viewed  with  suspicion  by  the  men  and  this  is  hardly 
surprising  when  churchmen  visited  field  hospitals  in  search  of  their  `flock',  checking 
hospital  bedcards  for  the  relevant  denomination.  If  the  injured  soldier  was  of  another 
denomination,  then  they  would  move  on:  211  further  evidence  that  the  established  churches 
were  detached  from  the  officers  and  men  at  the  front. 
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189 In  many  cases,  religion  gave  ground  to  the  proliferation  of  superstitions.  Mascots  and 
charms  were  abundant,  for  a  `soldier's  superstitions  are  the  most  trivial  things  possible,  in 
fact  childish.  Any  little  keepsake  he  cherishes  becomes  a  fetish  and  some  will  almost 
stake  their  lives  on  it.  '  It  was  not  uncommon  for  there  to  be  a  juxtaposition  of  superstition 
and  religion: 
There  are  many  men  who  carry  a  new  testament  in  their  breast  pockets  just  because  such  has 
stopped  a  bullet  from  entering  a  soldier's  heart.  And  it  has  to  be  a  bible  even  if  its  only  other 
use  is  for  a  convenient  piece  of  paper  to  light  a  cigarette.  Then  there  are  little  woolly  golly- 
wogs  by  the  hundreds  worn  beneath  the  cap  badge,  and  lord  knows  what  else  as  tokens  of 
good  luck  with  which  the  soldier's  wouldn't  part  for  a  pension.  212 
Webster  tells  of  the  arrival  of  a  signaller  called  Tom  Davidson  to  his  artillery  battery,  and 
this  fellow  happened  to  have  the  same  name  as  the  battery  commanding  officer: 
Some  superstitious  lads  in  the  Bty  attached  some  significance  to  this,  feeling  that  it  was  a  bit 
unlucky.  Their  fears  were  confirmed  when  soon  after  the  lad  appeared  at  the  gun  position  and 
went  on  duty  in  the  signal  hut  he  was  killed.....  It  certainly  cast  a  gloom  over  every  one  for 
several  days.  That  there  was  something  in  the  men's  theory  about  the  T.  D.  business,  was 
confirmed  later  for  during  their  long  sojourn  in  France  no  less  than  two  other  Tom  Davidsons 
came  to  the  Battery  and  none  lasted  long  213 
Wrench  himself  believed  that  he  had  more  `good  fortune'  than  others,  214  and  tells  of  an 
occasion  when  a  sergeant  assured  him  that  he  would  come  safely  through  the  war: 
When  he  enquired  how  he  knew  this,  the  sergeant  replied  that  he  had  dreamt  it.  "But  don't 
forget,  Sergeant,  that  dreams  always  turn  out  the  reverse.  "  "Yes  I  know,  "  he  replied  "And  I 
was  dreaming  that  you  were  killed.  "  He  was  as  serious  about  it  as  he  could  be,  for  no  more 
superstitious  a  creature  ever  lived.  215 
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190 Interaction  with  other  formations  and  national  groups 
The  way  that  the  division  interacted  and  engaged  with  other  formations  and  national 
groups  was  crucial  in  shaping  the  internal  esprit  de  corps.  What  others  thought  and  said 
of  the  5  1St  was  important,  and  what  it  thought  of  itself  was  in  part  a  reflection  of  this. 
Interaction  with  allied  forces 
Its  distinctive  appearance,  attitudes,  and  cultural  associations  made  the  (Highland) 
Division  stand  out  amongst  other  British  Army  formations,  and  Wauchope  related  how 
`The  arrival  of  the  Highland  soldiers  for  the  first  time  in  the  neighbourhood  created 
immense  excitement  among  the  inhabitants  and  the  French  troops'.  216  As  the  fame  of  the 
division  spread,  exchange  and  interaction  were  not  just  localised,  `The  152 
Vladicaucasian  Regiment  sent  a  parcel  of  picture  postcards  to  the  152  Brigade  so  General 
Pelham  Burn  retaliated  with  a  case  of  whisky  and  some  haggises.  Nothing  more  was 
heard  of  the  Russians.  '217 
It  can  be  stated  confidently,  and  this  was  particularly  true  after  Beaumont  Hamel,  that  the 
officers  and  men  of  the  (Highland)  Division  had  an  `implicit  belief  in  their  own 
superiority  over  every  other  country  in  the  world.  This  was  the  one  great  factor  in  their 
make-up  as  soldiers.  '218  However,  no  matter  how  much  it  believed  in  its  own 
invincibility,  it: 
has  a  profound  respect  for  other  Divisions,  and  especially  the  15th,  also  Scottish,  and  the 
Guards.  The  Highlanders  may  ask  themselves,  even  aloud  and  in  mixed  company,  `Wha's  like 
us?  '  but  in  justice  to  them  it  should  be  mentioned  that  from  one  end  of  the  line  to  the  other  I 
heard  the  praises  of  the  5l'  Division  sounded,  so  that  they  have  credit  enough  to  spare,  even 
should  it  be  true  that  self-praise  is  no  honour.  219 
The  51St  interacted  positively  with  other  Scots  divisions,  many  of  the  men  being  from  the 
same  background  and  from  the  same  regiments.  F.  W.  Bewsher  tells  of  many  Scottish 
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191 units  being  stationed  around  Arras  in  1917  and  getting  on  well  220  This  was  amplified  by 
Malcolm  who  thought  it  a  great  social  sector.  221  The  cultural  familiarisation  was  also 
apparent  with  other  Celtic  formations  and,  when  the  36th  (Ulster)  Division  was  threatened 
with  amalgamation  in  1917,  there  was  a  strong  view  that  if  the  (Ulster)  Division  had  to  be 
amalgamated,  it  should  be  with  the  51St  (Highland)  Division.  22  However,  the  troops  of 
the  51St  did  not  always  mix  well  with  counterparts  from  English  units.  There  was  a 
general  impression,  not  unjustified,  amongst  English  units  that  the  `Highlanders'  were 
outrageous  self-propagandists.  The  arrogance  that  accompanied  this  promotion  often  led 
to  friction  with  attached  units,  such  as  the  6  1St  223  or  32nd  Divisions  224 
If  the  (Highland)  Division  was  humbled  by  any  other  formation  in  the  British  Army,  then 
it  was  the  Guards.  Their  reputation  was  well  established  and  second  to  none.  F.  W. 
Webster  emphasised  the  martial  prowess  of  the  Guards,  when  he  stated  that  it  was 
wonderful  to  know  that  they  were  between  the  51st  Division  and  the  German  Army,  225 
and  S.  Bradbury  referred  to  them  as  `those  wonderful  Guards'.  226  The  51st  held  the 
Guards  in  great  respect  and  aspired  to  achieve  a  similar  standing.  This  aspiration  did  not 
function  without  rivalry,  aptly  defined  in  an  account  of  a  regimental  dinner  held  by  the 
officers  of  a  Gordon  battalion  in  the  51St  for  the  officers  of  a  Guards  battalion.  A  huge 
and  impressive  menu227  was  laid  on,  and  pomp  and  circumstance,  (Highland)  Division 
style,  was  evident  throughout  in  order  to  impress  the  visitors.  An  officer  of  the  Gordons 
explained  that  `This  is  a  gey  special  affair,  I'm  tellin'  ye'.  28 
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227  The  menu  included  Hors  d'Oevres  Varies,  Creme  de  Celere,  Bouillon  Ecossaise,  Filets  de  Plie  (Sauce 
Tartare),  Fricasse  de  Veau  a  l'Anglaise,  Poulet  Roti  (Sauce  au  pain),  Aloyau  de  Boeuf  au  Jus,  Choufleur 
(Pommes  Puree),  Choex  de  Bruxelles  (Pommes  Chateau),  Asperges  au  beurre  fondu,  Trifle  Ecossaise, 
Creme  au  Mille  Fruits,  Diables  a  Chevale,  Dessert,  Cafe.  in  Catto,  With  the  Scottish  Troops  in  France,  p. 
54. 
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192 This  rivalry  with  the  Guards  was  particularly  evident  as  the  stature  of  the  (Highland) 
Division  grew.  In  the  summer  of  1917,  the  division  joined  Lieutenant-General  Ivor 
Maxse's  XVIII  Corps.  Maxse  held  up  the  Guards  Division  as  a  model  for  imitation, 
especially  in  march  discipline  and: 
The  effect  of  the  Corps  Commanders  speech-especially  as  he  had  never  seen  the  Division-was 
to  arouse  a  certain  soreness.  This  was  particularly  the  case  as  regards  march  discipline,  on 
which  it  prided  itself.. 
.  The  battalion  soon  had  the  opportunity  to  see  the  model  held  up  to  it- 
two  battalions  of  the  Guards  marching  through  its  area,  one  up  to  the  front  line  and  the  other 
back  to  billets.  The  immediate  effect  was  the  unprecedented  demand  on  the  canteen  for  that 
useful  article,  `Soldier's  Friend'.  Men  could  be  seen  polishing  every  bit  of  brass  in  their 
equipment  during  their  spare  time.  This  was  not  the  end.  The  Adjutant,  who,  like  all  good 
adjutants,  knew  what  was  afoot  among  the  men  and  was  well  aware  of  the  general  desire  to 
show  the  Guards  how  the  Seaforth  Highlanders  could  march,  suggested  somewhat  diffidently 
that  the  battalion  would  like  a  route  march.  The  Commanding  Officer,  after  some  demur, 
assented  to  the  proposition,  insisting,  however,  that  full  marching  order  must  be  worn,  and  a 
distance  of  no  less  than  ten  miles  covered.  On  the  day  selected,  in  spite  of  the  sultriness  of  the 
weather,  the  battalion  did  a  voluntary  march  of  15  miles.  They  were  careful  to  go  through  all 
the  villages  occupied  by  the  Guards  Division  and  came  back  without  anyone  having  fallen  out, 
entirely  satisfied  with  their  performance.  So  did  the  battalion  reply  to  the  Corps  Commander's 
address.  229 
Other  sections  in  this  thesis  discuss  the  relationship  of  the  51St  Division  with  the  New 
Army,  Regular  units,  and  attached  troops.  However,  in  general  terms,  rear  units  of  the 
British  Army  were  looked  upon  with  a  mild  contempt,  as  Lieutenant  Paterson  emphasised 
when  he  wrote  that  most  `cushy'  jobs  were  behind  the  line.  30  A.  E.  Wrench  gave  another 
example  when  he  told  of  an  occasion  when  his  companion  got  drunk  and  lost  control  in 
front  of  a  regimental  sergeant  major  and  criticised  him  for  receiving  a  medal  whilst 
serving  behind  the  front  line  231 
The  division  interacted  well  with  other  allied  units  throughout  the  war,  particularly  the 
French,  the  Canadians  and  the  ANZACS,  and  there  was  a  mutual  respect  between 
formations.  G.  I.  Malcolm  referred  to  the  traditional  co-operation  and  mutual 
understanding  of  the  `Auld  Alliance',  but  rather  diluted  this  by  adding  that  the  men  of  the 
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193 51st  found  Frenchmen  rather  'smelly'.  232  However,  odour  notwithstanding,  upon  arriving 
in  Picardy  in  1915,  the  French  officers  and  men  did  their  utmost  to  help  the  515t  and  `their 
hospitality  was  unbounded'.  233  When  the  division  finally  marched  from  Picardy,  French 
soldiers  were  there  to  cheer  them  on.  34  This  positive  relationship  continued  throughout 
the  war,  and,  after  the  second  battle  of  the  Marne  in  1918,  when  the  (Highland)  Division 
fought  alongside  the  French,  a  memorial  was  raised  at  Durango  which  was  inscribed 
`Here  will  the  thistle  of  Scotland  forever  mingle  with  the  roses  of  France'.  235 
Peter  Simkins  has  stated  that  many  ANZAC  troops  were  disparaging  about  the  British 
soldier.  236  However,  this  appears  to  have  been  centred  on  the  English  soldier  and  not  the 
Scot.  With  the  ANZACs,  the  51St  Division  seemed  to  find  much  in  common.  On  relieving 
a  New  Zealand  unit  in  the  line,  the  `Kiwis'  are  referred  to  as  a  `gay  and  gallant  crowd'.  37 
Fuller  has  written  of  the  affinities  between  the  `Jock'  and  the  `Aussie',  and  stated  that 
`Evidence  is  more  plentiful  for  the  rather  more  numerous  Scots,  not  least  in  the 
comments  of  the  Dominion  troops.  Whereas  the  Anzacs  were  contemptuous  and  pitying 
towards  the  `Tommy',  they  admired  the  `Jocks'  and  recognized  a  `kinship'  with  them.  '238 
As  with  the  Dominion  troops,  the  (Highland)  Division  got  on  with  the  Americans  well 
enough  and  `the  more  we  saw  of  them,  the  better  we  liked  them'.  239  However,  they  were 
certainly  perceived  of  as  being  different,  240  and  there  were  suspicions  over  their  battle- 
readiness.  When  American  soldiers  were  attached  to  the  51St  for  instruction  during  1917, 
questions  were  asked  as  to  why  they  were  not  fighting  and  when  they  would  contribute  to 
the  combat.  241  Another  account  tells  of  an  American  general  asking  odd  questions  whilst 
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233  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51s`  Highland  Division,  p.  31. 
234  Peel  and  MacDonald,  6`hz  Seaforth  Highlanders,  p.  13. 
235  IWM  77/133/1,  The  Papers  of  J.  W.  Comber,  undated. 
236  Simkins,  `Co-Stars  or  Supporting  Cast?  British  Divisions  in  the  `Hundred  Days',  1918',  in  Griffith  (ed), 
British  Fighting  Methods  in  the  Great  War,  p.  54. 
237  IWM,  85/51/5,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  I,  15  August  1916. 
238  Fuller,  Troop  Morale  and  Popular  Culture  in  the  British  and  Dominion  Armies  1914-1918,  p.  161. 
239  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  133. 
240  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  263. 
241  IWM,  85/51/1,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  II,  p.  164. 
194 inspecting  a  battalion  of  the  51st,  intimating  that  he  did  not  have  sufficient  insight  into  the 
practical  side  of  war.  242 
On  the  whole,  the  division  fostered  positive  relationships.  However,  it  was  also  guilty  of 
taking  negative  relationships  to  excess.  In  1918,  a  general  routine  order  issued  within  the 
(Highland)  Division  commanding  the  men  to  stop  belittling  the  Portuguese  Division.  43 
Bradbury  wrote  of  retreating  Portuguese  being  bayoneted  by  Gordon  Highlanders  during 
the  battle  on  the  Lys  in  April  1918  244  Subsequently,  some  fleeing  Portuguese  troops  were 
killed  by  the  British  Army  as  `having  seized  bicycles  belonging  to  the  signallers,  were 
mistaken  for  Germans  by  British  reinforcements  hurrying  up,  and  were  mown  down'.  45 
Other  than  the  expected  steady  series  of  visits  and  inspections  from  higher  command,  the 
(Highland)  Division  also  experienced  a  significant  number  of  high  profile  visitors  which 
raised  its  profile  amongst  other  formations  and  on  the  home  front.  The  visits  also  gave  the 
men  a  sense  of  importance  and  their  significance  was  typified  by  the  number  of 
references  in  official  and  non-official  primary  sources.  The  51st  was  inspected  by  the 
King  in  October  1914,246  and  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Lord  Kitchener,  in  October 
1915.247  Also  in  October  1915,  the  King,  the  Prince  of  Wales,  and  President  Poincare 
inspected  the  division  as  part  of  an  Army  Group  visit.  48  However,  as  the  stature  of  the 
division  grew  and  its  public  fame  spread,  a  more  tailored  series  of  visits  and  tributes  is 
evident.  King  George,  visiting  the  division  in  March  1918,  stated,  `we  all  know  the  'Fifty- 
First'  and  proceeded  to  pay  the  division  many  compliments,  249  and  the  Prime  Minister 
said  of  it,  `Its  deeds  will  be  memorable  in  the  history,  not  only  of  the  war,  but  of  the 
world'.  250 
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195 Visits  from  VIPs  that  had  a  specific  interest  in  the  division  were  also  common,  including 
the  Scottish  Lord  Provosts.  51  The  Duke  of  Argyll  visited  the  Argyll  and  Sutherland 
Highlanders,  252  and  the  Principal  of  the  University  of  Aberdeen  visited  a  company  of  the 
114th  Gordons.  253  A  regular  visitor  was  Field  Marshal  Haig,  who  stated: 
If  it  were  possible  for  the  General,  who  for  three  years  commanded  all  the  British  Divisions  in 
France,  and  was  served  with  great  gallantry,  devotion,  and  success  by  each,  to  admit  a 
predilection  for  any  of  them,  my  affection  would  naturally  turn  to  the  Division  that  drew  so 
many  of  its  recruits  from  the  same  part  of  Scotland  where  my  boyhood  was  spent,  and  my  own 
people  lived.  254 
These  VIP  visits  also  allowed  the  (Highland)  Division  the  opportunity  to  show  off. 
Wauchope  wrote  of  the  1/6thBattalion  of  the  Black  Watch  that: 
the  battalion  furnished  a  Guard  of  Honour  of  three  officers  and  100  men  for  General  Plumer 
when  he  visited  the  town  of  Bailleul  in  1915  in  order  to  present  medals  to  Belgian  troops.  On 
this  parade  the  massed  pipe  bands  of  the  Division,  numbering  90  pipers  and  70  drummers 
were  present.  The  people  of  Bailleul  had  never  seen  or  heard  anything  like  this  mighty  band 
before,  nor,  in  fact,  had  many  men  of  the  Division.  255 
However,  the  visits  could  be  exacting  for  the  troops.  Inspections  could  be  time 
consuming  and  testing  for  the  men,  256  and  extra  activity,  if  visited  in  the  line,  could  cause 
increased  enemy  activity  and  lead  to  casualties.  Even  officers  were  known  to  complain  of 
the  downside  as  Lieutenant  Munro  emphasised  when  he  wrote  that  he  was  not  too 
enthusiastic  about  lining  the  roadside  as  Prime  Minister  Asquith  was  due  to  pass, 
`probably  another  lengthy  wait'.  257 
Interaction  with  national  groups 
When  the  51St  arrived  in  Bedford  in  August  1914,  patriotism  ran  high  and  the 
townspeople  were  extremely  welcoming.  There  was  an  initial  period  of  `settling  in'  when 
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196 the  mass  of  soldiers  learned  to  live  together,  many  away  from  home  for  the  first  time,  and 
the  local  people  became  used  to  having  them  around.  McConachie  states  that  the  people 
of  Bedford  looked  upon  the  (Highland)  Division  as  'kids',  258  and,  in  order  to  keep  the 
`kids'  entertained,  the  authorities  and  townspeople  formed  Entertainment  Committees259 
and  organised  dances.  60  The  overwhelming  patriotic  spirit  in  Britain  ensured  that  the 
colourful  `Highlanders'  with  their  marching  and  their  pipers  became  a  source  of  civic 
pride.  261  On  leaving  Bedford,  F.  W.  Webster  tells  of  tears  and  silence  as  crowds  lined  the 
streets  to  see  the  division  march  to  war.  262 
Craig  Gibson  maintains  that  by  1915,  there  was  little  evidence  of  the  feelings  of 
camaraderie  that  had  existed  in  late  1914  between  French  and  Belgian  civilians  and  the 
resident  `allied'  armies,  and  asserts:  `relations  during  the  years  of  trench  warfare  were 
fundamentally  different  from  those  characterizing  the  war's  opening  months.  '263  This 
may  explain  why  every  British  soldier  crossing  the  Channel  to  France  in  1915  received  a 
message  from  the  Secretary  of  State,  Lord  Kitchener,  to  maintain  cordial  relations  with 
the  French  and  Belgian  citizenry.  They  had  to  be  courteous,  considerate  and  kind  and 
were  not  to  do  anything  to  injure  or  destroy  property.  The  message  contained  an  explicit 
warning  to  resist  wine  and  women264 
However,  in  August  1915,  the  51st  Division  seemed  to  enjoy  a  good  rapport  with  many 
French  nationals  who,  `were  welcoming,  denying  themselves  a  multitude  of  comforts  in 
the  hope  that  the  troops  of  the  51St  would  not  endure  hardship  or  want'.  65  Another 
kindness  that  occurred  near  Armentieres  as  late  as  July  1916  led  to  the  conclusion  that, 
`in  some  of  these  country  places  the  folks  are  alright  and  very  decent'.  266  The  (Highland) 
258  McConachie,  The  Student  Soldiers,  p.  26. 
259  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  August  1914. 
260  McConachie,  The  Student  Soldiers,  p.  48. 
261  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960,  p.  19. 
262  IWM,  NA,  The  Memoirs  of  Major  F.  W.  Webster,  p.  48. 
263  C.  Gibson,  'My  Chief  Source  of  Worry:  An  Assistant  Provost  Marshal's  View  of  Relations  Between  2nd 
Canadian  Division  and  local  inhabitants  on  the  Western  Front,  1915-1917',  in  War  in  History,  No.  4,2000. 
264  P.  Simkins,  `Soldiers  and  civilians:  billeting  in  Britain  and  France',  in  Beckett,  and  Simpson  (eds),  A 
Nation  in  Arms,  p.  181. 
265  Ross,  The  Fifty  First  in  France,  p.  138. 
266  IWM,  85/51/5,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  I,  14  July  1916. 
197 Division  for  its  part  assisted  the  local  populace  not  merely  through  fighting,  but  in  other 
ways  such  as  bringing  money  to  cash-strapped  areas  and  assisting  the  local  populace  with 
medical  facilities.  67  A  glowing  tribute  to  the  formation  was  paid  by  a  disgruntled  French 
baron  whose  chateau  and  estate  lands  had  been  commandeered  by  the  51St.  Initially,  he 
begrudged  its  presence,  but  his  views  gradually  changed  and  he  finally  `said  to,  all  who 
listened'  that  the  5  1St  `were  the  finest  body  of  men  he  had  ever  met'.  268 
However,  there  is  evidence  that  relations  did  become  increasingly  strained  and  many 
French  and  Belgian  citizens  had  to  put  up  with  a  lot  of  bad  behaviour,  such  as  theft,  269 
drunkenness,  and  fighting.  270  There  were  tales  of  the  pipes  being  played  in  residential 
areas  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning,  271  and  bicycle  bells  being  rung  at  dawn  to  awaken 
the  locals.  272  There  was  also  the  necessary  and  sometimes  unnecessary  use  of  land  and 
property,  and  there  are  many  accounts  in  the  sources  of  land  being  seized  as  training 
grounds  and  trees  being  cut  down  for  building  and  firewood.  73 
There  were  many  official  attempts  to  ensure  that  men  stayed  in  line  and  that  relations 
with  the  local  populations  remained  cordial.  Routine  orders  abounded.  Unnecessary 
damage  to  property  was  to  be  reported  to  the  owner;  274  there  be  no  woodcutting  without 
authorization;  275  care  should  be  taken  that  football  did  not  destroy  grass;  276  there  should 
be  no  grazing  of  animals  without  permission;  277  and  troops  should  avoid  damaging 
crops.  78 
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198 Many  of  the  French  populace  saw  an  opportunity  for  financial  exploitation  which  resulted 
in  a  degree  of  bad  feeling,  `the  French  charge  such  exorbitant  prices  for  everything'.  79 
And  in  the  opinion  of  the  (Highland)  Division,  and  it  was  not  alone  in  the  BEF  in  having 
this  view,  the  Belgians  were  worse  than  the  French  . 
280  This  may  explain  a  degree  of  bad 
behaviour  by  troops  of  the  5  1st  as  it  was  considered  to  be  retribution  for  being  `fleeced'. 
Language 
Language  differences  could  cause  serious  difficulties  in  liaising  with  the  French.  On  one 
occasion  a  Scots  officer  was  asked  by  a  French  counterpart  to  speak  English  281  Although 
many  French  soldiers  actually  spoke  English,  war  diaries  still  testify  that  many  Scots, 
both  officers  and  men,  did  not  speak  French.  This  had  the  potential  to  cause  serious 
problems  when  the  division  moved  into  a  previously-held  French  area  or  when  the 
division  was  holding  the  front  or  advancing  alongside  a  French  unit.  282 
The  pronunciation  of  French  words  was  a  problem  for  the  majority  of  the  (Highland) 
Division.  On  taking  over  a  sector  from  French  troops,  trenches  had  to  be  renamed  as 
much  for  the  inability  to  say  the  French  words  as  for  any  other  reason.  `Jean  Bart  they 
could  manage,  though  they  assumed  that  the  trench  was  named  after  some  female 
celebrity.  Du  Guesclin  and  Vercingetorix  in  particular  were,  however,  a  sore  trial  to 
them.  '283  However,  on  the  whole,  given  their  limited  knowledge  of  the  French 
vocabulary,  the  troops  managed  to  communicate  quite  well  and  their  adaptations  were 
often  quite  amusing.  Most  names  were  anglicised,  but  some  had  no  English  equivalent. 
Naours  was  one  such  place  and  played  havoc  with  directions.  Nicholson  explained  that 
hardly  anyone  pronounced  it  the  same  way.  There  were  greater  successes  with  other  less 
tortuous  placenames,  when  Mutton  Villas  was  substituted  for  Mouton  Villers;  Frizzles  for 
Flesselles;  and  Villas  Bokage  for  Villers  Bocage.  Many  of  the  Scots  did  learn  some 
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199 French  and  Nicholson  asserted  that  `the  men  in  the  515`  Highland  Division  were  much 
more  proficient  in  the  language  than  the  17`x'  Northern  Divisioni  284 
The  troops  of  the  (Highland)  Division  experienced  similar  problems  whilst  billeted  in  and 
around  Bedford.  A  Scot  approached  a  refreshment  stall  and  asked  for  `tuppence  worth  of 
snaps'  and  was  given  a  pack  of  20  woodbine.  When  he  finally  explained  what  he  wanted, 
the  vendor  apologised  and  said  that  she  hadn't  understood  him  and  just  took  a  guess.  85 
Gaelic  was  another  issue  altogether  and  some  units  of  the  (Highland)  Division  had  more 
Gaelic  speakers  than  others.  The  1/40'  Seaforth  Highlanders  had  started  the  war  with  at 
least  25  per  cent  of  the  battalion  having  Gaelic  as  their  mother  tongue.  86  As  the  war 
progressed  and  fewer  recruits  were  drawn  from  the  home  region,  there  was  naturally  less 
Gaelic  spoken  in  the  battalion.  An  English  officer  visiting  the  line  thought  that  the  Gaelic 
was  German  and  anticipated  an  'attack',  287  whilst  another  commented  that  the  Gaelic 
speakers  were  worse  than  Indians.  288 
The  German  impression 
It  is  a  testimony  to  the  division  that  in  a  war,  where  German  regimental  histories  and 
official  pamphlets  frequently  noted  the  superiority  of  the  German  Army  over  its  British 
counterpart,  289  the  (Highland)  Division  was  held  in  some  esteem.  A  divisional  historian 
summarised  the  popular  impression,  `Even  the  enemy  seemed  impressed  by  the  Fifty- 
first's  ubiquity  and  stubbornness;  their  aviators  one  time  dropped  a  message  over  it 
"Good  old  Fifty-first!  Still  sticking  it!  "'.  90  Its  prowess  was  reputed  to  have  reached  such 
a  level  that  a  German  prisoner  of  war  asked  if  there  were  51  (Highland)  Divisions.  91 
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200 The  officers  and  men  of  the  division  did  not  possess  a  widespread  and  continually  all- 
consuming  hatred  of  their  German  opponents.  It  is  telling  that  Nicholson  stated  that  `they 
were  fighting  for  what  they  knew  not',  and  he  qualified  this  by  saying  that  one  country 
was  an  ally  and  the  other  a  foe,  and  for  neither  did  the  51St  `care  a  strawi  292  Private 
soldiers  often  held  the  same  view: 
coming  through,  I  saw  a  wounded  Kilty  walking  arm  in  arm  with  a  wounded  German  and 
passing  the  coffee  stall  there,  one  man  ran  out  with  a  cup  of  coffee  which  he  handed  to  the 
Argyll.  He  in  turn  handed  it  to  his  stricken  companion  after  which  they  limped  on  their  way 
together  smiling.  Enemies  an  hour  ago,  but  friends  in  their  common  troubles.  After  all,  this 
war  is  not  a  personal  affair.  Else  there  would  be  no  war.  293 
Some  German  units  and  individuals  earned  respect  from  the  (Highland)  Division.  When 
pitted  against  the  2nd  Guards  Reserve  Division,  the  51S`  thought  them  worthy  opponents. 
This  martial  respect  increased  when,  after  a  skirmish,  a  number  of  undetonated  rifle 
grenades  were  fired  into  the  divisional  lines  that  carried  a  message  in  English  that  a 
`gallant  Private  Robertson,  Seaforth  Highlanders,  had  died  of  his  wounds  and  had  been 
buried  with  full  military  honours  in  the  cemetery  at  Rouvroy'  294 
However,  instances  of  enemy  treachery  or  brutality  `roused  the  fiercest  antagonisms  in 
some  units,  who  in  revenge  gave  no  quarter  during  the  fight  or  subsequent  battles'. 
Revenge  was  the  motivation  for  a  soldier  of  the  division  who,  on  seeing  the  ruins  at  the 
Rue  de  Bois  near  Festubert  in  1915,  said  `Fa'd  ha'  thocht  it?  Man,  we'll  hae  to  pey  the 
devils  back  for't'.  295  Miss  Whittaker  observed: 
The  Highlanders  had  never  forgotten  the  Germans  deliberate  destruction  of  all  life,  buildings, 
roads,  railway  tracks,  woods,  fruit  trees,  and  wells  in  a  belt  ten  kilometres  wide  before  their 
withdrawal  a  year  earlier  to  the  Hindenburg  line.  The  Jocks  attitude  was  such  as  to  cause 
Louis  [Brigadier-General  Oldfield]  to  write,  'I  hope  to  keep  my  command  in  hand  and  make 
them  behave  like  gentlemen  in  Germany,  but  I  shall  have  to  use  an  iron  hand  to  do  it  I  can 
see'. 
96 
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201 The  (Highland)  Division  was  greatly  feared  by  the  German  soldier.  This  seemed  to  have 
been  as  much  for  the  threat  of  executions  as  for  the  51S''s  battle-readiness.  Prisoners  of 
war  expected  to  be  executed.  97  Ferguson  has  argued  in  `Prisoner  Taking  and  Prisoner 
Killing  in  the  Age  of  Total  War'  that  this  fear  of  summary  execution  was  not  uncommon 
amongst  German  troops  about  British  formations.  98  No  less  a  person  than  Brigadier- 
General  Oldfield,  during  a  hospital  visit,  wrote  of  overhearing  a  (Highland)  Division 
soldier  stating  of  German  injured  prisoners  of  war,  `if  those  blokes  had  been  opposite  our 
part  of  the  line  there  wouldn't  have  been  any  prisoners  for  you  to  nurse'.  299  During  the 
attack  on  Flesquieres  there  appeared  to  be  evidence  of  unarmed  German  soldiers  having 
been  bayoneted  Mo  However,  summary  executions  were  not  officially  sanctioned,  and  a 
General  Staff  note  of  July  1917  reiterated  this  fact.  30' 
It  is  little  wonder  that  the  (Highland)  Division's  fierce  reputation  in  battle,  coupled  with 
the  harsh  way  in  which  the  Germans  were  dealt,  contributed  to  its  much  debated 
placement  on  the  German  list  of  `Most  to  be  Feared'  British  divisions.  302  This  document 
has  never  been  found,  but  the  51  s`  Division  officially  endorsed  its  existence.  A  letter 
signed  by  Major  F.  W.  Bewsher  of  the  (Highland)  Division  on  25  February  1918  stated 
that: 
The  War  Office  has,  I  hear,  just  come  into  possession  of  a  document  of  extraordinary  interest, 
some  day  a  thrilling  story  may  be  told  of  how  and  where  it  was  secured.  The  document  is  one 
recently  prepared  by  the  Germans'  Headquarters'  Staff  and  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
Divisional  Commanders  in  the  field  for  their  guidance.  It  is  a  list  of  British  Divisions  in  their 
order  of  "Furchtbarkeit"  which  may  be  translated  "Much  to  be  Feared"  303 
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The  Pall  Mall  Gazette  Wednesday  6  February  1918,  "FRIGI  ITFUL'  to  the  Ilun.  The  War  Office  has,  I  hear,  just 
come  into  possession  of  a  document  of  extraordinary  interest.  Some  day  a  thrilling  story  may  be  told  of  how  and  where 
it  was  secured.  The  document  is  only  recently  prepared  by  the  German  I  leadquarters  Staff,  and  placed  in  the  hands  of 
Divisional  Commanders  in  the  field  for  their  guidance.  It  is  a  list  of  British  Divisions  in  the  order  of 
'FURCHTBARKEIT',  which  may  be  translated  `much  to  be  fearedness'.  FURCHTBARKEIT  is  frightfulness,  but  not 
SCI  IRECKLICIIKEIT,  the  frightfulness  as  practiced  in  Belgium  and  elsewhere.  In  this  historic  list,  pride  of  place  is 
given  to  the  following:  -  1.51  (I  lighland)  Division.  2.29i1'  Division  (reformed).  3.  Guards  Division.  ' 
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202 Change  over  time 
Over  the  course  of  the  war,  the  51st  Division  perceived  itself  and  was  perceived 
differently.  Whether  influenced  by  the  natural  environment,  opposing  forces,  the  season 
of  the  year,  a  style  of  leadership,  or  the  relations  with  the  home  front,  internal  and 
external  factors  combined  and  reacted  to  fuse  esprit  de  corps.  These  changes  were 
reflected  in  a  number  of  ways. 
Reputation 
The  reputation  of  the  51St  was  extremely  important  and  was  one  of  the  essential  pillars  in 
the  shaping  of  the  (Highland)  Division  esprit.  It  substantiated  a  self-belief  and  assisted  in 
sustaining  the  divisional  performance.  This  reputation  was  maintained  by  internal  and 
external  actors  and  factors.  The  outside  world  was  only  too  keen  to  latch  onto  the 
(Highland)  Division  as  much  needed  icons,  whether  it  was  fully  worthy  or  not. 
Self-belief  was  key.  The  51st  came  to  think  of  itself  as  the  best.  The  divisional  history 
stated,  amongst  many  understandable  boasts,  that  the  division  was  said  to  be  the  most 
formidable  of  all  allied  formations.  That  is  a  proud  boast  indeed  when  the  51s`  is 
compared  with  some  of  the  other  `elite'  formations.  However,  it  was  the  self-belief  that 
was  important.  Wimberley  believed  that  the  (Highland)  Division  had  the  battle  half  won 
before  it  started  because  of  its  self-belief.  304  The  division  was  convinced  that  the  victory 
at  Beaumont  Hamel  had  caused  the  German  Army  to  retreat  to  the  Hindenburg  Line,  305 
and  indeed  `the  capture  of  Beaumont  Hamel  had  `roused  the  whole  nation  to 
enthusiasm'.  306  Hammond  quite  rightly  points  out  that  the  (Highland)  Division  was 
renowned  for  boasting,  307  but  the  point  is  that  it  felt  it  had  something  to  boast  about. 
The  51st  owed  some  of  its  prominence  to  the  fact  that  it  was,  by  April  1918,  the  only 
Scottish  Territorial  division  on  the  Western  Front.  This  was  not  enough  in  itself.  There 
was  criticism  within  and  without  the  division  during  1915  and  1916  that  it  was  merely  a 
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306  S.  Gillon,  The  Story  of  the  29th  Division  (Edinburgh,  1925),  p.  90. 
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203 holding  formation,  its  two  attempts  at  attack  having  failed.  They  were  'Harper's  Duds' 
when  other  Scottish  divisions  were  covered  in  glory.  Beaumont  Hamel  made  the 
difference.  It  wasn't  necessarily  that  the  other  Scottish  divisions  got  worse,  but  Beaumont 
Hamel  placed  the  (Highland)  Division  on  another  level.  By  late  1917,  it  was  held  in  such 
high  regard  that  it  was  expected  to  be  able  to  do  anything. 
In  1918,  the  division's  external  status  and  reputation  were  stronger  than  ever.  A  gauge  of 
this  can  be  measured  during  eight  days  in  November  1918,  when  the  division  participated 
in  a  major  celebration  in  honour  of  the  President  of  the  United  States;  acted  as  guard  of 
honour  to  Marshal  Foch;  paraded  before  Field  Marshal  Haig;  was  visited  by  Prince 
Albert;  and  the  GOC  was  presented  to  the  King  of  the  Belgians.  308  Plaudits  from  notable 
figures  and  tributes  were  legion,  and  this  added  to  the  divisional  self-belief.  Marshal 
Foch,  in  an  article  entitled  `Humanity  is  Your  Debtor'  published  in  The  People's  Friend 
called  men  of  the  5  1St  `supermen'.  309 
Certainly,  its  reputation  was  founded  on  attack  rather  than  defence.  When  outlining  how 
the  division  stormed  forward,  MacDonald  wrote  that  it  was  `in  keeping  with  their 
reputation'.  310  Post-Beaumont  Hamel  perceptions  within  the  division  were  that  it  was 
always  fighting,  and  a  frequent  statement  within  the  official  documents  was  `the  division, 
as  usual,  had  taken  all  its  objectives'. 
Morale 
The  officers  and  men  of  the  (Highland)  Division  had  much  to  contend  with.  For  long 
periods  of  time  there  was  constant  patrolling,  raiding,  incessant  noise,  shelling,  insects 
and  vermin,  and  dreadful  weather.  These  were  among  the  many  factors  that  affected  the 
morale  of  the  troops.  Morale  was  vital  as  it  made  the  soldier  able,  or  less  able,  to  carry 
out  the  duties  of  soldiering,  and  more  or  less  enthusiastic  about  enduring  future  conflict 
and  privations.  This  was  a  crucial element  in  maintaining  a  strong  esprit  de  corps  as  spirit 
was  harder  to  maintain  if  morale  was  low. 
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204 At  an  official  level,  outside  of  basic  monitoring  through  the  censorship  of  mail,  morale 
was  not  dealt  with  in  any  systemised  fashion  and  the  British  Army  did  not  address  the 
issue  of  morale  in  an  institutional  way  throughout  the  war.  Indeed,  it  would  take  a  second 
world  war  to  impress  upon  the  military  hierarchy  that  morale  was  worthy  of  substantive 
monitoring  and  evaluation.  Divisional  morale  could  be  affected  by  one  factor  or  a  series 
of  contributory  factors,  some  of  which  reflected  the  morale  of  the  British  Army  as  a 
whole.  These  factors  could  range  from  poor  location  to  high  casualties  and  battle  fatigue. 
Morale  could  also  be  influenced  by  the  division's  perception  of  itself.  Whilst  in  Bedford, 
many  of  the  51St  felt  that  they  were  being  kept  away  from  the  war  because  they  were 
considered  to  be  of  poor  quality.  311  Captain  Ross  accounts  for  the  boost  in  morale  as  the 
division  arrived  in  France  when  he  stated,  `all  were  ready  for  the  fray  even  when  they 
hear  the  guns  for  the  first  time'.  312  Equally,  the  morale  of  the  division  was  affected  when 
it  felt  that  it  was  perceived  to  be  unfit  for  battle  and  was  merely  a  holding  formation.  The 
self-application  of  the  title  'Harper's  Duds'  does  not  suggest  high  morale. 
Morale  could  suffer  due  to  horrific  environmental  conditions.  In  early  1917,  in  her 
memoirs,  Miss  Whittaker  wrote  of  Brigadier-General  Oldfield:  `Louis  had  another  leave 
and  returned  just  before  Christmas  to  find  the  Division  exhausted  and  wretched  in  the 
miseries  of  Courcellette'.  Oldfield  had  observed  that  `the  limits  of  human  endurance  all 
but  reached'  and  `a hard  fighting  spell  without  a  rest  and  hideous  weather  and  ground 
conditions  act  more  on  highlanders  than  on  Englishmen'.  313 
The  incessant  nature  of  life  on  the  Western  Front  could  also  affect  spirits.  Captain  Ross 
complained  about  the  endless  rain,  314  and  Lieutenant  Munro  tells  of  new  recruits  going 
mad  just  because  of  constant  shelling.  315 
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205 Battle  fatigue  was  a  factor  for  the  51st  by  1917.  The  division  was  either  in  action  or 
holding  a  dangerous  section  of  the  line  for  much  of  that  year,  and  the  battering  could 
become  overwhelming.  In  May  1917,  Private  Wrench  wrote  that: 
there  are  awful  reports  from  the  Roeux  sector  though,  and  what  a  bloody  battle  it  is  there  as 
we  hear  that  the  chemical  works  have  been  retaken  and  lost  again.  Well,  why  should  we 
worry?  We've  had  our  bellies  full  of  it  already,  and  probably  more  than  our  fair  share.  16 
However,  Simkins  argues  that  there  is  strong  evidence  from  censorship  reports  that  the 
British  Army  throughout  remained  committed  to  fighting  the  war.  317  The  51s`  (Highland) 
Division  prided  itself  on  its  tenacity  and  stolid  nature.  A  medical  officer  in  the  Gordons 
talks  of  how  the  mud,  `has  been  pretty  bad  lately.  In  one  sector  we  were  in  the  men 
frequently  got  so  hopelessly  bogged  down  they  had  to  be  dragged  out  with  ropes  or  dug 
out!  They  stuck  it  jolly  well.  '318  The  grousing  of  the  Scots  had  a  sustained  and  positive 
effect  in  relieving  pressures,  and  if  the  men  were  occasionally  drunk  or  indulged  in 
seemingly  irrational  immature  behaviour,  it  should  be  perceived  as  a  form  of  escapism 
and  of  staying  young  in  a  world  of  premature  ageing. 
The  morale  of  the  (Highland)  Division  was  still  strong  during  a  difficult  period  for  the 
British  Army  in  late  1917  and  early  1918  when  corporate  morale  was  at  a  low  ebb. 
Wimberley  stated  that  some  officers  in  the  division  even  cancelled  their  leave  when  they 
discovered  they  might  miss  out  on  the  battle  of  Cambrai  in  November  1917,319  and 
Private  Webster  stated  that  on  the  eve  of  the  German  assault  in  March  1918,  when  all 
were  aware  that  something  was  coming,  the  men  were  `in  good  heart'.  320 
Collective  morale  was  boosted  by  external  factors  such  as  a  retreating  German  Army  and 
the  surrender  of  Bulgaria  in  1918. 
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206 It  is  clear  that  the  longer  men  served  at  the  front,  the  more  probable  that  a  change  in 
morale  would  occur.  Many  primary  source  accounts  when  viewed  over  months  and  years 
show  a  decline  and  change  in  personal  attitude  and  morale.  Private  R.  Pake  of  the  1/7th 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  who  joined  the  division  in  October  1915,  actually 
physically  altered  the  way  he  wrote  his  diary.  He  stopped  putting  dates  in  the  margins, 
explaining  this  by  stating  that  `dates  are  a  thing  of  the  past  now'.  321  Brigadier-General 
Oldfield,  a  stalwart  of  the  division  and  a  man  respected  by  all,  was  no  exception.  Miss 
Whittaker  wrote  in  her  journal  that,  `The  tone  of  his  letters  changes  now.  Jesting  ceases, 
and  there  is  no  more  gentle  teasing.  Increasingly  though  seldom  explicitly  weariness  and 
sadness  are  apparent.  '  Oldfield  himself  wrote  `everything  seems  more  squalid  than  before 
and  the  war  more  hateful  than  ever'  and  `a  hideous  business  I  shall  bear  its  scars  on  my 
soul  forever'.  322 
Officers  needed  to  be  aware  of  the  effect  that  conditions  and  decisions  could  have  on 
their  men.  Captain  Wimberley  ensured  that  his  men  avoided  the  body  of  a  dead  man  in 
Flesquieres  in  1917,  the  sight  of  which  may  have  affected  their  morale.  323  However,  if 
officers  did  not  gauge  the  mood  of  the  men  correctly,  this  process  could  backfire,  and  F. 
W.  Webster  tells  of  an  incident  when  an  officer  attempted  to  raise  the  morale  in  his  unit, 
with  the  result  being  that  the  men  blew  raspberries  and  morale  was  indeed  improved.  324 
Aggression 
The  First  World  War  had  a  number  of  interlinked  phases  of  aggression.  At  the  beginning 
of  the  conflict,  aggression  could  be  short,  sharp  and  bloody,  with  pauses  in  between. 
However,  as  Tony  Ashworth  has  argued,  during  the  war  aggression  became  a  more 
constant  affair  as  techniques  of  trench  war,  which  evolved  through  1915,  were  eventually 
codified  and  bureaucratically  imposed  throughout  the  British  Army.  Aggression  was  then 
managed  more  by  an  impersonal  than  personal  control  system.  325 
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207 The  (Highland)  Division  followed  this  path.  Its  evolution  on  the  Western  Front  in  1915 
was  slow  and  methodical.  Its  pace  was  measured  not  by  constant  battles,  but  by  constant 
trench-holding,  a  fact  not  missed  by  the  515`  as  officers  and  men  `cursed  our  bad  luck  as 
we  sat  behind  the  trenches  at  La  Boiselle  and  Roclincourt  where  we  heard  of  the  deeds  of 
the  other  Scottish  divisions'.  326  The  raw  formation  learned  its  trade  by  a  staged  process 
that  did  not  involve  constant,  proactive  aggression.  Major-General  Bannatine-Allason  did 
not  push  the  division  to  overt  displays  of  aggression.  The  51st  Division  Intelligence 
Report  of  14  August  1915  stated: 
On  our  left  sector,  the  enemy  pinned  2  copies  of  the  Frankfurter  Zeitung  of  8`h  and  9th  August 
to  a  stick  midway  between  the  trenches  on  the  night  of  13/14  with  a  request  in  writing  in 
English  to  exchange  newspapers  "as  before".  The  stick  was  brought  in  by  a  private  of  A 
Company  of  the  6th  Seaforths.  Later  on  in  the  day,  the  Btn  Interpreter,  without  permission 
from  an  officer  induced  a  lance  Corporal  of  the  6th  Seaforths  to  accompany  him  with  the 
intention  of  placing  papers  midway  between  the  line.  When  they  had  got  some  distance  two 
German  soldiers  came  up  in  front  of  their  barbed  wire  and  beckoned  them  to  come  closer 
when  two  English  newspapers  were  handed  to  the  Germans.  327 
That  the  51St  Division  gradually  built  up  its  readiness  for  combat  in  1915  without  being 
overly  aggressive  is  evidenced  by  the  stop-start  entries  in  the  war  diaries.  Nicholson 
pointed  out  that  the  trench  line  was  `fairly  safe'  during  this  period.  328  Ross  further 
emphasised  the  lack  of  aggression  by  stating  that  the  fighting  in  this  quarter  had  not 
attained  the  same  infuriate  heat  as  elsewhere'.  329 
As  Tony  Ashworth  points  out,  this  form  of  live  and  let  live  where  enemies  stopped 
fighting  for  a  short  time  and  indulged  in  reciprocal  exchange  was  not  uncommon  during 
the  period.  330  Truces  were  usually  tacit,  but  always  unofficial  and  unauthorised.  The 
agreement  between  antagonists  was  unspoken  and  carried  out  through  certain  actions  or 
non-actions.  A  sector  was  quiet  or  active  not  as  a  rule,  but  as  a  result  of  the  units  that 
326  NLS,  ACC  7300,  Book  2  of  `The  Highland  Division',  p.  11. 
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208 occupied  it.  However,  the  high  command  wanted  constant  aggression,  and  by  Christmas 
1915,  `strict  orders  had  been  issued  against  any  form  of  truce  on  the  trench  line'.  331 
The  arrival  of  Major-General  Harper  in  September  1915,  coupled  with  a  more  centralised 
scrutiny  of  aggression  and  the  increased  supply  of  ordnance  and  ammunition,  saw  a  more 
aggressive  approach  in  the  (Highland)  Division.  The  change  was  noted  by  officers  and 
men: 
When  the  Division  entered  this  sector  it  was  a  quiet  one  [early  1915].  By  the  time  it  left  it  was 
far  from  tranquil.  The  infantry  had  established  superiority  despite  shortage  of  guns  and 
ammunition.  By  the  time  we  left,  the  Highlander  had  learnt  that  it  pays  to  be  the  top  dog  in 
this  kind  of  war  and  the  Division  had  begun  to  establish  a  tradition.  33 
By  the  latter  stages  of  1916,  that  tradition  was  growing  and  this  is  evidenced  by  the 
accounts  in  war  diaries. 
However,  aggression  could  also  be  ritualised,  so  that  units  could  appear  to  be  constantly 
active,  but  where  activity  was  expected  on  both  sides  at  certain  times  and  in  certain 
places.  There  is  evidence  to  show  that  ritualisation  did  occur  with  the  (Highland) 
Division  in  1916.  During  August  1916: 
it  was  now  fine  weather,  and  both  sides  were  enjoying  an  unofficial  armistice.  Headquarters 
sat  under  a  willow  tree  in  the  open,  busily  preparing  defence  schemes.  The  men  were 
cheerfully  executing  their  appointed  tasks  without  suffering  the  slightest  interruption.  But  this 
display  of  inertness  was  quite  un-natural.  At  5  o'clock  we  resumed  activity  with  our  trench 
mortars,  provoking  a  prompt  retaliation  333 
Immediately  prior  to  the  attack  on  High  Wood  in  July  1916,  Major  A.  Anderson  further 
emphasised  a  form  of  ritualisation  when  he  explained  that: 
on  practically  our  last  night  in  the  line  eight  of  us  were  out  in  No  Mans  Land  repairing  the 
wire,  when  we  almost  walked  right  into  a  German  patrol.  It  is  doubtful  who  got  the  bigger 
surprise,  but  there  was  a  general  dive  for  cover  in  shell-holes,  all  of  which  were  half  full  of 
331  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  74. 
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209 water,  and  both  sides  commenced  firing  blindly  at  each  other.  After  a  while,  however,  we 
decided  to  call  it  quits  and  crawled  on  our  stomachs  back  to  the  line.  334 
Attempts  to  stimulate  aggression  did  upset  the  ritualised  approach,  and  on  Thursday  14 
September  1916: 
News  came  that  General  Stewart  has  been  killed  by  a  shell  near  the  Gordon  H.  Q....  It  seemed 
to  happen  so  suddenly  that  no  one  yet  realises  it.  But  it  appears  a  strange  occurrence  that  only 
yesterday  the  O/C.,  T.  M.  B.  was  here  and  the  General  was  asking  him  questions  relative  to  his 
front.  He  replied,  "Oh,  things  are  very  quite  sir,  the  Boche  don't  trouble  us  much  so  we  leave 
him  alone  too  for  a  change.  "  Then  the  General  got  mad  and  said,  "Look  here,  Maxwell,  please 
remember  this  is  a  war  and  not  a  game.  You  will  therefore,  strafe  tonight  at  eight  o'clock  and 
every  night  thereafter,  and  send  in  reports.  "  So  the  war  was  resumed  on  our  front,  and  for  what 
purpose  I  do  not  know,  but  it  means  many  more  men  to  die,  and  of  whom  the  general  is  the 
first  335 
After  the  battle  of  Beaumont  Hamel  and  throughout  1917,  the  division  was  involved  in  a 
steady  series  of  battles  and  aggression  was  a  constant.  Incentives  were  provided  for  the 
men  to  `double  their  efforts'  with  rewards  of  special  leave  for  outstanding  effort.  336 
By  1918,  the  (Highland)  Division  experienced  a  series  of  hammer  blows  which  changed 
its  approach  and  effectively  reduced  its  capacity  to  perform.  A  change  of  GOC,  massive 
changes  in  personnel,  and  a  breakdown  of  the  type  of  trench  war  that  had  been  the  norm 
for  the  division  since  1915  resulted  in  fewer  overt  acts  of  aggression.  Simkins  did  not 
even  mention  the  name  of  the  51st  Division  amongst  the  best  performers  in  the  British 
Army  during  `the  100  days'.  He  states  that  ten  British  divisions  performed  as  well  as  or 
better  than  the  leading  dominion  formations,  and  that  of  those  only  the  Guards  and  the 
66th  (TF)  Division  were  non-New  Army.  337 
The  change  of  emphasis  in  aggressive  tactics  and  applied  techniques  can  be  shown 
through  the  prism  of  patrolling  and  raiding.  Patrolling  could  be  for  reconnaissance  or 
fighting,  although  often  the  two  were  fused.  The  intelligence  summaries  of  the 
334  IWM,  85/23/1,  The  Papers  of  Major  A.  Anderson. 
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210 (Highland)  Division  stressed  a  frequency  of  patrolling  very soon  after  the  division  arrived 
in  France,  and  that  continued  throughout  the  war,  with  peaks  occurring  at  particular 
times,  such  as  in  March  1918  when  literally  dozens  of  patrols  could  be  sent  out  a  night. 
Raiding  evolved  from  patrolling  and  was  an  active  policy  in  the  division,  but  often  a  raid 
was  viewed  as  unproductive  in  terms  of  ground  gained  and  expensive  in  casualties.  With 
some  justification  the  men  viewed  raiding  as  the  high  command's  way  of  keeping  up  the 
offensive  spirit.  Whatever  the  justification,  raids  could  give  valuable  experience  and 
bring  useful  intelligence  to  a  sector.  338  Whether  raids  inspired  aggression  is  unclear,  but 
they  certainly  broke  up  the  live  and  let  live  system. 
Stimulating  action  and  reaction,  raiding  became  a  semi-regular  occurrence  for  the 
division  after  the  battle  of  High  Wood.  The  first  recorded  raid  on  enemy  trenches 
mentioned  in  the  war  diaries  occurred  in  January  1916  with  `a  small  bombing  attack  on 
enemy  trenches'339  and  152nd  Brigade  war  diaries  also  testified  to  an  increase  in 
aggressiveness,  more  sniping,  and  bombing  during  1916.340  In  line  with  a  general 
increase  in  aggression  throughout  the  Western  Front  during  1916,  the  (Highland) 
Division  participated  in  nine  raids  (1  in  January,  2  in  May,  1  in  June,  1  in  July,  2  in 
September,  and  2  in  November),  whilst  in  1917  only  four  (3  in  March  and  1  in 
September).  341  In  1918,  there  are  no  recorded  raids  in  the  war  diaries. 
The  decrease  in  raids  in  1917  reflected  the  near  constant  activity  of  the  (Highland) 
Division  over  much  of  the  year.  It  is  clear  that  it  simply  did  not  have  the  capacity  for 
staging  large-scale  raids  unless  they  were  deemed  essential.  There  was  also  no  need 
during  1917  to  provide  any  stimulants  to  sustain  aggression.  In  1918,  with  the  relative 
weakness  of  the  division,  compared  to  a  year  before,  and  the  change  in  the  nature  of  war, 
raids  would  have  been  considered  unnecessary  and  wasteful  of  men.  . 
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211 In  conclusion,  the  analysis  has  demonstrated  the  importance  of  esprit  de  corps  in  the 
51st  (Highland)  Division  and  that  the  esprit  de  corps  evolved  over  the  course  of  the  war 
and  was  influenced  by  a  multitude  of  internal  and  external  factors.  Every  formation  in  the 
British  Army  underwent  changes  dependent  on  its  circumstance,  but  a  particular 
combination  of  elements  defining  (Highland)  Division  esprit  de  corps  made  it  distinctive. 
The  internal  identity  was  a  fusion  of  strong  formation  and  sub-formation  loyalties,  a  pride 
in  and  endorsement  of  regimental  traditions,  an  awareness  of  what  it  was  to  be  a 
Territorial,  and  a  stake  in  Scottish  culture  and  civilian  society.  These  elements  were 
blended  together  to  create  a  unified  body  of  men,  loyal  to  the  idea  of  the  (Highland) 
Division,  proud  of  it,  valuing  its  traditions,  and  keen  to  promote  its  image. 
The  dynamics  between  officers  and  men  in  the  51St  were  essential  for  the  creation  and 
maintenance  of  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  division  because  the  officers  and  men  were  the 
division  and  to  a  large  degree  controlled  the  belief  system  within.  Key  senior  figures 
within  the  division  were  pivotal  in  setting  examples  of  leadership.  That  the  leaders  and 
the  led  forged  a  productive  partnership  within  the  division  was  central  to  the  creation  of  a 
sense  of  identity  and  a  promulgation  of  loyalty,  to  the  establishment  of  expectations  and 
the  generation  of  a  common  belief. 
Daily  life  in  the  51St  Division  was  hard  and  unyielding.  Its  rigours  could  have  a  serious 
negative  impact  on  the  formation's  view  of  the  world  and  its  place  in  it.  However,  in  an 
attempt  to  minimise  this  effect,  the  (Highland)  Division  organised  a  system  underpinned 
by  a  divisional  infrastructure  geared  towards  maintaining  the  connection  with  the  pre-war 
environment,  sustaining  morale,  relieving  pressures,  and  contributing  to  esprit. 
Interaction  and  engagement  with  other  formations  and  national  groups  ultimately  helped 
define  the  51S`'s  sense  of  being.  What  others  thought  of  it  and  how  it  promoted  itself  were 
central  to  its  esprit  de  corps.  That  the  division  was  respected  by  its  allies  and  feared  by  its 
opponents  accurately  reflects  this. 
212 The  esprit  de  corps  of  the  515`  changed  over  the  course  of  the  First  World  War  influenced 
by  a  multitude  of  internal  and  external  pressures  and  opportunities.  The  divisional  spirit 
was  a  construct  not  only  of  a  disparate  collection  of  units  that  operated  under  the  title  of 
Ist  (Highland)  Division  in  1914,  but  of  a  formation  with  a  cohesive  and  coherent  set  of 
values  and  attitudes,  stabilised  by  a  strong  morale,  and  bolstered  by  a  fine  reputation 
based  on  aggression  and  attack,  immortalised  under  the  name  of  5  1st  (Highland)  Division. 
213 Chapter  4  Battle  Performance  of  the  515  (Highland)  Division  at: 
Givenchy  1915;  Beaumont  Hamel  1916;  Cambrai  1917;  March  1918 
This  chapter  will  concentrate  on  four  battles  over  different  and  quite  pivotal  periods 
involving  the  51St  Division  during  the  course  of  the  war.  The  (Highland)  Division  at  the  end 
of  the  war  was  a  different  formation  from  that  which  mobilised  in  1914  and  each  engagement 
has  been  selected  in  an  effort  to  demonstrate  an  overall  military  evolution  for  the  division 
whilst  also  focusing  on  key  thematic  criteria. 
In  order  to  develop  each  interpretation,  it  is  necessary  to  establish  briefly  the  overall  strategic 
build-up  to  the  attack;  the  divisional  objectives;  the  nature  of  the  terrain  and  the  enemy 
forces;  the  strength  of  the  (Highland)  Division;  divisional  preparations  immediately  prior  to 
conflict;  and  the  outcome  of  the  engagement. 
A  further  analysis  will  determine:  the  divisional  achievements  in  the  engagement;  the 
performance  of  the  leadership  in  the  formation;  the  extent  to  which  the  organisation  and 
administration  functioned  satisfactorily;  the  strength  and  nature  of  esprit  de  corps;  the  extent 
and  impact  of  divisional  casualties;  how  well  trained  the  division  was;  and  the  level  of  co- 
ordination  and  co-operation  between  all  arms  in  the  5  1St. 
Givenchy  1915 
Narrative 
1915  was  important  to  the  British  Expeditionary  Force  as  tactics  and  technology  adapted  to 
the  vagaries  of  modern  war.  Prior  to  the  First  World  War,  well-organised  attacks  had 
frequently  been  successful  and  had  often  overwhelmed  robust  defences,  but  during  the  early 
months  of  the  Great  War  advances  in  weapons  technology  had  changed  that.  The  impact  of 
machine  guns  and  rapid  rifle  fire  hampered  the  mobility  of  the  attacker  and  insufficient 
artillery  firepower  could  not  create  and  sustain  an  infantry  breakthrough  against  entrenched 
positions.  The  pre-war  tactical  emphasis  on  outflanking  and  envelopment,  based  on  infantry 
attack  and  cavalry  exploitation,  and  supported  by  directly  firing  artillery)  was  to  prove  far 
less  successful  in  the  face  of  the  new  conditions. 
1  With  few  aircraft  and  basic  communications,  there  was  no  means  of  identifying  unsighted  positions  or  locating 
targets  in  depth. 
214 Since  November  1914,  the  German  Army  had  predominantly  maintained  a  defensive 
strategy.  In  contrast,  the  French  and  British  armies  both  carried  out  a  number  of  offensives 
which  consistently  attempted  to  breakthrough  the  enemy  lines.  One  of  the  key  battles  of  1915 
was  at  Neuve  Chapelle  in  April,  which  taught  the  British  that  enemy  defences  could  be 
breached  but  also  indicated  to  the  Germans  that  they  should  strengthen  their  defences.  It  also 
exemplified  problems  for  the  attacker  in  that  a  preliminary  bombardment  permitted  the 
Germans  to  bring  reserves  up  and  poor  communications  denied  the  British  the  option  of  a 
swift  advance  after  the  first  stage  break-in.  There  were  similar  problems  during  the  attack  on 
Aubers  Ridge  the  following  month.  2 
Between  17  and  25  May  1915,  the  51St,  as  a  reserve  division  in  the  Indian  Corps,  participated 
in  its  first  action  as  the  BEF  launched  a  series  of  attacks  near  Festubert  to  coincide  with  a 
simultaneous  French  Army  offensive.  The  attacks  were  characterised  by  a  series  of  small 
battles  against  strong  and  well-organised  enemy  defences  that  were  protected  by  barbed  wire 
and  machine  guns.  The  tactical  dilemma  of  the  breakthrough  continued  to  dominate. 
When  the  battle  of  Festubert  ended,  the  British  First  Army  was  ordered  by  GHQ  to  carry  out 
further  offensives  to  assist  French  armies  still  engaged  in  the  second  battle  of  Artois.  As 
French  attacks  were  planned  for  June,  the  BEF  was  scheduled  to  carry  out  assaults  on  the  left 
of  the  French  armies.  First  Army  was  to  concentrate  on  gaining  ground  from  Givenchy  to 
Violaines,  and  in  order  to  do  this,  Haig  (the  Army  Commander)  reorganised  his  front  into 
`one  defensive  and  two  offensive  sectors'.  The  latter  were  allotted  to  the  I  Corps  (47"',  1St  and 
2°d  Divisions),  and  the  IV  Corps  (Canadian,  7th,  and  51St  Divisions),  with  the  Indian  Corps 
being  given  a  defensive  role.  On  30  May,  First  Army  headquarters  ordered  IV  Corps, 
containing  the  51St  Division,  to  attack  the  enemy  line  between  Chapelle  St.  Roch  and  Rue 
d'Ouvert  and  advance  over  a  limited  distance.  `The  amount  of  ammunition  available  at  this 
time  permitted  only  an  assault-and  that  on  a  very  narrow  front-by  the  IV.  Corps,  but  the  I.  and 
Indian  Corps,  and  the  Second  Army,  were  directed  to  give  such  assistance  as  they  could  in 
subsidiary  attacks.  '  3 
2  T.  Ashworth,  Trench  Warfare  1914-1918,  The  Live  and  Let  Live  System  (London,  1980),  p.  50. 
3  J.  E.  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  France  and  Belgium,  1915.  Battles  of  Aubers  Ridge,  Festubert,  and  Loos 
(London,  1928),  p.  93. 
215 On  7  June,  orders  were  issued  from  IVth  Corps  to  its  divisions  to  attack  the  enemy  positions 
on  the  morning  of  11  June,  but  this  was  subsequently  postponed  until  15  June.  On  12  June, 
the  operation  order  for  the  attack  was  issued  to  brigades  from  51"  divisional  headquarters, 
with  brigade  orders  being  issued  on  14  June.  "  The  Canadian  Division  was  to  attack  on  the 
right  and  form  a  defensive  flank,  with  the  7"'  Division  in  the  centre  and  the  51"  Division  at 
5  the  extreme  ends 
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216 The  152"d  and  154th  brigades  were  ordered  by  divisional  headquarters  to  carry  out  the  assault. 
The  1/4th  Loyal  North  Lancashires  and  the  1/6th  Scottish  Rifles  of  154th  Brigade  were  to 
deliver  the  main  attack  on  the  right,  whilst  the  other  two  battalions  of  the  154th  Brigade,  the 
1/4th  King's  Own  Royal  Lancasters  and  the  1/8th  Liverpool  Regiment,  were  held  in  brigade 
reserve.  The  1/5th  Seaforth  Highlanders  of  152"d  Brigade  was  to  make  a  subsidiary  attack  on 
the  left  if  the  attack  of  the  154th  Brigade  was  successful.  The  1/6th  Seaforth  Highlanders 
occupied  the  front  line  trenches,  `and  the  Battalion's  job  on  the  left  of  the  5th  Seaforths  was  to 
man  the  parapet  with  every  available  man  and  open  rapid  fire  on  the  enemy's  trenches  so  as 
to  give  covering  fire  to  the  attacking  troops  and  keep  the  enemy's  head  down',  7  whilst  the 
1/6th  Argylls  were  in  brigade  reserve  and  the  1/8th  Argylls  were  in  divisional  reserve. 
The  enemy  trench  system  would  prove  to  be  a  substantial  problem.  Two  weeks  prior  to  the 
attack,  the  IV  Corps  commander,  Lieutenant-General  Rawlinson,  was  pessimistic  about 
attacking  such  a  strong  position.  He  wrote  in  his  diary  that  the  orders  he  produced  for  Haig 
were: 
in  the  form  of  pious  aspiration  rather  than  anything  that  is  likely  to  be  actually  carried  into  effect 
for  we  are  not  going  to  capture  Rue  d'  Ouvert  as  easily  as  he  appears  to  think.  The  new  photos 
taken  on  the  afternoon  of  the  12  [th]  of  the  enemy's  trenches  show  that  the  Boches  have  been 
working  like  beavers  and  have  constructed  many  new  works  which  will  give  us  trouble-  they  have 
strengthened  the  wire  to  an  alarming  extent  and  it  is  doubtful  if  we  shall  be  able  to  cut  it 
satisfactorily.  My  opinion  is  that  we  shall  be  v.  lucky  if  we  get  the  Rue  d'Ouvert  after  three  days 
hard  fighting  and  5000  casualties! 
The  ground  over  which  the  attack  was  to  take  place  was  practically  flat.  It  was  intercut  by 
ditches  and  there  were  a  number  of  trees  throughout  which  made  observation  very  difficult. 
The  heavily-wired  German  trench  system,  running  along  the  edge  of  the  Rue  d'  Ouvert, 
formed  a  salient,  where  the  German  trenches  were  only  100  to  150  yards  from  the  (Highland) 
Division,  the  distance  increasing  on  either  flank  to  200  or  250  yards. 
6  After  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  France  and  Belgium,  1915.  Battles  of  Aubers  Ridge,  Festubert,  and 
Loos,  pp.  92-93. 
R.  T.  Peel,  and  A.  H.  MacDonald,  6`4  Seaforth  Highlanders,  Campaign  Reminiscences  (Elgin,  1923),  p.  9. 
8  R.  Prior,  and  T.  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front  (Oxford,  1992),  p.  97. 
217 Captains  Peel  and  MacDonald  also  recorded  that  the  British  trenches  were  in  very  poor 
condition,  9  and  war  diaries  emphasised  that  the  whole  sector  proved  to  be  a  difficult  section 
of  the  line  to  hold  as  it  was  subject  to  constant  mining,  sniping  and  trench  mortar  activity. 
In  an  attempt  to  break  down  these  formidable  enemy  defences,  the  divisional  preparations 
before  the  assault  included  a  forty-eight  hour  slow  bombardment  in  order  to  destroy  the 
trenches  and  cut  the  wire.  The  artillery  began  the  wire-cutting  on  13  June,  continued  on  15 
June  and  became  intensive  between  5.30  p.  m.  and  6  p.  m..  Mountain  guns  and  trench  mortars 
also  participated  in  the  bombardment.  1°  The  bombardment  continued  up  to  the  moment  of  the 
infantry  assault  and  at  6  p.  m.,  the  actual  hour  of  the  assault,  the  guns  firing  on  the  enemy 
front  line  began  to  lift.  At  6.15  p.  m.  there  was  a  further  lift  onto  the  Rue  d'Orient. 
At  the  end  of  the  bombardment,  after  the  detonation  at  5.58  p.  m.  of  a  mine  near  the  junction 
of  the  Canadian  and  the  7`h  Division  fronts,  opposite  Chapelle  St.  Roch,  the  infantry  went 
forward.  However,  German  infantry  were  in  position  and  opened  fire  with  rifle  and  machine 
gun. 
The  assault  delivered  by  1/4t'  Loyal  North  Lancashires  and  1/6`h  Scottish  Rifles  of  154`" 
Brigade  at  6  p.  m.,  was  at  first  successful.  The  west  end  of  the  German  salient  was  punctured 
and  the  attack  pushed  on  towards  the  main  enemy  line  near  Rue  d'Ouvert,  and  three 
companies  of  the  1/4`h  King's  Own  Royal  Lancashires  were  sent  up  as  reinforcements. 
However,  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  the  Germans  counter-attacked  and  forced  back 
the  troops  to  their  own  front  line  trenches.  Captain  Mahon  of  154`h  Brigade  related: 
The  artillery,  however,  prevented  us  getting  adequate  reinforcements,  sandbags,  etc,  forward, 
whilst  the  enemy  made  a  strong  counter-attack,  headed  by  bombers  and  took  the  small  party  of  our 
men  on  a  flank,  with  the  result  that  they  had  to  retire  and  finished  away  over  to  the  right  in  the 
Guards  trenches.  " 
The  1/5th  Seaforth  Highlanders,  of  152nd  Brigade,  attacking  the  northern  section  of  the  salient 
at  6.45  p.  m.,  were  met  with  heavy  machine  gun  fire  and  uncut  wire.  The  report  from 
Brigadier-General  Ross  of  152nd  Brigade  to  the  divisional  commander  on  16  June  stated, 
`Immediately  these  infantry  advanced  they  came  under  an  intense  machine-gun  and  rifle  fire 
9  Peel  and  MacDonald,  6`h  Seaforth  Highlanders,  Campaign  Reminiscences,  p.  S. 
10  F.  W.  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  5  I$`  Highland  Division,  1914-1918  (Edinburgh,  1921),  p.  18. 
218 which  practically  mowed  down  the  first  two  platoons  and  parties  of  bomb  throwers  who 
accompanied  the  second  platoon'.  12  A  second  attack  ordered  for  before  dawn  was 
subsequently  cancelled  by  corps  headquarters. 
Neither  of  the  two  attacking  brigades  were  able  to  link  up  with  flanking  units  from  the 
Canadian  and  7t'  divisions. 
Throughout  the  night  of  15/16  June,  the  1/6`h  Scottish  Rifles  and  1/4`h  Loyal  North 
Lancashires  were  withdrawn  and  replaced  by  the  1/8`h  Liverpools  in  the  front  line,  and  the 
1/7`h  Black  Watch  of  153`d  Brigade  was  sent  up  to  the  reserve  trenches.  In  the  morning,  orders 
were  received  from  IV  Corps  to  renew  the  attack  at  4.45  p.  m.  after  a  preliminary  artillery 
bombardment.  The  1/5`h  and  1/7`h  Gordons  of  153rd  Brigade  were  temporarily  attached  to 
154`h  Brigade  to  replace  battalions  that  had  been  withdrawn.  The  assault  was  delivered  by  the 
1/8`h  Liverpools,  with  1/7`h  Black  Watch  in  support  at  4.45  p.  m.,  and  the  1/8`h  Liverpools 
managed  to  advance  in  small  parties  past  the  western  end  of  the  salient.  The  7th  Division,  on 
the  right,  was,  however,  unable  to  get  forward  and  at  about  8  p.  m.,  the  1/8`h  Liverpools  were 
forced  back  to  the  British  front  line  trenches.  The  152nd  Brigade  was  to  have  attacked  at  9 
p.  m.  but,  after  the  154`h  Brigade  was  driven  back,  the  attack  was  cancelled. 
The  relief  of  the  154th  Brigade  in  the  right  section  by  the  153rd  Brigade  was  completed  during 
the  early  morning  of  17  June.  Further  orders  were  received  at  5  p.  m.  to  assault  the  German 
salient  again  at  3  a.  m.  the  next  morning  after  a  short  and  intense  artillery  bombardment. 
Captain  Ross  outlined  the  development  of  the  attack: 
On  the  night  of  the  170'  the  attack  was  resumed  on  the  right  with  redoubled  fury.  The  2"d  Gordons 
were  ordered  to  attack,  their  first  objective  being  a  T-trench  jutting  out  from  the  German  lines.  "D" 
Company  of  the  Gordons,  linking  up  with  the  sister  battalion,  went  over  the  parapet  and  advanced 
to  the  enemy's  position  to  make  a  feint  demonstration  and  distract  his  attention  from  the  real 
assault.  But  it  was  a  labour  in  vain.  The  2nd  Gordons  hammered  ineffectual  blows,  and  melting 
before  the  sleet  of  lead,  collapsed  at  the  wire.  A  gallant  remnant,  however,  succeeded  in  gaining  a 
precarious  footing  in  the  T-trench.  Meanwhile,  "D"  Company,  miraculously  preserved  from  heavy 
casualties,  had  returned  to  the  original  line.  13 
11  Imperial  War  Museum,  78/22/1,  Diary  of  Captain  J.  S.  Mahon,  June  1915. 
12  N/A,  WO  95  2844,51°`  Division  G  War  Diary. 
13  B.  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France  (London,  1918),  p.  91. 
219 As  a  result,  at  2.30  a.  m.  on  18  June,  further  attacks  were  postponed  and  later  cancelled  by 
order  of  the  IV  Corps  commander. 
Analysis 
The  battle  was  a  failure  in  operational  terms  as  the  divisional  objectives  were  not  met. 
However,  it  did  play  a  part  in  supporting  the  French  armies  during  their  simultaneous 
attacks14  and  also  introduced  the  51St  Division  to  an  organised  assault  against  enemy 
positions.  The  learning  experience  was  to  impact  upon  the  development  of  its  training  and 
tactics  over  the  course  of  the  war,  and  through  this  and  subsequent  assaults  there  developed  a 
system  of  tactics  more  sophisticated  than  those  acquired  whilst  training  in  Britain. 
The  following  extract  from  the  IV  Corps  report  referring  to  the  attack  of  the  1/8t'  Liverpools 
on  16  June  summed  up  much  that  went  wrong  for  the  division  during  the  battle: 
the  Regiment  went  out  gallantly  and  came  at  once  under  a  heavy  artillery  fire.  They  pressed  on  in 
small  parties  and  gained  the  salient  but  did  not  get  much  further.  The  fire  of  the  German  artillery, 
added  to  machine  gun  fire  stopped  them  altogether,  and  they  retired  to  our  fire  trench.  The 
situation,  owing  to  the  difficulty  of  communication,  was  unknown  to  the  Brigadier,  and  in  my 
opinion,  had  reinforcements  been  sent  up  they  would  not  have  reached  the  firing  line.  The 
supporting  battalion  had  been  severely  knocked  about  by  artillery,  and  it  is  evident  that  the 
Germans  had  made  all  preparations  for  this  attack.  " 
This  account  clearly  showed  that  the  objectives  were  not  met;  heavy  casualties  were 
sustained;  leadership  and  organisation  were  confused  and  disrupted;  planning  was 
inadequate;  training  had  not  been  progressive;  the  co-ordination  and  weaponry  were 
inadequate;  the  artillery  bombardment  did  not  do  its  job  and  the  element  of  surprise  was  lost; 
but  through  this  an  esprit  de  corps  remained  solid.  The  51S`  Division  was  not  yet  ready  for  the 
kind  of  war  that  had  been  thrust  upon  it  and  the  simple,  linear  tactics  that  were  employed  by 
its  units  were  inappropriate  against  a  prepared  enemy  armed  with  machine  guns. 
It  was  a  limited  objective  attack  undertaken  by  battalion  or  brigade  sized  units  which  chiefly 
employed  the  rifle  as  the  infantry's  primary  weapon.  The  infantry  detachments  detailed  for 
14  This  was  nothing  new  and  was  to  be  a  common  factor  throughout  the  course  of  the  war,  and  it  frequently 
made  an  assault  more  difficult  as  the  ground  was  often  chosen  because  of  the  need  to  support  the  French  rather 
than  for  its  own  strategic  value. 
15  NA,  WO  95  710,  IV  Corps  Report  on  Givenchy  operation,  June  1915. 
220 the  assault  were  expected  to  leave  their  trenches  simultaneously  and  reach  their  objectives 
together.  1540'  Operation  Order  No.  10  of  14  June  stated: 
As  soon  as  the  leading  platoons  have  cleared  the  parapet,  the  next  platoons  in  succession  will 
double  inwards  along  the  fire  trench  and  as  soon  as  their  flanks  meet  at  the  marked  spot  will  scale 
the  parapet  and  follow  the  leading  platoons.  16 
However,  in  practice,  platoons  crossed  no  man's  land  in  alternate  rushes  but  failed  to  support 
one  another  with  firepower: 
At  6pm,  the  firing  ceased,  and  the  infantry  went  over  in  open  order,  to  cross  the  four  or  five 
hundred  yards  between  them  and  the  enemy.  In  the  light  of  later  warfare  one  can  visualise  the 
scene,  a  grassy  plain  on  a  beautiful  summer  afternoon,  no  artillery  barrage,  no  proper  cutting  of  the 
enemy's  wire,  no  firing  on  his  batteries  after  the  infantry  started,  the  infantry  advancing  absolutely 
unprotected  except  by  the  rifle  and  machine-gun  fire  of  their  comrades,  and  machine-guns  were 
few  and  far  between  in  those  days,  and  one  can  wonder  that,  in  spite  of  heroic  efforts  the  attack 
was  a  failure.  " 
The  loss  of  the  captured  enemy  trenches  by  the  154th  Brigade  on  the  night  of  the  15/16  June 
was  pivotal.  The  IV  Corps  report  to  First  Army  headquarters  stated,  `Had  the  7th  Division 
been  able  to  advance  and  join  up  with  the  51St  Division  the  ground  won  during  daylight  could 
probably  have  been  made  good  during  the  night'.  18  Although  the  attack  on  the  front  of  the 
51St  could  be  considered  a  failure,  account  must  also  be  taken  of  the  advances  to  the  left  and 
the  right  of  the  division  during  key  stages  of  the  assault.  Bewsher  stated,  `There  is  little  doubt 
but  that,  had  the  operations  on  their  flanks  been  successful,  they  would  have  had  every 
prospect  of  holding  their  gains'.  19  Ultimately,  Bewsher's  conclusion  is  speculative,  although 
it  would  have  clearly  been  of  benefit  to  the  units  of  the  division  to  have  had  secure  flanks. 
A  more  appropriate  conclusion  is  found  in  the  personal  diary  of  Rawlinson,  the  corps 
commander,  `It  is  a  thousand  pities  that  we  were  allowed  to  attack  the  Rue  d'  Ouvert  for  any 
sensible  person  would  have  known  that  we  should  not  take  it'.  20 
16  NA,  WO  95  2861,152  nd  Brigade  War  Diary. 
17  D.  Sutherland,  War  Diary  of  the  5`h  Seaforth  Highlanders  (London,  1920),  p.  20. 
18  NA,  WO  95  710,  IV  Corps  Report  to  First  Army,  June  1915. 
19  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  1914-1918,  p.  21. 
20  R.  Prior,  and  T.  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front  (Oxford,  1992),  p.  99. 
221 Artillery 
In  many  ways,  the  artillery  was  the  most  important  factor  in  the  battle,  as  it  was  for  much  of 
the  rest  of  the  war.  However,  the  51S`  Division  had  no  control  over  much  of  its  activity  during 
the  engagement  as  Brigadier-General  J.  F.  N.  Birch  of  the  7u'  Division  was  in  overall  charge  of 
IV  Corps  artillery,  21  which  included  both  heavy  and  field  artillery.  This  meant  corps  set  the 
timings  for  the  fireplan  and  set  divisional  rates  of  advance,  although  the  (Highland)  Division 
did  have  responsibility  for  selecting  its  own  gun  positions  and  carrying  out  the  centralised 
instructions  through  its  own  artillery  brigades.  22  Throughout  the  corps,  running  contrary  to 
the  prevailing  tactical  thought  for  concentrating  artillery  firepower  over  a  narrow  front,  there 
was  an  overall  paucity  of  guns  and  ammunition,  which  worked  against  the  application  of  the 
theory  in  practice.  This  did  not  contrast  well  against  the  strength  of  the  German  positions. 
Through  a  series  of  engagements  prior  to  the  attack  at  Givenchy,  such  as  at  Neuve  Chapelle 
and  the  Aubers  Ridge,  the  BEF  artillery  experimented  with  different  forms  of  bombardment 
and  supporting  fire.  Neuve  Chapelle  was  particularly  successful  in  establishing  the  guns  to 
ground  ratio  and  also  in  applying  indirect  fire.  However,  the  advances  at  Neuve  Chapelle 
were  almost  completely  absent  from  the  divisional  preparations  at  Givenchy.  Nicholson 
stated  that  it  faced: 
Such  a  matted  network  of  wire  that  no  man  during  an  assault  could  possibly  penetrate  it,  though 
armed  with  the  best  wire  cutters.  A  prolonged  artillery  bombardment  was  therefore  essential,  not 
only  to  pound  the  enemy's  trenches  and  prevent  reinforcements  coming  forward,  but,  an  even 
more  vital  need,  to  cut  lanes  through  this  wire.  23 
However,  as  there  were  less  guns  in  relation  to  length  of  front,  to  compensate,  there  was  a 
longer  barrage.  The  IV  Corps  scheme  of  attack,  stated  that  the  objective  of  the  heavy 
howitzers  and  field  guns  should  be  to  attempt  to  `destroy  the  enemy's  trenches  and 
strongholds  and  to  kill  him  if  he  moves  out  from  under  cover';  `To  prevent  him  from 
repairing  his  fortifications';  `To  forbid  him  food,  rest,  or  reinforcements  by  day  or  night';  and 
`To  complete  the  wire  cutting'.  24  However,  in  order  to  do  this,  the  CRA  Order  No.  1  by 
Brigadier-General  H.  A.  Brendon  of  7  June  1915  (to  be  carried  out  on  the  8th),  which  set  out 
guidelines  for  (Highland)  Division  field  batteries  to  cut  wire  stated  that  the  `Rate  of  fire  is  to 
21  NA,  WO  95  2844,  IV  Corps  Operation  Order  No.  18,30  May  1915. 
22  NA,  WO  95  2844,  IV  Corps  Preliminary  Instructions,  29  May  1915. 
23  W.  M.  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  An  Account  of  Administrative  Staffivork  in  the  British  Army  1914-1918 
(Stevenage,  1939),  p.  226. 
222 be  governed  by  accurate  observation,  it  should  not  exceed  60  rounds  per  battery  per  hour'  25 
This  logic  was  flawed.  The  barrages  were  for  the  most  part  ineffective,  for  the  artillery  was 
not  accurate  enough  to  shell  individual  strongpoints  and  systematically  destroy  the  enemy's 
defences,  high  explosive  shells  for  the  fifteen-pounders  made  little  impact  on  defensive 
works,  and  shrapnel  was  only  effective  in  eradicating  the  enemy  exposed  in  some  part  of  the 
trenchworks.  Wauchope  stated  that: 
The  failure  of  this  attack  may  be  put  down  to  the  lack  of  sufficient  artillery  preparation  and  to 
uncut  wire.  At  that  time  the  number  of  guns  and  the  allowance  of  ammunition  required  to  give 
infantry  a  reasonable  chance  of  success  had  not  been  fully  appreciated.  26 
After  the  preliminary  bombardment,  the  corps  artillery  and  divisional  artillery  were  to 
provide  a  lifting  barrage  to  enable  to  troops  to  advance.  27  However,  neither  the  preliminary 
nor  the  lifting  barrage  managed  to  destroy  the  wire  adequately,  forcing  the  Highlanders 
physically  to  cut  their  way  through.  The  bombardment  did  not  destroy  the  enemy  defensive 
structures  either.  Rawlinson  pointed  out: 
the  deep  dug-outs  were  so  well  constructed  that  they  were  almost  impossible  to  destroy......  it  was 
a  pretty  stiff  nut  for  us  to  crack.  It  will  cost  many  thousands  of  lives  before  we  are  in  possession  of 
it  unless  we  get  an  unlimited  amount  of  ammunition  to  smash  the  place  to  pieces  before  we  go  in.  28 
The  IV  Corps  report  reinforced  this  by  stating: 
I  much  doubt  if  any  kind  of  artillery  fire  however  accurate  and  well  sustained  will  have  the  desired 
effect  unless  it  is  sufficient  to  bury  the  garrisons  in  the  deep  dug-outs  they  have  now  constructed, 
and  this  is  a  matter  of  chance.  9 
To  diminish  further  the  possibility  of  success,  the  artillery  units  of  the  division  were  not 
brought  up  to  full  strength  until  May  1916  and  at  Givenchy  the  guns  at  their  disposal  were 
under  the  prescribed  war  establishment,  and  those  guns  they  had  were  outdated  (15  pounders 
were  still  being  used  instead  of  18  pounders).  30  Bidwell  and  Graham  have  pointed  out  that  the 
24  NA,  WO  95  2850,51s`  Division  CRA  War  Diary,  June  1915. 
25  NA,  WO  95  2850,51"  Division  CRA  War  Diary,  June  1915. 
26  A.  G.  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  11  (London,  1926),  p. 
253. 
27  NA,  WO  95  2850,51"  Division  CRA  Operation  Order  No.  5,15  June  1915. 
28  Prior  and  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front,  p.  96. 
29  NA,  WO  95  710,  IV  Corps  Report  on  operations  at  Givenchy. 
30  See  Annexe  2  for  the  development  of  the  51"  Division  artillery  capability  throughout  the  war. 
223 Territorial  formations  were  undergunned  as  there  had  been  no  expectation  of  overseas 
service. 
31 
In  addition,  on  28  May,  Sir  John  French  had  been  forced  to  order  the  First  Army  to  limit  its 
operation  to  "small  aggressive  threats  which  will  not  require  much  ammunition  or  many 
troops".  32  For  the  troops  of  the  (Highland)  Division  this  proved  almost  criminal  in  its 
application.  Captain  Ross  stressed  that  `Towards  morning  the  struggle  quietened  down.  Our 
guns  were  silent.  They  had  no  more  shells  to  fire'.  33 
However,  even  the  ammunition  that  the  division  did  have  at  its  disposal  was  not  of  a  good 
quality: 
In  addition  to  the  inadequacy  in  the  number  of  guns,  the  15"pounders  again  proved  themselves 
highly  unsatisfactory.  As  evidence  of  the  unreliability  of  their  ammunition,  it  is  worth  recording 
that  Captain  Duncan  of  the  80'  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  had  an  eye  knocked  out  by  a 
shrapnel  bullet  half  a  mile  behind  the  British  front  line  34 
Combined  arms 
There  were  a  number  of  developments  which  showed  some  promise  in  the  field  of  combined 
arms,  and  these  were  generated  by  lessons  learned  through  battles  fought.  By  early  1915  the 
infantryman  at  the  front  already  had  a  wide  variety  of  weapons  at  his  disposal,  although  these 
were  often  limited  in  number  or  quality,  or  improvised  in  form,  and  included  bombs  and 
machine  guns. 
The  official  history  stated  that  `in  February  1915,  the  number  of  machine  guns  per  infantry 
battalion  and  cavalry  regiment  had  been  raised  from  two  to  four'.  35  However,  the  515t's 
machine  gun  establishment  was  still  below  strength  in  July  1915  as  the  war  diary  made  clear, 
`One  Vickers  Gun  complete  with  mounting  re  for  each  of  the  following  units  on  allotment  by 
GHQ.  1/6th  Scottish  Rifles  and  1/4th  Loyal  North  Lanes  Regt.  Necessary  transport  also 
indented  for.  This  will  complete  these  units  to  3  machine  guns  per  battalion'.  36  This  situation 
31  S.  Bidwell,  and  D.  Graham,  Firepower,  British  Army  Weapons  and  Theories  of  War  1904-1945  (London, 
1982),  p.  97. 
32  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  p.  92. 
33  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  p.  92. 
34  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"'  Highland  Division,  p.  23. 
35  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  p.  64. 
36  NA,  WO  95  2853,515`  Division  DADOS  War  Diary,  31  July  1915. 
224 was  still  not  corrected  until  six  months  after  the  official  establishment  had  changed.  The 
division  had  spent  almost  four  months  on  the  Western  Front,  when  in  August  1915  twelve 
Vickers  machine  guns  arrived  to  complete  the  establishment  to  four  per  battalion.  37  However, 
at  Givenchy  there  were  not  enough  machine  guns  and  and  some  of  those  were  old  model 
Maxims,  and  the  use  of  the  Maxims  was  limited  because  of  their  weight.  It  might  have  made 
a  difference  to  the  outcome  of  the  battle  if  the  division  had  been  allocated  more  machine  guns 
(as  Lewis  guns  were  also  scarce  at  this  time),  not  to  take  part  in  the  initial  advance  but  to  be 
ready  to  move  up  swiftly  in  support. 
Bombing  parties  from  brigade  grenadier  companies  were  instructed  to  closely  support  the 
attack.  38  However,  there  were  not  enough  bombs  or  bombers,  and  many  of  those  were  killed 
by  enemy  machine  guns.  More  use  could  also  have  been  made  of  trench  mortars,  and  those 
that  were  available  were  used  piecemeal.  `The  contest  now  became  one  of  hand-grenades  and 
trench  weapons,  and  for  this  the  British  were  still  ill-equipped.  '39  It  is  no  surprise  to  find  that 
after  the  battle  a  divisional  circular  memorandum  of  7  July  1915  from  Bannatine-Allason 
emphasised  more  practice  on  bombing.  40 
Training,  and  command  and  control 
The  command  and  control  methodologies  employed  by  army  and  corps  were  flexible  and 
delegated  much  authority  to  divisional  commanders  and  their  staff.  Prior  and  Wilson  have 
stated  that  Rawlinson  set  about  devising  a  plan  and  training  divisions  for  the  attack  at 
Givenchy.  Devise  a  plan  he  did,  but  there  is  no  evidence  in  (Highland)  Division  war  diaries 
or  other  primary  sources  to  support  the  statement  on  training.  Certainly,  Rawlinson  was 
concerned  about  the  poor  staff  work  of  the  division  and  did  send  his  chief  of  staff  to  help 
them  prepare  operational  orders,  41  but  this  does  not  constitute  training  a  division. 
The  training  of  the  51St  Division  in  Britain  had  certainly  not  been  progressive  or 
comprehensive  enough  to  transform  the  division  into  a  formation  capable  of  operating 
coherently  and  cohesively  in  the  field.  War  diaries  added  that,  since  its  arrival  in  France,  the 
division  had  been  either  `on  the  move',  involved  in  the  clearing  and  consolidation  of 
37  NA,  WO  95  2853,51"'  Division  DADOS  War  Diary,  25  August  1915. 
38  NA,  W0952844,51"  Division  G  War  Diary,  Operation  Order  No.  11. 
39  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  p.  95. 
40  NA,  WO  95  2869,153rd  Brigade  War  Diary. 
41  Prior  and  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front,  p.  97. 
225 trenches,  or  placed  in  reserve.  Outside  the  useful  experience  gained  of  `on  the  job'  training, 
the  51St  had  no  opportunity  to  train  for  the  new  conditions  on  the  Western  Front.  It  was  usual 
for  a  new  division  arriving  at  the  front  to  receive  a  period  of  instruction  from  a  more 
seasoned  formation.  However,  the  51St  Division  did  not  have  the  benefit  of  any  such 
instruction.  These  factors  were  clearly  detrimental  to  the  capacity  of  the  division  to  engage 
successfully  in  an  assault. 
Despite  a  lack  of  centralised  training  advice  in  early  1915,  there  was  information  in 
circulation  and  discussion  was  taking  place  throughout  the  Expeditionary  Force  chain  of 
command.  After  the  battle  of  Festubert  reports  of  lessons  learned,  especially  concerning  the 
artillery,  were  circulated  to  formations  and  units.  Although  the  51  S"  Division  was  unable  to 
progress  a  great  deal  during  the  short  time  it  was  in  France  from  the  standard  that  it  had  set  in 
Britain,  it  did  employ  some  new  ideas  encouraged  by  tactics  prevalent  throughout  the  BEF, 
such  as  the  opening  of  a  bomb  school  for  the  active  encouragement  of  the  training  of 
bombers,  and  by  June  1915  the  bombing  squads  `had  been  evolved  into  a  fairly  workable 
unit'  42  Significantly,  there  had  been  very  little  training  on  this  weapon  and  its  application 
before  the  division  arrived  in  France. 
The  plans  for  the  attack  had  to  be  simple  to  enable  the  troops  to  deploy  and  advance 
accordingly,  but  poor  training  resulted  in  a  lack  of  cohesion  and  of  mutual  support  amongst 
and  within  units.  Nicholson  stated: 
I  saw  a  Regular  afterwards,  a  man  I  knew  well,  who  was  commanding  a  trench  mortar  battery,  in 
the  front  line.  He  told  me  that  when  the  assault  was  ordered,  our  men  went  over  the  parapet 
magnificently.  They  could  not  have  been  finer,  he  said.  Then  he  added,  `But  the  wickedness  of  it, 
they  didn't  know  what  they  had  to  do  when  they  got  to  the  other  side;  so  that  they  were  hopelessly 
sacrificed  before  they  started'.  This  must  not  be  taken  too  literally.  Every  endeavour  had  been 
made  to  make  a  plan  for  the  other  side  sufficiently  simple  for  our  men  to  carry  out;  but  what  is  as 
important  as  a  good  plan,  is  a  good  leader  who  instinctively  knows  what  is  the  only  thing  to  be 
done;  and  does  it.  13 
Of  course,  experience  is  a  powerful  force  for  development  and  practise  can  produce  greater 
consistency  in  results,  but  the  51St  could  at  least  have  been  trained  to  expect  what  was  to 
come.  That  was  not  the  case  and  the  accountability  for  this  resides  within  the  whole 
command  structure.  Wimberley  concluded,  `The  Division  therefore,  owing  to  its  enthusiasm 
42  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  pp.  80-81. 
226 and  lack  of  training  in  this  type  of  war,  suffered  casualties  that,  at  a  later  stage,  would  have 
been  considered  as  criminal'  44 
The  troops  had  been  trained  to  follow  the  commands  of  junior  officers,  and  the  junior  officers 
waited  on  instructions  from  higher  commanders  to  tell  them  what  to  do.  As  an  untested 
formation  with  a  relatively  short  operational  history,  the  divisional  leadership  was  extremely 
important  during  its  first  engagement. 
On  4  June,  Rawlinson  called  on  his  divisional  commanders  to  propose  assault  plans  for  their 
formations  in  the  coming  attack.  45  The  detailed  planning  fell  on  the  divisional  commander 
and  his  staff.  Bannatine-Allason  conferred  with  his  brigade  commanders  and  as  a  result  a 
draft  scheme  of  attack  was  submitted  to  corps  headquarters  on  5  June  and  a  corps  operation 
order  was  issued  for  a  combined  attack  on  7  June.  46 
However,  the  ultimate  failure  of  the  divisional  attack,  and  the  confusion  and  disorder  that 
characterised  it,  does  not  reflect  positively  on  the  planners  of  the  scheme.  It  is  perhaps  not 
surprising  that  Bannatine-Allason  gave  up  command  of  the  division  two  months  after 
Givenchy,  and  one  of  the  key  brigade  commanders  involved  in  the  attack,  Brigadier-General 
Hibbert  of  the  154th  Brigade,  followed  him  in  October  1915.  The  GSO1  was  also  replaced  in 
June  1915  and  the  CRA  in  July  1915.  Battalion  commanders  did  not  escape  criticism  and 
there  were  also  changes  in  unit  command  immediately  after  the  battle.  Malcolm  stated  that 
his  commanding  officer  was  confused  and  made  mistakes,  and  that  only  decisions  made  by 
the  adjutant  saved  the  day.  47  That  commanding  officer  was  later  sent  home. 
Junior  officers  in  the  division  also  lacked  experience  and  many  essential  qualities  of 
leadership.  In  Rawlinson's  view,  `their  officers  are  not  good,  too  few  gentlemen  amongst 
them'.  48  His  conclusion  supported  earlier  reports  that  Major-General  Bannatine-Allason  sent 
to  First  Army  headquarters  criticising  the  quality  of  officers.  However,  it  was  a  difficult 
transition  for  any  officer  newly  arrived  at  the  front,  and  Captain  J.  L.  Weston  stated  `it  was  the 
43  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  228. 
44  NLS,  ACC  7380,  box  9,  Book  1  of  `The  Highland  Division',  g.  11. 
45  NA,  WO  95  2844,  '154h  Brigade  Report  on  the  Attack  on  15  and  168i  June  1915'. 
46  NA,  WO  95  2844,  `15481  Brigade  Report  on  the  Attack  on  15th  and  168'  June  1915'. 
4'  G.  I.  Malcolm,  Argyll  Highlanders  1860-1960  (Glasgow,  1960),  p.  23. 
48  Prior,  and  Wilson,  Command  on  the  Western  Front,  p.  97. 
227 greatest  strain  he  had  ever  experienced'  49  Nicholson  further  explained  that  the  staff  were 
`terribly  anxious  at  the  lack  of  experience  of  our  battalion  officers'.  50  After  the  battle 
Bannatine-Allason  wrote  to  Rawlinson  that  `Brig.  General  Hibbert,  his  staff  and  Brigade 
generally  did  all  they  could  under  circumstances  of  considerable  difficulty.  I  much  regret  the 
loss  of  so  many  gallant  officers  and  men.  '51  This  was  an  accurate  summation  of  the 
performance  of  the  whole  division.  However,  unfortunately,  many  of  the  `circumstances' 
referred  to  by  the  divisional  commander  could  have  been  avoided. 
Organisation  and  administration 
The  organisation  and  administration  of  the  division  also  developed  serious  flaws  during  the 
engagement,  including  a  lack  of  intelligence,  poor  staff  work,  and  communication  failures. 
These  were  understandable  given  the  circumstances,  but  again  could  have  been  avoided  if  the 
division  had  been  better  prepared. 
Ideally,  the  simplistic  approach  to  the  attack  was  intended  to  have  permitted  the  officers  and 
men  of  the  division  to  gain  their  objectives  through  a  staged  process,  and  the  operational 
order  for  15  June  was  extremely  detailed.  However,  after  the  initial  assault  and  its  setbacks, 
the  ability  of  the  formation  to  respond  with  any  degree  of  flexibility  and  mobility 
deteriorated.  In  his  report  to  IV  Corps,  Bannatine-Allason  stated  of  the  attack  on  16  June,  that 
`I  do  not  think  there  was  time  to  properly  organise  this  attack  and  I  know  that  the  Colonel  and 
Adjutant  had  to  run  round  the  companies  and  give  very  hasty  instructions'.  52  The  lack  of  time 
to  prepare  and  organise  properly  was  the  rule  rather  then  the  exception  once  the  battle  was 
underway,  and  this  applied  to  all  levels  of  command.  At  brigade  level,  Brigadier-General 
Hibbert  stated  that  `Owing  to  the  short  time  at  my  disposal,  it  was  not  possible  to  issue  very 
detailed  orders  or  to  make  alteration  of  the  dispositions  of  the  troops  in  the  trenches'. 
Battalion  and  junior  officers  were  equally  affected: 
About  3.30  p.  m.  the  C.  O.  (Major  Johnson)  said  he  wanted  to  see  all  Officers  in  the  Firing 
Line.......  At  this  meeting  he  told  us  that  he  had  orders  to  make  an  attack  on  the  German  position 
at  4.45  p.  m.  about  an  hour  after.  Orders  are  orders  and  although  we  had  to  hurry  to  get  our  men  in 
position,  etc,  at  4.45  prompt  our  boys  scaled  the  parapet.  13 
49  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  227. 
50  Nicholson,  Behind  the  Lines,  p.  228. 
51  NA,  WO  95  710,  Major-General  Bannatine-Allason  to  IV  Corps,  26  June  1915. 
52  NA,  WO  95  710,5  1st  Division  Report  on  operations  at  Givenchy. 
228 This  reflected  badly  on  the  divisional  staff.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  Rawlinson  was  not 
impressed  by  this  aspect  of  the  division's  work,  and  there  are  a  number  of  instances  where 
the  infantry  units  could  have  been  better  assisted  by  more  able  staff  work.  Captain  Lusk 
complained  of  the  staff  that,  `I  got  my  column  to  the  point  indicated  in  the  map  reference,  and 
found  the  field  I  was  to  occupy  in  possession  of  another  unit's  transport.  This  is  what  is 
known  in  the  army  as  `bad  staff  work'.  '54  Another  incident  involving  a  failure  to  notify  troops 
of  an  attack  was  a  more  serious  lapse,  and  Captain  Ross  stated: 
At  3  a.  m.  a  company  of  Guardsmen,  armed  with  Hale  grenades,  suddenly  appeared  in  the  trench. 
One  of  their  officers,  noticing  me  standing  near,  approached  and  said:  "Hullo!  When  are  you  going 
over?  "  "Going  over?  I  don't  understand.  "  "What!  Do  you  mean  to  say  you  don't  know  you're 
attacking  this  morning?  "  "Well,  it's  the  first  time  I've  heard  of  it".  " 
The  problem  with  communications  accentuated  any  failings  in  planning  and  in  the  execution 
of  orders: 
When  one  compares  the  elaborate  signalling  arrangements  made  prior  to  an  attack  in  1917  or  1918, 
and  thinks  of  the  numerous  telephone  cables  buried  6  feet  deep,  with  elaborate  dug-outs  at 
cableheads,  and  all  the  numerous  switchboards,  ring  telephones,  etc.,  used,  the  very  rudimentary 
apparatus  and  cable  used  in  this  attack  provoke  a  smile.  There  were  no  buried  cables,  simply  thinly 
insulated  wires  laid  along  the  top  of  the  communication  trench,  with  one  or  two  alternate  routes 
laid  across  the  fields  and  carried  across  roads,  on  trees,  or  ruined  houses,  with  the  result  that,  as 
soon  as  the  German  artillery  retaliated,  all  communication  between  the  front  line  and  battalion 
headquarters  was  cut,  the  line  in  many  places  blown  to  pieces.  56 
In  many  instances,  the  only  way  to  understand  what  was  taking  place  was  to  be  in  the  right 
place  at  the  right  time,  such  as  the  adjutant  and  commanding  officer  who  arrived  `and  took  up 
a  point  of  vantage  in  the  trench  where  a  view  of  the  6th  Scottish  Rifles  could  be  got  during 
their  advance.  It  was  only  by  this  means  that  the  C.  O.  could  judge  as  to  the  failure  or  success 
of  the  Scottish  Rifles.  '57  If  this  was  not  possible,  then  commanders,  particularly  at  brigade 
level  and  above,  and  their  staff  were  often  unsighted:  `The  situation,  owing  to  the  difficulty 
of  communication,  was  unknown  to  the  Brigadier'.  58 
33  IWM,  78/22/1,  Diary  of  Captain  J.  S.  Mahon. 
54  J.  Lusk,  Letters  and  Memoirs  (Oxford,  1916),  p.  65. 
55  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  p.  9. 
56  Sutherland,  War  Diary  of  the  5`"  Seaforth  Highlanders,  p.  22. 
57  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  5T"  Highland  Division,  1914-1918,  p.  19. 
58  NA,  WO  95  710,5  151  Division  Report  on  operations  at  Givenchy. 
229 Confusion  was  a  natural  result.  Captain  Lusk  recorded,  `At  last  an  order  came  to  withdraw;  it 
came  from  the  right,  but  from  whom  no  one  knows.  Then  they  all  came  back-all  that  was  left 
of  them.  '59  War  diaries  also  stated  that  at  12  a.  m.  on  15  June,  152nd  Brigade: 
Ascertained  that  fresh  advance  ordered  by  Bde.  Commander  had  not  started.  Orders  were 
accordingly  given  for  the  advance  at  1.45  a.  m.  in  accordance  with  instructions  received  from  51" 
Divn......  A  few  minutes  later  message  was  received  by  Bde.  Maj.  that  the  1540i  Bde.  had 
withdrawn.  Instructions  were  accordingly  given  to  carry  out  the  withdrawal  onto  the  front 
parapet.  6o 
The  communications  from  reserve  trenches  to  the  front  line  were  very  bad  and  movement  had 
predominantly  to  be  carried  out  in  the  open  under  direct  German  observation.  This  inability 
to  conceal  the  intentions  of  the  formation  resulted  in  heavy  losses.  The  official  history  stated 
that  `The  enemy,  indeed,  seemed  to  know  not  only  the  exact  frontage  but  the  very  moment  of 
attack',  61  and  Wimberley  stated,  `The  Boches  rose  early,  having  apparently  known  of  our 
plans  and  cried  `Come  along  Jocks,  we  are  waiting  for  you'.  62  The  situation  did  not  improve 
on  16  June  and  once  more  the  enemy  were  ready,  as  the  official  history  testified:  `The  results, 
however,  were  even  more  disappointing  than  at  the  first  attempt,  the  enemy  again  being  fully 
prepared'.  63  The  official  history  was  supported  in  that  statement  by  Bannatine-Allason 
himself:  `it  is  evident  that  the  Germans  had  made  all  preparations  for  this  attack'.  64 
By  contrast,  the  51St  lacked  intelligence  as  to  the  strength  and  intentions  of  the  enemy. 
Bannatine-Allason  stated  to  IV  Corps: 
From  various  reports  it  seems  clear  that  the  Germans  had  been  reinforced,  as  there  is  evidence  that 
those  against  us  on  the  16`h  were  dressed  differently  to  those  seen  the  day  before.  They  were 
dressed  in  darker  blue  uniform  and  had  evidently  been  brought  up  during  the  night.  65 
However,  by  the  time  this  was  evident,  it  was  too  late. 
59  Lusk,  Leiters  and  Memories,  p.  75. 
60  NA,  WO  952861. 
61  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  p.  94. 
62  NLS,  ACC  7380,  box  9,  Book  1  of  `The  Highland  Division',  pp.  11-12. 
63  Edmonds,  Military  Operations,  p.  96. 
64  NA,  WO  95  710,51s`  Division  Report  on  operations  at  Givenchy. 
6s  NA,  WO  95  710,51s`  Division  Report  on  operations  at  Givenchy. 
230 Strength  and  casualties 
The  division  had  been  considered  by  higher  commanders  to  be  strong  enough  to  take  the 
field.  The  recorded  war  establishment  of  the  (Highland)  Division  at  embarkation  on  28  April 
1915  was  570  officers  and  15,729  other  ranks.  66  However,  in  the  period  since  its  arrival  in 
France,  casualties  had  been  heavy.  Prior  to  the  attack,  on  10  June  1915,  war  diaries  record, 
`The  very  high  proportion  of  losses  in  the  51st  Division  as  compared  with  casualties  in  the  7`h 
Div  and  Canadian  Div  was  commented  on  by  the  IV  Corps  Commander'.  67  During  the  battle 
itself,  it  is  no  surprise  that  the  casualties  were  also  high  in  the  attacking  battalions. 
Fig.  21  Casualties  for  battle68 
Officers  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
16  46  5 
Other  ranks  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
187  1040  386 
Captain  Lusk  of  the  1/6th  Scottish  Rifles  wrote  of  the  impact  on  his  battalion,  `before 
noonday  the  Companies  held  their  roll-call.  Out  of  the  total  number  of  Officers  and  men  who 
went  into  the  trenches  on  Sunday  night,  13/14th  June,  exactly  half  answered  their  names.  '69 
Wauchope  gave  another  example  of  the  loss  in  attacking  units,  `During  the  fighting  the 
machine  gun  section  in  the  front  line  suffered  severely;  Lieutenant  Westwood  was  killed  and 
15  out  of  a  total  of  25  men  were  either  killed  or  wounded'.  70 
The  heavy  casualty  rates  were  due  to  the  nature  of  the  attack  with  an  ineffective  barrage  and 
an  advance  in  wave  formation  against  enemy  machine  guns: 
Machine  guns  swept  over  the  parapet.......  At  6.45  P.  M.  the  order  came  `Advance!  '  The  place  was 
a  perfect  hell.  Just  one  solid  sheet  of  bullets.  Over  we  went.  Many  were  hit  on  the  top  of  the 
66  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
67  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"  Division,  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
68  NA,  WO  95  2848,51s`  Division,  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
69  Lusk,  Letters  and  Memories,  p.  75. 
70  A.  G.  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  11  (London,  1926),  p. 
252. 
231 parapet;  before  a  distance  of  thirty  yards  was  traversed  all  the  officers  of  our  company  were  hit,  as 
well  as  the  brigade  bombing  officer......  On  we  went;  but  men  were  falling  in  all  directions,  and  by 
the  time  we  were  within  reach  of  the  German  wire,  not  more  than  fifteen  of  the  company  were  still 
on  the  move.  The  outlook  was  hopeless,  the  wire  was  an  insurmountable  obstacle,  and  the  few  who 
remained  had  to  take  cover  in  the  nearest  shell-hole  until  darkness  allowed  us  to  make  our  own 
lines  again-  a  sad  dejected  remnant  of  a  company.  7' 
This  form  of  attack  took  a  heavy  toll  on  leaders  who  were  in  the  forefront  of  the  advance  and 
Captain  Lusk  recorded  that,  `A  Company  who  went  over  the  parapet  first  have  had  the 
heaviest  losses.  Murray,  Macdonald  and  Kennedy  all  killed,  McLean's  nerves  completely 
shattered,  and  every  sergeant  gone  save  Dowie'.  72 
Esprit  de  corps 
The  (Highland)  Division  that  took  up  position  at  Givenchy,  like  many  other  formations  new 
to  the  front,  maintained  high  levels  of  morale,  possibly  dampened  but  not  extinguished  by  the 
many  months  of  training  in  Britain.  The  division  now  considered  itself  to  be  a  combat 
formation.  However,  that  six  weeks'  experience  had  not  consisted  of  actual  combat  and 
Captain  Ross  recorded  that  many  in  the  division  had  not  come  to  terms  with  the  reality  of  the 
situation: 
the  thought  that  some  of  the  fine  fellows,  giants  in  frame  and  physique,  would  be  as  helpless  as 
pygmies  before  those  devouring  guns,  did  not  unduly  disturb  the  serenity  of  our  minds.  At  that 
moment  everybody  was  imbued  with  an  overmastering  desire,  to  meet  the  enemy  and  put  him  to 
confusion.  3 
Involvement  in  battle  had  both  a  positive  and  negative  impact  on  esprit  de  corps.  The 
division  did  grow  closer  together  as  a  formation  through  the  act  of  engagement,  and  although 
casualties  were  high  in  numerical  terms  (in  the  attacking  units)  and  in  prominent  figures,  the 
conduct  of  the  division  was  considered  by  its  troops  to  have  been  exemplary.  General  Ross, 
commanding  152nd  Infantry  Brigade,  stated  in  his  report  of  the  operations:  `I  am  glad  to  say 
that  both  officers  and  men  behaved  very  well  indeed,  and  all  went  into  the  attack  with  the  full 
intention  of  getting  through'.  74  Captain  Mahon,  conjuring  up  images  of  clan  charges  and 
glorious  defeat  stated: 
￿  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51S'  Division,  pp.  19-20. 
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73  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  in  France,  p.  32. 
74  NA,  WO  95  2844,152  nd  Brigade  Report  on  operations  at  Givenchy,  16  June  1915. 
232 All  this  sounds  like  a  defeat  and  I  suppose  that  so  far  as  capturing  trenches  was  concerned  it  was, 
but  we  only  had  an  hour  and  a  half  notice  and  it  took  the  C.  O.  half  an  hour  to  bring  the  news  up  to 
the  front.  Anyhow  all  the  Generals  patted  us  on  the  back  and  some  day  or  two  later  we  had  a 
7s  message  direct  from  the  G.  O.  C.  (General  Sir  John  French)  thanking  us  for  our  fine  work. 
However,  morale  did  suffer  as  the  reality  of  combat  became  apparent.  The  loss  of  friends  and 
the  shock  of  the  brutality  of  war  swiftly  eradicated  notions  of  childhood  wargames.  Captain 
Mahon  related: 
A  very  sad  sight  five  minutes  after  the  first  lot  went  over,  wounded  men  coming  back  by  the 
dozen,  full  of  grit  most  of  them,  but  many  dazed  and  wounded  so  badly  that  they  cared  for  little  but 
to  be  carried  back.  I  care  not  to  recall  individual  cases  in  writing,  they  are  to  be  seen  but  one 
cannot  read  about  them.  76 
Bewsher  summed  up  the  elation  of  leaving  the  sector: 
All  ranks  experienced  a  sense  of  relief  on  leaving  the  Festubert  area.  Not  only  on  account  of  the 
serious  casualties  suffered  in  many  units  during  the  attacks  and  the  retaliation  provoked  by  them, 
but  also  for  other  reasons,  it  was  rightly  regarded  as  an  unpleasant  sector.  " 
Beaumont  Hamel  1916 
Narrative 
After  Givenchy,  allied  offensives  continued  with  the  French  campaigns  in  Artois  and 
Champagne  which  made  little  progress.  A  supporting  British  attack  at  Loos  failed  due  to, 
amongst  other  things,  poor  communication  which  permitted  the  enemy  to  bring  up  reserves 
and  machine  guns  and  halt  any  further  attempts  at  exploitation.  During  this  period,  artillery 
continued  to  predominate  with  the  aim  of  restoring  mobility  by  winning  the  firefight  at  the 
expense  of  any  element  of  surprise.  However,  the  quantity  of  artillery  and  ammunition 
available  usually  determined  the  scale  of  attack,  and  the  tactics  employed  were  simplistic  and 
usually  materialised  over  three  phases:  preliminary  bombardment,  the  barrage,  and 
exploitation  and  consolidation. 
However,  by  1916,  with  more  centrally-driven  aggression  and  simultaneous  pressure  on  all 
fronts,  78  the  allied  high  commands  planned  big  offensives,  and  following  the  prevailing 
75  IWM,  78/22/1,  Diary  of  Captain  J.  S.  Mahon,  undated. 
76  IWM,  78/22/1,  Diary  of  Captain  J.  S.  Mahon,  undated. 
77  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"'  Highland  Division,  pp.  23-24. 
78  Ashworth,  Trench  Warfare,  p.  53. 
233 tactical  thought  aimed  to  employ  an  overwhelming  amount  of  weaponry,  shells  and 
ammunition.  Success  was  to  be  achieved  simply  by  the  unrelenting  use  of  artillery.  It  had 
become  a  straightforward  matter  to  destroy  trenches  and  it  was  considered  feasible  that 
attacks  might  proceed  without  prohibitive  loss.  In  the  summer  and  autumn  of  1916  when  the 
British  and  French  attacked  on  the  Somme  using  waves  of  troops  as  the  tactical  deployment 
for  the  advance,  massive  preliminary  bombardments  were  employed  to  wear  down  the  enemy 
defences  and  destroy  troops.  Fresh  issues  arose  for  the  BEF  as  the  battle  of  the  Somme  wore 
on.  The  British  high  command  became  committed  to  a  battle  of  attrition  in  a  series  of 
offensives  with  limited  objectives.  However,  the  German  high  command  countered  by 
deploying  its  forces  in  greater  depth.  This  necessitated  constant  revisions  and  adaptation  of 
tactical  application. 
Within  this  context,  the  post-Givenchy  period  had  not  been  one  of  excessive  activity  for  the 
51St  Division,  with  much  of  its  routine  being  taken  up  with  trench-holding.  The  division's 
only  experience  of  assault  before  Beaumont  Hamel  was  at  High  Wood  during  July  1916,  and 
this  attack  was  not  a  success.  `The  Germans  were  strong  in  both  numbers  and  in  position; 
their  trenches  were  well  wired  and  heavily  manned  by  machine  gunners  and,  in  addition,  they 
had  an  excellent  field  of  fire.  '79 
The  attack  on  Beaumont  Hamel  four  months  later  was  partly  undertaken  in  support  of  a 
simultaneous  French  offensive,  but  also  because  GHQ  needed  a  success  at  the  end  of  a 
gruelling  campaign.  80  The  general  attack  scheme  issued  on  10  November  1916  read: 
On  "Z"  day  the  Fifth  Army  will  attack  and  establish  itself  on  the  line  (BEAUCOURT- 
FRANKFURT  TRENCH-SERRE.  )  The  II  Corps  will  attack  south  of  the  ANCRE  and  the  V  Corps 
north  of  the  ANCRE.  The  V  Corps  will  attack  with  5  Divisions;  63rd  Division  (on  the  right),  51st 
Division,  2nd  Division  and  3rd  Division  (on  the  left),  the  37th  Division  being  in  reserve.  $' 
The  cavalry  were  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  exploit  their  attack. 
79  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  11,  p.  141. 
80  T.  Travers,  The  Killing  Ground,  The  British  Army,  the  Western  Front  and  the  experience  of  Mobile  Warfare 
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234 Within  this  scheme,  the  specific  objectives  liar  the  51"  Division  were  to  capture  the  village  of' 
Beaumont  I  lamcl  (Green  Line)  and  push  forward  between  the  converging  flanks  of'  the  63"' 
and  2"d  Divisions  as  far  as  the  strong  point  at  Frankfurt  'French  (Yellow  l,  ine).  S2 
Map  2.  The  Beaumont  Ilamel  sector  prior  to  attack83 
Brigadier-General  Campbell's  153`d  Brigade  deployed  1/7`h  Gordon  Highlanders  and  1/6`' 
Black  Watch  on  the  right.  These  units  were  positioned  in  the  first  line,  with  the  1/5"i  Gordon 
82  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  103. 
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235 Highlanders  in  support.  On  the  left,  the  152"  d  Brigade  under  the  command  of  Brigadier- 
General  Pelham  Burn  adopted  a  similar  formation,  with  the  1/5"'  Seaforths  and  the  1/8"' 
Argyll  and  Sutherland  I  lighlanders  in  front  and  the  1/6°i  Scaforths  in  support.  Ilowever,  the 
1/6`h  Gordon  Highlanders  were  kept  in  reserve.  In  each  brigade  the  leading  battalions  were  to 
proceed  to  the  first  objective,  whilst  `the  advance  to  the  narrow  second  objective  was  to  he 
made  by  two  companies  of  the  1/5`'  Gordons  (153`d  Brigade)  and  two  of  the  1/6"  Seaforth 
Highlanders  (152T  Brigade)'.  154''  Brigade  under  the  command  of  Brigadier-General 
14  Hamilton  was  held  in  divisional  reserve. 
In  the  attack  on  the  Green  Line,  three  intermediate  objectives  were  selected,  known  as  the 
Pink  Line  (the  German  front  line),  the  Blue  Line  (the  German  second  line),  and  the  Purple 
Line  (the  German  third  line). 
Each  of  these  lines  had  a  separate  wave  detailed  for  its  capture  composed  of  units  from  the 
following  battalions":  - 
Fig.  22 
Pink  Line: 
1/5`h  Seaforth  Highlanders,  1/8`h  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  1/7`h  Gordon 
Highlanders,  1/6`h  Black  Watch 
Blue  Line: 
1/5`h  Seaforth  Highlanders,  1/8`h  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  1/7`h  Gordon 
Highlanders,  1/6`h  Black  Watch 
Purple  Line: 
1/5th  Seaforth  Highlanders,  1/81h  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  1/7`h  Gordon 
highlanders,  1/6`h  Black  Watch 
Green  Line: 
1/6`h  Seaforth  Highlanders  (in  two  waves),  1/7`h  Gordon  Highlanders,  1/6`h  Black  Watch 
The  objectives  were  ambitious.  The  51st  Division  faced  an  enemy  position  which  had 
developed  into  a  formidable  stronghold  over  a  two  year  period.  The  area  was  well  situated 
defensively,  as  Beaumont  Hamel  village  lay  on  low  ground  surrounded  by  slopes  and  small 
84  W.  Miles,  Military  Operations,  France  and  Belgium,  1916  (London,  1938),  p.  491. 
236 hills  which  made  British  reconnaissance  difficult.  The  main  points  of  resistance  lay  in  the 
village  itself  and  in  the  heavily  fortified  `Y'  Ravine.  The  `Y'  Ravine  was  deep  with  almost 
precipitous  sides: 
It  lay  with  its  two  arms  pointing  like  antennae  towards  the  British  lines,  some  300-500  yards  south 
of  the  village.  It  was  honeycombed  with  dug-outs,  crossed  by  numerous  trenches,  and  its  garrison 
could  readily  be  reinforced.  The  village  was  also  strengthened  by  means  of  reinforced  concrete 
backings  to  its  ruined  walls,  forming  powerful  machine-gun  posts,  by  subterranean  passages 
between  its  cellars  and  caves,  and  by  trenches  dug  in  its  streets,  which  formed  a  further  system 
even  more  difficult  to  master  than  the  powerful  trenches  in  front.  In  addition,  the  whole  German 
position  was  heavily  protected  by  strong  wire  entanglements  throughout.  " 
By  contrast,  on  arrival  in  the  sector  the  51"  found  the  British  trench  system  in  appalling 
condition: 
The  line  was  found  in  bad  order.  Communication  trenches  narrow,  unrevetted  and  in  bad  repair, 
and  almost  entirely  deficient  of  trench  boards.  The  cross  trenches  narrow,  muddy  and,  to  a  great 
extent,  unrevetted.  Dug-outs  insufficient-  a  good  many  started  but  not  completed.  " 
In  dreadful  weather  conditions,  this  was  to  prove  wearisome  on  the  troops. 
24  October  was  the  planned  date  for  the  attack,  but  adverse  weather  conditions  postponed  it  a 
number  of  times.  88  These  postponements  were  often  at  short  notice  and  preliminary  artillery 
bombardments  were  continually  carried  out: 
Wire-cutting  was  begun  by  the  artillery  and  the  2"  trench-mortars  on  20`x'  October,  and  was  carried 
on  continuously  until  the  day  of  the  attack.  Every  precaution  was  taken  to  ensure  that  this  was 
successful.  Patrols,  often  accompanied  by  artillery  officers,  inspected  the  wire  protecting  the 
enemy  front  lines  every  night.  89 
During  the  postponements,  work  was  carried  out  on  the  trench  system.  However,  as  152°d  and 
153`d  brigades  assembled  to  attack  on  the  morning  of  13  November,  it  was  apparent  that  too 
much  had  needed  rectifying:  `Owing  to  the  state  of  the  trenches  movement  was  carried  out 
85  NA,  WO  95  2845,51s`  Division  Operation  Order  No.  109,10  November  1916. 
86  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51'''  Highland  Division,  pp.  100-101. 
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88  On  25  October  a  postponement  of  forty-eight  hours  was  ordered.  On  29  October  the  date  of  the  attack  was 
changed  to  5  November.  Later,  it  was  again  postponed  to  9  November,  and  again  to  10  November.  On  10 
November  it  was  ordered  to  take  place  on  13  November.  On  11  November  the  hour  for  zero  was  selected  at  5.45 
a.  m.,  in  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  104. 
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237 almost  entirely  over  the  open'.  However,  and  fortunately,  `the  attention  of  the  enemy  was  not 
attracted  and  there  was  little  hostile  artillery  fire  before  zero  hour'.  90 
The  assembly  was  accomplished  without  any  serious  delays  or  setbacks,  and  six  minutes 
before  zero  hour  the  leading  battalions  moved  forward  to  clear  the  British  wire.  At  5.45  a.  m., 
coinciding  with  the  detonation  of  a  mine  at  Hawthorn  Ridge,  the  British  artillery  opened  a 
heavy  barrage  on  the  German  front  line.  Simultaneously,  the  infantry  advanced,  trained  to 
move  up  behind  a  lifting  barrage,  91  `not  doubling,  not  even  walking,  but  wading  knee-deep 
and  sometimes  waist-deep  through  the  morass  of  sticky  mud  and  water  and  neck-deep  shell 
holes  which  constituted  no-man's  land'.  92 
The  official  history  confirmed  that  both  brigades  started  well: 
On  the  extreme  right  two  companies  of  the  1/7`h  Gordon  Highlanders  took  the  German  front  line 
with  little  trouble.  Still  following  the  barrage  closely,  they  broke  through  the  German  front  system, 
passed  the  eastern  end  of  Y  ravine  and  reached  the  first  objective  at  6.45  A.  M.,  with  a  small  party 
of  marines  (63  Division)  on  their  right  93  `d 
Harper  recorded  that  shortly  after  that  point  `considerable  resistance  was  encountered'.  94 
The  1/7t'  Gordon  Highlanders  were  held  up  by  machine  guns  and  snipers  and  the  1/6`h  Black 
Watch  encountered  the  Y  Ravine  salient.  The  1/5th  Gordon  Highlanders  advanced  to  assist  in 
the  attack  soon  after  7  a.  m.,  `Some  of  the  1/6th  Black  Watch  [employing  advanced  tactics] 
skirted  the  northern  side  of  the  ravine  and  pushed  on'.  95  By  `10.30  A.  M.  Major-General 
Harper  was  aware  that  the  right  of  the  attack  had  reached  the  first  objective.  He  had  already 
ordered  up  the  1/4th  Gordon  Highlanders  (from  the  154th  Brigade,  in  reserve)  for  the  purpose 
of  isolating  Y  ravine  by  bombing  attacks  from  north  and  south'.  96  However,  before  this 
started,  the  much  vaunted  `Y'  Ravine  fell  without  any  substantial  resistance.  Major-General 
Harper  confirmed  that  at: 
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238 12-40  p.  m.  it  was  reported  that  the  enemy  in  the  salient  and  "Y"  RAVINE  had  surrendered  to  two 
parties  of  the  6th  Black  Watch  who,  under  the  personal  leadership  of  the  Officer  Commanding  the 
Battalion,  had  effected  an  entrance  into  the  western  end  of  the  "Y"  RAVINE.  This  operation  was 
assisted  by  bombing  parties  of  the  50h  and  7`h  Gordon  Highlanders  who  had  pushed  into  unoccupied 
portions  of  the  line  and  taken  the  enemy  in  flank.  97 
By  the  early  afternoon  of  13  November,  the  1/4`h  Gordon  Highlanders  entered  Beaumont 
Hamel  village,  assisted  by  the  115`h  Gordon  Highlanders  and  the  1/6th  Black  Watch,  and 
consolidated.  By  late  afternoon: 
Consolidation  of  the  first  objective  proceeded  assisted  by  a  party  of  the  1/80,  Royal  Scots 
(pioneers),  and  some  reorganisation  was  carried  out.  The  new  front  was  then  held  by  the  1/4`h 
Gordon  Highlanders  (154`"  Brigade),  the  1/6`h  Black  Watch  (153rd  Brigade),  two  companies  of  the 
1/6`x'  Gordon  Highlanders,  and  the  1/80'  Argyll  and  Sutherland  (both  152°d  Brigade),  in  touch  on 
the  left  with  the  2od  Division.  The  1/7`"  Gordon  Highlanders  (153rd  Brigade)  and  1150'  and  1/6`h 
Seaforth  (152nd  Brigade)  were  withdrawn  to  the  reserve  line  of  the  German  front  system,  where 
they  were  reinforced  by  two  companies  of  the  1/7t'  Argyll  and  Sutherland  (from  the  154`"  Brigade, 
in  reserve)  about  9  P.  M.  The  1/5`'  Gordon  Highlanders  (153rd  Brigade),  having  no  knowledge  of 
the  extent  of  the  advance  of  the  63rd  Division,  formed  a  defensive  flank  to  connect  with  the  left  of 
that  division  in  the  German  front  line  system.  98 
On  the  morning  of  14  November,  the  advance  was  continued.  Corps  artillery  had  kept  up  a  barrage 
throughout  the  night  and  although  German  retaliation  was  growing  in  some  areas  at  6am,  the 
heavy  artillery  bombardment  opened  on  the  first  objective-Beaucourt  Trench  on  the  front  of  63`d 
Division,  and  Munich  Trench,  opposite  the  51s`  and  2nd  Divisions.  Twelve  minutes  later,  just  before 
dawn,  the  field  artillery  barrage  came  down,  and  at  6.20  A.  M.  the  infantry  advanced  to  the 
assault  99 
The  1/7th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  had  been  ordered  to  capture  Munich  Trench  and 
this  objective  was  achieved.  However,  there  was  little  cover  and  heavy  enemy  fire,  and  the 
battalion  was  withdrawn  to  a  new  line  called  `New  Munich  Trench'  150  yards  away. 
On  the  evening  of  14  November,  the  152nd  Brigade  was  ordered  by  the  divisional  commander 
to  attack  the  second  objective,  Frankfurt  Trench,  the  following  morning  at  9  a.  m.  with  units 
of  the  1/7th  Argylls  and  1/9th  Royal  Scots: 
These  troops  were  formed  up  in  NEW  MUNICH  TRENCH.....  The  attack  of  the  51"'  Division 
started  according  to  time  table,  and  the  waves  successfully  crossed  MUNICH  TRENCH,  when 
they  ran  into  the  barrage  and  suffered  severe  losses,  sufficient  totally  to  disorganise  the  attack. 
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239 Only  a  few  individuals  reached  FRANKFURT  TRENCH.....  In  these  circumstances  it  was  decided 
not  to  renew  the  attack  without  further  preparation.  '°° 
Analysis 
In  purely  operational  terms,  the  attack  could  only  be  classed  as  a  limited  success  because  the 
division  did  not  secure  all  its  objectives  at  a  time  when  the  German  forces  at  Beaumont 
Hamel  were  overconfident  and  largely  taken  by  surprise.  This  failure  to  exploit  the  advantage 
is  further  compounded  by  the  substantial  amount  of  time  that  the  division  had  to  prepare. 
However,  the  final  check  at  Frankfurt  Trench  was  predominantly  a  result  of  the  battle 
continuing  longer  than  it  should  have,  permitting  the  enemy  to  mobilise  its  reserves. 
Ultimately,  the  divisional  momentum  was  stymied  by  poor  communications  and  inadequate 
preparations  which  intensified  as  each  hour  passed. 
In  its  defence,  the  515  Division  did  succeed  in  taking  most  of  its  objectives  against  an 
incredibly  strong  position  when  it  did  not  have  significant  experience  in  attack.  It  employed 
sound  tactics  on  the  day  although  perhaps  it  was  fortunate  that  other  factors  assisted  the 
progress  of  the  attack.  However,  the  key  significance  of  the  attack  by  the  51S`  on  Beaumont 
Hamel  lay  in  its  enormous  strategic  implications,  as  its  loss  contributed  to  the  enemy  decision 
to  withdraw  in  early  1917.  It  was  also  crucial  to  Haig  that  he  gained  a  victory  and  created 
heroes  at  the  end  of  a  year  of  hard  fighting. 
On  13  November,  Harper  noted  that: 
The  attack  had  been  completely  successful.  Some  2,000  prisoners  had  been  taken.  The  modified 
objective  (the  GREEN  LINE)  had  been  gained  at  every  point,  and  an  advance  to  the  YELLOW 
LINE  (the  original  objective)  could  have  been  undertaken  had  the  positions  of  the  Division  on 
either  flank  been  less  obscure.  '°1 
However,  the  division  did  not  get  as  far  as  it  had  hoped  and  on  14  November  progress  was 
even  less  marked,  as  enemy  resistance  had  increased  as  reserves  and  extra  guns  were  brought 
into  play  leading  to  German  counter-attacks  on  `Y'  Ravine.  Significantly  though,  by  the  end 
of  14  November,  the  flanks  were  more  secure:  `I  hear  the  right  division  has  done  very  well 
too.  That  is  the  62  "a  (Naval)  div,  and  they  have  captured  Beaucourt.  The  left  got  on 
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240 indifferently  at  first  but  made  better  progress  afterwards.  '  102  However,  on  the  third  day  the 
attack  ultimately  petered  out  as  it  failed  to  reach  its  objective,  halted  due  to  the  British 
tactical  and  logistical  failings  rather  than  the  enemy  defence,  the  men  advancing  too  rapidly 
and  being  caught  in  the  barrage.  Brigadier-General  Pelham  Burn  added  that  mistakes  were 
also  made  by  other  divisions  as  `The  troops  of  the  2nd  Division  on  our  left  lost  direction  in  the 
mist  and  swung  to  the  Right  [sic]  across  our  rear  in  a  very  disorganised  state'.  103 
That  the  enemy  was  largely  taken  by  surprise  on  the  day  of  the  attack  is  undoubted.  This 
appears  to  be  outwardly  surprising  as  the  British  military  build-up  had  been  ongoing  for  over 
a  month.  The  artillery  barrages  repeatedly  signalled  that  an  attack  was  imminent,  and  the 
German  position  was  well  situated  for  reconnaissance  over  the  surrounding  landscape.  It  is 
true  that  the  51St  Division  did  carry  out  much  work  by  stealth,  and  on  the  night  prior  to  the 
attack  a  `covering  screen  of  troops,  who  were  not  detailed  to  take  part  in  the  first  phase  of  the 
attack,  lay  out  in  No  Man's  Land  to  prevent  German  patrols  from  approaching  our  trenches 
and  discovering  that  assembly  for  an  attack  was  in  progress'.  104  However,  due  to  the  poor 
state  of  the  British  trench  system  and  the  need  to  carry  out  work  in  the  open,  the  Germans 
should  have  been  able  to  detect  divisional  preparations.  Despite  this,  the  assembly  went 
undetected  and  the  153rd  Brigade  `was  in  its  positions  of  assembly  by  3  a.  m.  without  any 
signs  of  the  enemy  being  aware  of  the  movement  as,  up  to  Zero,  hostile  shell  fire  was  normal 
and  there  was  practically  no  Machine  gun  [sic]  activity'.  105 
However,  the  key  factor  in  surprising  the  enemy  lay  not  in  any  (Highland)  Division  action, 
but  in  the  enemy  forces  being  too  overconfident.  `Certainly  the  Germans  never  expected  that 
such  a  position  as  Beaumont-Hamel  would  ever  have  been  taken  away  from  them  and  thus 
their  seeming  laxity  in  its  defence'.  106  Also,  Pelham  Burn  stated  that: 
continued  bombardments  over  a  long  period  undoubtedly  deceived  the  enemy  and  he  had  given  up 
expecting  an  attack.  This  is  confirmed  by  prisoners  who  volunteered  the  statement  that  there  would 
be  no  counter-attack  as  reserves  were  brought  up  into  the  trenches  about  a  week  ago  because  it  was 
thought  our  intention  to  attack  had  been  abandoned.  Prisoners  agreed  that  a  gradual  relief  was  in 
progress.  107 
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241 Another  vital  factor  to  the  success  of  the  attack  lay  in  the  poor  quality  of  the  enemy  garrison: 
They  are  poor,  miserable,  dejected  looking  creatures  and  appeared  to  be  either  older  men  or  boys 
and  not  the  usual  sort  of  German  soldier.  It  is  really  pitiful  to  see  them,  they  are  as  scared  looking 
as  can  be,  and  ragged.  The  515`  took  over  a  thousand  prisoners,  the  fog  covering  the  attack  in  which 
the  Huns  were  absolutely  surprised,  many  of  them  still  in  bed  at  the  time........  Good  job  for  us, 
for  this  fact  alone  has  decided  the  fate  of  Beaumont-Hamel.  108 
The  guns  had  done  the  damage  according  to  the  journalist,  Alexander  Catto,  who  reported  an 
officer  overlooking  the  ruins  of  Beaumont  Hamel  asserting: 
"Its  all  very  well",  the  officer  said,  "to  take  as  an  instance  of  the  German's  fighting  capacity  what 
happened  down  there  in  that  gully,  honeycombed  with  Boche  dugouts.  Beaumont  Hamel  was  a 
hard  nut  to  crack,  even  after  the  awful  pounding  it  got  from  our  guns.  It  is  true  the  Boches 
surrendered  in  hundreds,  and  that  comparatively  small  bodies  of  our  troops  took  prisoners  ten 
times  their  own  number.  But  what  like  were  the  prisoners?  Stunned,  bewildered,  demoralised,  and 
nerve  shaken;  beaten  dispirited  and  hopeless.  For  nineteen  days  they  had  been  kept  down  in  their 
dark,  evil  smelling  holes  by  the  awful  battering  of  our  guns;  they  had  been  living  in  an  inferno.  "  "It 
was  more  than  human  flesh  and  blood  could  stand"  the  officer  added,  "and  Germans  are  flesh  and 
blood  like  ourselves,  not  iron.  They  were  hands  up  that  day,  and,  "Kamerad"  and  no  wonder.  But, 
meet  the  Boche  when  he  is  at  his  best:  it  is  hammer  and  tongs  all  the  time,  and  he  fights  hard,  no 
troops  in  the  world  better,  not  even  our  own".  109 
It  has  already  been  stated  that  poor  weather  conditions  over  the  weeks  prior  to  the  attack 
resulted  in  numerous  postponements  and  a  near  continuous  bombardment,  but  another  factor 
that  played  a  crucial  part  in  the  success  of  the  attack  was  the  weather  on  the  first  day  of  the 
assault.  At  5.45  a.  m.  on  13  November  there  was,  `a  fog,  similar  to  a  typical  London 
November  fog,  which  did  not  lift  throughout  the  day.  This  fog  was  a  definite  asset  to  the 
attack,  although  it  made  the  maintenance  of  direction  more  difficult.  "  10 1°  Harper  concluded 
that  the  fog,  `while  concealing  the  movement  of  the  attacking  troops,  prevented  the  enemy 
artillery  from  seeing  the  S.  O.  S.  signal  if  any  were  put  up.  At  all  events  the  hostile  barrage  on 
our  front  line  and  NO  MAN'S  LAND  was  light  and  did  not  open  until  6-15  a.  m..  ' 
However,  as  a  partial  corrective  to  the  potential  loss  of  direction  to  the  infantry,  the  British 
artillery  barrage  could  actually  assist  orientation  through  the  fog,  as  Dominick  Graham  has 
explained:  `When  they  were  correctly  paced  and  placed  and  the  infantry  had  learned  to  `lean' 
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242 on  them,  they  were  consistently  effective  in  both  wars.  In  a  terrain  in  which  most  features  had 
been  erased  by  shelling  they  gave  the  infantry  direction.  '  112  Apart  from  the  potential  for  loss 
of  direction  amongst  the  attacking  troops,  conditions  on  the  ground  were  troublesome. 
Excessive  rain  had  caused  waterlogging  and  continual  mists,  and  the  absence  of  wind 
prevented  the  rain  from  being  absorbed  into  the  atmosphere.  War  diaries  relate  that  the  state 
of  the  ground  had  become  so  bad  that  a  small  raid  which  took  place  on  11  November  failed 
because  the  raiding  party  found  it  a  physical  impossibility  to  keep  up  with  a  very  slow- 
moving  barrage.  Bewsher  used  a  sporting  metaphor  to  describe  the  state  of  the  ground  on  13 
November,  `Let  two  teams  dressed  in  battle  order  play  football  in  the  dark  on  a  ploughed 
field  in  a  clay  soil  after  three  weeks'  steady  rain,  and  the  difficulties  of  the  attacking  troops 
might  then  in  some  measure  be  appreciated'.  '  13 
Two  brigades  were  deployed  for  the  main  attack  on  13  November,  with  two  battalions  in  the 
line,  and  this  was  to  become  the  standard  attack  format  for  the  51St  Division,  dependent  on  the 
width  of  line  to  be  assaulted.  '  14  This  deployment  was  found  by  the  51St  to  be  most  conducive 
to  the  `leapfrogging'  method  of  advance  which  various  sources  attribute  to  Harper.  `General 
Harper's  leap-frog  system  of  attack  had  been  proved;  his  attack  with  two  brigades  instead  of 
three  had  been  fully  justified,  and  an  experience  had  been  gained  from  which  the  future 
training  of  the  Division  was  evolved.  '  115  The  mode  of  attack  for  the  division  was  to  assault  in 
four  `waves',  each  with  a  definite  objective.  Each  wave  was  held  responsible  for  the  taking 
and  `cleaning  up'  of  the  portion  of  the  enemy  line  allotted  to  it,  and  for  `bombing  up'  the 
communication  trenches  towards  the  next  line.  The  second  wave  would  then  pass  through  the 
first  and  so  on.  Undoubtedly,  this  action  proved  effective. 
Beaumont  Hamel  had  been  attacked  on  1  July  1916  with  disastrous  consequences.  On  that 
occasion,  the  plan  was  for  a  frontal  assault  employing  a  heavy  preliminary  bombardment  and 
an  advance  using  linear  wave  formations.  Since  then,  the  system  at  Beaumont  Hamel  had 
been  strengthened.  As  Graham  stated,  they: 
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243 were  now  deeper  and  looser  knit,  depended  on  infantry  fire-power  and  the  counter-attacks  of 
formed  bodies  up  to  a  division  in  strength,  initially  placed  beyond  field  gun  range.  The  front  was 
no  longer  held  by  men  in  a  trench  line  but  rather  by  skirmishers  in  well-concealed  posts  with  a 
high  proportion  of  machine  guns.  Such  a  line  was  not  markedly  vulnerable  to  heavy  bombardment 
or  a  creeping  barrage:  nor  were  companies  advancing  in  waves  an  appropriate  formation  in  which 
to  approach  it.  116 
The  tactics  of  the  (Highland)  Division  focused  not  on  a  frontal  attack,  but  predominantly  on 
outflanking  manoeuvres: 
The  futility  of  making  a  frontal  assault  on  the  ravine  and  its  defences  had  been  proved  in  the  July 
offensive,  and  on  this  occasion  the  idea  was  to  effect  an  entry  at  the  north  end  of  the  salient,  and  by 
bombing,  work  southwards  along  it,  making  the  task  of  its  capture  easier,  and  on  these  lines  the 
operation  was  carefully  rehearsed  beforehand.  '  17 
The  attack  methodology  still  utilised  the  linear  wave  formation,  but  employed  something 
new: 
In  the  event  of  the  portion  of  any  wave  being  held  up  succeeding  waves  should  not  attempt  to  push 
forward  immediately  behind  the  troops  which  are  checked.  They  should  swing  to  the  right  or  left, 
push  through  gaps  already  cleared  by  preceding  waves,  and  then  close  inwards  and  attack  the 
defenders  from  the  flanks  and  rear.  '  18 
The  51St  was  mixing  the  old  wave  formation  with  newer  ideas  of  small  unit  mobility.  As 
Griffith  has  stated,  the  principles  of  fire  and  movement  were  being  thought  out  again  as 
Lewis  guns  were  made  available  to  each  platoon  and  hand  grenades  and  rifle  grenades  were 
increasingly  available  to  non-specialist  infantrymen.  By  the  end  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme, 
platoons  had  more  firepower  and  this  allowed  an  evolution  in  tactical  development.  119 
Artillery 
It  was  disingenuous  of  Brigadier-General  Oldfield  when  he  stated  that  `The  Artillery  can  only 
claim  to  have  cut  the  wire  and  escorted  the  Infantry  into  BEAUMONT  HAMEL.  The  taking 
of  the  strongly  fortified  village  appears  to  have  been  entirely  an  Infantry  soldier's  battle.  '  120 
The  artillery's  role  in  the  battle  was  a  crucial  factor  in  its  success.  By  the  opening  of  the 
Somme  campaign  on  1  July  1916,  the  BEF  had  come  to  rely  on  artillery  firepower  to  a  huge 
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244 extent.  However,  the  Expeditionary  Force  that  took  the  field  early  in  the  summer  campaign 
was  inexperienced  and  lacked  the  ability  to  utilise  small  unit  firepower,  and  the  rationale  was 
to  deploy  it  using  simplistic  linear  tactics  after  the  artillery  had  cleared  a  path.  Ironically,  the 
artillery  was  the  solution  and  the  problem.  Indirect  fire  was  still  inaccurate  due  to  the  inability 
of  batteries  to  locate  targets  and  to  inconsistencies  in  ballistic  calibration.  This  meant 
registration  and  a  sustained  and  heavy  fire  were  essential,  which  compromised  surprise  and 
demanded  enormous  logistical  efforts  and  consumed  huge  quantities  of  materials.  The  long 
duration  of  a  bombardment  also  allowed  the  enemy  to  strengthen  his  defences.  However, 
during  the  months  of  the  Somme  campaign,  although  results  in  the  field  were  variable, 
advances,  such  as  the  development  of  the  creeping  barrage,  were  made  in  artillery/infantry 
co-ordination. 
Graham  also  pointed  out  that,  `In  the  summer  of  1916,  artillery  equipment  and  ammunition 
were  still  unreliable.  Almost  half  the  shells  did  not  explode.  The  sensitive  fuse  106,121  which 
destroyed  wire  and  was  lethal  against  infantry  in  the  open,  was  a  year  away  from  service.  '  122 
However,  during  Beaumont  Hamel,  the  artillery  brigades  of  the  515t  Division  were  at  full 
strength  with  up-to-date  artillery  pieces,  123  better  quality  ordnance,  and  were  supplied  with 
substantial  amounts  of  ammunition. 
Experience  had  shown  that  it  was  essential  to  improve  artillery  co-ordination  and  one 
solution  was  to  create  a  corps-level  artillery  commander  with  the  rank  of  brigadier-general.  124 
At  Beaumont  Hamel  command  centred  on  the  CRA  of  V  Corps  and  it  was  he  who  set  the 
times  of  fireplans  and  allocated  observers  to  batteries  throughout  the  corps.  Oldfield  stated  of 
the  system  that  he  was  `Impressed  by  the  Heavy  Art-liaison  officer  within  51St  HD  HQ' 
during  this  time.  125 
The  prolonged  bombardment  by  the  heavy  artillery  had  been  successful.  Harper  said  of  it 
that,  `There  is  scarcely  a  square  yard  in  BEAUMONT  HAMEL  which  is  not  torn  up  by  shell 
fire.  The  deep  dugouts  alone  have  escaped  destruction,  and  even  in  their  case  many  entrances 
121  However,  the  101  fuse  was  'very  effective  when  used  in  wire  cutting.  '  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Report  by 
Brigadier-General  L.  Oldfield,  20  November  1916. 
122  Graham,  Against  Odds,  Reflections  on  the  Experiences  of  the  British  Army,  1914-45,  p.  36. 
123  Brought  up  to  full  strength  in  May  1916. 
124  J.  Bailey,  'British  Artillery  in  the  Great  War',  in  Paddy  Griffith  (ed),  British  Fighting  Methods,  p.  32. 
125  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Report  by  Brigadier-General  L.  Oldfield,  20  November  1916. 
245 have  been  blown  in.  '  126  Oldfield  confirmed  this  and  recorded  that  `The  wire  was  the  most 
formidable  I  have  ever  seen.  It  was  more  thoroughly  destroyed  than  in  any  previous  case  that 
I  know  of.  '  127 
The  fireplan  became  progressively  more  complex  immediately  prior  to  the  attack  as  six 
batteries  of  heavy  artillery  operated  over  the  divisional  front: 
They  will  open  at  ZERO  on  the  2"d  German  line  (LIGHT  BLUE)  and  they  will  move  back 
approximately  200  yards  beyond  the  18-pdr.  Barrage.  Six  guns  of  the  above  Batteries  have  been 
allotted  special  tasks  and  will  maintain  their  fire  on  certain  dangerous  points  in  the  BEAUMONT 
HAMEL  Valley,  and  on  the  western  slopes  of  the  opposite  hill......  The  4.5"  Hows.  will  similarly 
maintain  a  barrage  100  yards  beyond  the  18-pdr.  barrage,  their  special  task  being  to  deal  with  all 
communication  trenches  running  eastwards  by  enfilade  fire.  '28 
The  lack  of  a  bombardment  immediately  before  the  advance  assisted  in  achieving  the  aim  of 
maximising  surprise  without  compromising  the  efficacy  of  the  destruction  and  neutralisation 
of  the  enemy  system.  129  Pelham  Bum  noted  that  it  was  significant  that  there  was  `the 
SURPRISE  EFFECT  which  was  brought  about  by  the  Infantry  advancing  at  the  same 
moment  as  the  Artillery  opened  fire,  there  being  no  preliminary  bombardment  immediately 
before  the  assault'.  130 
The  creeping  barrage  worked  well  alongside  the  heavy  artillery  bombardment  with  the  18 
pounder  barrage  commencing  at  Zero  hour  on  the  first  day,  and  moving  forward  at  the  rate  of 
100  yards  in  four  minutes.  `The  18-pdr.  barrage  will  commence  at  ZERO  with  25%  of  the 
guns  firing  50  yards  short  of,  and  the  remainder  on,  the  German  front  line.  '131  Bewsher 
stated: 
Both  the  destruction  of  the  wire  and  the  accuracy  of  the  barrage  further  strengthened  the  great 
confidence  of  the  infantry  in  the  Divisional  artillery.  It  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  most  of  the 
troops  had  followed  an  artillery  barrage.  Those  who  were  able  to  keep  up  with  it  could  not  speak 
too  highly  of  its  accuracy.  132 
'26  NA,  WO  95  2845,51s`  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  18  December  1916. 
127  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Report  by  Brigadier-General  L.  Oldfield,  20  November  1916. 
128  NA,  WO  95  2845,51  Division  Operation  Order  No.  109,10  November  1916. 
129  NA,  WO  95  2845,51  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  18  December  1916. 
130  NA,  WO  95  2845,152nd  Brigade  Report  on  the  operation  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  24  November  1916. 
131  NA,  WO  95  2845,51"  Division  Operation  Order  No.  109,10  November  1916. 
132  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  121. 
246 However,  many  of  the  troops  did  fail  to  keep  up,  but  this  was  in  the  main  due  to  the  terrain 
and  the  poor  visibility. 
Another  creeping  barrage  was  employed  on  14  November  at  5.50  a.  m.,  `lifting  approximately 
100  yards  in  5  mins'.  133  However: 
following  the  barrage  closely  was,  in  this  case  a  difficult  operation,  as  in  few  cases  were  the  trench 
lines  parallel.  Thus  the  keeping  of  direction  was  certain  to  require  skilful  leading.  The  elaboration 
of  the  trench  system  also  entailed  a  very  careful  detailing  of  objectives  to  the  different  bodies  of 
troops,  and  an  exact  knowledge  of  what  these  objectives  were.  134 
On  15  November,  infantry/artillery  co-operation  actually  failed  and  the  barrage  caused  many 
casualties  in  the  attacking  battalions  of  the  division.  `After  passing  Munich  Trench,  the 
attackers  ran  into  our  own  barrage,  and  suffered  severe  losses  sufficient  to  disorganise  the 
whole  attack.  This  unfortunate  incident  was  due  to  the  impetuosity  of  the  men.  '  135  There  is 
some  truth  in  this  as  the  (Highland)  Division  had  never  employed  a  creeping  barrage  prior  to 
Beaumont  Hamel  and  training  for  it  was  of  a  different  order  than  anything  it  had  previously 
been  used  to.  As  the  battle  stretched  into  the  third  day,  the  preparation  became  less  effective. 
In  these  circumstances  it  was  decided  not  to  renew  the  attack  without  further  artillery 
preparation. 
Combined  arms 
The  tactical  employment  of  combined  arms  in  the  division  had  progressed  since  Givenchy. 
By  January  1916,  each  infantry  brigade  had  received  a  dedicated  machine  gun  company,  136 
and  late  in  the  Somme  battles  the  scale  of  Lewis  guns  in  each  battalion  increased  from  eight 
to  sixteen  (at  least  on  paper),  sufficient  for  one  gun  to  a  platoon.  137  In  theory,  more  advanced 
technology  permitted  a  greater  firepower  that  focused  more  on  smaller  units.  However,  the 
division  had  only  been  fully  equipped  with  Vickers  guns  in  July  1916  and  was  still  under 
establishment  in  Lewis  guns  at  Beaumont  Hamel.  138 
133  NA,  WO  95  2845,51st  Division  Operation  Order  No.  111,14  November  1916. 
134  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51  s1  Highland  Division,  p.  102. 
135  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  5131  Highland  Division,  p.  119. 
136  NA,  WO  95  2848,51°`  Division,  A  and  Q  War  Diary,  15-16  January  1916. 
137  Graham,  Against  Odds,  Reflections  on  the  Experiences  of  the  British  Army,  1914-45,  p.  37. 
138  On  22  October  1915,  an  Army  Order  was  issued  bringing  into  existence  a  Machine  Gun  Corps  to  operate 
Vickers  and  Maxim  machine  guns,  leaving  each  infantry  battalion  with  an  establishment  of  eight  Lewis  guns. 
The  Official  History  stated,  `The  reorganisation  depended  upon  the  output  of  Lewis  guns,  and  was  ordered  to 
take  place  in  brigades  by  rotation.  It  was  completed  before  the  Somme'.  It  further  stated  that,  `Further  proposals 
247 As  early  as  August  1915,  the  (Highland)  Division  had  been  experimenting  with  indirect 
machine  gun  fire.  139  At  Beaumont  Hamel,  the  divisional  artillery  and  machine  guns  jointly 
attempted  to  neutralise  enemy  machine  guns  and  the  early  experiments  paid  dividends  as, 
`This  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  the  Division  had  employed  machine-guns  to  fire  an 
overhead  barrage  during  the  attack'.  140  Brigadier-General  Hamilton  testified  to  its  success, 
`The  excellent  effect  of  machine  gun  barrage  when  the  ground  admits  of  it'.  141 
Machine  guns  were  fully  integrated  in  the  attack.  `Vickers  guns  were  in  position  in  the 
German  front  line  within  half  and  hour  of  zero....  Vickers  guns  were  assigned  definite  roles 
in  the  consolidation  and  were  placed  in  depth  throughout  the  captured  area.  '  142  Small  unit 
firepower  was  further  maximised  as: 
Lewis  Guns  will  be  used  boldly  and  pushed  forward  into  the  enemy  trenches  as  soon  as  they  are 
entered.  They  must  come  into  action  at  once  and  seize  every  opportunity  to  assist  succeeding 
waves  by  enfilade  fire  on  communication  trenches  or  on  the  fire  trenches  on  their  flanks.  143 
The  (Highland)  Division  also  exploited  the  opportunities  presented  by  the  use  of  mines  and 
this  resulted  in,  `the  destruction  of  Machine  Gun  emplacements  from  which  a  devastating 
enfilade  fire  could  have  been  directed  on  the  attacking  infantry'.  144  It  attempted  to  work  with 
tanks  to  clear  the  village,  but  the  technology  let  them  down.  `By  the  time  they  had  travelled 
this  distance  they  had  built  up  great  mounds  of  mud  under  their  bellies,  which  prevented  their 
further  advance'.  145 
were  made  by  G.  H.  Q.  to  give  each  division  a  fourth  or  divisional  machine-gun  company  (or  each  battalion  a 
heavy  machine-gun  section),  and  to  increase  the  number  of  Lewis  guns  per  battalion  from  8  to  16'.  This  was  not 
the  case  with  the  51s`  Division.  The  process  to  create  the  units  of  the  Machine  Gun  Corps  and  the  progress  in  re- 
arming  the  battalions  with  eight  Lewis  guns  can  be  determined  by  the  war  diary  accounts.  On  15  -16  January 
1916,55  Lewis  guns  were  received  and  152"d,  153`d  and  154th  Machine  Gun  Companies  were  formed.  By  5 
March  1916,  two  extra  Lewis  machine  guns  were  supplied  to  each  battalion  totaling  only  six  per  battalion,  and 
even  by  23  December  1916  the  maximum  establishment  had  amounted  to  merely  twelve  Lewis  guns  per 
battalion. 
139  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  513'  Highland  Division,  p.  44. 
140  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  513'  Highland  Division,  p.  104. 
141  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Lessons  Learnt  by  Brigadier-General  Hamilton  of  154th  Brigade,  21  November  1916. 
142  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  513'  Highland  Division,  p.  122. 
143  NA,  WO  95  2845,51"  Division,  G,  `Instructions  with  Regard  to  offensive  Operations',  22nd  October  1916. 
144  NA,  WO  95  2845,51"  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  18  December  1916. 
145  NA,  WO  95  2845,  Report  by  Brigadier-General  L.  Oldfield,  20  November  1916. 
248 The  Stokes  mortars  were  much  better  understood,  and  more  integrated,  than  they  had  been 
the  year  before.  Each  brigade  had  been  supplied  with  a  dedicated  battery  in  March  1916,  and 
a  second  battery  was  added  in  May  1916.  These  batteries  were  amalgamated  in  July  1916.146 
However,  they  were  still  under-employed,  being  mainly  sited  in  the  front  line  and  used 
predominantly  to  cut  wire.  147  Divisional  orders  did  attempt  to  underline  the  importance  of 
advancing  with  trench  mortars: 
The  value  of  Stokes  Guns  both  [sic]  to  support  a  bombing  attack  or  to  defend  the  flanks  of  the 
portion  of  captured  trench  against  the  attacks  of  hostile  bombers  must  be  borne  in  mind,  and  every 
effort  must  be  made  to  get  a  proportion  of  guns  and  ammunition  into  the  German  trenches.  148 
Grenades  grew  less  important  as  enemy  defences  and  British  and  German  tactics  changed, 
but  they  were  still  vital  as  an  arm  of  combined  firepower.  `Bombing  parties  will  be  invariably 
accompanied  by  two  rifle  grenade  men,  and  will  be  followed  up  by  the  infantry  who  will 
consolidate  the  ground  gained.  '  149  Many  more  infantrymen  could  now  use  them  and  they 
were  better  constructed,  and  they  were  often  used  in  the  clearing  of  trenches  and  in 
consolidation. 
Training 
The  battle  of  Beaumont  Hamel  demonstrated  that  the  (Highland)  Division  had  trained 
progressively  and  learned  lessons  from  others.  The  time  that  the  division  had  to  prepare  for 
the  attack  was  very  useful  and  doubtlessly  contributed  to  the  overall  performance  of  the 
formation. 
Since  Givenchy,  the  division  had  experienced  a  slow,  staged  evolution  of  training 
progression.  With  a  BEF  emphasis  in  1915  on  localised  attacks  which  predominantly 
involved  limited  objectives  and  battalion/brigade  sized  units,  tactics  employed  were  relatively 
simplistic.  Moreover,  any  rapid  development  for  the  51St  through  unit  and  formation  training 
was  hampered  by  long  periods  spent  in  the  line.  Musketry  and  bombing  were  training 
priorities  during  1915,  along  with  trench  work  and  route  marches,  at  a  time  when  there  was 
limited  centralised  training  advice. 
146  NA,  WO  95  2848,51$`  Division,  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
147  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51s'  Highland  Division,  p.  104. 
148  NA,  WO  95  2845,51$`  Division,  G,  `Instructions  with  Regard  to  Offensive  Operations',  22nd  October  1916. 
249 Harper's  arrival  brought  significant  positive  changes  to  the  divisional  approach  to  training 
with  a  vigorous  emphasis  being  placed  on  assault  practice.  Tactical  principles  were  still  basic, 
with  the  infantry  trained  to  attack  in  waves,  but  each  battalion  carried  out  practise  attacks  on 
specially  constructed  areas,  and  often  these  would  focus  on  the  company  as  the  principal 
unit.  150  According  to  Bewsher,  Harper  trained  men  at  the  beginning  of  1916  in  leapfrogging 
tactics.  `This  form  of  attack  became  the  sealed  pattern  for  all  attacks  carried  out  by  the 
Highland  Division......  its  value  became  apparent,  and  it  eventually  became  the  stereotyped 
form  of  attack  in  the  majority  of  Divisions  in  France.  '151  Specialist  weapons  such  as  trench 
mortars  and  machine  guns  were  incorporated  into  the  practise  attacks  to  improve  support  to 
the  infantry.  However,  no  artillery  practise  was  possible  due  to  lack  of  ordnance,  and  there 
were  also  shortages  in  other  ammunition  and  weapons,  leading  the  152"d  Brigade  war  diary  to 
refer  to  `Highlanders  pelting  enemy  with  French  grenades'  on  14  March  1916.152 
No  amount  of  training  would  substitute  for  actual  experience  gained  through  battle.  Although 
the  51St  was  not  to  blame  for  much  of  the  planning  of  the  attack  on  the  German  strongpoint  at 
High  Wood,  the  futile  assaults  clearly  emphasised  that  the  division  needed  to  improve,  a  fact 
recognised  by  Wauchope  in  his  analysis  of  the  build-up  to  Beaumont  Hamel  as  he  explained 
that  much  had  been  learned  by  the  5  1St  Division  since  its  reversal  at  High  Wood.  153 
During  the  second  half  of  1916,  the  divisional  focus  (although  formation  training  was  still 
irregular)  was  set  on  continuing  to  develop  attack  practice,  whilst  increasingly  combining  it 
with  activities  such  as  trench  raiding. 
Combined  arms  training  was  a  priority.  Battalions  co-operated  with  artillery  154  and  the  Royal 
Flying  Corps,  155  and  many  more  troops  were  trained  in  the  use  of  specialist  weapons,  and  the 
1/5th  Seaforth  war  diaries  referred  to  `specialist'  training  alongside  bombing  classes  and 
Lewis  gun  instruction.  156 
19  NA,  WO  95  2845,51'  Division,  G,  `Instructions  with  Regard  to  Offensive  Operations',  22"d  October  1916. 
150  NA,  WO  95  2865,1/6th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  War  Diary. 
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250 Analysis  of  the  war  diaries  of  the  1/4t'  Gordon  Highlanders  and  of  the  152nd  Brigade 
indicates  the  nature  and  form  of  training  in  the  run-up  to  Beaumont  Hamel.  Much  of  the 
activity  was  carried  out  on  areas  similar  to  that  which  was  to  be  attacked.  '" 
Fig.  23 
1/4th  Gordon  Highlanders 
October  1916 
3rd  Company  at  bombing  practice.  Lewis  gunners  to  range. 
9th  Brigadier  lectured  all  officers  and  NCOss  on  `the  attack'.  Brigade  practised 
attack  over  a  marked  course. 
10th  Brigade  practised  attack  over  a  marked  course,  then  company  training. 
13th  Battalion  in  attack  practice.  Revolver  practice. 
14th  Companies  and  demo  on  Stokes  in  attack. 
16th  Battalion  attack  practice 
22nd  Battalion  practising  attack  formation  by  Company  in  forenoon.  In  afternoon, 
the  attack  by  Battalion  was  practised.  158 
152°d  Infantry  Brigade 
October  1916 
?  The  Brigade  practised  the  attack  on  the  practice  course.  An  aeroplane  from 
No.  5  Squadron  cooperated.  `The  aeroplane  in  this  instruction  was  invaluable 
and  all  ranks  received  every  opportunity  of  learning  what  was  required  of 
them  to  denote  to  the  observer  the  position  of  their  front  line.  ' 
1  lt'  Units  at  the  disposal  of  their  commanders  practise  the  attack. 
12th  The  Brigade  practises  attack  on  the  practise  ground,  both  in  the  morning  and 
again  in  the  afternoon.  159 
More  centralised  advice  and  input  was  increasingly  evident  in  the  later  stages  of  1916.  This 
information  was  often  devolved  through  Harper  and  his  senior  officers  to  the  rest  of  the 
157  Ross,  The  Fifty-First  In  France,  p.  281. 
158  NA,  WO  95  2886,1/4d'  Gordon  Highlanders  War  Diary. 
159  NA,  WO  95  2861,152  "d  Brigade  War  Diary. 
251 troops  (to  various  degrees).  SS  papers  and  GHQ,  army  and  corps  memoranda  were  frequent. 
Harper  even  referred  to  the  pre-war  Field  Service  Regulations: 
This  has  been  termed  the  leapfrog  attack,  but  it  is  no  new  form  of  attack.  It  is  an  attack  in 
accordance  with  Field  Service  Regulations,  where  an  advanced guard  is  detailed  to  attack  the 
enemy's  foremost  positions  and  then  act  defensively  while  the  main  body  is  deployed  and  passes 
through  it  to  capture  the  enemy's  main  positions,  a  further  attack  if  necessary  being  carried  out  by 
the  Reserve.  160 
In  partnership  with  his  senior  officers  and  battalion  commanders,  Harper  increasingly 
encouraged  initiative  amongst  his  men,  in  contrast  to  the  focus  earlier  in  the  war  on  ensuring 
compliance  and  conformity  with  training  programmes  that  had  been  issued  from  above.  By 
the  time  of  Beaumont  Hamel,  training  in  these  methods  had  advanced  to  a  satisfactory  level 
and  evidence  can  be  seen  in  divisional  instructions: 
This  principle  will  be  assiduously  impressed  on  all  ranks  both  by  lectures  and  in  practice  attacks, 
so  that  every  man  thoroughly  understands  that  his  safety  lies  in  getting  close  to  the  barrage  and  that 
he  must  wait  for  no  [sic]  orders  to  advance  the  moment  the  barrage  lifts.  161 
Command  and  control 
The  divisional  commander  was  a  strong  leader  with  a  markedly  different  style  from  that 
practiced  by  his  predecessor.  He  brought  a  more  progressive  attitude  and  well-rounded 
experience  to  the  (Highland)  Division,  and  Wauchope  stated  of  him  that  he  `immediately 
began  working  on  retraining  his  men,  drawing  upon  what  he  perceived  as  the  lessons  from 
Loos:  clearer  definition  of  objectives,  fewer  successive  objectives  for  the  same  troops, 
bounds,  leapfrogging,  consolidation  against  counter-attacks,  a  better  flank  protection'.  162  By 
November  1916,  he  had  been  in  command  for  over  a  year  and  Wimberley  stated  that  the 
conditions  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  `suited  Uncle  Harper  down  to  the  ground'.  163 
At  Beaumont  Hamel,  Harper  exercised  considerable  independent  responsibility  for  tactical 
planning  within  the  command  structure  of  army  and  corps.  `General  Harper  was  urged  to 
attack  with  his  three  infantry  brigades  in  line.  He  did  not,  however,  consider  that  an  attack 
launched  in  such  strength  and  unsupported  by  a  complete  unit  of  reserve  was  justified.  He 
160  G.  M.  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training  (London,  1919),  p.  39. 
161  NA,  WO  95  2845,  `Instructions  with  Regard  to  Offensive  Operations',  22  October  1916. 
162  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  11,  p.  246. 
252 therefore  decided  to  attack  with  two  brigades  in  line.  '  164  This  strategy  was  a  gamble,  as  the 
commander  of  153rd  Brigade  pointed  out:  'It  is  thought  that  the  front  of  our  attack  was  too 
extended  for  the  numbers  available.  The  waves  were  consequently  too  thin  and  if  the  element 
of  surprise  had  been  lacking  the  attack  might  easily  have  fallen.  '  165 
Corps  still  held  the  greater  power  and,  for  the  attack  on  15  November,  Harper  ordered  152d 
Brigade  to  prepare  for  an  attack,  `pending  definite  orders  from  the  V  Corps'.  166  All  had  a 
place  in  the  hierarchy,  no  matter  how  influential. 
As  a  general  rule  of  thumb  in  late  1916,  the  planning  and  implementation  of  an  attack  would 
take  the  following  form.  GHQ  would  issue  an  attack  order  through  army,  and  corps  would 
co-ordinate  and  plan  the  attack  at  a  tactical  level;  but  division,  a  participant  in  the  planning 
with  corps,  had  the  key  responsibility  for  implementation.  The  level  of  divisional  input  into 
the  corps  plan  was  dependent  on  the  relationship  between  the  corps  GOC  and  his  divisional 
commanders,  and  Harper  was  never  one  to  withhold  his  views.  When  the  attack  of  15 
November  failed,  divisions  were  asked  to  provide  details  of  how  they  had  carried  it  out,  and 
the  response  is  interesting.  Harper  blamed  his  division's  failure  on  the  men  being  caught  in 
their  own  barrage,  and  asserted  that  this  was  due  to  their  own  impetuosity  and  that  they  were 
used  to  a  faster  moving  `creeper'  than  that  used  on  the  day.  However,  he  was  also  critical  of 
the  corps  commander,  Fanshawe,  saying  that  `the  chances  of  success  would  have  been  greatly 
increased  if  the  attack  had  been  carried  out  by  a  formation  under  one  command',  167  and  GOC 
2nd  Division  also  complained  that  his  formation  had  not  been  given  enough  time  to  co- 
ordinate  the  attack.  Not  surprisingly,  Fanshawe  disagreed  and  expressed  his  belief  that  the 
divisions  should  have  been  familiar  with  the  ground.  Significantly,  Gough  (the  army 
commander)  was  less  than  complimentary  about  the  corps  co-ordination: 
V  Corps  G.  267  of  15`h  November.  This  order  puts  too  much  on  the  divisional  commanders  and 
does  not  exercise  sufficient  control  over  the  operation.  The  want  of  strict  Corps  control  is  evident 
in  several  respects  .... 
No  mention  made  of  capture  of  Munich  Trench...  should  have  been  clear 
and  co-ordinated.........  artillery  orders  not  clear  for  attack  on  Munich  Trench.  168 
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253 Harper  did  firmly  command  in  the  (Highland)  Division,  but  a  strong  cadre  of  brigadier- 
generals  and  senior  officers  worked  with  him  in  a  progressive  partnership.  One  of  those 
partners  was  the  CRA,  Oldfield,  and  Miss  Whittaker  recorded  in  her  diary,  `Louis  was  at  that 
time  preparing  for,  and  then  enduring,  the  horrors  of  the.  attack  on  Beaumont  Hamel,  in  which 
he  and  General  Harper  established  the  values  of  new  tactics  they  had  evolved  together,  and 
the  51"  vindicated  itself  forever'.  169  To  a  lesser  degree,  this  partnership  applied  to  battalion 
commanders  also.  The  interconnected  relationships  were  assisted  by  a  continuity  of  officers 
in  key  positions  throughout  1916.  There  were  some  significant  changes,  although  they  all 
occurred  well  before  Beaumont  Hamel.  170  When  Wimberley  stated  that  `it  is  the  tradition  of 
the  Highland  Division  that  we  never  make  the  same  mistake  twice',  171  it  was  a  reflection  on 
an  institutional  memory  promulgated  by  the  continuity  of  leadership. 
An  ethos  within  the  division,  derived  from  Harper  and  reinforced  by  the  partnership  within 
the  command  hierarchy,  was  increasingly  centred  on  devolution  of  knowledge  and  an 
inculcation  of  personal  responsibility  relative  to  position.  This  was  not  radical  and  the  troops 
were  not  given  a  huge  degree  of  autonomy,  but  there  was  a  more  thorough  awareness  of  an 
individual  and  collective  role: 
Notes  of  the  concerted  movements  were  taken  with  scrupulous  care,  in  order  that  everybody,  from 
colonel  to  cook,  might  be  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  intended  plan  and  thus  provide  for  a 
more  complete  victory  by  the  assurance  of  individual  initiative  if  it  would  be  required.  Suggestions 
were  invited.  The  Colonel  gave  each  suggestion  its  just  consideration.  172 
This  decentralisation  and  devolution  of  responsibilities  can  be  detected  against  a  background 
of  tactical  and  technological  advance  complimentary  with  increased  aggression.  The  growth 
of  raiding  assisted  in  ensuring  that  its  development  became  commonplace.  Wimberley  stated: 
In  the  first  place  the  Highland  Division  did  not  achieve  the  impossible.  We  did  what  others  thought 
was  impossible,  but  what  our  commanders,  knowing  their  job  and  their  men  and  being  given  their 
own  head,  knew  we  could  tackle  with  success.  The  limited  objective,  `Uncle  Harper's  speciality.  It 
worked  well  because  we  had  been  trained  for  it  and  every  man  knew  his  job.  173 
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254 Organisation  and  administration 
Organisation  and  administration  in  the  division  had  improved  dramatically  since  Givenchy, 
assisted  by  experience  gained,  staff  continuity,  generic  developments  throughout  the  BEF, 
and  a  clear  and  incisive  leadership  in  the  51st. 
Every  effort  was  made  to  ensure  that  both  the  most  up-to-date  and  traditional  methods  were 
used  to  provide  adequate  communications  during  the  engagement.  Telegraph,  telephone, 
visual  signalling,  pigeons,  despatch  riders  and  runners,  and  contact  aeroplanes  were  used.  174 
Prior  to  the  battle,  it  was  reinforced  to  officers  and  men  that  communications  were  vital  to 
success: 
The  necessity  for  sending  back  information  from  front  to  rear  is  not  sufficiently  realised.  The 
difficulty  of  ascertaining  positions  of  troops  during  an  action  is  undoubtedly  due  to  the  fact  that 
platoon  and  company  commanders  are  not  trained  to  send  back  frequent  reports  to  their  superiors. 
The  vital  importance  of  transmission  of  information  must  be  impressed  on  every  officer  in  the 
Division.  '75 
The  Royal  Engineers  worked  tirelessly  before  the  battle  to  ensure  that  communications  were 
maintained  during  it,  but  after-battle  reports  indicate  how  the  most  meticulous  preparation 
could  still  fail.  `Signal  wires  should  not  be  laid  under  trench  boards,  as  traffic  is  dislocated 
and  the  trench  put  into  bad  order  by  the  boards  being  frequently  lifted.  '  176  The  official  history 
stated  that  in  the  early  stages  of  the  battle: 
communication  by  runner  and  telephone  was  tolerably  well  maintained,  although  here,  as 
elsewhere,  the  action  after  dawn  was  fought  in  the  half-light  of  a  heavy  fog  which  made 
observation  impossible  from  the  usual  ground  stations  and  from  the  air.  Reports  were  therefore 
fragmentary  and  apt  to  mislead.  " 
Communications  were  in  part  a  success,  but  the  problems  encountered  where  they  failed  were 
significant.  `The  difficulty  of  communication  was  again  most  marked.  Up  to  12.40  p.  m.  there 
was  a  complete  lack  of  information  owing  to  so  many  runners  being  killed  by  snipers  left  in 
portions  of  the  German  front  line.  '  178 
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255 The  gathering  and  use  of  intelligence  by  the  515`  Division  had  also  benefited  from  experience 
and  a  heightened  state  of  aggression  during  1916.  War  diaries  emphasised  the  number  of 
patrols  and  raids  and  their  value  in  determining  the  layout  of  the  terrain,  the  state  of  the  wire, 
and  the  identification  of  the  enemy  units. 
The  staffwork,  which  had  been  such  a  concern  to  Rawlinson  at  Givenchy,  was  considerably 
more  efficient  and  thorough,  although  the  poor  weather  conditions  and  vast  quantities  of  mud 
made  the  task  in  planning  such  matters  as  supply  all  the  harder,  and  `The  inconvenience 
caused  to  "Q"  by  this  unavoidable  restriction  was  immense,  but  the  ingenuity  of  the 
Quartermaster's  staff,  as  usual,  overcame  the  difficulty  with  marked  success'.  179 
Meticulous  preparation  was  not  always  sufficient  to  guarantee  success  for  a  division  still 
inexperienced  in  the  attack,  as  Brigadier-General  Hamilton  observed: 
Not  enough  time  is  allowed  for  movements,  especially  movement  to  a  flank  down  trenches.  Not 
enough  time  was  also  allowed  for  messages  to  reach  their  destination.  The  length  of  time  it  takes 
for  a  message  to  go  from  Brigade  to  Battalion  and  Battalion  to  Companies  and  for  the  information 
to  be  circulated  from  the  Company  downwards  does  not  appear  to  be  realised  at  all.  180 
Although  problems  in  organisation  and  administration  were  still  evident,  there  was 
significantly  less  confusion  in  and  between  units  during  much  of  the  battle.  However,  at  key 
points  there  were  failures,  either  when  dealing  with  the  poor  weather  and  ground  conditions 
or  in  the  latter  stages  of  the  three-day  attack.  One  example  can  be  demonstrated  by  the 
problems  thrown  up  by  fog  on  the  first  day  of  the  attack:  `all  units  became  mere  disintegrated 
masses,  sections  quitting  the  side  of  neighbouring  sections,  platoons  splitting  up  into 
leaderless  knots  of  wandering  men,  all  detached  and  fighting  with  the  supreme  courage  of 
isolation'.  181  However,  when  the  fog  lifted,  the  organisation  returned  and  units  pressed 
forward  with  more  cohesion. 
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256 Strength  and  casualties 
The  recruitment  process  had  considerably  altered  since  Givenchy.  During  October  to 
December  1915,  the  Derby  Scheme  had  failed  to  produce  sufficient  recruits  to  stave  off  the 
introduction  of  the  Military  Service  Acts  of  1916,  and  by  mid-1916  reforms  to  officer 
selection  meant  that  the  officer  base  was  more  diverse  and  was  increasingly  based  on  merit. 
However,  conscription  did  not  have  an  immediate  impact  on  the  recruiting  pattern  of  the  51St 
Division,  as  throughout  1916  reinforcements  from  local  areas  continued  to  predominate, 
although  there  was  a  consistent  decline  throughout  the  year. 
The  division  was  still  under  war  strength  for  much  of  1916.  One  example  of  this  can  be  seen 
prior  to  the  battle  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  `As  the  1/6th  Black  Watch  were  somewhat  weak  this 
battalion  was  reinforced  prior  to  the  attack  by  2  platoons  of  the  1/7th  Black  Watch'.  182 
However,  in  relative  terms,  in  contrast  to  other  BEF  formations,  the  division  was  still 
reinforced  fairly  well.  The  monthly  sanitary  report  from  the  ADMS  certified  that  on  the 
whole  troops  were  in  good  health:  `The  Division  has  now  been  in  the  line  for  9  months 
without  any  period  of  rest.  Considering  these  circumstances  the  health  of  the  troops  has  been 
good.  '  183  However,  by  Beaumont  Hamel,  it  became  apparent  that  the  standard  of  recruits  was 
less  than  it  had  been.  This  was  due  to  the  huge  numbers  of  reinforcements  needed  throughout 
the  British  Army:  `New  drafts  arriving  from  the  base,  though  perhaps  not  up  to  original 
standard  of  the  Division  are  fairly  good'.  184 
There  had  been  many  changes  in  the  divisional  composition  also,  but  the  last  of  those  took 
place  in  June  1916,  and  many  of  the  units  that  joined  had  brought  combat  experience  with 
them.  By  Beaumont  Hamel,  the  division  was  composed  solely  of  Scottish  units,  and  the  only 
significant  movements  of  the  5  1St  prior  to  the  attack  were  through  various  corps  commands. 
For  a  battle  of  this  significance,  the  overall  number  of  casualties  was  quite  low.  War  diaries 
record  that  the  actual  casualty  figures  for  the  battle  were: 
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257 Fig.  24  Casualties  for  the  battle'  85 
Officers  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
30  78  3 
Other  ranks  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
494  1881  194 
However,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  at  the  time  of  the  battle  the  battalions  were  extremely 
weak  in  numbers.  `The  casualties  during  the  action  represented  45  per  cent  of  those  who  took 
part  in  the  attack.  '  1  86 
There  had  been  a  number  of  casualties  during  the  initial  advance  due  to  the  terrain  and  fog. 
`Casualties  had  been  unduly  heavy,  as  the  state  of  the  ground  had  proved  in  places  so  bad  that 
the  troops  had  been  unable  to  keep  up  with  the  barrage',  187  but,  overall,  the  casualty  rate  rose 
as  the  enemy  resistance  toughened  after  the  initial  advance.  Wrench  stated  of  the  latter  stages 
of  the  attack: 
The  whole  place  is  again  battered  out  of  all  recognition  and  never  looks  twice  the  same  except  that 
it  is  always  one  shocking  scene  of  desolation  and  destruction,  and  while  they  were  all  German 
dead  that  lay  about,  now  they  are  all  kilted  men,  ever  being  removed  yet  even  more  and  more  to 
take  their  places  in  the  mud.  '  8 
The  toll  on  officers  in  the  attacking  units  was  heavy.  Eric  and  Andro  Linklater  pointed  out 
that  `There  were  so  few  officers  left  in  the  6th  Battalion,  that  the  7`h  sent  up  replacements 
together  with  bombers  and  two  platoons'.  189  The  men  still  followed  the  leader,  although  it  is 
interesting  to  note  that  this  was  gradually  being  superceded  in  training  with  greater  emphasis 
being  placed  on  the  use  of  initiative  amongst  the  troops. 
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258 Esprit  de  corps 
Between  July  and  the  end  of  November  1916,  the  (Highland)  Division  moved  to  different 
areas  in  the  line  18  times  and  although  `Mobility  replaced  stagnation'  the  `welfare  of  the 
troops  suffered  in  consequence'.  190  However,  Harper  and  his  officers  continued  to  train  the 
men,  and  the  men  were  still  proud  to  be  part  of  the  division,  although  morale  deteriorated  as 
the  days  passed  and  Beaumont  Hamel  drew  closer.  This  was  due  to  poor  weather,  sub- 
standard  billets  and  waterlogged  trench  systems: 
We  were  accustomed  to  wander  about  like  nomads,  sleeping  at  night  in  our  great-coats,  heavy  with 
damp,  and  freezing  to  the  clammy  waterproof  sheets,  or  clinging  to  each  other  for  warmth  in  the 
huts  whose  porous  roofs  admitted  the  rain  and  earthen  flooring  chilled  and  made  us  miserable.  191 
The  troops  blamed  the  high  command: 
Here  they  failed  most  damnably;  and  here  we  were  most  dependent  on  them.  We  returned  late  in 
1916  to  the  Somme  battlefield  and  sank  into  the  bottomless  mud  of  this  devastated  country  unaided 
by  those  who  alone  could  have  saved  us.  On  our  third  entry  into  the  battle  in  the  Autumn  of  1916 
we  were  allotted  imaginary  tented  camps  prior  to  attacking.  The  rain  was  continuous,  the  tents  did 
not  exist,  the  slopes  on  which  it  was  said  they  once  stood  had  dissolved  in  mud.  The  winter  had 
seemingly  surprised  the  Army  Commander  as  decisively  as  any  general  could  ever  hope  to  surprise 
the  enemy.  192 
By  November,  the  men  were  glad  to  have  the  opportunity  to  act  after  a  number  of  attack 
postponements.  It  was  also  viewed  by  the  troops  as  an  opportunity  to  improve  the  reputation 
of  the  division  after  previous  failures  at  Givenchy  and  High  Wood.  Morale  was  boosted  and 
esprit  firmed  up  through  personal  appearances  by  such  as  the  Moderator  of  the  Church  of 
Scotland  who  appealed  to  Scottish  pride,  courage  and  spirit.  After  the  battle,  Harper  testified 
to  the  spirit  of  his  men  and  of  their  need  to  succeed:  `The  resolution  and  gallantry  of  the 
men,  who  in  spite  of  heavy  losses  and  the  heavier  going,  pressed  on  to  their  objectives  with 
the  greatest  determination,  and  overcame  the  resistance  at  each  successive  trench'.  193 
The  results  of  these  efforts  were  that  the  capture  of  Beaumont  Hamel  revolutionised  the 
external  view  of  the  (Highland)  Division  and  turned  it  into  an  elite  formation  in  the  minds  of 
the  military  and  the  public.  Lieutenant-General  E.  A.  Fanshawe  of  V  Corps  stated,  `It  is 
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259 evident  that  all  the  world  looks  upon  the  capture  of  Beaumont  Hamel  as  one  of  the  greatest 
feats  of  arms  in  the  war,  and  to  those  who  know  the  ground  and  its  defences  it  must  ever  be  a 
marvellously  fine  performance'.  194  It  was  integral  to  creating  an  internal  self-belief  which 
was  vitally  important  in  maintaining  and  enhancing  the  existing  divisional  esprit  de  corps. 
Private  Wrench  stated: 
It  was  the  key  position  to  the  whole  of  the  Somme  where  after  the  disaster  we  suffered  last  July, 
this  capture  now  is  sure  a  feather  in  the  cap  of  the  Fifty-First.  We  feel  proud  of  it  anyhow,  even  if 
we  don't  know  whether  we  are  dead  or  alive............  We  are  wondering  what  the  papers  will  say 
about  it.  195 
This  was  a  crucial  moment,  for  without  an  element  of  good  fortune  in  the  attack,  the  famous 
(Highland)  Division  might  never  have  been. 
Cambrai  1917 
Narrative 
The  British  Army  continued  to  evolve  and  adapt  throughout  1917,  developing  what  has  been 
classified  by  Jonathan  Bailey  as  the  `modern  style  of  warfare',  characterised  by  `three 
dimensional  artillery  indirect  fire  as  the  foundation  of  planning  at  tactical,  operational  and 
strategic  levels  of  war'.  196  Bidwell  and  Graham  recognised  that  it  was  a  gradual 
developmental  process  with  troops  often  having  similar  combat  experiences  in  1916  and 
1917: 
although  [in  1917]  the  firepower  in  the  hands  of  his  [the  infantryman's]  battalion  and  that 
employed  by  the  artillery  of  both  sides  was  much  greater.  In  1916,  he  would  have  walked  forward 
in  lines  and  waves  following  a  creeping  barrage  which  he  would  have  practised  with  men  on 
horses  carrying  flags  to  denote  the  line  of  shell  bursts.  The  distance  between  the  lines  and  between 
individuals  would  increase  in  1916  and  still  more  in  1917  and,  if  he  were  in  a  follow-up  wave,  he 
might  have  moved  in  a  platoon  or  section  column  rather  than  in  line.  The  appearance  of  the 
objective,  too,  would  have  changed.  Instead  of  the  regular  continuous  trench  line  of  1915,  with  its 
thick  barbed  wire  entanglements,  he  would  have  found  scattered  groups  of  battered  trenches,  a 
quarry  or  mine  crater,  the  entrance  to  a  mined  dug-out  or  cellar,  or,  in  1917,  a  concrete  pill  box; 
and  the  wire,  except  in  front  of  the  Hindenburg  Line,  was  less  systematic.  197 
194  NLS,  ACC  7380,  box  9,  Book  3  of  `The  Highland  Division',  p.  2. 
195  IWM,  85/51/5,  The  Diary  of  A.  E.  Wrench,  Volume  I,  p.  73. 
196  This  takes  place  over  an  extended  3D  area,  employing:  a  rapid  tempo  which  destroys  the  enemy  ability  to 
respond  effectively;  informed  and  accurate  intelligence  central  to  targeting;  measured  and  accurate  application 
of  firepower;  and  the  effective  ability  to  command  and  control.  J.  Bailey,  `The  First  World  War  and  the  Birth  of 
the  Modern  Style  of  Warfare',  in  Strategic  and  Combat  Studies  Institute  Occasional  Paper,  No.  22,  p.  3. 
197  Bidwell,  and  Graham,  Firepower,  p.  119. 
260 The  51St  Division,  in  the  latter  stages  of  1916  had  been  utilising  progressive  tactics,  but  had 
been  obstructed  by  problems  in  such  fundamentals  as  command  and  control  and  timely 
supply  during  an  advance.  However,  throughout  1917,  the  division  was  consistently 
employed  in  aggressive  activity  in  the  line  or  was  involved  in  offensive  action,  and  through 
experience  gained  made  substantial  progress  towards  remedying  earlier  problems. 
When  the  British  attacked  at  Arras  on  9  April  in  support  of  the  French  offensive  at  Chemin 
des  Dames,  the  (Highland)  Division  was  involved  in  a  limited  objective  attack  against  a 
strong  enemy  position.  Objectives  were  all  achieved,  although  heavy  casualties  were 
sustained.  In  another  attack  during  the  battle  of  Arras,  against  wooded  positions,  villages,  and 
trenches  situated  deep  in  the  German  battle  zone,  tanks  assisted  the  5lSt  in  an  attempt  to  cross 
five  lines  of  objectives.  This  attack  ultimately  failed  because  of  superior  enemy  artillery  fire 
and  effectively  executed  German  counter-attacks  during  which  the  Germans  employed 
infiltration  and  outflanking  tactics.  However,  the  51St  did  stop  the  enemy  counter-attacks  from 
breaking-through,  using  machine  guns  and  engaging  with  a  series  of  counter-attacks  of  its 
own. 
During  the  second  half  of  1917,  Third  Ypres  was  marked  by,  amongst  other  things,  attacks  on 
positions  that  could  not  be  seen.  During  its  first  attack  in  that  campaign,  the  51St  had  four 
lines  of  objectives,  and  employing  its  (by  then)  standard  two  brigade-  two  battalion  frontage 
with  artillery  and  machine  guns  firing  indirectly,  the  division  employed  small  unit  tactics 
such  as  `dribbling'  and  the  bypassing  of  strongholds.  During  its  second  attack  over  a  narrow 
front,  the  division  used  one  brigade  combined  with  a  variety  of  barrages  (standing,  combing, 
creeping)  and  its  objectives  were  reached,  but  once  again  the  enemy  counter-attack  drove  the 
5  1St  back. 
By  the  end  of  1917,  circumstances  were  ripe  for  a  major  change  in  artillery  and  all-arms 
tactics.  The  nature  of  the  changes  was  determined  by  the  tactical  experience  gained  earlier  in 
the  year  and  Bailey  has  posited  that  the  resulting  modern  style  of  war  was,  `tested  by  the 
British  Army  at  Cambrai'.  198 
261 Haig  stated: 
The  general  object  of  the  operations  south-west  of  CAMBRAI  was  by  means  of  a  surprise  attack 
acting  in  combination  with  a  large  number  of  Tanks  to  pierce  the  HINDENBURG  system  between 
the  CANAL  de  L'ESCAUT  and  the  CANAL  du  NORD,  and  thus  compel  the  enemy  to  withdraw 
from  the  salient  between  the  CANAL  du  NORD  and  the  SCARPE.  With  this  in  view, 
arrangements  were  made  for  rapidly  exploiting  the  initial  success  by  Cavalry  and  a  force  of  all 
arms  so  as  to  occupy  the  quadrilateral  marked  by  the  CANAL  du  NORD,  the  SENSEE  River,  and 
CANAL  de  L'ESCAUT.  It  was  hoped  that  the  town  of  CAMBRAI  might  be  surrounded  and 
isolated  by  the  Cavalry  before  the  enemy  could  bring  reinforcements  of  any  serious  strength  to  the 
threatened  position......  The  first  main  objective,  however,  was  the  high  ground  at  BOURLON 
Wood,  and  careful  arrangements  were  made  for  its  early  capture.  199 
The  (Highland)  Division  was  a  key  formation  in  the  offensive,  and  `The  main  attack  of  the  IV 
Corps  will  be  carried  out  by  the  51"  Division  on  the  right  with  the  62"d  Division  on  the  left'. 
The  36`h  and  560'  Divisions  were  to  the  north  (left)  of  the  62nd  Division  and  the  6th  Division 
(of  III  Corps)  was  situated  to  the  south  of  the  51st.  0° 
The  divisional  assembly  trenches  were  situated  on  a  downward  slope  which  ran  a  distance  of 
2200  yards  to  a  position  known  as  the  Grand  Ravine,  from  which  the  ground  rose  for  another 
1200  yards  to  the  Flesquieres  Ridge.  Over  the  ridge  lay  Flesquieres  village  and  from  there 
Cantaing,  La  Folie  Wood,  and  Cambrai  to  the  right,  and  Bourlon  Wood  and  Fontaine-Notre- 
Dame  to  the  left.  Between  Bourlon  and  La  Folie  woods,  the  land  was  largely  open.  Within 
this  area,  the  enemy  outpost  line  (600  to  900  yards  from  the  51S)  was  lightly  held  with  saps 
and  crater  posts,  but  the  Hindenburg  front  line  (1400  yards  from  the  51S)  behind  it  was 
comprehensively  wired  with  well  constructed  trenches.  Triangle  support  trench,  120-200 
yards  to  the  rear  of  it,  was  similarly  stoutly  constructed  and  defended.  Between  it  and  the 
Grand  Ravine  was  a  series  of  sunken  roads  and  light  trenches.  There  was  also  a  trench  at 
Grand  Ravine  and  behind  it  another,  better  defended,  called  Chapel  Trench.  In  front  of 
Flesquieres  village,  but  behind  Flesquieres  Ridge,  was  situated  the  Hindenburg  support  line, 
which  was  again  a  strongpoint,  with  the  Flesquieres  trench  150-200  yards  to  its  rear: 
Between  FLESQUIERES  and  FONTAINE-NOTRE-DAME,  there  was  only  one  trench  system,  the 
CANTAING  LINE,  running  across  the  front  line  from  NINE  WOOD  to  BOURLON  WOOD.  It 
was  incomplete,  with  the  greater  part  of  its  double  lines  merely  marked  out  and  trenches  dug  for  a 
198  Bailey,  `The  First  World  War  and  the  Birth  of  the  Modern  Style  of  Warfare',  in  Strategic  and  Combat 
Studies  Institute  Occasional  Paper,  No.  22.,  p.  5. 
199  NA,  WO  158  54,  Report  from  Haig  summarising  the  operations  between  20  November  and  7  December 
1917,23  December  1917. 
200  NA,  WO  95  2850,51"  Division  Artillery  Instructions  No.  3,16  November  1917. 
262 few  yards  on  either  side  of  the  numerous  dug-outs;  it  had  a  double  belt  of  wire  and  was  linked  in 
the  right  centre  with  a  strop  well-wired  trench  round  three  sides  of  CANTAING  Village.  Over  the 
ground  between  FLESQUIIRES  and  FONTAINE,  however,  were  sunken  roads  running  in  all 
directions,  and  providing  in  many  parts  good  positions  for  defensive  stands.  201 
Reports  of  the  enemy  strength  are  inconsistent.  Hussey  records  that  four  German  divisions 
were  known  to  be  covering  the  sector  on  20  November  1917  (the  9th  reserve,  54th,  20th 
Landwehr,  and  20th).  It  is  significant  that  Hussey  points  out  that  a  specially  trained  anti-tank 
unit  was  with  the  54th  202  Woollcombe  states  that  there  were  only  three  German  divisions 
facing  the  IV  Corps  front:  -  20th  Landwehr  `which  was  not  of  high  fighting  quality',  and  the 
54th  and  9th  Reserve  divisions.  203  However,  Harper  recounted  that  only  two  divisions  were  in 
the  line  opposite  the  51St,  including  the  division  with  the  anti-tank  regiment  mentioned  by 
Hussey,  and  the  other  mentioned  by  Woollcombe  to  be  of  poor  quality: 
On  the  enemy  side,  facing  the  51st  Division  on  November  20`h,  were  regiments  of  the  54`h  Division 
and  the  20`h  Landwehr  Division,  side  by  side.  Both  had  two  regiments  in  the  line,  each  regiment 
with  two  battalions  in  the  front  system  and  one  well  back.  204 
The  aim  of  the  (Highland)  Division  attack  was  the  capture  of  the  front  and  support  positions 
of  the  Hindenburg  line  approximately  5000  yards  behind  the  enemy  front  line.  The  area  was 
divided  into  three  objectives:  the  "blue,  "  "brown"  and  "red"  lines.  The  first  included  the 
Hindenburg  front  trenches  and  Chapel  Trench,  the  second  the  village  of  Flesquieres  and  the 
German  support  system,  while  the  third  was  a  sunken  road  running  from  Marcoing  to 
Graincourt. 
The  51  t  Division  was  to  attack  on  its  standard  two-brigade  front,  with  the  152nd  on  the  right 
and  the  153`d  on  the  left,  each  with  two  battalions  in  the  front  line.  The  153rd  Brigade  was  to 
attack  with  the  1/6`h  Black  Watch  on  the  right  and  the  1/6th  Gordon  Highlanders  on  the  left. 
The  1/7`h  Black  Watch  supported  the  1/6`h,  whilst  the  1/7`h  Gordon  Highlanders  supported 
their  own  6th  Battalion  205  `The  task  of  the  leading  battalions  was  the  capture  of  the  German 
front  trenches  (the  blue  line)  and  after  those  had  been  taken,  supporting  battalions  were  to 
pass  through  and  capture  the  "brown"  and  "red"  lines'.  206 
201  NA,  WO  95  2846,51't  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Cambrai. 
202  J.  Hussey,  `Uncle  Harper  at  Cambrai,  A  Reconsideration',  in  British  Army  Review,  No.  117,  p.  18. 
203  R.  Woollcombe,  The  First  Tank  Battle,  Cambrai  1917  (London,  1967),  p.  60. 
204  NA,  WO  95  2846,51't  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Cambrai. 
205  NA,  WO  95  2850,51't  Division  Artillery  Instructions  No.  3,16  November  1917. 
206  NA,  WO  95  2846,5  1't  Division  Instructions  No.  2,  Plan  of  Operations,  13  November  1917. 
263 To  advance  against  such  a  strong  position,  the  element  of  surprise  was  key.  To  ensure  that  the 
enemy  did  not  reinforce  prior  to  the  attack,  no  preliminary  artillery  registration  was  carried 
out  prior  to  the  heavy  bombardment  that  began  immediately  before  the  advance.  To 
compensate  for  the  lack  of  a  sustained  period  of  artillery  bombardment  on  the  enemy 
defences,  a  large  number  of  tanks  were  to  be  utilised  to  crush  the  wire  and  spearhead  the 
advance  of  the  infantry.  In  order  to  do  this,  `seventy-two  tanks  were  allotted  to  the  Divisional 
front.  These  were  allotted  on  a  basis  of  three  for  every  150  yards  and  were  to  advance  from 
200  yards  in  front  of  the  infantry.  '207 
Secrecy  was  paramount.  The  assembly  took  place  between  17  and  19  November,  with  the 
artillery  moving  into  position  by  17  November,  tanks  moving  forward  on  the  18/19 
November  (hidden  in  Havrincourt  Wood  until  20  November),  and  infantry  advancing  to 
assembly  positions  from  18  November.  The  tanks  formed  up  for  the  initial  assault  behind  a 
taped  line  slightly  forward  of  the  infantry  assembly  trenches.  Harper  described  how  his  troops 
took  up  their  positions  on  the  19  November: 
The  platoons  to  form  the  first  two  waves  in  the  attack  took  over  the  line  on  the  morning  of  the  19th 
, 
and  thus  had  an  opportunity  to  view  the  ground  in  front.  At  midnight  the  remainder  of  the  four 
battalions  to  go  in  first  came  up;  and  before  Zero  the  four  battalions  for  the  later  stage  of  the 
opening  attack  were  assembled  in  rear  of  our  trenches  with  their  front  on  the  CHARING  CROSS- 
TRESCAULT  Road.  Those  in  first  were  busy  as  soon  as  it  grew  dark  in  making  ways  for  the 
Tanks  across  the  trenches;  those  who  came  in  during  the  night  were  spared  confusion  and  fatigue 
by  the  use  of  red  lamps,  flags,  boards  and  night  markers  to  show  route  and  positions  of  platoons. 
Before  Zero  all  the  men  had  a  hot  meal;  they  had  rested  in  excellent  close  billets  on  the  preceding 
night  and  were  in  high  spirits.  208 
The  divisional  report  stated  that  the  artillery  barrage  fell  on  the  enemy  front  line  at  zero  hour, 
in  addition  to  a  smoke  screen  deposited  on  the  Flesquieres  Ridge.  To  coincide  with  the 
barrage,  wire-crushing  tanks  moved  forward  with  small  groups  of  infantry  following.  At  9.30 
a.  m.,  the  leading  wave  of  infantry  moved  forward,  following  a  second  and  third  wave  of 
tanks. 
The  first  phase  of  the  attack  to  the  lower  slopes  of  the  Flesquieres  Ridge  was  achieved  with 
little  impediment.  However,  during  a  second  phase  (up  to  noon),  when  the  advance  centred 
207  NA,  WO  95  2846,51"  Division  Instructions  No.  2,  Plan  of  Operations,  13  November  1917. 
208  NA,  WO  95  2846,51"  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Cambrai. 
264 on  the  Flesquieres  Ridge,  there  were  a  number  of  casualties  and  repeated  but  only  partially 
successful  attempts  to  eject  the  enemy  entrenched  in  a  large  part  of  the  defensive  line  behind 
uncut  wire  and  supported  by  thickly  clustered  nests  of  machine  guns  in  the  village.  During  a 
third  phase,  which  took  place  in  the  afternoon  and  evening,  heavy  fighting  centred  around  the 
Flesquieres  trench  with  only  insubstantial  advances.  However,  by  late  afternoon,  a  number  of 
tanks  had  advanced  into  Flesquieres  village. 
Early  on  21  November,  units  advanced  to  the  "Brown"  line  and  the  infantry  entered 
Flesquieres  village  without  obstruction.  By  the  close  of  the  day,  the  154`h  Brigade  had  passed 
through  the  152nd  and  153`d  brigades  and  advanced  with  tanks  to  capture  Cantaing  and 
Fontaine-Notre-Dame. 
265 Map  3. 
The  Battle  of  ('amhrai:  Position  at  7pm,  21"  November  1917  ° 
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On  22  November,  the  enemy  counter-attacked  Fontaine-Notre-Dame  from  the  ßollrlon  Wood 
and  the  (Highland)  Division  was  breed  to  withdraw.  Renewed  attempts  to  recapture  the 
village  and  to  advance  on  ßourlon  Wood  (with  the  aid  of  the  40th  Division)  met  with  läilure 
due  to  an  inability  to  destroy  or  incapacitate  strongly  entrenched  enemy  positions. 
Analysis 
In  purely  operational  terms,  the  battle  was  a  limited  success  at  a  time  when  enemy  forces 
were  weak  and  the  element  of  surprise  was  with  the  51  "  Division.  As  at  Beaumont  I  laurel, 
after  a  successful  initial  advance  the  division  was  checked  as  enemy  resistance  stillcned. 
-  1-1  it 
62".  "  U 
. 
Or 
266 More  critically,  the  failure  of  the  (Highland)  Division  to  take  its  objectives  (arguably) 
resulted  in  an  overall  stalling  of  the  entire  offensive  and  the  resultant  reverses  that  were 
experienced  later  in  the  month.  However,  the  participation  of  the  division  in  an  attack  that 
used  massed  tanks  for  the  first  time  ultimately  proved  to  be  beneficial.  Cambrai  allowed  the 
British  to  determine  how  best  to  use  the  tank  as  a  tool  to  break-in.  This  was  vital  to  the 
subsequent  tactical  developments  displayed  at  Amiens  in  August  1918.  Artillery  also 
benefited  greatly  as  Cambrai  was  to  prove  that  surprise  could  be  retained  and  success 
achieved  without  a  preliminary  bombardment  thanks  to  improved  targeting  techniques. 
The  (Highland)  Division  broke  through  the  Hindenburg  front  line  and  support  systems  across 
a  1500  yard  frontage,  and  captured  Flesquieres  Ridge  and  the  villages  of  Cantaing  and 
Flesquieres,  whilst  it  temporarily  occupied  Fontaine-Notre-Dame.  Although,  there  were 
substantial  advances  on  the  first  day,  with  the  advantage  of  surprise,  not  all  of  the  division's 
objectives  were  reached  due  to  anti-tank  fire  and  enemy  machine  guns.  The  inability  of  the 
(Highland)  Division  to  take  the  "brown"  line  at  Flesquieres  village  on  the  first  day  caused  a 
delay  in  the  IV  Corps  attack  and  the  exploitation  of  Bourlon  Wood  and  Ridge  was  not 
possible.  However,  it  is  also  significant  that  the  cavalry.  failed  to  take  the  initiative  and 
advance  to  support  the  51"  (as  once  the  Hindenburg  Line  was  breached,  the  second  stage 
exploitation  by  the  cavalry  up  to  the  "red"  line  and  beyond  was  scheduled  to  begin)  210 
Griffith  stated  that  Bourlon  Wood  could  have  been  captured  by  cavalry  if  they  had  moved 
quickly  enough  as  it  was  only  lightly  defended  at  the  end  of  the  first  day.  11  If  the  division, 
with  or  without  the  cavalry,  had  managed  to  advance  far  enough  to  take  the  Bourlon  Wood, 
then  it  might  have  been  able  to  drive  further  into  the  enemy  defensive  system,  as  Wimberley 
related: 
Cambrai  with  its  tall  spires  a  mile  and  a  half  away  seemed  within  a  stone's  throw.  A  cavalry 
subaltern  informed  me  that  the  evening  before  some  troops  had  wandered  all  through  La  Folie 
Wood  without  seeing  a  single  Boche.  I  am  convinced  that  had  we  attacked  again  at  dawn  we  could 
have  had  Cambrai  almost  without  opposition.  At  the  same  time  it  is  easily  understood  that  a  break 
through  for  such  a  depth  on  the  very  limited  frontage  on  which  we  were  attacking  would  have 
21z  rendered  us  particularly  prone  to  being  attacked  in  the  flanks-cut  off  and  isolated. 
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267 It  was  at  the  end  of  the  first  day  that  the  battle  started  to  go  awry.  It  was  then  that  there  was  a 
difference  of  opinion  at  the  higher  levels  of  command  as  to  what  action  to  take  next.  IV 
Corps  had  stressed  of  Bourlon  Wood  that  `It  is  very  important  that  it  should  be  captured  the 
first  day'.  213  In  IV  Corps  opinion,  when  the  cavalry  failed  to  exploit,  the  main  objective  had 
failed,  and  this  was  the  view  of  the  GSO1  of  Third  Army,  who  recommended  consolidation. 
However,  Field  Marshal  Haig  wanted  exploitation.  214 
On  the  second  day,  when  the  division  moved  forward  and  entered  Fontaine,  the  position  was 
exposed  and  the  divisional  flanks  were  insecure.  Travers  has  written  that: 
on  the  second  day,  when  the  offensive  advanced  on  the  two  wings,  one  toward  Bourlon  Ridge  and 
Wood,  the  other  toward  Masnieres  and  Marcoing,  the  latter  advance  stalled,  and  so  the  thrust  of  the 
offensive  shifted  towards  Bourlon  Wood.  It  was  at  this  point  that  the  attack  should  have  been 
halted. 
He  went  on  to  assert  that  the  element  of  surprise  had  been  lost  and  that  there  were  not 
enough  reserves  to  break  through215  The  ensuing  German  counter-attack  pushed  back  the  51St 
Division  and  attempts  on  the  fourth  day  to  renew  the  advance  failed.  On  that  occasion,  the 
right  flank  was  exposed  throughout  the  attack,  and  artillery  cover  was  insufficient.  There  had 
also  been  little  time  to  carry  out  a  reconnaissance,  the  men  were  exhausted,  and  the  tanks 
repeatedly  developed  mechanical  problems. 
Thus  far  the  Cambrai  offensive  was  following  the  same  formula  as  the  Somme  and 
Passchendale  campaigns,  albeit  on  a  smaller  scale,  in  that  it  ultimately  became  unclear  what 
the  objectives  were  and  combat  was  carried  on  for  too  long.  216  Pelham  Bum  stated: 
These  operations  have  again  proved  conclusively,  in  my  opinion,  that  after  the  first  day's  battle 
further  advance  is  impracticable  until  an  entirely  new  operation  has  been  planned  and  prepared,  a 
proceeding  that  takes  weeks  rather  than  days.  I  have  seen  this  proved  again  and  again- 
BEAUMONT  HAMEL,  VIMY  RIDGE,  ARRAS,  3`'  Battle  of  YPRES  and  CAMBRAI  all  go  to 
prove  my  point.  In  all  these  battles  the  first  days  operations  ended  entirely  in  our  favour,  while 
succeeding  days  gradually  turned  the  scale  against  us.  The  defence,  with  modern  weapons  strong 
out  of  all  proportion  compared  with  the  attack  is  easily  and  quickly  strengthened  by  the  bringing 
up  of  machine  guns  and  reserves  which  are  never  far  away  in  a  highly  organised  defensive  system, 
while  the  ever  increasing  wire  in  front  of  the  German  rear  defences  is  a  further  argument  against 
breaking  through.  The  enemy  is  operating  in  country  well  known  to  him  and  intact  while  we 
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268 operate  over  unknown  country  in  which  the  difficulties  have  been  increased  in  the  havoc  of  war. 
Further,  as  the  advance  increases  our  communications  lengthen,  and  the  supply  of  artillery 
ammunition  becomes  more  and  more  difficult.  In  the  operations  before  CAMBRAI  we  had 
everything  in  our  favour,  surprise  to  a  degree  that  is  unlikely  ever  to  be  obtained  again,  ideal 
weather  and  vast  superiority  in  men  and  guns,  besides  assembly  of  troops  and  formation  of  dumps 
unhindered  by  hostile  shell  fire,  and  yet  our  `break  through'  was  never  in  view.  217 
The  divisional  objectives  had  been  ambitious  as  the  enemy  defences  were  in  depth  as 
Woollcombe  described: 
It  was  an  immensely  strong  position.  J.  F.  C.  Fuller  (who  was  GSO1  at  the  Tank  Corps  headquarters 
during  the  battle  of  Cambrai  and  was  influential  in  the  planning  of  the  attack)  had  suggested  that 
tanks  should  not  assault  it  frontally,  but  this  had  not  been  conceded.  Standing  today  where  the  lane 
from  Ribecourt  enters  Flesquieres,  at  just  about  where  the  fire  trench  of  the  Hindenburg  Support 
Line  ran,  and  looking  back,  the  strength  of  the  position  is immediately  clear.  8  21 
It  was  a  typical  defensive  system  as  outlined  by  Martin  Samuels,  219  with  limited  frontal 
defences  which  grew  stronger  as  the  system  deepened.  Griffith  has  stated  of  the  initial  attack 
on  the  frontal  system  that,  `the  Germans  had  a  mere  thirty-four  guns  covering  the  front.  In 
these  circumstances  the  attack  almost  inevitably  made  famous  headway.  220  In  addition  to 
this,  the  enemy  garrison  in  the  front  system  was  not  of  the  best  quality: 
They  were  a  miserable  lot  of  men,  unshaven  of  course,  but  so  were  we,  but  dirty,  consumptive  and 
small,  or  grossly  fat,  some  of  them  very  young,  but  most  of  them  middle-aged  men  with  cartoonist 
spectacles.  They  were  a  Landsturm  division  of  "duds",  poor  devils,  had  never  seen  fighting  on  the 
Western  front  and  they  had  been  on  the  Eastern  front  in  a  very  quiet  sector.  22' 
As  Woollcombe  has  stated: 
The  failure  on  20`h  November  to  carry  Flesquieres....  was  caused  by  a  fantastic  stroke  of 
misfortune  in  that,  as  coincidence  would  have  it,  the  German  divisional  artillery  on  the  ridge  had 
been  specially  trained  in  anti-tank  defence  by  their  divisional  commander  who  was  himself  an 
artilleryman.  His  guns  had  practised  it  against  French  light  tanks  on  the  Aisne  in  April  222 
Wimberley  described  how  the  enemy  fought  in  the  outpost  and  front  line: 
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269 At  one  time  that  morning  we  had  to  cease  firing  the  M.  G.  s  for  a  minute  or  two,  owing  to  a  mass  of 
prisoners  which  started  walking  towards  the  guns-it  would  have  been  sheer  massacre  to  have  gone 
on  shooting.......  The  attack  was  evidently  slowing  down,  and  a  line  of  blazing  tanks  outside  the 
village  wall  of  Flesquieres  told  of  some  good  work  by  the  German  tank  gunners-it  was  a  very 
interesting  sight  for  our  tanks  seemed  to  be  stopped  on  some  line  on  the  far  ridge  which  they  could 
not  pass.  I  was  told  later  that  a  German  officer  working  an  anti-tank  gun  alone-all  his  men  having 
been  killed-knocked  out  about  five  of  our  tanks  at  point  blank  range-a  magnificent  piece  of 
bravery.  He  himself  was  killed  in  time  and  died  by  his  gun  with  which  he  had  seriously  hindered 
our  advance.  23 
Webster  added  an  interesting  note  on  the  famous  German  gunners  as  he  looked  over  the 
German  position  on  the  first  day  of  the  battle,  saying  their  `bodies  were  still  warm  when 
Webby  examined  them'.  He  added  of  the  tank  losses: 
considerable  credit  for  knocking  them  out  was  given  to  a  German  officer  Lt.  Muller  and  indeed 
mention  was  made  in  a  British  despatch  about  his  bravery-but  Webby  did  not  come  across  the 
body  of  a  Hun  officer  in  the  pits  that  morning.  224 
However,  the  defences  became  more  difficult  to  exploit  the  deeper  the  (Highland)  Division 
advanced  into  the  system  and  as  the  enemy  reinforced  and  counter-attacked: 
The  rear  battalions  were  hurried  forward  when  the  attack  began...  On  the  21"t,  the  enemy  put  in 
107th  Division.. 
. 
On  the  22nd,  the  119`h  and  214`h  Divisions  appeared..  . 
On  the  23`d,  the  prisoners 
included  men  from  the  LEHR  Regiment  of  the  3`d  Guards  Division  (a  "crack"  Berlin  Regiment  met 
225  by  the  5  1"  Division  N.  E.  of  YPRES  on  July  3  1",  1917) 
Much  has  been  written  about  the  tactics  employed  by  the  (Highland)  Division  at  Cambrai. 
However,  aside  from  the  co-operation  with  tanks  which  has  been  dealt  with  elsewhere  in  this 
thesis,  the  approach  adopted  was  sensible.  The  wave  formation  using  `leapfrogging' 
principles226  was  now  standard  practice  in  the  5  1S`  and  was  also  used  by  many  other  divisions. 
The  use  of  initiative  and  the  application  of  firepower  were  also  evident  when  the  51St 
advanced  against  machine  guns  and  strongpoints,  with  the  priority  in  the  advance  being  to 
bypass  these  obstacles,  leaving  parties  to  deal  with  them  in  isolation.  Harper  concluded: 
`Throughout  there  was  notable  success,  with  many  examples  of  individual  initiative,  in 
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270 tackling  isolated  machine  gun  posts;  the  combined  effect  of  rifles,  lewis  guns  and  grenades 
was  well  applied'.  227 
Artillery 
The  use  of  artillery  at  Cambrai  was  innovative  and  was  a  sign  of  continuing  development  and 
progression.  That  no  preliminary  bombardment  was  necessary,  in  contrast  to  the  artillery 
tactics  at  Third  Ypres,  was  indicative  of  a  number  of  simultaneous  tactical  advances  that  were 
becoming  increasingly  co-ordinated  in  the  BEF.  The  focus  was  not  on  the  mass  of  shells,  but 
on  where  they  were  going  and  various  methods  for  target  location  had  been  developed,  such 
as  the  use  of  soundranging  and  more  effective  artillery  impact  observation.  In  addition,  the 
106  shell  had  been  in  use  for  some  time,  guns  were  better  calibrated,  weather  conditions  were 
increasingly  taken  into  account,  and  aerial  photographs  regularly  employed  228  The  use  of 
tanks  to  cut  the  wire  also  released  artillery  resources  to  be  utilised  in  other  areas  of  the  attack. 
To  support  the  divisional  advance,  the  artillery  brigades,  which  had  been  reorganised  in 
January  1917,  were  by  this  time  well  supplied  with  guns,  ordnance  and  ammunition.  `All 
echelons  full  and  dumps  of  700  with  each  18  pr  gun  and  450  with  each  Howitzer.  500  rounds 
with  each  13  pr.  229  It  was  also  important  that  the  quality  of  ammunition  could  be  relied  upon, 
and  the  divisional  artillery  report  confirmed  that,  `Ammunition.  Was  generally  good.  '23° 
Centralised  artillery  co-ordination  at  corps  level  was  very  necessary  throughout  the  battle  as 
the  artillery  fireplan  involved  1003  guns  over  the  army  frontage.  To  add  to  the  complexity 
and  to  maintain  secrecy,  incoming  guns  had  to  be  calibrated  elsewhere  before  deployment. 
The  fireplan  involved  three  elements  which  included  the  creeping  barrage  to  support  infantry 
and  tanks,  the  targetting  of  enemy  strongholds,  and  counter-battery  work.  In  addition,  a 
number  of  batteries  were  also  tasked  with  halting  enemy  counter-attacks.  231 
The  (Highland)  Division  artillery  had  a  difficult  task  to  perform  as  it  had  not  long  arrived  in 
the  sector,  although  operational  orders  reflected  the  lack  of  familiarity  and  were  extremely 
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271 comprehensive.  The  degree  to  which  advances  in  artillery  preparation  and  application  had 
progressed  (particularly  in  the  difficult  circumstances)  was  evident  in  divisional  artillery 
notes  produced  after  the  battle:  `No  registration  was  allowed  and  the  whole  of  the  fire  was 
from  maps  and  callibration  [sic].  The  fire  was  accurate  and  I  know  of  no  single  dangerous 
round  fired  by  the  Field  Artillery.  '232  Infantry/artillery  co-operation  had  been  extensively 
practised: 
The  ESSENTIAL  PRINCIPLE  is  that  the  leading  infantry  should  follow  so  closely  on  the  heels  of 
the  barrage  that  the  enemy  has  no  time  to  recover  or  man  his  machine  gun  before  they  are  on 
him.....  This  principle  will  be  assiduously  impressed  on  all  ranks  both  through  lectures  and  in 
practice  attacks,  so  that  every  man  thoroughly  understands  that  his  safety  lies  in  getting  close  up  to 
the  barrage  and  that  he  must  wait  for  no  orders  to  advance  the  moment  the  barrage  lifts  233 
However,  during  the  later  stages  of  the  battle,  even  though  much  of  the  artillery  had  moved 
forward,  234  artillery  support  was  not  as  effective  as  enemy  positions  were  unknown  and 
enemy  retaliation  was  more  prevalent.  Wimberley  noted  that: 
About  five  minutes  later  when  we  were  half  way  across  country  to  Cantaing,  the  shelling  got 
heavier  and  we  could  see  Boche  running  out  of  Bourlon  Wood  and  from  La  Folie  to  the  east.  Our 
artillery  were  not  retaliating  at  al1.235 
Combined  arms 
The  usage  and  application  of  combined  arms  had  continued  to  progressively  develop  along 
with  improvements  in  technology.  Cambrai  tested  new  ideas  and  equipment  in  a  full-scale 
operation  and  demonstrated  how  a  breakthrough  could  occur  if  innovations  were  developed 
further.  The  relationship  of  the  artillery  to  the  other  arms  was  not  reduced,  but  redefined  by 
this  engagement.  Paddy  Griffith  has  asserted  that: 
The  battle  had  originally  been  planned  predominantly  as  an  artillery  operation  to  exploit  the  new 
techniques  of  predicted  fire,  and  the  tanks  obviated  the  need  for  guns  to  cut  the  German  wire,  so  to 
that  extent  they  assisted  the  artillery  fireplan,  but  it  could  be  argued  that  their  contribution 
extended  little  further  than  that.  In  operational  terms  they  were  certainly  never  intended  to  make 
the  breakthrough,  or  trained  for  it,  but  only  to  accompany  the  infantry  during  the  initial  phases  of 
the  break-in.  If  any  arm  was  intended  to  break  out  it  was  the  cavalry.  236 
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272 The  shock  of  the  tank  was  enough  in  the  early  phase  of  the  attack  to  confound  the  enemy,  and 
despite  its  limited  firepower  its  overall  value  was  demonstrated  in  a  report  from  Brigadier- 
General  Buchanan:  `None  of  the  above  [Cantaing,  Fontaine-Notre-Dame,  sw.  corner  of 
Bourlon  Wood]  were  captured  without  very  material  assistance  from  the  Tanks'.  237  Harper 
wrote  that  tanks  could  be  of  great  value  in  taking  strongpoints  such  as  defended  villages,  but 
that  the  assaults  had  to  be  carried  out  systematically: 
The  only  chance  of  success  lies  in  close  cooperation  between  the  tanks  and  the  infantry.  The  tanks 
must  in  all  cases  halt  on  the  first  objective  until  it  has  been  consolidated.  The  second  group  of 
tanks  must  then  pass  through  to  the  final  objective.  It  will  be  of  no  avail  for  tanks  to  go 
independently  down  the  streets  of  the  village  in  no  conformity  with  the  movements  of  the 
238  infantry. 
However,  there  were  considerable  problems  associated  with  the  use  of  the  tank.  Rawling  has 
said  that  tank  casualties  on  the  first  day  had  been  extremely  high  and  that  those  tanks  that 
remained  were  in  need  of  maintenance,  239  whilst  Bidwell  and  Graham  added  of  the  anti-tank 
farrago  at  Flesquieres,  `German  batteries  of  the  54th  Division,  specially  trained  to  handle 
tanks,  executed  twenty-six  of  them  without  being  molested  by  the  infantry  of  the  51St 
Highland  Division,  although  low  flying  aircraft  strafed  their  gun  positions'.  40 
The  use  of  combined  arms  as  close  support  for  the  infantry  and  as  independent  firepower  in 
its  own  right  was  considered  a  divisional  priority.  Harper  stressed  that  there  should  be  a 
`Dependence  not  on  weight  of  infantry  attack,  but  on  the  skilful  employment  in  combination 
of  all  arms',  241  and  that  a  `purely  infantry  attack  against  an  organised  position  cannot  be 
considered  as  a  serious  military  proposition'.  242 
Overall,  the  1917  division  was  very  different  from  that  of  two  years  before.  Then  the  majority 
of  infantry  were  ordinary  riflemen,  with  each  battalion  having  a  small  number  of  trench 
mortars  and  Lewis  guns.  However,  during  1917,  each  platoon  was  capable  of  using  the  rifle, 
hand  grenade,  Lewis  gun,  and  rifle  grenades,  as  its  primary  weapons. 
237  NA,  WO  95  2846,1540'  Brigade  Report  on  the  operation  at  Cambrai,  2  January  1918. 
238  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  pp.  72-73. 
239  B.  Rawling,  Surviving  Trench  Warfare  (Toronto,  1992),  p.  168. 
240  Bidwell,  and  Graham,  Firepower,  p.  138. 
241  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  p.  18. 
242  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  p.  28. 
273 Machine  guns  were  used  particularly  well: 
Machine  Guns,  being  a  powerful  weapon  of  defence,  naturally  played  a  more  conspicuous  part  on 
the  enemy's  side  than  on  ours  during  the  battles  of  November  20'"  to  23`d;  but  the  guns  of  the  four 
Companies  with  the  Division  were  kept  well  forward  from  the  beginning  and  in  the  later  stages  did 
heavy  execution  amongst  the  numerous  hostile  parties  moving  against  our  front.  43 
Lewis  guns  had  been  deployed  and  employed  to  maximise  small  unit  firepower: 
In  normal  circumstances,  one  or  more  sections  in  each  platoon  will  continue  the  advance  in  turn, 
covered  by  the  fire  of  the  remainder.  Under  certain  conditions  of  ground,  however,  the  two  Lewis 
gun  sections  may  remain  behind  and  give  overhead  covering  fire,  for  instance,  if  the  attack  is  down 
the  slope  of  a  hill  or  across  a  valley.  24 
Lewis  guns  were  also  used  to  destroy  enemy  machine  guns  when  they  were  located. 
Training 
Although  the  operation  was  shrouded  in  secrecy,  the  division  had  had  the  opportunity  to  carry 
out  tailored  training  programmes  for  the  Cambrai  attack.  Although,  these  were,  by  necessity, 
time  restricted,  the  (Highland)  Division  had  already  received  extensive  training  throughout 
1917. 
Centralised  advice,  memoranda,  and  SS  papers  had  been  prolific  throughout  the  year  and 
Harper  and  his  senior  officers  ensured  that  the  (Highland)  Division  trained  in  accordance 
with  the  general  guidelines.  The  overriding  tactical/training  focus  was  on  small-unit  training. 
As  early  as  January,  the  war  diary  of  the  1/5`h  Seaforths  was  highlighting  section  and  platoon 
training  on  a  regular  basis.  45  In  February,  platoons  had  been  reorganised  into  four  sections, 
one  of  bombers,  one  with  rifle  grenades,  one  with  Lewis  guns,  and  the  fourth  with  rifles.  The 
platoon  focus,  utilising  its  own  firepower,  was  intended  to  assist  in  dealing  with  enemy 
strongpoints  that  had  proved  resistant  to  artillery  shelling.  In  contrast  to  training  earlier  in  the 
war  when  the  focus  in  a  battalion  had  been  on,  alternately,  the  rifle  and  bayonet,  then 
bombing,  followed  by  an  increasing  use  of  machine  guns,  the  new  focus  was  on  learning  to 
use  the  variety  of  weapons  in  the  platoon.  By  February  1917,  the  war  diary  of  the  115`h 
Seaforths  indicated  that  platoon  and  section  training  was  also  taking  place  alongside  wider 
243  NA,  WO  95  2846,515`  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Cambrai. 
244  NA,  WO  95  2846,51"  Division  Report  on  the  operation  at  Cambrai. 
245  NA,  WO  95  2866,1/5`''  Seaforth  Highlanders  War  Diary. 
274 company,  battalion,  and  brigade  training  manoeuvres.  246  A  further  reorganisation  to  the  four 
section  platoon  took  place  in  May  1917,  when  the  rifle  and  grenade  sections  were  combined 
to  form  two  rifle  sections  both  equipped  with  rifle  grenades,  thus  increasing  the  flexibility  of 
the  platoon.  The  decline  in  the  concept  of  specialists  continued  as  all  men  in  the  rifle  sections 
were  also  trained  in  the  use  of  the  rifle  grenade  or  Lewis  gun,  or  were  expected  to  be  skilled 
in  the  use  of  the  hand  grenade.  Emphasis  on  training  and  on  individual  initiative  reflected  the 
very  real  probability  that  mobility  was  set  to  return  and  the  growing  tendency  in  the  BEF's 
tactical  thought  was  to  employ  small,  flexible  units,  rather  than  the  use  of  successive  massed 
waves  of  troops. 
When  the  (Highland)  Division  joined  Maxse's  corps  in  June  1917,  it  was  subjected  to  a  very 
focused  corps  training  programme.  The  division  was  trained  in  specific  tasks  on  ground 
similar  to  the  area  over  which  the  troops  were  to  advance,  and  this  concentrated  on  repeated 
platoon  and  company  practice.  Units  also  performed  mock  attacks  at  the  battalion  level  in 
which  emphasis  was  placed  on  dealing  with  unforeseen  obstacles  like  machine  guns  and 
strongpoints. 
Combined  arms  training  continued  to  be  a  focus.  Communications  with  aircraft  were 
practised,  and  the  artillery  took  advantage  of  the  quiet  times  to  practise  precise  shooting  that 
would  be  required  when  activity  began  again. 
By  way  of  contrast  to  Maxse's  XVIII  Corps,  the  IV  Corps'  influence  over  training  at  Cambrai 
was  barely  evident,  and  the  organisation  of  training  was  `firmly  delegated  to  divisional 
commanders'.  247  However,  the  training  undertaken  by  the  (Highland)  Division  at  Cambrai 
was  good  and  embodied  much  that  was  considered  to  be  `state  of  the  art'  tactical 
development,  and  included: 
Careful  study  of  Map  and  Aeroplane  Photographs,  by  all  concerned,  including  Platoon  and  Section 
Commanders,  and  repeated  rehearsals  at  length,  over  difficult  ground,  with  the  actual  trenches  to 
be  taken  by  each  section,  marked  by  tapes  or  flags;  and  where  every  Platoon  had  to  go  by 
compass.  248 
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275 Command  and  control 
The  relationships  between  the  various  levels  of  command  had  shifted  again  during  1917. 
Army  was  less  assertive  than  in  1916,249  corps  permitted  divisions  more  autonomy  to  plan 
and  execute,  and  divisions  were  becoming  more  regulated  in  their  execution  of  orders  and 
application  of  tactics.  As  Simpson  has  explained: 
the  planning  of  the  attack  was,  once  Third  Army  had  taken  over,  much  like  that  of  other  offensives 
in  1917.  Army  issued  its  draft  in  three  parts,  and  "subject  to  such  alterations  as  have  already  been 
approved  by  the  Army  Commander,  the  Draft  Scheme  will  form  the  basis  on  which  Corps  [III  and 
IV  Corps  were  to  undertake  the  initial  attack]  will  formulate  their  Schemes  and  make  preparations 
for  carrying  out  the  operation".  25° 
IV  Corps  command  certainly  did  not  cover  itself  in  glory.  It  is  significant  that  Lieutenant- 
General  C.  Woollcombe  (a 51s'  Division  GOC  before  the  war)  did  not  last  long  in  command 
after  the  Cambrai  battle.  Cambrai  was  his  first  major  engagement  as  corps  commander  and 
IV  Corps  itself  had  not  itself  seen  action  since  1916  251  Harper,  never  one  to  remain  silent 
when  the  opportunity  arose  to  speak,  stated  at  a  corps  conference  during  a  dispute,  `Sir,  the 
IVth  Corps  has  not  been  engaged  in  an  offensive  for  twelve  months.  The  51st  Highland 
Division  undertakes  offensives  of  this  kind  every  three  months.  '252  It  is  clear  that 
Woollcombe  did  not  inspire  confidence.  Headlam  of  the  Guards  Division  confirmed  the  view 
that  the  corps  commander  was  less  than  experienced,  stating: 
About  midday  Major-General  Fielding  received  a  telegram  from  the  N  Corps  stating  that  the 
Guards  might  be  called  upon  to  relieve  the  51S`  Division  in  the  line  that  night  [at  8.30  a.  m.,  on  the 
morning  of  the  23rd  November,  Major  General  Fielding  had  asked  the  IV  Corps  whether  his 
division  was  to  be  employed  to  relieve  any  division  in  the  line  and  had  been  told  that  it  was  "most 
unlikely"],  but  the  telegram  contained  no  intimation  as  to  the  whereabouts  of  the  headquarters  of 
the  51S"  Division  and  its  brigades.  It  was  not  until  2pm  that  this  necessary  information  could  be 
obtained  from  the  N  Corps.  The  brigadiers  of  the  1`  and  3rd  Guards  Brigades  then  started  off  to 
get  in  touch  with  the  brigades  that  they  were  to  relieve,  but,  as  the  locations  supplied  by  N  Corps 
turned  out  to  be  incorrect,  they  were  for  a  long  time  unsuccessful  in  their  quest.  It  was,  indeed, 
more  by  good  luck  than  by  good  management  that  by  about  6pm  they  succeeded  in  finding  the 
advanced  headquarters  of  the  51S`  Division  at  Flesquieres.  They  then  discovered  that  the  staff  of 
that  division  had  received  no  instructions  as  to  the  relief  by  the  Guards  and  was,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
arranging  its  own  divisional  relief.  253 
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276 The  leadership  was  tested  during  the  new  style  engagement.  However,  Paddy  Griffith's 
classification  of  Harper  as  `erratic',  a  judgement  based  predominantly  on  the  actions  at 
Cambrai,  is  incorrect.  254  Travers  has  also  erred  in  stating,  `Despite  two  weeks  of  training  in 
tank-infantry  cooperation  before  the  attack,  there  were  instances  of  commanders  who  simply 
refused,  or  were  unable  to  comply  with  tactical  rules.  One  well-known  example  was  Major 
General  Harper.  '255  Harper  may  have  made  a  mistake  in  deployment,  but  there  is 
considerably  more  evidence  to  suggest  that  his  overall  leadership  was  sound.  Just  because 
Harper  varied  his  tactics  from  the  rest  of  the  divisional  GOCs  does  not  automatically 
incriminate  him.  Travers  also  used  the  term  `tactical  rules',  but  there  were  no  tactical  rules, 
merely  guidelines,  and  these  were  not  enforced. 
Bidwell  and  Graham  have  stated  that: 
as  the  battle  was  considered  to  be  an  infantry  advance  with  tanks  and  not  a  tank  advance  with 
infantry,  and  although  many  more  tanks  were  available  than  in  any  previous  attack,  the  infantry 
still  largely  determined  the  tactics  in  most  divisions.  Consequently,  there  were  variations  in  the 
way  divisions  used  their  tanks,  some  of  which  were  not  designed  to  maximise  co-operation 
between  the  two  arms.  256 
It  might  indeed  have  made  a  difference  if  all  the  divisions  had  conformed,  but,  as  Andro  and 
Eric  Linklater  stated: 
The  official  historian  blamed  Harper's  formation,  asserting  that  it  slowed  to  advance  and  left  the 
infantry  too  far  from  the  tanks  to  give  support  against  the  artillery.  It  must  be  said,  however,  that  it 
was  hard  to  see  how  the  7`h  Battalion  [Black  Watch],  for  instance,  could  have  approached  close 
enough  to  knock  out  the  field  guns  except  under  cover  of  smoke,  which  was  not  available.  Nor  is 
any  delay  apparent  in  the  6th  Battalion's  finely  executed  advance,  except  that  occasioned  by 
machine-guns,  which  would  presumably  have  been  present  whatever  the  formation.  257 
The  final  summation  of  the  tank  question  is  most  accurately  stated  by  Hussey: 
the  evidence  shows  Harper's  tank/infantry  tactics  were  neither  eccentric  nor  silly.  His  [Harper's] 
general  tactics  were  well  ahead  of  many  infantry  specialists  then  and  still  earn  serious  respect 
today.  On  how  to  use  tanks  with  infantry  in  1917,  he  was  in  advance  of  Fuller  himself  in  key 
aspects  and  we  have  seen  how  exploratory,  how  far  from  definitive,  were  the  methods  proposed: 
after  the  battle  Baker-Carr  [Brigadier-General  of  the  15`  Tank  Brigade  at  Cambrai]  applauded 
Harper's  tactics  as  good,  and  very  similar  to  62nd  Division's  which  earned  everyone's  full  praise 
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277 (against  a  weaker  defence).  The  Harper  method  worked  perfectly  in  Phase  One,  and  the  setback  in 
the  next  phase  owed  much  to  a  resolute,  well  trained  anti-tank  battery  hidden  behind  a  crest  and  a 
fluke  tank  formation.  But  in  concentrating  on  the  fate  of  six  tanks  on  the  right  flank  the  critics 
ignore  the  genuine  problems  experienced  by  tanks  further  to  the  left,  of  fuel  and  ammunition 
shortages,  just  as  they  tend  to  ignore  the  very  considerable  efforts  which  finally  got  tanks  into  the 
village...  . 
It  was  not  Harper  who  laid  down  the  scope  and  organisation  for  the  attack  on  the  wide 
slope  nor  the  artillery  method,  but  Corps  and  Army.  58 
Bryn  Hammond,  in  his  article  on  the  51St  Division  at  Cambrai,  thinks  that  `Harper  was  not  a 
brilliant  tactician.  He  undoubtedly  suffered  from  a  blinding  stubbornness.....  an  obstinate, 
tactically  weak  general',  adding  somewhat  dismissively,  `however,  he  did  think  himself 
sufficiently  qualified  in  the  matter  of  tactics  to  produce  a  booklet  entitled  Notes  on  Infantry 
Tactics  and  Training.  '259  This  remark  is  contradictory,  for  the  booklet  was  an  exceptional 
piece  of  work.  Hussey  notes  that  Paddy  Griffith  has  compared  the  booklet  with  similar 
publications  by  Maxse  and  de  Lisle,  and  judges  it  `the  best  of  the  lot....  more  sophisticated 
than  Maxse's  work,  especially  since  it  links  the  platoon's  action  to  the  Brigade  or  Divisional 
battle  and  the  artillery  barrage  (which  was  usually  planned  at  Corps  level)  in  a  way  that 
Maxse  does  not  really  mention'.  60 
Harper's  leadership  was  more  valued  by  the  military  hierarchy  than  by  a  number  of  post-war 
military  historians,  as,  subsequent  to  Cambrai,  Harper  received  a  KCB  and  a  corps, 
(ironically  he  commanded  IV  Corps  for  the  rest  of  the  war),  followed  by  a  promotion  to 
Southern  Command  in  Britain  in  1919. 
The  senior  officers  in  the  division  continued  to  have  significant  responsibility  and  influence. 
Continuity  in  command  was  marked  at  all  senior  levels,  and  collectively  the  accumulated 
experience  in  the  51"  throughout  the  engagements  of  1917  was  invaluable.  An  interesting 
insight  into  the  various  levels  of  command  interaction  was  demonstrated  during  a  pivotal 
moment  in  the  battle.  Wimberley  related  that: 
In  the  late  evening,  Hardie  [Machine  Gun  Officer]  came  up  and  we  went  again  to  Brigade  to  be 
told  that  we,  the  HD  were  not  to  advance  further,  as  Bourlon  Wood  on  our  left  was  untaken  and 
that  154  Brigade  had  established  itself  in  Fontaine,  along  the  road  to  Cantaing  and  that  village 
itself.  Hardie,  the  shrewd,  looking  at  his  map  and  seeing  Fontaine  like  a  pistol  pointing  into  the 
Boche  line,  suggested  that  eight  of  my  guns  should  go  up  and  help  154  M.  G.  Company  in  the 
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278 consolidation,  but  this  the  General  judged  as  unnecessary,  as  reports  from  Colonel  Unthank, 
commanding  the  40'  Seaforths  in  Fontaine,  said  there  was  not  a  Boche  in  sight.  Those  eight  guns 
might  have  made  a  lot  of  difference!  261 
This  indicated  that  the  brigadier-general  retained  overall  authority  over  his  units  during 
combat,  whilst  permitting  relatively  junior  officers  to  suggest  a  course  of  action.  However, 
the  word  of  the  battalion  commander  still  carried  more  weight  than  that  of  a  `specialist' 
officer.  There  was  much  dialogue  and  integration  throughout  the  division,  but  it  was  still 
maintained  within  a  rigid  hierarchical  order. 
Organisation  and  administration 
Organisation  and  administration  continued  to  function  well  with  staff  well  trained  and 
efficient.  Every  effort  was  made  to  ensure  that  preparations  for  the  battle  were  complete  and 
effective.  However,  these  efforts  were  made  more  difficult  by  the  unorthodox  nature  of  the 
attack  and  problems  did  occur. 
Communications  were,  as  always,  vital.  Major  advances  at  the  tactical  level  had  been 
complemented  throughout  1917  by  the  improved  use  of  various  applications  for 
communications.  Power  buzzers,  wireless,  and  telephones  were  more  widely  available  and 
reliable,  and  the  use  of  aircraft  had  increased.  However,  Harper  pointed  out  that  `Conditions 
for  the  Signal  Service  were  more  exacting  than  at  any  previous  battle  in  which  the  Division 
had  been  engaged''262  and  Brigadier-General  Buchanan  agreed  whilst  indicating  some 
examples  of  problems  that  were  encountered: 
Pigeon  messages  were  not  satisfactory.  A  certain  number  never  arrived,  and  those  that  did  were  2 
and  3  hours  in  reaching  the  Brigade.  Visual  requires  a  great  deal  of  practice.  When  Battalions 
moved  forward  their  station  broke  up  and  followed  without  any  thought  of  leaving  an  intermediate 
station  to  keep  in  touch  until  Brigade  got  forward  enough  to  communicate  direct.  Brigade  schemes 
must  be  carried  out  at  training.  The  Tanks  continually  destroyed  forward  lines.  When  they  had  all 
gone  through  the  Artillery  did  likewise.  263 
As  the  battle  progressed  things  became  even  more  problematic,  `Very  difficult  after  the 
advance  began.  The  lamp,  runner,  mounted  orderly  and  old  German  wires  were  all  used  at 
times  but  messages  came  back  slowly.  '264 
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279 Intelligence  was  based  largely  on  information  the  division  had  received  from  IV  Corps 
command  on  the  state  of  the  enemy  defences  and  enemy  forces.  This  led  to  expectations  that 
the  battle  would  not  be  a  difficult  contest.  Wimberley  explained  that  prior  to  the  attack 
`Officers  thinking  one  thing,  would  it  be  a  walk-over  as  intelligence  had  promised'.  265 
Hussey  has  pointed  out  that  the  (Highland)  Division  intelligence  failed  at  crucial  points,  such 
as  the  initial  attack  at  Flesquieres  village: 
The  enemy's  resistance  in  Flesquieres  was  slackening  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  the  village  could 
have  been  entered  with  small  loss.  A  message  was,  however,  received  by  telephone  through  the  6m 
Gordons  from  GOC  152"d  Bde,  asking  that  the  projected  attack  should  not  be  carried  out,  as  the 
northern  portion  of  the  village  was  believed  to  be  already  in  the  hands  of  51"  Division.  66 
It  was  not.  Ultimately,  the  ability  of  the  division  to  advance  was  diminished  due  to  a 
combination  of  less  than  comprehensive  intelligence  and  inadequate  foresight.  Wimberley 
complained: 
Progress  was  very,  very  slow,  the  road  was  packed  with  reinforcing  infantry,  field  guns,  shells  for 
the  guns  already  up,  lorries  full  of  stone  for  mending  the  road  and  filling  up  the  mine  craters; 
cavalry,  armoured  cars,  a  company  of  cyclists-hundreds  of  men  and  guns  trying  to  pass  through  the 
narrow  break  before  it  could  be  closed  up.  After  about  half  a  mile  the  stream  stopped  altogether, 
and  there  we  stuck......  I  am  convinced  that  these  mine  craters,  which  in  spite  of  the  sappers'  efforts 
took  twenty-four  hours  or  more  to  bridge  over,  had  a  great  deal  to  do  with  our  not  being  able  to 
exploit  our  initial  success.  The  difference  between  the  31a`  July  at  Ypres  and  the  20th  November  at 
Cambrai  were  in  this  respect  very  noticeable-in  the  first  battle  everything  seemed  to  have  been 
thought  out  and  prepared,  in  the  second  battle,  nothing  267 
This  situation  placed  a  heavy  burden  on  the  supply  infrastructure  and  the  `Ammunition 
supply  required  the  continuous  efforts  of  every  horse  and  man'.  268  However,  even  with  the 
best  efforts,  `It  is  regrettable  that  more  fire  could  not  be  given  during  the  counter-attack  on 
FONTAINE  but  the  ammunition  supply  made  it  simply  impossible'.  269 
Strength  and  casualties 
The  troops  of  the  51S`  at  Cambrai  were,  in  general,  still  of  good  quality.  The  ADMS  report  for 
October  1917  stated,  `The  Physique  of  the  Division  is  good....  '  and  `The  General  health  of 
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280 the  troops  is  very  good'.  270  However,  the  ever-growing  casualty  list  was  gradually  denuding 
the  division  of  its  corporate  experience  and  of  the  network  of  relationships  that  had  developed 
over  time.  One  result  of  this  was,  as  Moore  has  stated,  that  `All  the  Territorial  units 
outwardly  retained  their  structure  but  reinforcements  were  no  longer  exclusively  from  their 
own  recruiting  areas'.  271 
It  was  significant  that,  although  the  515t  was  relatively  well  supplied  with  reinforcements 
throughout  1917,  it  remained  consistently  understrength.  However,  this  did  not  have  an 
impact  on  the  battle  as  it  was  not  a  shortage  of  men  that  contributed  to  any  reverses.  Casualty 
rates  were  relatively  low  and  most  of  those  were  incurred  during  the  later  stages  of  the 
combat.  The  total  number  of  killed,  wounded  or  missing  in  the  division  amounted  to  68 
officers  and  1502  other  ranks. 
Fig.  25  Casualties  for  the  battle272 
Officers  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
21  43  4 
Other  Ranks  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
183  1190  129 
The  low  casualty  rate  would  indicate  that  the  division  had  fought  well,  but  it  should  be 
remembered  that  the  enemy  were  relatively  weak  in  the  early  stages  of  the  attack.  The 
relatively  low  rate  of  officer  casualties  is  also  informative  as  no  longer  was  it  common 
practice  in  the  division  for  officers  to  be  so  exposed  in  leading  from  the  front,  as  tactics  had 
now  adopted  another  form. 
Esprit  de  corps 
The  changing  nature  of  the  troops  had  a  limited  impact  on  the  esprit  de  corps  as  long  as  a 
balance  between  recruitment  and  representation  was  maintained.  Networks  did  change,  but  as 
long  as  they  didn't  change  too  dramatically,  a  continuity  remained.  Harper  was  conscious  of 
this  as  early  as  July  1917,  when  he  wrote  to  the  corps  commander  requesting  that  men  be 
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281 returned  from  corps  school,  `As  you  know,  we  have  had  to  replace  a  great  deal,  and  we 
should  like  a  few  old  faces'.  273 
However,  the  (Highland)  Division  had  fought  regularly  and  added  to  its  reputation 
throughout  1917.  `When  we  arrived  on  the  scene,  we  were  greeted  by  the  Ulster  Division 
then  holding  the  line  with  the  exclamation  `Kurds  of  Ill  Omen"...  we  were  told  that  our 
appearance  in  that  peaceful  countryside  denoted  there  was  something  in  the  wind.  '274 
Malcolm  stated  that  the  division  was  at  its  most  formidable  in  the  second  half  of  1917  and 
that  it  was  superior  to  the  formation  that  fought  at  Beaumont  Hamel,  275  and  Wauchope  added 
that  divisional  successes  at  the  close  of  1916  and  throughout  1917  accounted  for  its  selection 
for  Cambrai.  276 
Because  of  this  status,  esprit  was  solid  and  morale  was  strong  before  the  battle,  although 
there  was  surprise  amongst  the  officers  and  men  that  the  515`  had  been  earmarked  for  another 
engagement.  `The  news  that  this  was  the  case  came  as  rather  a  shock,  as  the  Division  had 
already  fought  battles  in  the  year  1917  on  9th-12th  April,  23`d-24th  April,  16th  May,  31st  July- 
1st  August,  20th-23`d  September,  and  had  lost  in  casualties  since  9th  April  457  officers  and 
9966  other  ranks.  '  277 
After  the  battle,  a  spat  with  another  `elite'  formation  indicated  the  position  of  the  515`  on  the 
ranking  scale  of  divisions  in  the  BEF: 
At  midnight,  the  Guards  Division  relieved  our  Division  but  not  before  there  had  been  a  little 
unpleasantness  between  the  men  of  the  two  Divisions  owing  to  the  Guards  making  a  few  nasty 
remarks  on  the  non  capture  of  the  whole  of  Fontaine  with  the  result  that  our  men  commenced 
fighting  the  Guards  and  for  a  time  there  was  quite  a  `set  to'  with  a  few  casualties  on  both  sides.  278 
However  this  setback  also  indicated  to  the  rest  of  the  BEF  that  the  (Highland)  Division  was 
not  invincible,  which  may  or  may  not  have  influenced  subsequent  judgements  on  its 
performance  in  the  line  on  21  March  and  beyond. 
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282 March  1918 
Narrative 
In  many  senses  Cambrai  was  the  end  of  the  superiority  of  defence  over  offence.  The  war  had 
caused  ever  increasing  resource  shortages,  both  human  and  material,  and  1918  was  to  provide 
a  platform  where  attacks  could,  one  way  or  another,  ultimately  cause  a  breakthrough.  The 
German  Army,  with  the  advantage  of  the  collapse  of  the  Eastern  Front  and  the  return  of 
troops  to  the  west,  planned  a  massive  attack  with  the  aim  of  staging  an  audacious 
breakthrough  using  infiltration,  close-combined  fire  support,  and  decentralised  command 
techniques.  279 
The  BEF,  expecting  an  attack,  used  the  winter  period  to  rework  its  defensive  systems  to  cope 
with  the  new  style  of  attack,  broadly  reflecting  much  of  the  theory  that  the  enemy  had  applied 
to  its  own  defensive  systems. 
Within  this  context  in  March  1918,  the  (Highland)  Division  was  a  part  of  IV  Corps  of  Third 
Army  and  was  deployed  over  a  frontage  extending  from  the  northern  edge  of  the  Flesquieres 
salient,  with  the  6th  Division  to  the  north  and  the  17th  (Northern)  Division  to  the  south.  When 
the  51  t  Division  took  over  the  sector  it  was  in  poor  condition  and  considerable  effort  had  to 
be  put  into  reworking  and  improving  it.  280  GHQ  had  issued  a  memorandum  on  14  December 
1917  which: 
laid  down  the  broad  principles  upon  which  a  defence  was  to  be  conducted...  it  laid  down  that  as 
far  as  possible  the  defence  was  to  be  actively  conducted  by  means  of  local  offensives,  raids,  and 
the  use  of  gas  to  harass  the  enemy.  Defences  were  to  be  sited  in  depth  and  counterattacks  were  to 
be  planned  in  detail.  The  main  battle  zone  was  to  be  between  2,000  and  3,000  yards  (1839  to  2750 
metres)  deep  in  successive  lines,  and  switch  systems  were  to  be  included  so  that  in  the  event  of  a 
breakthrough  the  enemy  could  be  prevented  from  turning  outwards  and  rolling  up  the  line  from  the 
flank.  The  first  line  of  defence  was  to  be  the  outpost  line,  based  on  machine  guns  and  sited  so  as  to 
conform  to  the  machine  gun  plan  and  not  vice-versa.  281 
Harper  and  his  senior  commanders  organised  the  divisional  area  into  three  zones  or  lines. 
There  was  a  front  system  in  the  forward  zone  that  consisted  of  a  front,  support,  and  reserve 
line.  The  two  former  were  continuous  trenches  held  by  wired  posts,  whilst  the  support  line 
also  contained  a  number  of  dugouts.  The  reserve  line  (which  was  also  the  front  line  of  the 
279  Bailey,  `The  First  World  War  and  the  Birth  of  the  Modern  Style  of  Warfare',  in  Strategic  and  Combat 
Studies  Institute  Occasional  Paper,  No.  22.,  p.  42. 
280  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  11,  p.  176. 
283 battle  zone)  was  composed  of  a  series  of  defended  localities  and  portions  of  wired  trenches. 
The  battle  zone  contained  an  intermediate  line  with  dugouts  and  wired  trenches.  At  the  rear  of 
the  battle  zone  lay  the  Beaumetz-Morchies  line  which  consisted  of  a  single  continuous 
strongly  wired  trench  with  a  series  of  switches  that  connected  to  the  intermediate  line.  `In 
these  three  systems  contact  is  made  with  flank  Divisions  in  the  front,  support  and 
intermediate  lines,  the  system  of  the  flanking  Divisions  being  continuous  with  the  system  of 
the  51st  (H)  Division.  282  However,  this  continuity  did  not  include  the  Beaumetz-Morchies 
line. 
All  three  brigades  were  in  the  line  (holding  the  trenches  in  depth  from  the  front  to  the 
Beaumetz-Morchies  line,  each  with  a  complete  battalion  in  reserve  which  was  designated  to 
garrison  the  Beaumetz-Morchies  line).  283  Every  line  of  defence,  and  in  many  places 
communication  trenches,  were  heavily  wired,  and  `In  the  experience  of  this  Division  no 
trench  system  has  ever  been  occupied  which  has  been  protected  by  a  quarter  of  the  wire 
which  had  been  erected  in  this  sector'.  284  Machine  guns,  positioned  for  covering  fire  were 
sited  in  groups  of  two,  and  all  four  machine  gun  companies  were  deployed  with  the  exception 
of  six  guns  that  were  held  in  reserve.  285  Each  brigade  had  four  trench  mortars  in  the  front  line, 
with  a  further  four  in  the  battle  zone.  286  In  addition,  each  brigade  was  covered  by  a  brigade  of 
field  artillery,  deployed  with  nine  forward  18  pounders  and  4.5  inch  howitzers,  whilst  the 
remainder  were  situated  in  positions  3500  yards  behind  the  front  line.  Tank  traps  were  also 
laid  and  trench  mortar  bombs  were  set  down  as  mines. 
Facing  this  defensive  system  were  arrayed  the  following  German  Army  corps: 
XIV  Reserve  Corps  set  to  attack  the  right  of  the  British  6th  Division  and  left  of  51St  Division: 
1St  Line:  3rd  Guards  Division,  20th  Division 
2  "d  Line:  39th  Division. 
281  F.  Myatt,  The  British  Infantry  1669-1945  (Poole,  1983),  p.  179. 
282  NA,  WO  95  2847,51St  Division  Defence  Scheme,  13  March  1918. 
283  The  154th  Brigade  on  the  right,  152d  Brigade  in  the  centre,  and  153`d  Brigade  on  the  left.  From  right  to  left 
were  deployed  the  1/4th  Gordons,  1/7th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  1/6th  Gordons,  1/7t'  Black  Watch, 
and  1/6th  Black  Watch.  In  reserve  were  deployed  1/4th  and  1/6th  Seaforths  and  1/7th  Gordons. 
284  WO  95  2847,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
285  14  in  the  support  line,  14  in  the  reserve  line,  16  in  the  intermediate  line,  6  in  support  at  points  between  the 
intermediate  line  and  the  Beaumetz-Morchies  line,  and  8  at  the  Beaumetz-Morchies  line. 
284 XI  Corps  set  to  attack  the  centre  and  right  of  the  51s`  (Highland)  Division  and  northern  flank 
of  the  Flesquieres  salient: 
1st  Line:  24`h  Reserve  Division,  53rd  Reserve  Division,  I  I9`h  Division 
2"d  Line:  40'  Division.  287 
286  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  272. 
287  M.  Middlebrook,  The  Kaiser's  Battle,  21"  March  1918  (London,  1983),  p.  381. 
285 Map  4. 
The  German  Offensive:  Disposition  of  51"  (llighland)  Division,  Morning, 
21s'  March  191828 
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That  the  division  worked  tirelessly  to  get  the  defences  ready  for  an  attack  is  undoubted  and 
the  war  diaries  of  all  units  reflected  that.  It  was  also  of  benefit  that  there  was  relatively  little 
enemy  activity  in  January  and  early  February  1918,  and  that  period  of  quiet  assisted 
divisional  preparations.  Every  man  in  the  51s1  Division  expected  an  attack.  Patrols  were 
consistently  sent  into  no  man's  land'289  and  as  early  as  18  February  1918  Bradbury  stated  that 
`At  night  the  Divisional  Staff  got  the  wind  up  expecting  Fritz  to  make  his  great  attack  which 
was  now  expected  to  commence  any  day,  consequently  orders  were  given  for  all  sentries  to 
be  doubled  and  every  precaution  to  be  taken.  '290  The  expectation  continued  until  mid-March, 
when  the  signs  for  an  impending  attack  were  incontrovertible  as  Wrench  stated,  `Reports  go 
that  Fritz  is  massing  strongly  here  and  is  coming  over  in  the  morning',  and  Wimberley 
continued,  `About  the  15"i  the  real  "wind  up"  started  and  every  day  we  were  told  that  the 
Boche  would  attack  the  next'.  291  British  artillery  was  in  action  during  this  period  with  the  aim 
of  disrupting  any  enemy  preparation,  and  `One  4.5-inch  howitzer  battery  in  the  51"  Division 
caused  an  estimated  100  dumps  of  ammunition  to  explode  during  a  ninety-minute 
288  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  Map  IX. 
289  Wauchope,  A  History  of  the  Black  Watch  in  the  Great  War,  1914-1918,  Volume  11,  p.  177. 
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286 bombardment'.  92  The  heightened  state  of  alert  was  a  constant  until  the  attack  came.  When  it 
did  come,  it  fell  on  the  (Highland)  Division  like  a  hammer  blow.  153  `d  Brigade  reported: 
At  5.3  [sic]  a.  m.  the  enemy  opened  with  a  very  heavy  bombardment  of  all  kinds  of  shell.  He 
employed  Trench  Mortars  and  H.  E.  shells  mixed  with  gas  shell  on  our  area  forward  of  BEUGNY, 
the  gas  shell  being  more  concentrated  in  rear  of  the  Intermediate  Line.  Everyone  forward  of  that 
however  had  to  wear  gas  masks  for  from  2  1/2  to  4  hours.  While  there  is  no  one  of  the  Front  or 
Support  Lines  of  this  Brigade  North  of  RABBIT  ALLEY  now  present  to  say  what  happened  it  is 
abundantly  clear  from  accounts........  at  a  time  varying  from  9  to  9.30  a.  m.,  the  enemy  in  very 
considerable  numbers  appeared  from  the  left  flank  over  CENTRAL  AVENUE,  and  Support  Line 
North  of  the  STRAND,  and  swept  along  mainly  behind  our  Support  Line  from  N.  to  South,  his 
move  being  accompanied  by  a  smoke  and  shrapnel  barrage  moving  South  along  our  trenches.  In 
almost  every  case  the  first  thing  a  garrison  knew  was  that  the  enemy  were  behind  their  trench,  and 
bombing  along  the  trench  from  their  left....  The  smoke  and  fog  prevented  any  distant  view.  293 
Throughout  the  divisional  sector,  the  enemy  targeted  divisional  positions  using  a  mixture  of 
artillery,  heavy  trench  mortars,  and  gas.  The  1/6`h  and  1/7`h  Black  Watch  on  the  extreme  left 
of  the  division  were  the  first  to  be  attacked  by  enemy  troops: 
The  enemy  counted  on  the  Highlanders  holding  their  ground  despite  the  merciless  bombardment  to 
which  they  had  been  subjected;  and  in  this  they  were  right,  for  they  succeeded  in  cutting  off  all  the 
troops  holding  the  front  and  support  lines,  every  man  of  whom  was  either  killed  or  captured.  The 
survivors  of  these  front  line  battalions,  located  in  the  Intermediate  line  and  in  the  rear  of  it,  soon 
found  themselves  in  a  desperate  position,  and  were  forced  to  fall  back  gradually,  frequently  halting 
and  forming  defensive  flanks  to  retard  the  enemy's  advance  and  to  avoid  being  cut  off  like  their 
comrades  in  front.  294 
Wimberley,  who  was  in  the  battle  zone  with  his  machine  guns,  recorded  that 
The  next  hour  passed  very  slowly-the  shelling  did  not  diminish  in  the  least,  and  as  it  was  still  dark 
I  guessed  the  attack  had  not  begun.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  sit  still  and  listen  to  the  signaller 
drawling  down  the  telephone.  "Hullo  Argylls,  Hullo,  Hullo,  Hullo,  Hullo  Argylls"-  no  reply-  "Line 
cut  to  Argylls,  Sir".  "Hullo,  Seaforths,  hullo,  hullo"  -  "Line  cut  to  Seaforths,  Sir".  So  it  went  on. 
When  the  barrage  started  we  had  some  eight  or  nine  telephone  lines  out  to  various  Headquarters, 
one  by  one  these  were  all  out.  Infantry  Brigade  Headquarters  was  the  last  to  go,  and  they  reported 
before  the  line  went,  that  they  too  were  isolated  except  for  their  few  buried  cables.  A  few  minutes 
later  they  were  gone  and  we  were  completely  isolated  in  the  dark29S 
Rear  areas  were  being  systematically  targeted  and  that  targeting  also  included  divisional 
headquarters. 
292  Middlebrook,  The  Kaiser's  Battle,  21S'  March  1918,  p.  117. 
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287 As  German  forces  advanced,  the  forward  units  of  the  division  were  increasingly  outflanked, 
and  the  153`d  and  152nd  Brigade  sectors  in  the  front  and  support  lines  were  lost  by  early 
afternoon.  The  far  left  of  the  divisional  sector,  right  back  to  the  intermediate  line  was  full  of 
enemy  soldiers.  `I  then  made  off  to  join  Hastings  at  the  two  nearest  guns  and  as  I  did  so  the 
mist  rolled  away  like  the  curtain  of  a  theatre,  revealing  a  sight,  the  like  of  which  I  had  never 
seen  before,  and  enough  to  frighten  all  but  the  bravest.  The  Boche  were  there  in  hundreds.  '296 
By  the  end  of  the  day,  many  men  and  guns  had  been  lost  and  the  enemy  were  pressing  to  take 
the  Beaumetz-Morchies  line  and  corps  deployed  units  from  other  divisions  to  reserve 
positions  in  case  of  a  breakthrough. 
Early  on  22  March,  orders  were  received  by  515`  Divisional  headquarters  to  withdraw  the 
division  in  accordance  with  a  withdrawal  by  17th  Division  to  its  right  in  the  Flesquieres 
salient.  A  new  line  of  defence  was  sited  on  a  switch  line  behind  the  intermediate  line,  but 
throughout  the  day  units  on  the  left  continued  to  be  pushed  back  and  reserve  troops  were  sent 
forward  to  assist.  By  the  close  of  22  March,  enemy  pressure  resulted  in  infiltration  to  the 
Beaumetz-Morchies  line  and  new  orders  were  issued  to  form  a  new  line  of  defence  behind  it. 
On  23  March,  the  division  was  ordered  to  withdraw  to  the  army  line,  in  accordance  with  the 
17th  Division  on  the  right.  The  51St  was  still  `in  touch'  with  the  17th  Division  throughout  23 
and  24  March,  but  this  contact  was  becoming  increasingly  fragmented,  and  on  the  following 
morning,  `no  touch  with  British  troops  could  be  obtained  on  either  flank'.  97  The  51St  was  in 
danger  of  encirclement  and  Bewsher  stated  `The  remnant  of  the  Division  was  thus  left  still 
facing  the  enemy,  its  three  brigade  headquarters  just  in  rear  of  the  fighting  line  still  in  the 
same  order  of  battle  in  which  they  had  begun  the  engagement,  but  their  fighting  efficiency 
was  gone'.  298  On  25  March  1918,  the  division  was  withdrawn  into  reserve  and  on  26  March 
was  replaced  in  the  line. 
Analysis 
March  1918  had  enormous  implications  for  the  51"  Division,  as  it  did  for  the  whole  British 
Army.  Whatever  had  remained  of  the  (Highland)  Division  that  had  fought  since  May  1915 
was  almost  completely  obliterated  during  the  German  March  offensive  and  that  which 
295  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  113. 
296  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  `A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  p.  115. 
297  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  513`  Highland  Division,  p.  292. 
288 continued  to  linger  was  bludgeoned  to  extinction  the  following  month  at  the  battle  of  the  Lys. 
The  ghost  of  the  division  would  remain  for  the  rest  of  the  war,  but  it  would  never  regain  the 
form  or  structure  that  it  had  enjoyed  before  the  March  engagement. 
Middlebrook  has  stated  that  the  51st  had  a: 
high  reputation  as  a  `stormer'  division  dating  from  the  attack  and  the  capture  of  Beaumont  Hamel 
during  the  closing  stages  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme.  But  the  Highlanders  may  have  been  used  too 
often  since  Beaumont  Hamel;  they  had  suffered  many  casualties  and  were  suspected  of  having  lost 
their  fighting  spirit.  There  was  also  some  doubt  whether  the  Highland  nature  was  as  suited  to 
sitting  out  a  bombardment  and  then  defending  against  an  infantry  attack  as  it  was  to  storming 
German  trenches.  299 
There  is  some  merit  in  this,  but  the  argument  needs  to  be  developed.  The  division  had  indeed 
been  involved  in  substantial  conflict,  but  it  still  remained  a  good  division  at  the  onset  of  the 
March  offensive.  Secondly,  the  allusion  to  the  `Highland  nature'  is  melodramatic,  and  if 
referring  to  the  romantic  images  of  clan  charges  and  long-ago  battles  is  anachronistic  in  this 
context.  However,  when  referring  to  the  division's  potential  inability  to  defend,  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that  the  51  S`  had  been  trained  (albeit  not  extensively)  in  defence  techniques  and 
it  had  conducted  stout  defences  during  1917  against  vigorous  enemy  counter-attacks.  The  51St 
Division  did  fight  well  enough,  but  it  will  be  demonstrated  that  the  initial  blow  on  the 
division  was  such  that  it  did  not  have  the  capacity  to  recover  and  the  only  action  that  it  was 
capable  of  taking  was  reaction. 
The  objective  of  the  defensive  system  was  to  stop  a  German  attack.  In  this,  ultimately,  the 
(Highland)  Division  failed,  although  it  did  delay  it  enough  that  the  attack  in  the  divisional 
sector  lost  impetus.  Samuels  has  stated  that,  German  'Stosstruppen'  tactics  had  been  under 
development  since  the  autumn  of  1914: 
By  1918,  they  had  become  the  standard  tactics  of  almost  the  entire  German  Army.  In  addition,  the 
defensive  system  in  which  the  British  still  had  such  faith  was  not  only  a  poor  reflection  of  the 
German  system  that  it  was  intended  to  copy,  but  it  was  also  seriously  flawed  and  had  contributed 
very  considerably  to  the  disasters  of  March  1918  310 
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289 The  German  mode  of  attack,  an  unprecedented  barrage,  disruption  and  infiltration,  and  rapid 
and  unanticipated  actions,  left  the  (Highland)  Division  confused  and  disorganised.  At  that 
stage,  further  actions  merely  increased  the  dislocation  and  the  51St  began  to  cease  to  function 
as  a  formation. 
GHQ  had  published  memoranda  on  the  BEF  defensive  system,  and  Harper,  `In  view  of  the 
fact  that  so  much  new  work  was  necessary  in  the  sector',  published  a  memo  of  his  own 
containing  key  principles  of  defence  and  trench  construction.  301  This  memo  recommended 
trench  construction  on  a  wider  scale  than  had  been  the  case  previously.  Harper  also  laid  down 
fixed  principles  and  practical  positioning  for  the  defence  of  the  sector.  This  included  the 
methods  to  build  and  the  materials  to  construct  defensive  positions  and  strongholds.  Carter- 
Campbell  confirmed  that  Harper's  system  was  in  place  exactly  as  embodied  in  the  defence 
scheme  that  had  issued  ten  days  before  the  attack.  302  The  division  was  holding  a  front  of 
5,400  yards  with  all  brigades  in  the  line.  This  was  not  Harper's  usual  deployment  and  meant 
that  any  retention  of  significant  reserves  was  not  possible,  and  a  great  deal  of  faith  was  placed 
in  the  positioning  of  machine  guns  to  bolster  the  sparsity  of  troops. 
However,  a  key  weakness  in  the  defence  in  depth  principle  that  Harper  and  GHQ  advocated 
was  that,  in  periods  of  poor  visibility  and  heavy  attack,  strongpoints  could  be  isolated  and 
lack  supporting  fire.  On  21  March,  visibility  was  poor,  and  it  is  debatable  whether  the  attack 
might  have  been  halted  if  this  had  not  been  the  case,  as  the  fog  compromised  the  defence 
scheme,  with  units  being  broken  up  and  command  becoming  isolated,  often  in  the  hands  of 
junior  officers  and  NCOs.  In  addition  to  this  Carter-Campbell  was  critical  of  Harper's  trench 
construction: 
Owing  to  the  depth  of  our  trenches  and  the  height  of  the  excavated  earth  piled  up  on  the  traverses 
and  on  the  parados,  the  men  could  not  see  what  was  taking  place  on  their  flank,  nor  use  their  rifles 
to  a  flank;  nor  could  they  see  or  bring  fire  to  bear  on  the  enemy  in  rear  of  them  until  he  was  well 
within  bombing,  and,  probably,  Flammenwerfer,  distance  303 
Harper,  along  with  GHQ,  had  made  an  error  of  judgement  in  failing  to  take  into  account  that 
flanking  could  be  the  main  form  of  enemy  attack.  As  Travers  has  emphasised,  `There  was, 
however,  a  decisive  error  in  GHQ's  estimation  of  the  nature  of  the  German  offensive.  This 
301  Bewsher,  The  History  of  the  51"  Highland  Division,  p.  265. 
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290 was  that  GHQ  obviously  expected  the  German  offensive  to  follow  the  1917  BEF  model  of  a 
manpower  and  wearing  down  campaign.  '304  Harper  should  have  known  better.  As  early  as 
October  1916  he  had  stressed: 
It  is  the  duty  of  every  Commander  to  protect  his  flanks  the  moment  he  occupies  a  new  position. 
This  principle  holds  good  for  the  advanced  post  as  for  the  Brigade.  ...  Neglect  of  this  principle  has 
been  the  fruitful  cause  of  troops  being  turned  out  of  positions  which  they  have  won.  305 
There  was  also  an  insufficient  number  of  switch  lines  which,  had  there  been  more,  would 
have  been  very  useful  as  a  measure  to  halt  outflanking  in  the  rear  areas.  This  would  suggest 
that  the  front  systems  had  been  the  priority.  The  defence  scheme  asserts  that: 
The  main  Zone  of  defence  will  be  the  Battle  Zone,  and  the  Corps  Scheme  of  Defence  is  to  defend 
this  Zone  against  all  attacks,  and  to  regain  by  counter  attack  any  portion  of  the  Battle  Zone  in 
which  the  enemy  gains  a  footing.  The  51°`  (Highland)  Division  will  defend  the  Battle  Zone  by 
preventing  the  enemy  from  breaking  through  the  Forward  Zone,  and  will,  therefore,  offer  the  most 
resistance  to  any  hostile  attack  from  the  Front,  Support  and  Reserve  Lines.  306 
This  was  not  a  mistake  in  principle,  but  a  disproportionate  concentration  on  the  posititioning 
of  units  in  the  forward  and  battle  zones  without  adequate  reserves  and  tends  to  support 
Samuels'  assertions  that  the  BEF  failed  to  allocate  resources  in  the  correct  way.  Samuels 
points  out  that,  `Largely  as  a  consequence  of  the  emphasis  on  offensive  operations  up  to  that 
time,  the  British  Army  had  no  up-to-date  doctrine  for  defence,  commanders  had  no  guide 
how  to  lay  out  positions,  how  to  deploy  men  within  the  system,  or  how  to  react  to  enemy 
attacks'.  307  The  Cambrai  inquiry  had  focused  predominantly  on  the  British  attack  and 
inadequately  on  the  German  counter-attack,  but  it  did  emphasise  that  the  troops  needed 
training  and  that  there  was  a  lack  of  doctrine  for  defence  in  depth.  308 
A  crucial  point  was  the  flanks.  As  Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  M.  Scott  stressed: 
The  main  lesson  to  be  learned  is  that  Defensive  systems  must  be  prepared  on  an  Army  basis.  It  is 
not  enough  that  certain  Divisions  work  hard  while  holding  the  line,  but  all  should  work  to  one 
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291 system.  If  the  trenches  recently  lost  had  been  organised  months  before,  and  the  work  carried  out  as 
the  5  1'`  (Highland)  Division  did  it;  there  would  have  been  a  different  report  to  make  today.  309 
His  analysis  stated  that,  if  the  flanks  on  either  side  of  the  51"  had  held,  then  it  would  not  have 
had  to  withdraw.  However,  it  is  symptomatic  that  each  of  the  reports  of  the  divisions  in 
question  refers  to  insecure  flanks. 
How  the  division  fought  in  defence  was  as  important  as  the  defensive  system  it  occupied.  The 
enemy  forces  arrayed  against  it  were  formidable.  Travers  has  calculated  that  on  the  Third 
Army  front,  fourteen  British  divisions  were  attacked  by  elements  of  seventy-six  German 
divisions  310  German  morale  was  high  and  the  men  were  willing  to  do  what  was  needed  to 
end  the  war.  311  Major  Jobson  of  the  1/4t'  Seaforths  described  the  enemy  method  of  attack: 
A  screen  of  scouts  was  first  thrown  out  and  the  infantry  would  follow  at  an  interval  of  from  300  to 
400  yards-  generally  in  two  double  waves.  The  extension  appeared  to  be  about  10  paces  and  the 
distance  between  lines  about  100  to  200  yards.  Behind  the  two  waves  of  infantry  was  a  line  of 
machine  gunners,  behind  these  again  light  field  guns  and  trench  mortars.  When  the  infantry  came 
within  effective  rifle  or  machine  gun  range  he  adopted  a  "dribbling"  method  of  advance  very 
similar  to  that  described  in  the  attached  pamphlet.  Men  would  spring  up  irregularly  along  the  line- 
rush  forward  about  15  or  20  paces  and  lie  down  again-  the  same  process  being  followed  by  the 
men  behind.  The  advance  of  the  hostile  infantry  was  covered  all  the  time  by  overhead  fire  from  the 
machine  guns  in  the  rear.  As  the  hostile  infantry  closed  with  the  infantry,  light  machine  guns  and 
trench  mortars  were  rushed  up-  the  field  guns  firing  point  blank  at  our  positions.  Aeroplanes  would 
also  hover  over  our  line  and  harass  infantry  with  low  flying  machine-gun  fire.  Throughout  his 
forward  movement  the  infantry  would  put  up  star  shells  as  an  indication  of  the  position  of  the 
infantry.  The  system  of  co-ordination  of  arms  adopted  by  the  enemy  was  very  well  carried  out.  His 
method  of  attack  appeared  to  be  an  adaptation  of  the  leap  frog  system.  312 
However,  as  Terraine  points  out,  the: 
`storm  troops'  were  only  part  of  the  Army  and  the  quality  of  the  whole  mass  was  too  uneven  for 
the  universal  application  of  the  new  elixirs.  This  was  gloomily  recognised  by  O.  H.  L.,  which 
allotted  training  and  equipment  priorities  to  `attack  divisions'  as  opposed  to  `trench  divisions.  313 
The  enemy  attack  was  centred  on  the  artillery  bombardment  which  worked  its  way  along  the 
flanks.  Jonathan  Bailey  states  that: 
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292 By  March  1918,  the  Germans  had  begun  trying  to  devise  new  ways  of  controlling  barrages  from 
the  front  line,  although  the  British  experience  was  that  this  was  not  possible  in  a  large  centralised 
plan,  since  information  rapidly  became  out  of  date.  Great  attention  was  paid  to  coordinating  the 
close  and  deep  battles.  The  neutralisation  of  enemy  forward  positions  would  have  offered  little 
advantage  had  enemy  guns  been  left  intact  and  its  C2  system  paralysed.  German  tactics  developed 
well  in  1917,  but  failed  because  they  had  lost  the  materialschlacht.  3  4 
With  the  heavy  bombardment  on  rear  areas  and  extensive  counter-battery  work,  the  aim  was 
to  roll  back  the  enemy  to  each  strongpoint  and  then  use  a  combination  of  arms  to  destroy  it. 
Whole  groups  of  German  divisions  had  sometimes  been  given  a  line  of  advance  that  angled 
sharply  away  from  the  apparent  centre  line  of  attack.  This  was  especially  so  for  several  miles 
on  either  side  of  the  Flesquieres  salient  where  the  Germans  were  attempting  to  complete  a 
massive  encircling  movement,  the  base  of  which  was  twenty  miles  across.  This  pincer  hit  the 
5  1St  Division  and  Carter-Campbell  explained: 
His  system  of  attack  would  appear  to  have  this  advantage  over  ours,  namely,  that  he  is  not  tied 
down  to  the  consolidation  of  a  particular  objective,  but  he  continues  fighting  with  a  view  to  rolling 
us  up  to  a  flank  and  turning  our  defensive  lines.  He  thus  introduces  a  more  fluid  form  of  attack  and 
reduces  the  necessity  of  frontal  attacks  against  our  original  defended  lines  to  a  minimum,  but  it  is 
not  thought  that  this  form  of  attack  compensates  him  for  his  much  larger  proportion  of 
casualties....  Until  the  Division  broke  off  from  the  fight  on  the  evening  of  March  26`h,  the  enemy 
by  this  means  found  almost  every  weak  place  in  the  British  line,  and  the  battle  consisted  of 
repeatedly  forming  defensive  flanks  to  check  him  in  his  areas  of  penetration  and  ultimately  of 
withdrawing. 
However,  for  the  (Highland)  Division: 
There  was  undoubtedly  too  great  a  tendency  to  deal  with  a  turned  flank  by  a  conforming 
movement  rather  than  by  fire  power,  as,  normally,  it  was  only  a  small  advanced  guard  which 
threatened  our  flanks:  these  advanced  guards  not  being  adequately  engaged  and  dealt  with  by  fire 
were  soon  reinforced  and  turned  into  an  offensive  force  which  compelled  our  withdrawal'.  The 
result  was  that  `frequently  small  local  successes  by  which  the  enemy  penetrated  portions  of  our 
line,  led  to  a  general  withdrawal,  and  were  treated  as  a  serious  turning  of  the  flank  instead  of  being 
met  by  fire  and  manoeuvre  on  the  part  of  the  local  Commander,  and  our  action  in  these  cases 
frequently  flattered  the  enterprise  of  the  enemy.  315 
The  worst  of  the  outflanking  was  on  the  opening  day  as  the  bombardment  was  at  its  heaviest 
and  the  weather  its  poorest.  The  front  line  troops  did  not  stand  a  chance: 
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293 This  incident  is  described  by  a  soldier  in  the  51"  (Highland)  Division  who  did  not  want  his  name 
mentioned.  "there  were  no  dug-outs  in  our  front  line;  it  was  very  thinly  held  to  prevent  casualties. 
We  had  to  huddle  up  under  the  parapet  during  the  shelling;  there  was  no  other  shelter.  When  the 
bombardment  lifted,  we  were  not  attacked  frontally.  We  were  considerably  shaken  by  the  shelling. 
It  was  a  moment  of  fear.  `what's  coming  next  out  of  the  mist?  '  we  fired  our  rifles  blindly  into  the 
mist  then  heard  firing  from  our  left  and  from  our  rear.  We  realised  that  we  were  being  outflanked. 
The  men  started  to  drift  back  until  we  were  left  with  only  two  men,  myself  and  a  sergeant.  The 
next  thing  I  knew  was  that  two  Germans  were  coming  up  the  trench  to  our  left;  they  were  about  ten 
yards  away.  The  sergeant  had  been  at  the  rum  for  some  time.  I  cleared  off;  I  wasn't  going  to  get 
caught.  The  last  I  saw  of  the  sergeant  he  was  shaking  his  fist  at  the  Germans  and  using  strong 
language.  I  saw  him  taken  prisoner.  016 
Wimberley  stressed  the  shock  of  the  outflanking  movement: 
Writing  these  orders  and  making  all  the  arrangements  took  some  threequarters  of  an  hour,  and  I 
was  just  sending  a  runner  with  orders  to  this  effect,  when  we  heard  steps  coming  down  the  dug- 
out.  The  next  moment  a  grimy  and  dishevelled  Machine  Gunner  came  stumbling  into  our  earth 
chamber,  his  clothing  torn,  one  leg  badly  burnt  and  evidently  much  exhausted.  He  gasped  out  that 
he  was  the  survivor  of  the  two  guns  at  Louveral  at  the  garden  wall  there,  and  that  they  had  been 
attacked  from  the  rear  and  squirted  by  Germans  with  liquid  fire.  I  could  hardly  believe  my  ears- 
these  two  guns  were  only  some  twelve  hundred  yards  on  our  left  front  and  a  good  mile  behind  the 
front  line.  If  the  Boche  were  there,  they  had  practically  broken  right  through.  31 
The  ability  to  take  the  initiative  was  wanting.  (Highland)  Division  counter-attacks  invariably 
failed  due  to  lack  of  information  and  overwhelming  enemy  forces,  but  also  because  the  51St 
continued  to  act  as  the  enemy  anticipated: 
I  arranged  to  send  forward  a  company  of  6'h  Black  Watch  from  the  BEAUMETZ-MORCHIES 
LINE,  (which  by  10.17  a.  m.  had  been  reinforced  by  2  1/2  Companies  of  7`h  Gordon  Highlanders) 
to  attempt  to  relive  POST  29  and  drive  back  enemy  in  the  valley.  This  Company  advanced  as  far  as 
the  road  North  of  the  valley  at  J.  7.  but  by  that  time  had  sustained  50%  of  casualties  from  Machine 
Guns  near  the  R.  E.  Dump  and  could  go  no  further.  318 
Major-General  Harper's  ideal  counter-attacking  scenario  did  not  exist  during  the  March 
offensive: 
Deliberate  counter  only  after  enemy  has  been  checked  and  situation  clear  for  `adequate  artillery 
combination'  etc  to  be  arranged.  Should  be  treated  like  any  attack  and  needs  careful  thought  and 
preparation-flanks  must  always  play  a  part  in  the  plans.  If  circumstances  are  such  that  a  counter- 
attack  has  no  reasonable  chance  of  success,  the  principle  which  governs  the  employment  of  the 
reserve  is  that  it  should  be  so  disposed  as  to  offer  resistance  to  the  enemy's  advance.  31 
316  Middlebrook,  The  Kaiser's  Battle,  21s'  March  1918,  p.  174. 
317  NLS,  ACC  6119/1,  'A  Scottish  Soldier',  Volume  I,  pp.  114-115. 
318  NA,  WO  95  2846,153''  Infantry  Brigade  `Account  of  Operations  Commencing  21  March  1918',  8  April 
1918. 
319  Harper,  Notes  on  Infantry  Tactics  and  Training,  p.  93. 
294 Crucial  to  the  discussion  is  to  what  extent  the  51St  Division  failed  to  function.  The  German 
attack  principle  partly  focused  on  paralysis  of  the  enemy.  Travers  has  explained  that  IV 
Corps  seemed  to  inspire  the  rumour  of  a  German  breakthrough  as  it  was  repeatedly  the  focus 
of  massive  German  onslaughts,  and  in  particular  one  report  stated  that  the: 
51"  Division  simply  ceased  to  operate  as  a  unit  from  23  March,  and  on  25  March  made  no  effort  to 
stand,  but  conducted  a  dour,  deliberate,  and  selfish  retreat.  Every  day  the  51"  retreated  and  left  its 
neighbours  in  the  air. 
Another  officer  confirmed  that  the  51st  was  inactive  and  that  on  the  25th,  at  a  divisional 
conference,  the  GOC,  Carter-Campbell  `to  the  surprise  of  all  present,  declined  to  put  his 
division  in  the  line  saying  that  the  men  were  exhausted  and  demoralised  and  could  not  be 
trusted  to  stand'.  320  We  have  already  determined  that  the  51st  had  to  be  withdrawn,  but 
Travers's  version  of  events  is  extremely  damning.  His  evidence  is  based  on  a  report  from  an 
officer  from  a  neighbouring  division,  and  it  has  become  apparent  that  it  was  all  too  common 
for  that  evidence  to  be  biased  or  incomplete  when  considering  the  situation  on  the  flanks. 
A  variety  of  sources  demonstrates  the  actual  sequence  of  events  after  the  opening  attack  on 
21  March.  Wauchope  stated  of  the  left  flank  on  the  morning  of  the  second  day  (22  March), 
`While  the  artillery  pounded  us,  the  infantry  was  steadily  trying  to  work  up  to  our  wire  and 
line,  but  the  defence  held,  in  spite  of  heavy  casualties'.  321  Wrench  emphasised  the  strain  that 
the  division  was  under:  `The  fatigue  is  awful  and  the  strain  of  holding  is  tremendous,  and 
God  knows  how  long  it  will  go  on.  Our  line  is  getting  thin  while  the  Germans  seem  to  be 
coming  on  in  inexhaustible  numbers  and  must  surely  get  through  sometime.  '322  However, 
153`d  Brigade's  Report  confirmed  that  it  was  standing  firm  and  there  was  no  question  of  a 
collapse.  323 
On  23  March,  153`d  Brigade  recorded  that  orders  had  been  issued  to  stage  a  withdrawal  due 
to  insecure  flanks,  however  there  was  to  be  no  retreat  without  further  orders.  324  A  similar 
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295 state  of  affairs  existed  early  on  24  March  when,  `At  11.17  a.  m.  Division  notified  me  that  if 
enemy  broke  through  in  front  of  us  the  19th  Division  would  fall  back  by  successive  stages  and 
if  it  was  necessary  for  them  to  retire  through  our  line,  we  were  to  cover  their  withdrawal'.  325 
However,  later  in  the  day,  enemy  pressure  increased.  `At  3.50  p.  m.  I  ordered  units  in  the 
event  of  their  being  pushed  back  by  overwhelming  numbers  to  retire  one  line  through 
another,  and  no  line  to  retire  without  informing  the  troops  on  its  flanks'.  326  Pressure  was 
mounting.  Wrench  believed  he  was  fortunate  to  become  a  casualty: 
Praise  God  from  Whom  all  blessing  flow;  --  I'm  wounded.  What  a  bombardment  it  was  all  night. 
We  stuck  it  out  till  this  morning  when  we  had  to  beat  it  to  a  trench  behind.  Then  the  General  took 
me  out  round  all  the  posts  the  brigade  is  holding  over  on  the  ridge  in  front.  Our  front  is  thinning 
out  and  being  stretched  too  as  the  men  grow  fewer  in  numbers.  We  were  shelled  to  hell,  some 
bursting  only  a  few  yards  away  as  the  aeroplanes  were  showering  down  their  bullets  like  hail327 
On  24  March,  whilst  at  Reincourt,  the  1/60'  Gordons  were  faced  with  a  dilemma: 
On  the  left  "A"  Company's  flank  was  totally  unprotected.  "C"  Company  was  in  touch  with  troops 
on  the  right  and  was  holding  the  enemy,  but  soon  after  five  o'clock  a  message  came  from  the 
Officer  Commanding  the  next  Brigade  saying  that  he  had  been  outflanked  and  was  preparing  to 
withdraw.  The  message  was  passed  on  to  "B"  Company,  but  the  messenger,  in  delivering  it,  used 
the  word  "Retire".  "Go  back,  "  was  Donald  Clark's  spirited  answer,  "and  tell  him  that  this  Division 
never  retires.  "  To  remain  now  meant  being  surrounded,  and  it  was  decided  to  move  back  to  new 
positions.  328 
Retire  in  this  context  meant  disorderly  retreat,  not  an  orderly  withdrawal. 
Again  on  25  March,  153rd  Brigade  confirmed  that  it  was  to  hold  its  position  and  work  with 
flanking  units.  `At  10.40  a.  m.  orders  were  sent  to  units,  that  if  the  19th  Division  were  forced 
to  withdraw,  we  were  to  cover  their  retirement  and  hold  on  till  the  last  possible  moment.  '329 
However,  later  on  25  March,  at  2.35  p.  m.,  the  division  did  begin  to  give  way: 
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296 About  this  time  a  general  retirement  was  in  progress  though  the  enemy  did  not  appear  to  be 
pressing  unduly  from  the  South,  and  I  telephoned  the  G.  O.  C.  Division  that  I  considered  the 
situation  somewhat  critical  unless  a  line  of  fresh  troops  could  be  formed  somewhere  through  which 
the  much  mixed  remnants  of  Divisions  could  pass  and  reform.  The  G.  O.  C.  ordered  further  efforts 
to  be  made  to  hold  these  men  back  and  accordingly  I  sent  all  mu  [sic]  staff  out  to  the  East  of 
IRLES-PYS  Valley  to  do  this  and  went  myself  to  the  PYS  Ridge......  The  disorganisation  however 
owing  to  the  mixture  of  other  Divisions  was  so  great  and  the  lack  of  officers  or  rather  of  any 
exertion  on  the  part  of  their  officers  (with  a  few  exceptions)  was  so  marked  that  as  soon  as  one  had 
one  party  going  well  and  went  on  to  take  another,  men  behind  and  on  the  flanks  kept  going  steadily 
back.  I  saw  no  sign  of  panic  or  of  the  slightest  hurry  on  the  part  of  any  groups  of  men  or 
individuals  but  all  appeared  in  an  apathetic  sort  of  way  to  have  a  fixed  idea  of  getting  back 
somewhere,  presumably  behind  some  line  of  fresh  troops.  30 
Bradbury  on  the  headquarters  staff  of  the  machine  gun  battalion  affirmed  the  breakdown  in 
the  division: 
News  travelled  like  lightning  through  the  lines  that  the  German  cavalry  had  broken  through  and 
was  approaching  the  village....  Almost  immediately  from  every  point  which  the  eye  could  see 
there  came  galloping  scores  of  horses  and  mules  drawing  every  kind  of  conveyance  imaginable  in 
addition  to  thousands  of  men  running.  Evidently  panic  had  caught  hold  of  everybody.  Our  own 
officers,  instead  of  behaving  like  officers,  soon  caught  the  same  fever  and  instructions  were  issued 
for  everything  to  be  thrown  into  the  limbers  as  quick  as  possible  and  to  move  off  irrespective  of 
turn  or  order  but  as  soon  as  they  were  ready......  Each  driver  therefore  had  the  `wind  up' 
immediately  and  without  even  waiting  to  get  properly  loaded  and  fastened  up  they  galloped  across 
the  fields  towards  the  only  road  which  led  to  the  rear.  331 
This  is  critical.  This  was  the  point  when  the  old  (Highland)  Division  ceased  to  exist: 
`Brigadier  General  BURN  came  up  and  after  conferring  we  decided  that  we  ought  to  go  at 
once  to  Division  and  report,  as  the  situation  appeared  very  serious  and  it  was  now  impossible 
to  stop  the  general  retirement  except  on  a  line  of  fresh  troops'.  332 
Artillery 
The  artillery  support  for  the  division  was  found  wanting.  Travers  asserts  that: 
Seen  from  a  command  perspective,  there  was  general  agreement  that  the  artillery  support  of  the 
infantry  in  the  retreat  was  a  relative  failure  due  to  lack  of  liaison.  In  other  words,  the  local  infantry 
brigade  and  battalion  commanders  had  no  control  over  the  artillery  when  the  needed  it,  especially 
in  an  emergency,  because  artillery  orders  came  either  from  division  or  corps.  33 
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297 Lieutenant-Colonel  J.  M.  Scott  of  1/5`h  Seaforth  Highlanders  confirmed  that  `Liaison  between 
Infantry  and  Artillery  when  lines  are  down  should  be  improved'.  334 
There  were  also  a  significant  number  of  artillery  brigades  positioned  in  the  battle  zone.  As 
the  engagement  progressed,  numerous  accounts  referred  to  gun  positions  being  abandoned 
due  to  positions  being  overrun.  The  lack  of  co-ordinated  artillery  support  coupled  with  the 
loss  of  firepower  through  abandoned  or  captured  guns  was  critical  to  the  division,  as  the  51st 
had  come  to  expect,  at  the  very  least,  an  adequate  artillery  support. 
Combined  arms 
Small  unit  tactics  and  firepower  were  crucial  to  the  defence  of  the  (Highland)  Division  sector 
and  this  was  an  area  where  the  51"  was  relatively  well  advanced.  However,  there  were  a 
number  of  negatives.  Along  with  the  reorganisation  of  the  infantry  brigades,  trench  mortar 
batteries  and  machine  gun  companies  had  also  undergone  restructuring  during  February  1918. 
This  reorganisation  had  not  fully  `shaken  down'  before  March,  and,  as  Griffith  points  out, 
`They  sometimes  failed  to  ensure  a  fully  interlocking  coverage  of  the  whole  front,  and  on 
other  occasions  they  lacked  decisive  leadership'.  335  Infantry  commanders  tended  to  lay  the 
blame  on  the  machine  guns,  but  the  gunners'  retort  was,  `They  alleged  machine  guns  had 
been  overrun  only  because  they  had  continued  firing  to  the  bitter  end  in  a  vain  attempt  to 
cover  the  over-hasty  retreat  of  the  infantry'.  336  This  is  significant  because  the  (Highland) 
Divisional  sector  relied  heavily  on  paired  machine  gun  cover  and  as  it  was  so  pivotal  to  the 
defence  the  following  analysis  will  focus  on  this  particular  aspect  of  combined  arms  use 
during  the  engagement. 
Captain  Wimberley  was  acting  divisional  machine  gun  officer  from  January  1918: 
When  I  got  to  Division  I  found  that  rumours  of  a  great  Boche  offensive  for  the  spring  were  coming 
in  to  Headquarters  every  day,  and  in  consequence  "Uncle"  was  ordering  a  strengthening  of  the  line 
everywhere.  From  the  M.  G.  point  of  view  we  wanted  deep  dug-outs  for  every  gun,  so  that  the  team 
might  stand  the  bombardment,  and  in  consequence  all  M.  G.  Companies  in  the  Division,  with  the 
technical  help  of  the  R.  E.  's  got  busy.  Hardie  was  very  keen  on  guns  being  grouped  in  pairs  and 
near  the  infantry.  This  was  undoubtedly  sound.  Grantham  [Machine  Gun  School],  looking  at  it 
purely  theoretically,  advocated  guns  away  from  the  infantry  and  the  recognised  trench  line,  in 
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298 order  to  escape  the  enemy's  artillery  fire.  But  what  was  gained  by  this  disposal  of  the  guns  was 
more  than  lost  by  the  weakening  of  the  teams'  morale.  37 
In  the  (Highland)  Division  it  was  an  operational  expectation  that  the  work  of  the  machine 
gunners  would  be  carried  out  closely  alongside  the  infantry. 
However,  Wimberley  also  commented  that  the  corps  co-ordination  was  less  than  effective 
when  it  came  to  machine  gun  positions  throughout  the  corps  sector: 
I  rode  over  to  a  place,  Vaulx,  west  of  Morchies,  and  there  met  the  B.  G.  G.  S.,  by  name  Brigadier 
General  De  Pree,  the  Corps  M.  G.  O.,  a  Major  Westrop,  the  D.  M.  G.  O.  of  the  division  on  our  left,  by 
name  Deane-Drummond,  and  the  other  D.  M.  G.  O.,  whose  name  I  have  forgotten.  We  had  a  most 
argumentative  day.  De  Pree  was,  in  my  opinion,  an  idiot  about  M.  G.  's-there  is  no  other  word  for 
him-he  had  no  idea  of  placing  guns  at  all,  and  did  not  know  how  to  set  about  it.  Weston  was  sound 
according  to  his  lights,  but  very  keen  on  the  battery  system  of  6  and  8  guns,  which  I  thought  too 
many  eggs  in  one  basket.  Deane-Drummond  was  frankly  bored,  he  was  a  typical  Munster  Fusilier, 
and  I  believe  very  gallant  in  action.  However,  we  all  agreed  that  De  Pree  was  all  wrong,  and, 
together,  dissuaded  him  from  the  positions  he  usually  chose.  338 
Major  Westrop  was  actually  correct,  as  Wimberley  himself  realised,  but  it  is  interesting  that 
his  influence  was  insufficient  to  ensure  consistency  in  the  corps: 
Next  day,  however,  came  orders  that  each  division  was  to  send  a  sketch  of  their  suggested 
positions  to  Corps.  I  spent  a  full  day,  by  myself,  on  the  Corps  line  on  the  HD  front,  and  drew  my 
sketch,  and  next  morning  rode  out,  along  with  D.  C.  [G.  S.  O.  1],  and  showed  him  my  prospective 
positions,  the  majority  of  which  he  approved.  At  that  time  I  was  a  firm  believer  of  never  grouping 
more  than  two  guns  together,  as  I  considered  that  was  sufficient  fire-power  to  stop  an  attack. 
Afterwards,  or  rather  now,  I  am  in  favour,  on  occasions  where  the  field  of  fire  is  wide,  of  putting 
four  guns  together.  I  found  that  two  guns  together  were  not  enough  on  the  21``  March,  but  until  I 
personally  saw  it,  I  never  would  have  believed  that  the  boche  could  attack  in  such  dense 
formations.  339 
Training 
Lessons  learnt  from  April  1918  stressed  that  the  division  had  not  been  sufficiently  trained  for 
the  type  of  defensive  positions  it  held: 
Few  lessons  were  learnt  in  the  operations  in  April.  Beyond  those  that  have  previously  been  learnt 
in  the  operations  in  March.  The  following  points  were  again  emphasised:  -  TRAINING  The  most 
important  lesson  learnt  both  in  the  operations  beginning  on  April  9`h  and  those  beginning  on  March 
21",  was  that  the  system  of  training  in  force  did  not  prove  equal  to  the  test  of  semi-open  warfare.  340 
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299 Efforts  had  been  made  to  tackle  the  lack  of  training  in  defence  as  soon  as  the  division 
occupied  the  sector  with  the  expectation  that  it  would  face  a  German  attack.  On  15  December 
1917,  Harper  lectured  officers  on  `Principles  of  Deliberate  Defence',  341  and  training 
programmes  were  to  focus  on  both  offence  and  defence.  The  GHQ  memos  on  defence  in 
December  1917  and  March  1918  were  comprehensive,  but,  as  usual,  were  ambiguous  enough 
to  permit  tactical  flexibility,  and  the  defensive  principles  were  complex,  and  it  was  not  a 
straightforward  task  to  develop  training  programmes  that  applied.  In  addition  to  this,  the 
(Highland)  Division  had  to  deal  with  a  poor  trench  system,  significant  fatigue  work,  and 
winter  conditions.  However,  with  the  attack  imminent  and  the  weather  improving,  there  was 
an  increase  in  training  activity  including  the  establishment  of  battalion  schools  342 
Command  and  control 
Outwardly,  it  was  hugely  significant  that  Major-General  Harper  left  the  division  just  days 
before  the  attack.  For  an  officer  to  take  over  the  command  of  a  division,  no  matter  how 
capable  that  officer  was,  would  have  been  difficult,  but  to  take  over  command  of  a  division 
that  was  deployed  in  a  sector  with  an  incomplete  defensive  system  and  on  the  eve  of  an 
imminent  attack,  made  it  all  the  more  problematic.  That  impairment  of  command  weakened 
the  ability  of  a  formation  to  react  and  respond,  as  Brigadier-General  Louis  Oldfield's  friend, 
Miss  Whittaker,  testified:  `When  the  attack  came  in  full  ferocity  on  March  215,  Uncle 
[Harper]  had  just  become  corps  commander.  This  meant  tremendous  weight  on  Louis,  since 
'3a3  the  new  divisional  commander  was  necessarily  still  unfamiliar  with  men  and  positions. 
The  division  was  fortunate  that  the  senior  officer  cadre  had  been  in  place  for  some  time  and 
were  familiar  with  the  way  that  the  division  fought.  Brigadier-Generals  Pelham  Bum, 
Beckwith,  and  Buchanan  had  been  in  command  since  July  1916,  August  1917,  and 
September  1917  respectively;  the  CRA  and  the  CRE  since  July  1916  and  March  1917 
respectively;  and  the  GSO1  and  AA  and  QMG  since  November  1916  and  March  1917 
respectively.  Only  the  ADMS  was  relatively  new  to  command  (November  1917),  but 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Rorie  did  have  continuous  service  in  the  RAMC  of  the  (Highland) 
Division.  It  could  also  be  considered  fortunate  that  Harper  had  stayed  in  command  as  long  as 
341  NA,  WO  95  2863,152  nd  Brigade  War  Diary. 
342  NA,  WO  95  2863,  Memorandum  from  F.  W.  Bewsher,  12  January  1918. 
343  IWM,  PPIMCR/134,  Papers  of  Miss  Whittaker,  p.  138. 
300 he  did  as  it  permitted  him  to  carry  through  his  plans  for  the  defensive  system  and  his  troops  to 
gain  experience  of  the  system  under  a  familiar  leadership. 
However,  if  the  transfer  of  command  at  such  a  crucial  point  was  detrimental  to  the  fighting 
efficiency  of  the  formation,  then  the  same  can  be  suggested  of  Harper's  arrival  at  IV  Corps 
(of  which  the  51"  was  a  constituent  part  at  this  time).  The  same  rule  applied  for  Harper  as 
that  which  affected  his  successor  in  the  51st,  in  that  it  would  have  been  extremely  difficult  for 
him  to  fully  maximise  command  of  the  corps  under  those  circumstances. 
The  army  hierarchy  was  aware  that  the  BEF  was  in  an  unusual  defensive  situation  prior  to 
March,  and  considered  it  prudent  to  apply  a  more  centrally-driven  level  of  conformity  (as  had 
been  the  case  during  the  early  stages  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme).  However,  as  usual  with 
BEF  centralisation,  the  guidelines  were  vague.  The  flexibility  inherent  in  this  permitted 
divisions  a  degree  of  latitude  of  interpretation,  such  as  Harper's  `ideal'  trench  dimension,  or 
Wimberley's  machine  gun  siting.  `A  number  of  new  trenches  were  everywhere  dug  to 
strengthen  the  position  in  depth,  and  in  all  these  new  trenches,  we,  the  Machine  Gunners, 
were  more  or  less  allowed  to  choose  the  position  for  the  platoon  and  M.  G.  dug-out  post.  '344 
That  the  corps  commander  Woollcombe,  was  replaced  the  week  before  the  attack  does  not 
indicate  confidence  in  his  abilities,  and  his  leadership  may  have  impacted  negatively  on  the 
defensive  systems  of  the  divisions  on  either  side  of  the  51s`.  The  interpretation  of  the 
centralised  guidelines,  and  the  corps  application  and  co-ordination  of  them,  would  have  been 
crucial.  However  Woollcombe  had  failed  to  impress  at  Cambrai,  and  Wimberley  stated  of  his 
chief  of  staff,  `He  left  Corps  when  Woollcombe,  the  Corps  Commander,  left,  and  a  new 
B.  G.  G.  S.  took  over;  but  how  a  man  like  that  man  seemed  to  have  got  such  a  very  responsible 
job  as  B.  G.  G.  S.,  I  can't  imagine'.  345 
It  would  appear  that  Woollcombe  had  been  moved  on  as  a  result  of  a  number  of  changes  at 
the  higher  levels  of  the  BEF  immediately  prior  to  21  March  1918.  Middlebrook  states  that  it 
was  difficult  to  understand  `the  way  in  which  several  high-level  command  charges  were 
346  allowed  to  be  made  at  this  time'.  This  situation  has  long  been  the  subject  of  debate  without 
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301 a  definite  conclusion.  However,  the  papers  of  Miss  Whittaker  emphasised  the  role  that 
Brigadier-General  Oldfield  played  in  those  command  changes: 
Louis  had  leave  and  we  got  two  days  hunting  in  East  Devon.  The  leave  had  very  important 
consequences  for,  after  long  deliberation,  he  and  another  general  headed  to  risk  their  futures  and 
made  representations  on  some  aspects  of  the  High  Command  to  the  most  exalted  persons  they 
could  get.  They  proved  eventually  to  be  very  exalted  indeed...  not  the  very  highest  but  the  next  to 
it.  Even  now  I  cannot  bring  myself  to  mention  the  names  of  the  other  General  or  the  men  they  saw. 
There  was  a  succession  of  interviews  lasting  hours,  and  in  the  end  Louis  overstayed  his  leave.  All 
that  I  heard  seemed  too  confidential  even  for  my  locked  journal,  and  the  details  have  gone  from 
my  memory,  but  there  are  letters  written  after  his  return....  2/3/18  "It  is  surprising  how  easily  I  got 
the  opportunities  I  wanted,  and  how  well  I  was  received.  The  result  in  part  was  immediate  and  the 
future  will  see  great  changes...  If  only  I  could  have  done  this  a  year  ago,  but  of  course  my  opinion 
would  have  had  little  weight  then.  "  13/3/18  "Changes  have  started  out  here  exactly  as  I  had  hoped, 
3  possibly  more  than  I  had  hoped.  Among  others,  Uncle  got  his  Corps,  this  Corps". 
The  ability  of  both  the  51St  Division  and  IV  Corps  to  react  to  the  onslaught  was  impaired  by 
the  changes  in  command.  Just  as  it  was  also  highly  significant  that  the  commanding  officers 
of  the  battalions  on  the  extreme  left  of  the  division,  the  1/6th  and  1/7`t'  Black  Watch,  which 
faced  the  brunt  of  the  initial  attack,  were  both  new  to  their  commands  in  March  1918. 
However,  the  nature  of  the  German  attack  was  to  disrupt  the  ability  to  command  and  control 
at  all  levels,  and  often  units  were  left  to  fight  predominantly  on  their  own. 
Throughout  the  previous  two  years  Harper  had  been  devoted  to  inculcating  a  level  of  tactical 
decentralisation  throughout  the  units  in  the  division.  However,  consistent  engagement  and 
substantial  casualties  had  impacted  upon  the  progressive  development  of  this  ability,  and 
much  of  what  had  been  achieved  had  centred  on  using  initiative  in  attack.  Faced  with  the 
German  disruption  tactics  and  a  disintegrating  defensive  system,  and  a  lack  of  command  and 
control  from  headquarters,  the  ability  of  smaller  units  to  act  was  diminished. 
Organisation  and  administration 
The  organisation  and  administration  of  the  division  had  functioned  well  prior  to  the  attack. 
Whatever  the  merits  or  otherwise  of  the  defensive  system,  every  effort  had  been  expended  to 
cover  all  conceivable  eventualities,  with  the  one  noteable  exception  of  an  omission  of  any 
comprehensive  plan  for  a  retirement. 
347  IWM,  PP/MCR/134,  Papers  of  Miss  Whittaker. 
302 Communications  were  again,  despite  technical  advances,  a  problem.  The  heavy  German 
bombardment  destroyed  telephone  communications,  the  deep  buried  cabling  being  wrecked 
by  high  explosives.  In  the  early  stages,  the  ability  of  the  division  to  communicate  was  also 
hampered  by  the  fog.  Visual  signals  could  not  be  seen.  Pigeons  and  equipment,  such  as 
wireless,  were  often  captured  and  runners  could  not  get  through.  This  led  to  isolation.  The 
situation  was  not  aided  by  the  consistently  changing  positions  of  units  and  headquarters. 
`Communication  with  Brigade  Headquarters  had  become  impossible.  My  runners  had  got 
through,  but  not  back  again,  and  the  necessary  removal  of  Brigade  Headquarters  further  back 
made  touch  difficult  until  after  dark.  '348 
As  the  position  stabilised  (to  a  degree)  after  the  first  onslaughts  and  the  division  fell  back, 
attempts  were  made  from  divisional  headquarters  down  to  individual  sections  to  restore  order 
and  pattern  to  (Highland)  Division  actions.  However,  confusion  was  everywhere  and 
overwhelming,  and  it  was  not  just  the  5  1s`: 
Tonight  the  190h  division  came  up  and  counter  attacked  Doignes  with  the  aid  of  some  tanks  but  tho' 
the  tanks  got  here  the  19`h  did  not,  leaving  the  154  bde  almost  hopelessly  surrounded.  There  is  only 
one  way  open  now  to  retire  to  the  Hermies  defences.  Went  with  the  B.  M.  to  the  new  line  at  7  p.  m. 
to  see  what  the  position  was  and  what  a  mix-up.  Men  from  the  6,19,17,21,  and  51  divisions  are  all 
running  over  each  other  not  knowing  where  their  front  lines  are  and  so  groups  from  all  and  either 
of  these  divs  are  assembled  together  with  any  stragglers  under  different  officers  to  hold  posts  here 
and  there  and  try  to  keep  some  semblance  of  a  connected  line.  The  noise  was  almost  maddening 
and  we  were  challenged  at  various  places.  From  Demicourt  we  proceeded  back  the  way  to  Doignes 
but  half  way  over  the  hill  a  sentry  stopped  us  and  told  us  it  was  still  held  by  the  Germans.  So  thus 
the  19`h  div  didn't  do  their  stuff,  and  we  were  saved  running  into  God  knows  what.  349 
Intelligence  had  suggested  that  an  attack  was  imminent.  On  the  eve  of  the  battle,  the  war 
diary  of  the  256th  Artillery  Brigade  recorded,  `Unusual  movement  on  the  Divisional  front  on 
our  left  was  reported  during  the  afternoon  by  our  observers.  Indications  point  to  an  attack 
tomorrow  morning.  Special  harassing  fire  scheme  arranged  and  carried  out  in  addition  to  the 
harassing  fire  and  concentrated  shoots.  Batteries  warned  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout',  350  but 
infantry  patrols  `encountered  no  enemy  and  noticed  nothing  unusual  '351  and  there  was  no 
specific  warning  order  from  Third  Army  on  21  March.  However,  it  is  barely  conceivable  that 
it  would  have  made  any  difference  to  the  outcome. 
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303 Strength  and  casualties 
There  had  been  substantial  changes  to  the  recruitment  and  reinforcement  of  the  division 
immediately  prior  to  March  which  did  have  a  negative  impact  on  its  capacity  to  defend.  Due 
to  the  lack  of  manpower  in  the  British  Expeditionary  Force,  infantry  brigades  had  been 
reduced  from  four  to  three  battalions.  In  the  biggest  reorganisation  since  Bedford,  1/5`x' 
Gordons,  1/8th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  and  1/9`h  Royal  Scots  left  the  division  on 
2,4,  and  6  February  respectively.  352  The  result  of  this  was  that  the  (Highland)  Division  had 
the  same  amount  of  line  to  hold,  but  with  three  battalions  less  (hence  the  reason  why  all  three 
brigades  were  in  the  line).  The  theory  was  that  greater  divisional  firepower  would 
compensate  for  the  loss  of  infantrymen. 
The  division  had  become  increasingly  understrength  over  the  previous  months,  but  was  still 
relatively  strong  by  comparison  with  other  BEF  divisions.  It  is  also  clear  that  although  the 
ADMS  Report  stated  that,  `The  Physique  of  the  Division  is  good....  The  General  Health  of 
the  troops  is  good',  353  the  lack  of  quality  in  reinforcements  was  beginning  to  become  more 
evident  in  the  division.  The  cabinet  committee  on  manpower  had  allocated  only  100,000 
category  A  men  to  the  Army,  with  100,000  men  of  lower  medical  grades.  354  Wimberley 
stressed  how  dangerous  to  operational  ability  this  actually  was: 
With  first  rate  N.  C.  O.  's  and  men,  it  is  no  doubt  better  to  separate  [machine  guns]  from  the  infantry 
in  defence,  but  by  1918,  with  our  category  of  "B"  men,  and  conscripts,  they  needed  the  infantry 
with  them,  and  the  infantry  needed  us  too  -one  Corps  encouraging  the  other.  A  failure  to  observe 
this  human  frailty,  led  to  many  instances  where  gun  teams  left  their  guns,  when  the  Germans  got 
within  a  100  or  200  yards  of  them,  when  often  the  attack  might  have  been  repulsed  at  the  last 
minute  with  stouter-hearted  troops.  355 
There  were  also  proportionally  fewer  recruits  from  local  areas  and  proportionally  more  from 
wider  Scotland  and  to  a  lesser  degree  wider  Britain.  The  reinforcement  of  the  officer  class 
with  good  quality  officer  replacements  was  also  problematic,  as  `The  drain  on  officers  had 
been  severe  during  the  last  twelve  months,  and  the  deficiencies,  in  this  respect  were  hard 
adequately  to  replace'.  356 
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304 Casualties  had  been  heavy  during  the  engagement.  Wrench  outlined  the  devastation  to  the 
units: 
Now  I  hear  that  the  roll  call  of  the  units  hardly  average  100  men  each  so  it  has  been  an  awful 
massacre....  The  152  and  153  brigade  batts  have  about  60  men  left  while  in  the  Black  Watch  I  am 
told  10  men  answered  the  roll  call.  Ten  men.  My  God,  so  the  battalion  is  almost  wiped  out,  but 
there  must  be  many  stragglers  lost  in  the  confusion  who  will  turn  up  yet.  Anyhow,  I  do  hope  so. 
The  Germans  have  not  yet  broken  our  line  tho,  and  it  might  seem  like  the  Highland  Division  is 
hanging  on,  as  it  were,  to  the  very  last  shreds  of  its  reputation.  357 
The  fate  of  the  British  units  in  the  forward  and  battle  zones  was  particularly  harsh.  Of  the 
153rd  Brigade,  the  official  history  stated  that  `the  troops  occupying  the  Forward  Zone  had 
been  mostly  killed,  buried  by  the  bombardment,  or  taken  prisoner;  the  few  survivors  were  not 
capable  of  much  resistance,  and  none  returned  to  tell  the  tale'.  358 
Over  the  five  day  period,  the  total  casualties  were  219  officers  and  4,646  other  ranks. 
Assuming  that  most  of  these  casualties  were  from  infantry  battalions,  the  proportionate  losses 
were  enormous.  Brigadier-General  Oldfield  wrote  of  the  artillery,  `We  struck  the  first  blast  of 
the  avalanche.  The  Boche  came  in  through  the  Division  on  our  left,  and  came  in  behind  us. 
Our  casualties  were  heavy,  about  half  the  officers  in  the  fighting  part  of  the  RA.  059 
Fig.  26  Casualties  for  this  battle360 
Officers  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
24  92  103 
Other  Ranks  Killed  Wounded  Missing 
308  1624  2714 
Esprit  de  corps 
Prior  to  the  battle,  the  esprit  de  corps  was  still  strong.  The  division  had  performed  well 
throughout  1917  and,  despite  the  twin  blows  of  brigade  reorganisation  and  the  loss  of  Harper, 
the  51St  Division  maintained  a  consistency  in  senior  officers  and  was  still  considered  by  itself 
and  by  others  to  be  a  formidable  fighting  force.  Morale  appeared  to  be  high.  The  sector  that 
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305 the  division  was  deployed  to  defend  appeared  to  be  robust,  there  had  been  less  aggression 
over  the  previous  three  months,  which  had  given  the  troops  the  opportunity  to  rest  and 
recuperate  away  from  constant  engagement,  the  weather  was  improving,  and  leave  was  in 
operation. 
Numerous  accounts  verify  that  sound  morale  continued  during  the  opening  days  of  the  attack. 
The  report  of  operations  from  153rd  Brigade  stated  that,  `All  ranks  had  had  rations  and  water, 
but  practically  no  sleep  owing  to  the  cold,  but  though  tired  they  were  cheerful  and  had  plenty 
361  of  fight  in  them'. 
Until  the  retreat  on  25  March,  the  biggest  cumulative  problem  was  fatigue  and  exhaustion 
and  153rd  Brigade  reported,  `At  4.55  a.  m.  I  was  able  to  report  the  Brigade  in  position.  The 
men  were  in  good  fettle  considering  what  they  had  gone  through  but  were  extremely  tired. 
The  night  however  was  so  cold  that  no  one  could  sleep  for  more  than  half  an  hour.  '362 
However,  the  post-battle  impact  on  esprit  de  corps  was  significant  and  negative.  The  old 
cadre  was  shattered,  and  was  perceived  by  the  remaining  and  reinforcing  troops  as  having 
been  shattered.  The  battle  on  the  Lys  hammered  this  home  and  with  the  loss  of  so  many  key 
figures  and  many  of  the  rank  and  file,  the  continuity  in  esprit  de  corps  that  had  been 
consistent  throughout  the  war  was  severely  diminished. 
In  conclusion,  these  four  battles  demonstrate  a  significant  developmental  process  for  the  51st 
Division,  much  of  which  was  in  tune  with  generic  advances  across  the  BEF,  such  as  the 
combined  use  of  arms,  progressive  training,  and  tactical  deployment  to  combat  changes  in 
enemy  defences.  However,  to  a  degree,  each  formation  still  retained  its  own  ability  to  evolve 
and  some  formations  became  more  individual  in  style  than  others.  This  was  subject  to  a 
number  of  internal  and  external  variables,  such  as  the  quality  and  style  of  leadership,  the 
number  of  casualties,  and  the  range  of  battle  experiences.  The  (Highland)  Division  was  one 
of  the  more  individual  divisions. 
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306 Throughout  the  war,  the  ability  of  the  division  to  perform  was  strongly  affected  by  external 
factors  outwith  its  control.  These  factors  could  include  strategic  deployment  and  timing  of 
attack,  but  also  more  logistical  elements  such  as  reinforcement  and  supply. 
Upon  its  arrival  in  France,  the  division,  with  a  high  level  of  esprit  de  corps,  but  only  partly 
trained  in  (by  then)  already  outdated  concepts,  was  entirely  unprepared  for  battle.  At 
Givenchy,  led  by  the  inexperienced,  its  objectives  were  not  met.  Command  and  control 
mechanisms  were  faulty,  preparations  were  inadequate  and  incomplete,  and  the  incorrect 
tactics  were  applied  during  the  engagement. 
However,  the  division  learned  from  Givenchy  and  its  subsequent  deployment  and  activity, 
and  by  1916  centralised  advice  became  more  prevalent.  By  Beaumont  Hamel,  the  (Highland) 
Division  was  ready  for  a  battle  for  which  it  had  had  adequate  time  and  training  to  prepare.  Its 
objectives  were  largely  achieved  and  the  division  fought  extremely  well,  applying  the 
appropriate  tactics  under  predominantly  favourable  battle  conditions.  Command  and  control 
were  effective  and  it  was  highly  significant  that  the  esprit  de  corps  of  the  51St  was  inexorably 
strengthened  by  the  capture  of  Beaumont  Hamel. 
As  centralisation  continued  and  aggression  increased,  the  (by  then  highly  regarded)  51st 
Division  fought  and  trained  consistently  throughout  1917.  The  division  continued  to  be 
reinforced  adequately  and  was  well  supplied.  At  Cambrai,  the  efficiency  that  had  become  a 
hallmark  continued  with  satisfactory  divisional  preparation  and  training  prior  to  the 
engagement.  The  objectives  were  largely  achieved  with  one  significant  failure,  and  the 
command  and  control  functioned  effectively.  However,  although  predominantly  sound, 
elements  of  tactical  planning  and  administration  within  the  division  were  flawed,  but  under 
the  conditions  of  the  battle  that  was  perhaps  understandable. 
By  March  1918,  although  the  division  prepared  its  defences  with  customary  efficiency  and 
thoroughness,  a  number  of  key  factors  diminished  its  ability  to  defend  its  position.  The  loss 
of  Harper,  the  reorganisation  of  the  infantry  brigades  and  the  sheer  weight  of  the  enemy 
assault  had  significant  negative  impacts.  The  division  fought  well  up  to  a  point  and  a 
testimony  to  this  was  the  extent  to  which  it  suffered  critical  damage.  However,  ultimately  the 
command  and  control  failed  and  tactically  the  5  1St  was  outfought  and  outthought. 
307 Conclusion 
It  is  clear  that  for  a  formation  to  perform  effectively  and  efficiently  in  war,  two  essential 
elements  must  positively  interact.  The  first  element  is  the  capacity  to  achieve  an  optimal 
internal  balance  and  the  second  is  that  the  military  system  must  sustain  and  support  that 
balance.  The  prime  function  of  any  formation  in  war  is  to  fight.  In  order  for  it  to  fight 
well,  a  division  must  have  soundly-trained  men  that  can  be  relied  on  to  carry  out  their 
martial  tasks;  it  must  be  led  by  competent  officers;  and  it  must  be  proficient  in  the 
appliance  of  tactics  and  technology.  If  the  military  system  fails  to  support  a  formation,  to 
the  extent  that  there  are  problems  in  the  supply  of  ordnance  or  ammunition;  or  the 
provision  of  training  facilities  and  resources  is inadequate;  or  a  formation  is  overused  (or 
underused)  in  battle,  then  the  delicate  balance  within  a  division  can  destabilise.  The 
reverse  of  this  scenario  is  also  true,  in  that  the  correct  form  of  military  support  can  assist 
in  maintaining  an  optimal  balance. 
To  a  considerable  extent,  the  analysis  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  has  concentrated  on 
its  internal  balance  over  the  course  of  the  war,  whilst  simultaneously  determining  the 
degree  to  which  that  balance  was  supported  by  the  military  system.  Each  formation 
serving  in  the  BEF  during  the  First  World  War  would  have  had  its  own  distinctive  mix  of 
internal  balance  and  external  systemic  support.  However,  the  variables  in  both  balance 
and  support  were  ubiquitous  and  would  have  included:  training;  recruitment  and 
reinforcement;  and  esprit  de  corps;  whilst  the  ultimate  test  of  the  mix  was  in  the 
division's  performance  in  battle.  It  has  been  demonstrated  that  the  51St  Division  was  for  a 
considerable  period  a  poorly-trained  formation,  with  inadequate  internal  training 
procedures  and  insufficient  external  support.  However,  increasingly  capable, 
experienced,  and  progressive  officers,  in  partnership  with  a  willing  and  able  body  of  men, 
in  time  created  and  maintained  a  divisional  system  that  promoted  and  fostered  a 
progressive  training  ethos.  The  inculcation  of  combined  arms  and  small  unit  tactics  and 
training,  whilst  developing  a  capacity  for  initiative  amongst  junior  officers  and  men,  pays 
testimony  to  that. 
308 Centralised  advice  and  support  structures  (such  as  higher  echelon  schools  of  instruction) 
were  vital  to  the  development  of  the  division.  The  (Highland)  Division  greatly  benefited 
from  this  dissemination  of  up-to-date  tactics  and  methods,  which  were  products  of  an 
increasing  bureaucratisation  within  the  BEF  and  an  improved  ability  to  rationalise  and 
interpret  lessons  learnt  through  combat  experience.  Crucially  (either  by  accident  or 
design  on  behalf  of  the  higher  command),  the  progressive  training  capacity  of  the  51" 
was  marked,  for  the  most  part,  by  a  productive  balance  between  active  service  (time  spent 
holding  the  line,  carrying  out  fatigues,  etc)  and  active  training  (individual,  unit,  and 
formation  training),  and  a  sustainable  casualty  rate. 
For  the  51St  Division,  the  period  of  training  under  the  command  of  Major-General  Harper 
was  its  most  productive  and  progressive.  Before  and  after  Harper,  the  division  failed  to 
establish  the  correct  internal  balance  and/or  the  military  system  did  not  provide  effective 
support. 
The  importance  of  maintaining  a  divisional  structure  constituted  by  units  from  the 
Highland  regions,  or  regions  associated  with  the  Highlands,  throughout  the  war  is  clear.  It 
is  also  clear  that  officers  and  men  would  ideally  be  recruited  from  the  established  pre-war 
Territorial  and  regimental  recruiting  areas.  The  inability  of  those  areas  consistently  to 
provide  sufficient  reinforcements  as  the  war  continued  led  to  a  proportional  dilution  of 
other  ranks  from  local  regimental  recruiting  areas.  However,  the  subsequent  focus  on  the 
provision  of  reinforcements  from  wider  Scotland  (and  not  wider  Britain)  was  significant. 
To  maintain  a  body  of  predominantly  Scottish  troops  for  the  rest  of  the  war  (which  was 
not  without  its  difficulties  in  the  post-conscription  era),  the  military  drafting  system  had 
to  provide  a  `priority  service'  to  the  51"  Division.  That  the  system  benefited  the 
(Highland)  Division  and  other  Scottish  formations  and  units  is  evident  from  the  research, 
but  it  is  interesting  to  contrast  these  findings  with  other  formations  (such  as  many  English 
divisions)  that  were  not  so  well  supplied. 
The  significance  of  the  balance  of  recruitment  and  reinforcement  to  the  51st  Division 
becomes  very  apparent  through  an  analysis  of  the  divisional  esprit  de  corps.  This  esprit 
309 was,  in  part,  a  result  of  a  consistently  strong  internal  identity,  which  was  a  construct  of 
formation  and  sub-formation  loyalties,  regimental  traditions,  and  a  stake  in  Scottish 
culture  and  society.  It  was  also  the  product  of  a  partnership  forged  between  officers  and 
men  that  was  sustained  by  strong  belief  reinforced  by  daily  ritual. 
The  esprit  had  always  been  manifest.  The  division  had  considered  itself  different  and 
distinct  from  the  outset,  but  the  success  at  Beaumont  Hamel  actively  solidified  and 
magnified  it,  creating  a  strain  of  martial  self-belief  that  was  to  be  constant  from  that  day 
on.  Interactions  with  other  formations  and  national  groups  were  never  quite  the  same  and 
that  was  reflected  by  a  widespread  recognition  amongst  allied  forces,  veneration  in 
Britain,  and  respect  from  its  enemies. 
Ultimately,  the  evolution  and  development  of  the  51St  (Highland)  Division  followed  a 
rather  fortuitous  course.  The  long  period  before  it  was  consistently  used  in  battle 
permitted  it  time  to  train,  bond,  and  prepare.  Its  introduction,  too  soon,  to  battle  at 
Givenchy  was  marked  by  a  failure  of  internal  balance  and  external  support,  whilst  its 
greatest  triumph  at  Beaumont  Hamel  was  the  result  of  good  preparation  and  `everything 
going  well  on  the  day'.  The  coup  de  grace  at  Beaumont  Hamel  catapulted  the  division  to 
fame  and  seemed  to  ensure  that  it  was  accorded  priority  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  It  is 
probably  true  to  state  that  the  division  fought  more  efficiently  during  1917  than  it  had  at 
Beaumont  Hamel,  with  a  good  balance  and  improved  systemic  support.  However,  the 
nature  of  the  balance  changed  as  the  division  suffered  heavier  casualties  and  was 
overemployed  in  battle,  but  this  was  offset  by  advances  in  training,  prompt 
reinforcements,  and  an  adequate  supply  of  equipment  and  ammunition.  By  the  battle  of 
Cambrai,  although  the  division  fought  well  enough,  there  were  signs  that  the  balance  was 
beginning  to  fail.  In  March  1918,  both  the  balance  and  the  system  were  failing.  To  meet 
the  German  onslaught,  the  (Highland)  Division  held  an  underprepared  sector,  had 
experienced  a  change  in  leadership,  had  undergone  divisional  reorganisation,  and  lacked 
reserves.  However,  the  greatest  single  factor  that  led  to  the  disintegration  of  the  division 
was  the  strength  of  the  enemy. 
310 If  the  internal  balance  and  external  support  provided  a  positive  mix  of  variables,  progress 
was  possible.  However,  the  51s`  had  suffered  reverses  since  it  had  mobilised  in  1914,  and 
the  setback  of  1918  merely  underlined  that  linear  progress  was  not  a  constant  for 
formations  throughout  the  First  World  War. 
311 Annexe  1  The  Constitution  of  the  51't  (Highland)  Division 
At  mobilisation  on  5  August  1914,  the  1St  (Highland)  Territorial  Division  was  composed 
of  the  1St,  2nd,  and  3`d  (Highland)  infantry  brigades.  The  ISt  (Highland)  Brigade  (Seaforth 
and  Cameron)  was  composed  of  1/4th,  1/5th,  1/6th  Seaforth  Highlanders,  and  1/4th 
Cameron  Highlanders,  whilst  the  2nd  (Highland)  Brigade  (Gordon)  was  composed  of 
1/4th,  1/5th,  1/6th,  and  1/7th  Gordon  Highlanders.  The  3rd  (Highland)  Brigade  was 
composed  of  1/6th,  1/7th,  1/8th,  and  1/9th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders.  ' 
Whilst  the  (Highland)  Division  was  stationed  in  Bedford,  six  infantry  battalions  left  to 
join  the  British  Expeditionary  Force  in  France.  The  1/4`"  Seaforth  Highlanders  and  1/6`h 
Gordon  Highlanders  left  in  November  1914,  and  the  1/7t'  Argyll  and  Sutherland 
Highlanders  left  in  December  1914.  The  1/4th  Gordon  Highlanders,  1/4th  Cameron 
Highlanders,  and  1/9th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  left  the  division  in  February 
1915.  ' 
To  replace  the  infantry  battalions  of  the  (Highland)  Division  that  had  been  sent  to  France, 
1/6d'  and  1/7d'  Black  Watch  joined  2nd  (Highland)  Brigade  on  17  April  1915.  Four 
Lancashire  battalions  also  joined  on  17  April  1915  and  formed  the  31d  (Highland) 
Brigade.  Those  battalions  were  1/40'  Loyal  North  Lancaster  Regiment,  1/4th  King's  Own 
Lancaster  Regiment,  1/80'  King's  Liverpool  Regiment,  and  2/5th  Lancashire  Fusiliers. 
The  1/6`h  and  1/86'  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders  were  transferred  to  the  I` 
(Highland)  Brigade  to  bring  that  formation  to  full  brigade  strength.  3 
Between  30  April  and  5  May  1915,  the  division  moved  to  France  and  on  12  May  was 
redesignated  51s`  (Highland)  Division  and  the  three  infantry  brigades  were  renumbered 
152nd,  153`d,  and  154th  Brigade.  From  19  May  to  9  July  1915,  the  2/5th  Lancashire 
Fusiliers  were  sent  to  St  Omer  for  further  training.  1/6th  Scottish  Rifles  were  attached  to 
'National  Library  of  Scotland,  ACC  7380  File  4,  The  Papers  of  Major  General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
2  NLS,  ACC  7380  File  4,  The  Papers  of  Major  General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
3  NLS,  ACC  7380  File  4,  The  Papers  of  Major  General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
4  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
312 1540'  Infantry  Brigade  on  2  June  1915.5  On  19  August  1915,1/8th  Royal  Scots  joined  the 
division  as  the  pioneer  battalion. 
On  6  January  1916,  the  four  Lancashire  battalions  that  formed  154th  Brigade  left  the 
(Highland)  Division,  and  in  February  1916  were  followed  by  1/6th  Scottish  Rifles  .6 
Also 
in  January  1916,1/4th  and  1/5th  Black  Watch,  1/4th  Seaforth  Highlanders,  and  1/4th 
Cameron  Highlanders  joined  the  division  to  form  154th  Brigade.  With  the  exception  of 
1/4th  Seaforth  Highlanders,  those  battalions  left  51St  Division  on  15  February  1916.7  The 
1/4th  Seaforth  Highlanders  were  joined  by  1/90h  Royal  Scots,  1/4t"  Gordon  Highlanders, 
and  1/7th  Argyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  on  1  March  1916,23  February  1916,  and  I 
March  respectively,  to  bring  154th  Brigade  to  full  strength.  8  On  12  June  1916,1/6th  Argyll 
and  Sutherland  Highlanders  left  152"d  Brigade  to  be  replaced  by  1/6th  Gordon 
Highlanders  who  had  joined  on  1  June  1916.9 
When  the  infantry  brigades  of  the  British  Army  were  reorganised  in  1918,115th  Gordon 
Highlanders,  1/8thArgyll  and  Sutherland  Highlanders,  and  1/9th  Royal  Scots  left  the 
division  on  2,4,  and  6  February  respectively.  10 
On  6  October  1918,1/7`h  Gordon  Highlanders  and  1/6d'  Gordon  were  amalgamated  to 
form  6/7th  Gordon  Highlanders  in  the  152nd  Brigade.  The  1/6th  Argyll  and  Sutherland 
Highlanders  replaced  1/7`"  Gordon  Highlanders  in  the  153`d  Brigade  on  6  October  1918.11 
Supporting  Units 
At  mobilisation,  the  (Highland)  Division's  attached  units  were  as  follows: 
The  Divisional  Royal  Artillery  was  made  up  of  three  field  artillery  brigades  (I,  II,  and  III 
Highland  RFA),  a  mountain  artillery  brigade  (IV  Highland  RGA),  and  a  heavy  battery 
(Highland  (Fifeshire)  RGA).  Each  artillery  brigade  had  an  ammunition  column.  There 
ä  Becke,  A.  F.  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A  (London  1936),  p.  105. 
6  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  105. 
7  NLS,  ACC  7380  File  4,  The  Papers  of  Major  General  D.  N.  Wimberley. 
8  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  105. 
9  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  105. 
10  NA,  WO  95  2846,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
11  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  105. 
313 were  two  Royal  Engineer  field  companies  (1st  and  2nd  Highland  RE),  a  divisional  signals 
company  (1st  Highland),  three  field  ambulances  of  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps  (1st, 
2nd  and  3`d  Highland),  and  four  companies  of  the  Divisional  Transport  and  Supply 
Column  (1st  Highland).  12 
On  19  August  1914,  the  General  Staff  war  diary  of  the  51St  Division  stated,  `instructions 
were  received  to  reorganise  the  Supply  and  Transport  Services  of  the  Division  on  the 
same  basis  as  those  of  the  Expeditionary  Force,  the  T  and  S  Column,  plus  a  proportion  of 
the  2"d  Line  Transport  of  units,  to  be  formed  into  a  Divisional  Train  and  the  enlistment  of 
the  personnel  for  a  Divisional  Supply  Column  of  Mechanical  Transport  being  at  once 
proceeded  with'.  13 
Whilst  in  Bedford,  the  IV  Highland  Mountain  Artillery  Brigade,  the  2nd  Highland  Field 
Company  RE,  and  1St  Highland  Field  Ambulance14  left  the  division  to  join  other 
formations  in  the  field.  To  replace  the  RE  Company  and  the  RAMC  field  ambulance, 
second  line  units  were  sent  to  join  the  division  from  Scotland  (2nd/2nd  Highland  and  2nd/1st 
Highland  respectively).  A  divisional  cyclist  company,  a  divisional  ammunition  column 
(as  well  as  the  artillery  brigade  ammunition  columns),  and  a  mobile  veterinary  section 
were  formed.  A  squadron  of  the  Northern  Irish  Horse  also  joined  the  division. 
After  arrival  in  France,  when  the  (Highland)  Division  was  redesignated,  divisional  troops, 
such  as  the  ammunition  column  and  cyclist  company,  were  also  renumbered  5  1St. 
By  10  May,  the  Northern  Irish  Horse  and  the  divisional  cyclist  company  had  left  the 
(Highland)  Division.  An  additional  field  artillery  brigade  (ls`  Lowland  RFA)  and  field 
ambulance  (2nd  Highland)  joined  51s`  Division  on  10  November  1915  and  31  January 
1916  respectively.  15 
12  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  106. 
13  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
14  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
15  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  106. 
314 Between  the  15  and  16  January  1916,  each  infantry  brigade  received  a  machine  gun 
company  that  was  numbered  after  the  parent  brigade16  and  on  13  July  1917  a  further 
machine  gun  company  joined  as  divisional  troops  (232"d  Machine  Gun  Company).  On  19 
February  1918,  the  infantry  brigade  machine  gun  companies  and  the  232"d  Machine  Gun 
Company  formed  a  composite  unit  within  the  division  that  was  designated  No.  51 
Battalion  Machine  Gun  Corps. 
Infantry  brigades  each  received  a  trench  mortar  battery  numbered  152/1,153/1,  and  154/1 
by  16  March  1916.17  A  second  battery  was  attached  to  each  brigade  numbering  152/2, 
153/2,  and  154/2  by  May  1916.  Within  the  infantry  brigades,  the  batteries  were 
amalgamated  to  form  152"d,  153d,  and  1540'  Trench  Mortar  batteries  by  July  1916.  Three 
medium  trench  mortar  batteries  joined  as  divisional  troops  between  March  and  April 
1916,  and  were  designated  X,  Y,  and  Z  Medium  Trench  Mortar  batteries  (515`  Division). 
A  divisional  heavy  trench  mortar  battery  joined  the  515`  on  18  October  1916  and  was 
designated  V  Heavy  Trench  Mortar  Battery  (51st  Division).  In  February  1918,  the 
medium  batteries  were  reorganised  and  the  division  had  X  and  Y  Medium  Trench  Mortar 
batteries  thereafter.  The  heavy  trench  mortar  unit  left  the  division  during  February 
1918.18 
The  field  companies  of  the  Royal  Engineers  were  renumbered  400th  (formerly  1st 
Highland),  4015`  (formerly  2nd  Highland),  and  404th  (formerly  2nd/2nd  Highland),  and  a 
divisional  employment  company  joined  the  51St  on  16  June  1917  and  was  numbered  245th 
Divisional  Employment  Company  on  4  April  1917. 
The  four  field  artillery  brigades  were  renumbered  during  May  1916  and  I,  II,  and  III 
Highland  brigades  becoming  255t1i,  256`h,  and  258th.  I  Lowland  Brigade  RFA  was 
renumbered  260th  by  15  May  1916.19  Brigade  ammunition  columns  were  also  reorganised 
16  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"'  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
17  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"'  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
18  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  106. 
19  NA,  WO  95  2850,5  1"  Division  CRA  War  Diary. 
315 and  merged  into  the  divisional  ammunition  column  during  this  month.  20  In  August  191621 
and  January  1917,258th  and  2600'  were  broken  up.  22 
During  the  period  of  emergency  on  the  Western  Front  in  late  1914  and  early  1915,  the 
East  Lancashire  (42"d),  the  Wessex  (43rd),  and  the  Home  Counties  (44th)  first-line 
Territorial  divisions  were  sent  to  replace  Regular  divisions  returning  from  imperial 
garrison  duty.  These  divisions  were  essentially  composed  of  the  pre-war  battalions  and 
supporting  units.  The  North  Midland  (46`h),  the  2nd  London  (47`h),  the  South  Midland 
(48`h),  the  West  Riding  (49`h),  and  the  Northumbrian  (50`h)  divisions  were  sent  to  the 
Western  Front  before  the  (Highland)  Division  and  were  also  mainly  composed  of  their 
pre-war  territorial  units.  3 
The  (Highland)  Division  was  the  first  Territorial  division  to  be  sent  to  France  that  had 
been  seriously  affected  by  the  loss  of  a  number  of  its  pre-war  infantry  battalions  and 
support  troops.  However,  other  first-line  Tc  erritorial  divisions  (serving  in  all  theatres) 
experienced  similar  upheaval.  The  Lowland  Division  (52"d)  lost  three  infantry  battalions 
and  support  troops,  the  Welsh  Division  (53`d)  lost  six  infantry  battalions  and  support 
troops,  the  East  Anglian  Division  (54t)  lost  three  infantry  battalions,  the  West  Lancashire 
Division  (55th)  lost  all  twelve  infantry  battalions  (three  to  the  (Highland)  Division)  and  its 
support  troops  were  attached  to  other  divisions,  and  the  I"  (London)  Division  (56th)  also 
lost  all  twelve  of  its  infantry  battalions  and  its  support  troops  were  attached  to  other 
divisions.  4 
Most  of  these  attachments  were  of  a  temporary  nature  and  many  infantry  battalions  and 
supporting  troops  returned  to  the  parent  formation  at  a  later  date.  All  the  infantry 
battalions  and  the  RE  company  that  left  the  (Highland)  Division  in  Bedford  were  returned 
at  various  stages  of  the  war.  However,  with  the  other  first-line  territorial  divisions  this 
20  NA,  WO  95  2854,51"  Division  DAC  War  Diary. 
21  NA,  WO  95  2850,51"  Division  CRA  War  Diary. 
22  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  p.  106. 
23  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  pp.  36-100. 
24  Becke,  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions.  Part  2A,  pp.  109-147. 
316 was  not  always  the  case.  Of  the  infantry  battalions  of  the  52nd  (Lowland)  and  53rd 
(Welsh)  divisions,  none  were  returned  to  the  parent  formations. 
With  two  major  exceptions,  the  infantry  composition  in  the  (Highland)  Division  remained 
`largely'  unchanged  throughout  the  war.  The  first  of  these  exceptions  was  a  divisional 
reorganisation  in  January  1915  when  the  battalion  structure  in  the  Territorial  Force  was 
altered  from  eight  companies  to  four  companies  in  line  with  the  Regular  Army.  Each  of 
these  companies  had  four  platoons,  which  in  turn  were  composed  of  four  sections  25  The 
second  exception  occurred  in  early  1918,  when,  due  to  a  shortage  of  troops,  each  infantry 
brigade  was  reduced  from  four  to  three  battalions. 
However,  there  were  a  number  of  changes  to  the  composition  of  the  supporting  services 
during  the  course  of  the  war.  As  with  the  alterations  in  the  infantry  units,  these  structural 
changes  were  generic  and  over  a  set  period  affected  all  the  infantry  divisions  of  the 
British  Army  in  France  and  Belgium. 
25  NA,  WO  95  2844,51"  Division  G  War  Diary. 
317 Annexe  2  Divisional  Artillery  Development 
By  the  end  of  1914,  there  were  already  no  fewer  than  five  different  field  artillery 
establishments  with  the  Regular  divisions  in  France,  and  still  another  field  artillery 
establishment  was  added  in  1915  with  the  arrival  of  the  Territorial  Force  divisions. 
On  arrival  in  France,  the  artillery  of  the  51st  was  one  field  brigade  below  the  official  war 
establishment  of  Territorial  Force  divisions,  with  two  field  brigades  of  15  pounder  guns 
at  twelve  guns  to  a  brigade;  one  howitzer  field  brigade  which  had  eight  5  inch  guns;  one 
heavy  battery  of  four  4.7  inch  guns,  and  brigade  and  divisional  ammunition  columns.  ' 
The  low  establishment  of  the  Territorial  divisional  artilleries  often  entailed  the  provision 
of  additional  artillery  from  the  Regular  divisions,  so  as  to  assist  a  Territorial  division  in 
carrying  out  its  appointed  tasks.  In  1916,  partly  by  reducing  the  artillery  of  regular 
divisions  in  France  to  64  guns  and  howitzers,  similarity  of  field  artillery  establishment 
was  at  last  secured  for  all  divisions.  By  then,  the  heavy  battery  had  been  withdrawn  to 
corps,  and  the  15  pounder  and  5  inch  howitzers  had  been  replaced  by  18  pounders  and  4.5 
inch  howitzers,  a  process  noted  in  the  DADOS  war  diary  on  27  August  1915:  `Received 
notification  that  24  Guns,  Carriages,  and  Limbers  Q7  18  pr  and  72  Wagons  Ammunition 
and  Limbers  Q7  l8pr  will  arrive  at  supply  railhead  during  night  of  27th-28th  inst.  These 
are  for  rearming  the  Division.  '2 
By  January  1916  the  howitzer  brigade  had  eight  4.5  inch  howitzers.  By  May  1916,  the 
(Highland)  Division  artillery  was  brought  up  to  full  strength  with  four  field  brigades 
(with  the  arrival  of  the  1s`  Lowland  in  November  1915)  totalling  forty-eight  18  pounders, 
and  twelve  4.5  inch  howitzers. 
From  June  1915,  the  changes  in  artillery  establishment  are  evident  from  the  following 
reports  from  the  divisional  A  and  Q  branch: 
1  Becke,  A.  Order  of  Battle  of  Divisions  Part  2A  (London  1936)  pp.  150-15  1. 
2  National  Archive,  WO  95  2853,51"  Division  DADOS  War  Diary. 
318 June  1915:  23x  15  pounders  and  7x  5  inch  howitzers 
July  1915:  20x  15  pounders  and  7x  5  inch  howitzers 
August  1915:  24x  15  pounders,  7x  5  inch  howitzers,  16x  18  pounders,  4x  4.5 
inch  howitzers 
October  1915:  24x  18  pounders,  8x  5  inch  howitzers,  4x  4.5  inch  howitzers,  4x 
4.5  inch  howitzers 
January  1916:  36x  18  pounders,  8x  4.5  inch  howitzers 
February  1916:  36x  18  pounders,  12x  4.5  inch  howitzers 
March  1916:  36x  18  pounders,  12x  4.5  inch  howitzers 
May  1916:  48x  18  pounders,  12x  4.5  inch  howitzers.  3 
In  a  memo  to  the  headquarters  of  the  divisional  artillery  dated  15  May  1916,  Lt.  Colonel 
A.  J.  G.  Moir  (AA  and  QMG)  stated,  `The  reorganisation  of  the  Divisional  Artillery  has 
been  carried  out.  It  consists  now  of  four  artillery  brigade  and  a  Divisional  Ammunition 
Column.  The  Howitzer  Brigade  and  the  Brigade  Ammunition  Columns  have  been 
abolished.  Three  of  the  Artillery  Brigades  consist  each  of  three  18  pounder  Batteries  and 
one  4.5"  Howitzer  Battery.  The  fourth  artillery  Brigade  consists  of  three  18  pounder 
batteries.  '4 
However,  the  divisional  artillery  was  again  reorganised  in  1917.  On  14  January  1917,  a 
memo  from  the  headquarters  of  divisional  artillery  stated,  `1.  The  Field  Artillery  will  in 
future  be  divided  into  two  categories:  -  a)  The  Divisional  Artillery  which  will  form  an 
integral  part  of  the  Division.  b)  The  Army  Field  Artillery  Brigades  which  will  be 
available  for  allotment  to  Armies,  by  Armies  to  Corps  and  by  Corps  to  Divisions  as  the 
situation  demands.  '  The  memo  continues:  `The  Divisional  Artillery  will  consist  of  36  18- 
pounder  guns  and  12  4.5"  Howitzers  and  will  be  organised  as  follows:  -  Two  Brigades  of- 
5  36  gun  18-pdr.  Batteries  [and]  16  gun  4.5"  How.  Battery  each'. 
3  NA,  WO  95  2848,51"'  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
4  NA,  WO  95  2850,51"  Division  A  and  Q  War  Diary. 
5NA,  WO  95  2850,51"  Division  CRA  War  Diary. 
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